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Abstract 
This thesis lies at the junction of migration control and refugee 
protection. As asylum is a migration-related matter, it can be difficult 
for States to dissociate it from the fight against irregular immigration. 
Asylum, as a measure for protecting refugees and other persons in 
need of international protection, may thus easily come into conflict 
with policies and practices derived from strict border control 
considerations. This thesis concentrates upon this tension and aims, 
primarily, to investigate - with a specific focus on the European Union 
(EU) geographical context - whether the implementation of bilateral 
agreements linked to the readmission of irregular migrants can 
hamper refugees’ access to protection, understood here as the 
combination of the right to non-refoulement and an individual’s right 
to have access to asylum procedures and effective remedies before 
return. The material content and the normative scope of these 
protection standards is thus analysed through the lens of international 
refugee and human rights law and in respect of the traditional rules of 
treaty interpretation.  
The central objective of this thesis is to develop the concept of 
agreements linked to readmission by broadening – to my knowledge, 
for the first time - the scope of legal analysis to the multifaceted 
framework of bilateral cooperation arrangements connected to the 
readmission of irregular migrants from the EU to third countries of 
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origin or transit. This encompasses written accords employed to 
facilitate the forced return of undocumented migrants from the 
territory of an EU Member State (standard readmission agreements 
and diplomatic assurances on the fair and humane treatment of the 
deportee, especially if formalized within MoUs), and those 
agreements for technical and police cooperation that are de facto 
utilized by  EU Member States to divert migrants back to the ports of 
departure before they arrive to the destination country.  
In order to fully understand the real impact of bilateral agreements 
linked to readmission on refugee rights, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that the study of legal texts alone will not suffice in 
gaining a sufficiently comprehensive approach. Rather, equal 
attention has also to be accorded to the implementation of the law, 
and, as a result, a number of case studies have been incorporated as an 
integral element of the methodological framework. This thesis 
concludes that the text of agreements linked to readmission does not 
seem to raise per se issues of incompatibility with core refugee rights. 
However, in situations of informal border controls, massive arrivals, 
public emergency, and pre-arrival maritime interceptions, the 
enforcement of these bilateral agreements can de facto hamper 
refugees’ access to protection. Therefore, this thesis will make a 
number of recommendations as a platform for further discussion 
among legal scholars and policy-makers. 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 
1.1. Encountering the refugee and the State 
This thesis lies at the junction of migration control and refugee 
protection. As asylum is a migration-related matter, it can be difficult 
for States to dissociate it from the fight against irregular immigration. 
Asylum, as a measure for protecting refugees and other persons in 
need of international protection, may thus easily come into conflict 
with policies and practices derived from strict border control 
considerations.
1
 This thesis concentrates upon this tension and aims, 
primarily, to investigate – with a specific focus on the European 
Union (EU) geographical context - whether the implementation of 
bilateral agreements linked to the readmission of irregular migrants 
can hamper refugees’ access to protection, understood here as the 
combination of the right to non-refoulement and an individual’s right 
to access asylum procedures and effective remedies before return. 
                                                 
1
See, e.g., Jens Vedsted-Hansen, ‘Europe’s Response to the Arrival of Asylum 
Seekers: Refugee Protection and Immigration Control’ (UNHCR Working Paper n 
6, 1999); Jens Vedsted-Hansen and Gregor Noll, ‘Non-communitarians: Refugee 
and Asylum Policies’ in Philp Alston (ed), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press 1999) 359-410; Jerzy Sztucki, ‘Who is a Refugee?’ in F Nicholson 
and P Twomey (eds), Refugee Rights and Realities (Cambridge University Press 
1999) 69. Areti Sianni, ‘Interception Practices in Europe and their Implications’ 
Refuge (2003) 25-34; Agnese Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to 
Protect Refugees, (Oxford University Press 2009) c 1; Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, 
Access to Asylum (Cambridge University Press 2011) c 2. 
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Fleeing persecution and gross human rights violations in their 
home country, refugees stand as the most vulnerable category of 
people crossing an international border during the phases of both 
entry into and removal from the destination country. They frequently 
travel alongside economic migrants and are often unable to obtain 
identity and travel documents. As such, they are at a particularly high 
risk of being assimilated with common undocumented migrants 
violating formal immigration control requirements.  
In 1951, Hannah Arendt, referring to the experience of Jews in 
Nazi Germany, defined refugees as ‘the most symptomatic group in 
contemporary politics.’2 She argued that refugees are not only forced 
to abandon their homeland because of national or ethnic persecution 
but they also lose any reasonable prospects of obtaining a new 
citizenship elsewhere,
3
 thus being deprived of any possibility of 
having a community able and willing to guarantee their rights.
4
 As a 
result, ‘[t]he desperate confusion of these Ulysses-wanderers who, 
unlike their great prototype, do not know who they are’, inexorably 
follows.
5
 
                                                 
2
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Andre Deutsch 1973, first 
published 1951) 277. 
3
 ibid 293-4. 
4
 ibid 297. 
5
 Hannah Arendt, ‘We Refugees’ (1943) Menorah Journal 69, 76. 
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As uninvited aliens, refugees are in principio ‘outside the field of 
loyalty.’6 Perceived as a menace to the peace and internal security of 
the host State, they have no community protecting them, no linkage 
with the home country; and as such, they are treated as outsiders 
whose claims must first be carefully assessed in order to decide 
whether they are legitimate. States’ endeavours to impose even more 
robust barriers to those who seek to enter their national territory 
continue to accentuate, and therefore lead to a ‘tension between 
generosity towards those at home and wariness of those from 
abroad.’7 
Between 1950 and 1970, European States began to assume 
increased responsibilities with respect to the huge number of post-war 
refugees. What is more, since the early 1990s, a sharp increase in 
asylum applications has been recorded across Western countries, in 
particular Western Europe.
8
 Shifting our attention to the present-day 
situation, in 2011, an estimated 4.3 million people were displaced due 
                                                 
6
 Elspeth Guild, ‘International Terrorism and EU Immigration, Asylum, and Borders 
Policy: the Unexpected Victims of 11 September 2011’, in Carr, Fergus and 
Massey, Andrew (eds), Public Policy And the New European Agendas (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2006) 234. 
7
 Maryellen Fullerton, ‘The International and National Protection of Refugees’, in 
Hurst Hannum (ed.) Guide to International Human Rights Practice (Inc. 4th ed., 
Transnational Publishers 2004) 246. 
8
 Between the early 1970s and the late 1990s, the annual number of asylum 
applications in the countries of the European Union has grown from 15,000 to more 
than 300,000. See, Hatton Timothy J, ‘Seeking Asylum in Europe’ (April 2004) 19 
Economic Policy 7.  
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to conflict or persecution.
9
 Additionally, in 2012 alone, there was an 
8% increase in the number of asylum applications submitted in the 44 
industrialized countries.
10
 Therefore, the question of ‘who is 
responsible for refugees’ springs up yet again for debate, this time all 
the more pressing. 
While EU Member States have attempted to elaborate harmonized 
solutions to face this challenge, such as the progressive creation of the 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS),
11
 they have, however, 
also employed a new approach of reinforcing their territorial and 
                                                 
9
 Whilst, in 2011, more than 800,000 people were newly displaced as refugees 
across international borders, another 3.5 million were internally displaced. If added 
to previous figures, the number of forcibly displaced people worldwide exceeded 42 
million. See, UNHCR, A Year of Crises: Global Trends 2011 (2012) 2-3 
<http://www.unhcr.org/4fd6f87f9.html> accessed 28 March 2013. The Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established on 14 
December 1950 by the United Nations General Assembly. Its mandate includes the 
leading and coordination of  State action to protect refugees as well as safeguard 
their rights and well-being worldwide. More detailed information on the activity of 
the UNHCR can be found at its official website 
<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html>.  
10
 While an estimated 479,300 asylum applications were registered in the 44 
industrialized countries in 2012, the 27 EU Member States registered 296,700 new 
asylum claims in 2012. See, UNHCR, Asylum and Trends in 2012: Levels and 
Trends in Industrialized Countries, 21 March 2013 
<http://www.unhcr.org/5149b81e9.html> accessed 28 March 2013.  
11
 The aim of the CEAS is to establish common asylum procedures and equivalent 
conditions for persons in need of international protection valid throughout the EU. 
The four most important legislative measures adopted between 1999 and 2005 were: 
The Council Directive 2003/9/EC, [2003] on minimum standards for the reception 
of asylum seekers; the Council Directive 2004/83/EC, [2004] on minimum 
standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals as refugees or as 
persons who otherwise need international protection (Qualification Directive); the 
Council Directive 2005/85/EC [2005] on minimum standards on procedures in 
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status (Procedures Directive); 
Council Regulation 343/2003, 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum 
application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national. 
For an overview of the historical development of asylum law, see, Rosemary Byrne, 
Gregor Noll and Jens Vedsted-Hansen, ‘Understanding Refugee Law in an Enlarged 
European Union’ (2004) 15 EJIL 355, 358-367. 
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maritime border controls, criminalizing of migrants,
12
 and 
accelerating the procedures for returning unauthorized migrants to the 
countries they originated from or transited through. Such a proactive 
management of irregular migratory flows - especially by both seeking 
readmission of unwanted foreigners and intercepting them on the high 
seas, faraway from territorial borders
13
 - has been both criticized and 
disparaged at national, regional, and international levels, alerting, 
inter alia, legal scholars and human rights organizations. 
In view of fighting irregular migration - both by preventing the 
arrival of unauthorized flows of migrants and returning those 
individuals who do not have the status to stay in the territory of the 
host country – the cooperation with third countries outside the EU is 
vital. Within such a ‘globalization of migration control’,14 the 
opportunity to conduct research on the international human rights and 
refugee law obligations binding States in territorial and extraterritorial 
                                                 
12
 Bigo Didier, ‘Criminalization of “Migrants”: The Side Effect of the Will to 
Control the Frontiers and the Sovereign Illusion’, in Barbara Bogusz, Ryszard 
Cholewinski, Adam Cygan and Erika Szyszczak (eds), Irregular Migration and 
Human Rights: Theoretical, European, and International Perspectives (Martinus 
Nijoff Publishers 2004) 61. 
13
 Following the collapse of the regimes in Tunisia and Libya, the frequency of boat 
arrivals increased in early 2011. Frontex Risk Analysis Report 2012 records nearly 
141,000 detected irregular entries to the EU (approximately 55,000 via the Eastern 
Mediterranean route, approximately 64,000 via the Central Mediterranean route, and 
approximately 8,500 via the Western Mediterranean route. See, 
<www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Attachment_Featured/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2012.
pdf> accessed 28 March 2013. Since 1988, at least 18,567 people have died along 
the European borders while attempting to cross the Mediterranean. See, Fortress 
Europe, <http://fortresseurope.blogspot.co.uk/2006/02/immigrants-dead-at-
frontiers-of-europe_16.html> accessed 28 March 2013. 
14
See, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law 
and the Globalization of Migration Control (Cambridge University Press 2011). 
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operative contexts becomes even more imperative. As Louis Henkin 
explains, ‘how [a State] behaves even in its own territory, [is] no 
longer […] its own business: it has become a matter of international 
concern, of international politics, and of international law.’15 
Likewise, readmission - whether performed before or after arrival 
at the border of the host, or would-be host country – lies at the 
intersection of distinct disciplines, such as international law and 
international relations. In this respect, it has been argued that  
 
The readmission system is not only built on obligations which would be defined 
in international customary law. Nor is it only a system based on incentives, costs, 
and benefits. It is also a system contingent on predominant schemes of 
understanding, paradigms and a hegemonic lexicon shaping policy perceptions and 
hierarchies of priorities.
16
 
 
This work, however, does not delve into international relations 
theory. Rather, it aims to provide a legal analysis of the implications 
of readmission schemes for the rights and safety of those seeking 
protection in Europe. Examining State practices of migration control 
against the backdrop of refugee rights assumes increasing relevance 
                                                 
15
 Luis Henkin Lecture: The Robert L Levine Distinguished Lecture Series, ‘That 
“S” Word: Sovereignty and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera’ (1999) 68  
Fordham Law Review 1, 4.  
16
Jean-Pierre Cassarino, ‘Inventory of the Agreements Linked to Readmission’, 
available at:   <http://rsc.eui.eu/RDP/research/analyses/ra/> accessed 28 March 
2013. 
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after 11 September 2001, when the new ‘war on terror’ increased the 
tendency of perceiving refugees as a threat to international peace and 
security.
17
 By investigating the broad subject of bilateral agreements 
linked to readmission through the lens of international refugee and 
human rights law,
18
 this thesis focuses on the principle of non-
refoulement, and the right to access asylum procedures and effective 
remedies before return. In this interplay between human rights and 
State prerogatives, the refugee ends up occupying 
 
A legal space characterized, on the one hand, by the principle of State 
sovereignty and the related principles of territorial supremacy and self-preservation; 
                                                 
17
For example, in late September 2001, the UN Security Council, acting under its 
binding Chapter VII powers, adopted Resolution 1373, which requires all States to 
take financial, penal, and other regulatory measures against individuals and 
organizations involved in terrorist activities. In particular, paragraph 3(f) calls on 
States to ‘take appropriate measures […]before granting refugee status, for the 
purpose of ensuring that the asylum seeker has not planned, facilitated or 
participated in the commission of terrorist acts.’Moreover, pursuant to paragraph 
3(g), the Security Council requires States to ‘ensure […] that refugee status is not 
abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims 
of political motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the 
extradition of the alleged terrorists.’ See, UN SC Resolution 1373, 28 September 
2001, UN doc S/RES/1373 (2001). Addressing the issue of the relationship between 
terrorism and refugee law would be beyond the scope of this thesis. For literature in 
the field refer, inter alia, to: Joan Fitzpatrick, ‘Speaking Law to Power: The War 
Against Terrorism and Human Rights’ (2003) 14(2) EJIL 241; Guild 2006a; René 
Bruin and Kees Wouters, ‘Terrorism and the Non-derogability of Non-refoulement’ 
(2003)15(1) IJRL 5; William Schabas, Non-refoulement, Human Rights and 
International Cooperation in Counter-terrorism (Liechtenstein 2006). 
18As far as I am aware, the expression ‘agreements linked to readmission’ was first 
coined by Cassarino in Jean-Pierre Cassarino, ‘Informalizing Readmission 
Agreements in the EU Neighbourhood’ (2007)42(2) The International Spectator 
179. 
 26 
 
and, on the other hand, by competing humanitarian principles deriving from general 
international law […] and from treaty.
19
 
 
Thus, the debate on agreements linked to readmission and refugee 
rights reflects a political debate involving national identity and 
security concerns, which is further confirmed by the European trend 
of seeking to deflect responsibility for migrants and refugees as far as 
possible from European borders. This would unduly emphasize, 
however, uncertain and flexible national security interests to the 
detriment of the protection of migrants and the fundamental rights of 
refugees.
20
 
In navigating this landscape, this introduction explains the 
structure, objective, scope, and contribution of the research, as well as 
its methodology and related terminology. This section also describes 
the main sources used in the drafting of the thesis, pinpoints the aim 
and the content of agreements linked to readmission, and illustrates 
the real world implications of this study. It reflects the overall relevant 
law and practice, to the best of my knowledge, as it stood on 8 
January 2013. However, this does not preclude occasional reference to 
                                                 
19
 Guy S Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd 
ed, Oxford University Press 2007)91. See also, Ingo Venzke, How Interpretation 
Makes International Law: on Semantic Changes and Normative Twists (Oxford 
University Press 2012) 1. 
20
Part II of this work will be dedicated to study the impact of bilateral migration 
policies - aimed to facilitate the return and the readmission of 
unwanted/unauthorized third country nationals - on the rights of people seeking 
protection in Europe. 
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later case law. It is also important to note that on 12 June 2013, the 
European Parliament voted for the final adoption of the recast of the 
EU directives and regulations on asylum.
21
 Due to the fact that States 
will need to transpose the new provisions into their respective national 
legal frameworks within two years, this thesis will continue referring 
to both the original text of the asylum directives as well as the revised 
versions. 
 
1.2. Object of research and structure 
This study primarily aims to investigate whether the 
implementation of bilateral agreements linked to readmission can 
hamper refugees’ access to protection, meant as the combination of 
the right to non-refoulement and the right to access asylum procedures 
and effective remedies before return. 
                                                 
21
The EU legislative instruments on asylum that have undergone a recast process are 
the following ones: i) Recast Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 
2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless 
persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees 
or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection 
granted (Recast), OJ L 337/9, 20 December 2011 (Recast Qualification Directive); 
ii) Directive 8260/2/13 of 7 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and 
withdrawing international protection status (Recast) (Recast Procedures Directive); 
iii) Directive 14654/2/12 of 7 June 2013 on minimum standards for the reception of 
asylum seekers (Recast) (Recast Reception Directive); iv) Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council 15605/3/12 of 7 June 2013 establishing the 
criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country national or a stateless person (Recast Dublin Regulation). 
The Recast Procedures Directive, the Recast Reception Directive, and the Recast 
Dublin Regulation have been adopted by European Parliament legislative resolution 
of 12 June 2013.  
For an extensive analysis of the recasting process, see, Francesca Ippolito and 
SamanthaVelluti, ‘The Recast Process of the EU Asylum System: A Balancing Act 
between Efficiency and Fairness’ (2011) 30(3) RSQ24. 
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Methodologically, this main research question boils down to the 
three following sub-questions: 
i)   What is the content and scope of the right to non-
refoulement, as well as the right to access asylum procedures and 
effective remedies before return? 
ii)    What is the relationship between agreements linked to 
the readmission of unauthorized migrants and the decision to return 
refugees to countries of origin or transit?  
iii)   To what extent is the text of bilateral agreements linked 
to readmission compatible with core refugee protection standards, as 
enshrined in the main international refugee and human rights law 
treaties? 
For purposes of expository clarity, this work is divided into two 
main Parts. Part I explores the content and scope of the relevant 
international refugee and human rights protection standards, which are 
binding on the EU Member States when dealing with questions 
relating to the admission or readmission of refugees. Therefore, the 
legal content of the principle of non-refoulement, as well as an 
individual’s right to have access to asylum procedures and effective 
remedies before return will be examined in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 by 
means of a thorough analysis of the text of the main international 
refugee and human rights treaties, in primis the 1951 Convention 
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relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva Convention),
22
 the UN 
Convention against Torture (CAT),
23
 the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 1950 European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).
24
 
These Chapters will also provide the most comprehensive review 
possible of the jurisprudence of the relevant international human 
rights bodies. Part I is thus principally designed to provide a backdrop 
of the relevant legal norms – as interpreted by national and (mainly) 
international human rights courts and committees - against which the 
compatibility of bilateral agreements linked to readmission with 
refugee rights will be assessed in Part II.  
 Part II is, indeed, the core of this thesis. It intends to separately 
peruse in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 the main categories of agreements 
linked to readmission that have been identified as instruments of 
bilateral cooperation between EU Member States and third countries 
outside the EU. The expression ‘agreements linked to readmission’ is 
herein used as an overarching term encompassing the various patterns 
of bilateral cooperation designed to facilitate the return and the 
readmission of unauthorized foreigners. This expression therefore 
includes: i) standard readmission agreements;
25
 ii) diplomatic 
                                                 
22
 Geneva Convention, 28 July 1951, in force 22 April 1954, 189 UNTS 150.  
23
 CAT, New York, 10 December 1984, in force 26 June 1987, 1465 UNTS 85. 
24
 ICCPR, New York, 16 December 1966, in force 23 March 1976, 993 UNTS 171. 
25
See, e.g., the Agreement between Italy and Albania for the Readmission of People 
at the Frontier, Tirana, 18 November 1997; Agreement between the UK and Albania 
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assurances on the fair and human treatment of the deportees, with a 
focus on assurances contained within Memoranda of Understanding 
(MOUs);
26
 and iii) agreements providing for technical and police 
cooperation used to patrol maritime borders and intercept 
undocumented migrants at sea.
27
 
A detailed reading of the text of these agreements along with the 
scrutiny of the return practices rising from their implementation will 
demonstrate how their underlying object and purpose, even where not 
openly stated, is to facilitate the return and readmission of 
unauthorized/unwanted foreigners. As we will better see in the 
following Chapters, the element of ‘effective control’ over migrants 
                                                                                                                                                   
on the Readmission of Persons, Tirana, 14 October 2003. These agreements are 
taken as units of analysis in Chapter 5.  
26
See, e.g.,Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Provision of Assurances 
in Respect of Persons Subject to Deportation, Ethiopia – UK,  12 December 2008 
(Ethiopia-UK MOU); Memorandum of Understanding regulating the provision of 
undertakings in respect of specified persons prior to deportation, Jordan – UK, 10 
August 2005 (Jordan-UK MOU);  Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the 
Provision of Assurances in Respect of Persons Subject to Deportation, Libya – UK, 
18 October 2005 (Libya-UK MOU); Memorandum of Understanding Concerning 
the Provision of Assurances in Respect of Persons Subject to Deportation, Lebanon 
– UK, 23 December 2005 (Lebanon-UK MOU). An extensive account of these 
MoUs is offered in Chapter 6. 
27
The agreements for technical and police cooperation signed by Italy with Libya to 
patrol Libyan territorial waters and international waters are the following: 
Protocollo tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Gran Giamahiria Araba Libica Popolare 
Socialista (Tripoli, 29 December 2007) (Protocol); Protocollo Aggiuntivo Tecnico-
Operativo al Protocollo di Cooperazione tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Gran 
Giamahiria Araba Libica Popolare Socialista, per fronteggiare il fenomeno 
dell’immigrazione Clandestina(Tripoli, 29December 2007) (Additional Protocol); 
Protocollo Aggiuntivo Tecnico-Operativo concernente l’aggiunta di un articolo al 
Protocollo firmato a Tripoli il 29/12/2007 tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Gran 
Giamahiria Araba Libica Popolare Socialista, per fronteggiare il fenomeno 
dell’immigrazione clandestina (Tripoli, 4 February 2009) (Executive Protocol). See, 
Chapter 7 for a more thorough discussion of their content. 
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and refugees suffices to trigger responsibility for a human rights 
violation, regardless of whether there is a legal basis for the action of 
the State. However, such a study intends to highlight the relationship 
between agreements linked to readmission and the return order, thus 
revealing to what extent the latter is influenced by the former, and 
which role a certain agreement may play in the actual decision of a 
State to jeopardize refugees’ access to protection through formal or 
informal practices of containing migration and securing its borders. 
In this context, the hypothesis of this thesis is that the actual 
enforcement of agreements linked to readmission might end up having 
a pernicious impact on those who seek protection in Europe, thus 
affecting core refugee rights. Therefore, by highlighting a specific 
case study for each category of agreements as unit of analysis, this 
thesis must take into account certain crucial elements, such as State 
practice, case law, and the technical and legal content of the bilateral 
agreements at hand. 
 
1.3. Instances of readmission and refugee protection 
This Section provides information on three incidents occurring 
within and beyond the territorial borders of EU Member States. In so 
doing, it illustrates how closely related the practices reflected in the 
typologies of accords falling under the shorthand term ‘agreements 
linked to readmission’ are.  
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i) Between February and April 2011, masses of undocumented 
migrants and refugees, following the upheavals in North Africa, begin 
landing in Italy in disarray after crossing the Mediterranean by boat. 
As denounced by several NGOs, a significant number of these 
individuals, especially Tunisians and Egyptians, are denied access to 
Eurodac and to the informative mechanisms offered by UNHCR. 
They are confined for long periods of time in either overcrowded 
detention centres or on board ships,
28
 subjected to summary 
identification procedures by their consular officials, or rapidly 
expelled to their countries of origin, all in the name of the efficiency 
required by the implementation of the readmission agreements 
between Italy and the two North-African countries.
29
 As a result, such 
                                                 
28
 See, Associazione per gli Studi Giuridici sull’Immigrazione (ASGI), ‘Grave 
preoccupazione per le continue violazioni del diritto nei riguardi degli stranieri 
respinti, espulsi, o trattenuti nei CIE, dei richiedenti asilo e dei lavoratori stranieri’ 
(12 August 2011) < 
http://www.asgi.it/public/parser_download/save/1_asgicomunicati.12811.pdf> 
accessed 22 March 2013; Migrants at Sea, ‘Italy Continues Shipboard Detention of 
Hundreds of Tunisians’ (28 September 2011) 
<http://migrantsatsea.wordpress.com/2011/09/28/italy-continues-shipboard-
detention-of-hundreds-of-tunisians/?>  accessed 22 March 2013; Fortress Europe, 
‘Espulsi 3,592 tunisini, nei Cie tornerà la calma?’ (1 November 2011) 
<http://fortresseurope.blogspot.com/2011/11/espulsi-3592-tunisini-nei-cie-
tornera.html> accessed 22 March 2013.  
See also, Cooperation Agreement in the field of readmission between Italy and 
Egypt, Rome, 9 January 2007.  An agreement to accelerate readmission of unwanted 
migrants was signed on 5 April 2011 by Italy and Tunisia. This agreement is 
unpublished, but information on its content can be retrieved from: Martina Tazzioli, 
‘Cronologia degli Accordi Italia-Tunisia’ Storie Migranti (December 2011) < 
http://www.storiemigranti.org/spip.php?article1004> accessed 22 March 2013. 
29
 See, Yasha Maccanico, ‘The EU’s Self-Interested Response to Unrest in North 
Africa: the Meaning of Treaties and Readmission Agreements between Italy and 
North African States’ Statewatch (January 2012) 6 
<http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-165-eu-north-africa.pdf> accessed 22 
March 2013. A more extended account of readmission agreements and informal 
practices of border control will be provided in Chapter 5. 
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actions beg the question of whether a readmission agreement may 
boost the use of swift and accelerated identification and return 
procedures in dissonance with international human rights and refugee 
law, especially in situations of emergency and mass influxes. 
ii) Since 2005, UK governments have unsuccessfully attempted to 
deport Mr Omar Othman (Abu Qatada) - a radical Muslim cleric who 
was granted refugee status in the UK in 1994 - by seeking diplomatic 
assurances from Jordan on his fair and human treatment upon 
removal. Given that Article 3 of the ECHR precludes the transfer of 
suspect terrorists to countries where torture is systematic,
30
 the British 
Foreign Secretary realized that formalizing bilateral diplomatic 
assurances for national security-related deportations in the structure of 
standardized blanket MoUs would smooth future deportations from 
the UK. Therefore, the British Embassy in Amman was instructed to 
engage the Jordanian government in discussions concerning the 
possibility of creating a framework MoU, which was finally signed on 
10 August 2005. Abu Qatada is the first person to challenge, before 
the ECtHR, a deportation order issued on the basis of a MoU - a 
framework agreement that can be used in every case of removal of an 
individual deemed to be inconducive to the public good. Despite the 
January 2012 decision of the Court to block Abu Qatada’s deportation 
to Jordan, the saga has ignited intense debate on the legal status of 
                                                 
30
 ECHR, Rome, 4 November 1950, in force 3 September 1950, 213 UNTS 221. 
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assurances and their reliability in the ex ante assessment of the risk for 
the deportee.
31
 
iii) On 6 May 2009, 471 migrants and refugees crossing the 
Mediterranean aboard three boats are intercepted by Italian authorities 
on the high seas. The migrants and refugees are transferred onto the 
vessels of the Italian authorities and immediately redirected to Libya 
on the basis of bilateral agreements for technical and police 
cooperation establishing joint naval patrols to prevent irregular 
immigration to Europe. Following this first incident, Italy has since 
embarked on a forcible and indiscriminate ‘push-back’ policy, 
deflecting hundreds of migrants and refugees to North Africa before 
they are able to enter the territorial waters of an EU Member State. No 
onshore access to asylum procedures is ensured. Intercepted migrants 
and refugees are collectively returned to Libya, reports evidencing 
that they are detained, tortured, raped, abused, or ultimately 
repatriated to their countries of origin, where they may return to a 
war-torn country and or face persecution.
32
 
As empirical grounds for legal analysis, the above examples will 
be substantively explored in Part II of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is 
worth highlighting the red thread that runs through these cases and 
                                                 
31
See, Chapter 6 for a description of the case and the legal issues stemming from the 
use of MoUs setting diplomatic assurances on the fair and human treatment of the 
deportees. 
32
 See, Chapter 7 for a narrative of facts and an extensive legal discussion on the 
Italy-Libya push-back policy. 
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how they fit into the argument of this thesis. It is the thread of return, 
of the layered distance placed between the refugee and the State, of 
the border built and reinforced to sever, at the earliest point in time, 
the jurisdictional bridge between who-seeks-protection and who-
gives-protection. It is within this logic that, in the wake of the pro-
active management of European borders before and after the 
migratory waves triggered by the Arab Spring, diverse bilateral 
cooperative strategies have been devised to keep migrants and 
refugees away from the doors of the EU. 
 
1.4. Contribution of the thesis and policy relevance 
Readmission agreements are bilateral or multilateral treaties setting 
standards and procedures indicating how return of irregular migrants 
is to be conducted. However, this study is not limited to readmission 
agreements strictu sensu. Rather it contributes to the existing 
literature by broadening – to my knowledge, for the first time - the 
range of legal analysis applied to a multifaceted framework of 
bilateral cooperation arrangements connected to the readmission of 
irregular migrants from the EU to third countries of origin or transit. It 
encompasses written agreements aimed at facilitating the forced 
return of undocumented migrants from the territory of an EU Member 
State (standard readmission agreements and diplomatic assurances on 
the fair and humane treatment of the deportee, especially if written 
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within MoUs), and those agreements for technical and police 
cooperation that are de facto utilized by EU Member States to divert 
migrants back to the ports of departure before their physical arrival to 
the destination country. In this process of diversification (rather than 
‘informalization’) of cooperative tools, the term agreements linked to 
readmission is better-suited for understanding the plethora of bilateral 
agreements made by EU Member States with non-EU third countries 
to both ease the forced return of irregular migrants with no status or 
right to stay any longer within their territory, and for preventing 
arrivals by outsourcing migration controls and, indirectly, 
responsibilities relating to refugees.  
The word ‘informalization’ can give rise to different interpretations 
in the field of law and international relations. Cassarino uses the 
expression ‘informalization’ to refer to alternative patterns of 
cooperation beyond standard readmission agreements to return 
unauthorized migrants. Indeed, today, readmission is a network 
composed of different institutional instruments, ranging from 
development aid to visa facilitation, and from technical cooperation 
for the externalization of migration controls to labour exchanges.
33
 
                                                 
33
 Cassarino identifies various types of arrangements beyond standard readmission 
agreements: i)  Police cooperation agreements  including a clause on 
readmission/removal of unauthorized persons; ii) Memoranda of Understanding; iii) 
Administrative arrangements; iv) Exchanges of letters. See, Cassarino 2007,185-
7.For an overview of these agreements linked to readmission, see the inventory 
drafted by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the EUI, available 
at: <http://rsc.eui.eu/RDP/research/analyses/ra/>. 
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In order to avoid misunderstandings related to terminology, the 
legal analysis carried out in this thesis will opt for the term 
‘diversification’ of agreements designed to return and readmit 
unauthorized migrants. In legal terms, so-called ‘informal agreements’ 
are international arrangements, which are primarily deemed to be 
‘outside the realm of law’, and whose binding character in 
international law is generally up for debate.
34
  As will be observed 
throughout this thesis, some of the selected agreements linked to 
readmission are formal while others are not. However, focusing on 
such distinctions is not the goal of this thesis. Rather, what I aim to 
emphasize in this work is the underlying objective of all these 
arrangements, namely facilitating the return and the readmission of 
unauthorized and unwanted third country nationals, regardless of their 
designation or their legal status under international law. 
One of the main ambitions of this thesis is to contribute to the 
ongoing academic debate by adding legal coherence to a subject that 
has often been fraught with a certain level of confusion and partiality 
from both a terminological and substantive point of view. A frequent 
item of misunderstanding is the widespread use in literature and 
popular press of the ‘readmission agreement’ concept to 
interchangeably refer to diverse and non-overlapping legislative and 
                                                 
34
 Moreover, so-called ’informal agreements’ might be recorded without all the 
formalities required for the conclusion of treaties, and might be signed by officials 
whose treaty-making powers are doubted. See, Jan Klabbers, Developments in 
International Law: the Concept of Treaty in International Law (Kluwer 1996) 19. 
 38 
 
administrative instruments. What is important to underline is that 
‘agreements linked to readmission’ are employed to carry out  
different return and readmission practices as post-arrival removals and 
pre-arrival interceptions.
35
 Thus, taking a first step toward the 
acceptance of a specific vocabulary, this thesis seeks to establish a 
conceptual coherence that is so manifestly lacking. If, at face value, 
this issue has a purely terminological connotation, it attains import for 
a number of reasons.  
First, it draws a clear picture of the various cooperative patterns of 
migration control used by States to facilitate the return and 
readmission of unwanted foreigners. Second, it goes beyond a mere 
informative value by interpreting State practice on return and 
readmission through a three-dimensional systematization of bilateral 
agreements linked to readmission in the light of their underlying 
purpose. Third, identifying different types of agreements permits a 
better understanding of their content, aims, and main functions, 
thereby allowing for an assessment of the role such agreements play 
in the decision to return migrants and asylum seekers to countries of 
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 To give an example, the agreements for technical and police cooperation 
negotiated by Italy with Libya to prevent the arrival of unauthorized migratory 
flows at the EU border – through interceptions at sea – have frequently been 
labelled as ‘readmission agreements.’ See, inter alia, Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (CoE), Report on Readmission Agreements: A Mechanism for 
Returning Irregular Migrants, Doc. 12168 (16 March 2010) (Parliamentary 
Assembly CoE Report); Maccanico 2012, 6; Sabrina Tucci, ‘Libyan cooperation on 
migration within the context of Fortress Europe’ Amnesty International, 
International Secretariat (London, 2012) <http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/tuccipaper.pdf> accessed 22 March 2013; Marion 
Panizzon, ‘Readmission Agreements of EU Member States: A Case for EU 
Subsidiarity or Dualism?’ (2012) 31(4) RSQ 101. 
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origin or transit – or to what extent they influence such decisions. 
Fourth, a careful analysis of diverse agreements linked to readmission 
reveals how findings regarding their impact on refugees’ rights vary 
according to the different classes of agreements under examination.  
Therefore, studying all these agreements as part of the overarching 
‘agreements linked to readmission’ concept does not only allow us to 
analyse their similarities and common purpose, but to also explore the 
ways in which they differ. Indeed, the implementation of diverse 
typologies of agreements linked to readmission raises a manifold of 
diverse legal issues. By influencing the return decision to different 
extents, the impact of such agreements on access to protection is 
subject to change, and as a consequence, the follow up to the analysis 
varies from agreement to agreement. This is how a research journey 
that began with the intent to find uniformity, or at least commonalities 
between accords, ends up mapping out agreements linked to 
readmission just like a constellation of planets all orbiting around the 
same sun, but at different speeds and in different directions. 
By specifically focusing on the standard readmission agreements 
concluded by Italy and the UK with non-EU third countries on a 
bilateral basis, this research differs from other recent contributions, 
which have mainly addressed readmission policy from the perspective 
of the EU. For instance, Coleman concludes that EU readmission 
agreements are not detrimental to refugee protection, although he 
 40 
 
concedes that more quantitative and qualitative studies in relation to 
informal border practices would be required.
36
 In joining the debate, 
Chapter 5 of this thesis aims to assess whether the existence of 
readmission agreements could de facto stimulate informal practices 
relating to border control and return of irregular migrants, including 
refugees. Moreover, as readmission agreements do not generally 
include separate provisions on refugees, a real risk exists of removing 
asylum seekers, as unauthorized migrants, to allegedly ‘safe third 
countries.’ The Chapter hails, therefore, as an added value, the 
insertion of both non-affection clauses and procedural human rights 
clauses creating extra safeguards for removable asylum seekers. To 
this end, this thesis makes a number of concrete proposals of draft 
provisions as a platform for further discussion among legal scholars 
and policy-makers. 
Chapter 6 challenges one of the most cutting-edge strategies 
European States are testing out to remove unwanted foreigners seen as 
a threat to the safety of the host country. MoUs have been established 
with the intent of formalizing, within a written standardized 
agreement, the human rights commitments of a third country with a 
dismal human rights track record. It is herein argued that the format of 
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a MoU cannot be used as a ‘legal nicety’37 to remove a person to a 
country that is notorious for its dubious interrogation techniques. As a 
consequence, I suggest that States should refrain from relying on 
diplomatic assurances – whether or not framed within standardized 
MoUs - with countries that continue to employ torture tactics.  
Chapter 7 deals with agreements concerning technical and police 
cooperation, and that are designed to intercept boat migrants and 
refugees at sea before arriving at the gates of Europe. Joint offshore 
migration controls operated through bilateral agreements between an 
EU Member State and a third country have become increasingly 
fashionable because of the presumption that States can be divested of 
their refugee and human rights law obligations when moving beyond 
their territorial borders. Therefore, this study also hopes to contribute 
to a more general understanding of the current trend toward 
externalization of migration controls through bilateral agreements 
with migrants’ countries of origin or transit—the rationale of which 
lies at the brink of law and politics. 
Moreover, this work combines areas of law and policy that are 
generally considered neatly distinct, even in a temporal sense. Return 
and readmission are thus studied in relation to refugees’ access to 
territory and to protection, in search of a link that at face value 
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addressed in Chapter 6. 
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appears overly remote. However, a more attentive scrutiny of practice 
reveals how, in certain operative scenarios, especially in situations of 
extraterritorial migration controls, admission/non-admission and 
readmission overlap.  
It is worth adding that there is a need for a legal analysis that 
comprises the synoptic review of widely disputed case studies that 
have sparked the interest of scholars and practitioners. While there 
have been separate studies on standard readmission agreements, 
agreements for technical and police cooperation, as well as diplomatic 
assurances, such three clusters of bilateral arrangements have not been 
conceptualized as falling within a broader category of agreements 
linked to readmission in light of their object and purpose—as this 
thesis intends to do. Moreover, it is to be noted that the only studies 
tackling agreements linked to readmission have so far addressed this 
topic from a non-legal perspective.
38
 
The description of both legal texts and State practice is a stepping 
stone to ascertaining the relationship between bilateral agreements 
linked to readmission and the decision to return refugees to countries 
of origin or transit, thereby handing them over to authorities of 
countries where their life and liberty may be put at risk. Where the 
implementation of these bilateral arrangements hampers refugees’ 
                                                 
38
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access to protection, individuals are entitled to seek a remedy before 
the treaty monitoring bodies of the main international and European 
human rights conventions, which implicitly or explicitly embody the 
principle of non-refoulement and the right to access asylum 
procedures and effective remedies before removal.  
It is also my hope that this thesis might contribute to clarify the 
nebulous boundaries of States jurisdiction, particularly in 
extraterritorial contexts, and, consequently, the geographical reach of 
refugee and human rights obligations. Indeed, the activity of human 
rights courts and committees is, by and large, openly or tacitly 
constrained by jurisdictional filters, which have traditionally been 
territorially limited. It follows that not all cases of alleged violations 
of rights can be considered admissible. Whereas States seem to be 
committed to alter geographies and move borders, an added value of 
this thesis would consist in exploring which avenues general 
international law offers to determine State responsibility in situation 
of joint migration control. In this context, agreements for technical 
and police cooperation seem to be designed to sever the jurisdictional 
link by distancing the territorial border and (potentially) overall 
responsibility from the European States.  
The rationale behind the decision to focus this research on primary 
human rights obligations rather than on the general international rules 
on the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts rests 
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on the urgency to determine, at the outset, the content of human rights 
obligations and their normative potential. State responsibility for an 
internationally wrongful act can, indeed, be established only when 
two conditions are met: the conduct at issue is attributable to the State, 
and such conduct constitutes a violation of an international legal 
obligation.
39
 Tracing the contours of ordinary obligations is, therefore, 
the foundation stone of any thorough analysis on State responsibility, 
in particular when EU Member States displace migration controls 
beyond borders to the high seas or the territorial waters of a third 
country, where the grounds for both exercising jurisdiction and 
engaging extraterritorial human rights obligations are arguably more 
tenuous.
40
 However, if the analysis of inter-state responsibility 
enforcement mechanisms would be any more broad or exhaustive, it 
would simply be beyond the overall objective of this thesis. 
In determining whether a given State conduct constitutes a breach 
of its international obligations, the principal focus will be on the 
primary obligation concerned. It is this primary obligation which must 
be interpreted and applied to the situation, thereby determining the 
substance of the required conduct, the standard to be observed, the 
                                                 
39
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result to be achieved, and so forth.
41
 Moreover, delving into the 
substance of human rights will also let us establish the efficacy of the 
legal guarantees to which every individual seeking protection in 
Europe is entitled, thereby serving to assist future research in the area 
of migration control and refugee rights. 
Although this thesis does not focus  exclusively on State 
responsibility only, outlining the primary types of liability, under 
general international law, that may arise from the joint commitment of 
two States in the area of migration control, is also important, given 
that clauses on common commitments are frequently inscribed within 
agreements linked to readmission with the objective of diluting or 
“washing down” the responsibilities of States. It must also be noted, 
however, that once it is established that responsibility can be engaged 
under human rights law and general international law (including 
indirect liability) by a State involved in joint migration controls with a 
third country, governments are called upon to forsake impermissible 
practices by adjusting their bilateral agreements and harmonizing the 
activities they carry out relating to the interception and return of 
unauthorized migrants to international and European human rights 
standards.  
Whilst this thesis is oriented principally towards the field of 
refugee law, it also speaks directly to broader questions of public 
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international law - especially treaty law and treaty interpretation, 
international human rights law, and EU law. The readership of this 
study may range from postgraduate students, scholars, and 
professional researchers in the aforementioned areas to human rights 
judges and lawyers, involved in cases of post-arrival expulsion or in 
cases of an extraterritorial nature. Such readers might benefit from the 
conceptual coherence and systematization of a complex subject, and 
rely on the extensive review of case law by the main international 
human rights bodies. The descriptive and normative analysis of 
international and European protection standards can also be useful in 
defining the content and scope of primary human rights obligations, 
especially when States are involved in migration control activities 
beyond their territorial borders. This work will also be of primary 
interest for government officers, policy-makers and intergovernmental 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) concerned with refugee 
law. Such groups and individuals might focus on the description and 
assessment of State practice in the field of post-arrival and pre-arrival 
readmission, on the impact of these practices on the rights of those 
seeking protection, or on the concrete proposals I make with respect 
to amending the text of readmission agreements. 
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1.5. Defining key concepts 
 
1.5.1.Refugees, asylum, and protection 
Before scrutinizing the implications bilateral agreements linked to 
readmission have for human rights of protection seekers, some 
terminological clarifications are needed in view of agreeing - for the 
purpose of this thesis - on concepts whose meaning is always open to 
debate and interpretation. However, no exhaustive analysis of such 
concepts can be reasonably carried out in the ambit of the following 
two sections. In the area of refugee law, definitions are herein 
provided of terms such as, ‘refugee’, ‘asylum seeker’, ‘asylum’ (in its 
two facets, ‘right of asylum’ and ‘right to access asylum procedures’), 
‘subsidiary protection’, and more broadly ‘access to protection.’ In the 
field of migration control, attention is focused on terms such as, 
‘migrant’, ‘readmission’, ‘return’, ‘expulsion’, ‘removal’, 
‘deportation’, ‘extradition’, and ‘safe third country.’ 
 Pursuant to Article 1(a)(2) of the 1951 Geneva Convention, as 
amended by Article 1(2) of the 1967 Protocol,
42
 a refugee is a person 
who  
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Owing to a well-funded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.  
 
The term ‘asylum seeker’ does not exist in international refugee 
and human rights law treaties. It is, however, used by States to refer to 
a person seeking protection in a country other than one’s own. The 
latter may be based on refugeehood according to the elements of the 
1951 Convention, or on the need for complementary protection – 
including subsidiary protection under EU law. In international law, 
 
 The term ‘complementary protection’ describes States’ protection obligations 
arising from international legal instruments and customs that complement - or 
supplement - the 1951 Refugee Convention. It is, in effect, a shorthand term for the 
widened scope of non-refoulement under international law.
43
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At the EU level, the Qualification Directive, adopted in 2004 by 
the EU Council and amended by the 2011 Recast Qualification 
Directive, is especially noteworthy. While the definition of refugee is 
entirely shaped on Article 1(a)(2) of the Geneva Convention, the 
definition of subsidiary protection employed in the Directive is based 
largely on international human rights instruments and embraces all 
those situations faced by asylum seekers that fall outside of the five 
grounds of persecution of the international refugee protection 
regime.
44
 
It is also worth clarifying that ‘migrant is a wide-ranging term that 
covers people who move to a foreign country for a certain length of 
time.’45 Although migrants and refugees often travel together, 
                                                                                                                                                   
country of origin or nationality.’ See, 1969 OAU Convention, in force 20 June 
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migrants choose to move in order to improve their lives, while 
‘refugees are forced to flee to save their lives or preserve their 
freedom.’46 Since the recognition of a person as a refugee is of a 
declaratory (and not constitutive) nature, asylum seekers may enjoy a 
prima facie refugee status until a determination of their status on the 
part of the States discredit their claims.
47
 Therefore, this thesis often 
uses the term ‘refugee’ to also refer to people seeking protection, 
although they have not been recognized as refugees yet.  
Whilst individuals have a right to seek asylum,
48
 they may not be 
able to claim a right to asylum, in the sense of ‘admission to residence 
and lasting protection against the jurisdiction of another State.’49 
According to the open definition adopted by the Institut du Droit 
International at its Bath Conference in 1950, ‘the term asylum means 
the protection offered by a State on its territory or elsewhere to an 
individual who came to seek it (emphasis added).’ More specifically, 
asylum has been defined as an institution ‘based on the principle of 
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non-refoulement and internationally or nationally recognized refugee 
rights.’50 It is offered only to foreigners who seek protection outside 
their country of origin from some threat or danger, and can be granted 
either on the State territory or elsewhere, including at the border or 
abroad. A further definition concerns the right of asylum, which refers 
to ‘[t]he right of the State, by virtue of its territorial sovereignty and in 
the exercise of its discretion, to allow a non-national to enter and 
reside, and to resist the exercise of jurisdiction by any State over that 
individual.’51 Chapter 3 is, however, dedicated to examining the 
content and scope of an individual’s right to access asylum 
procedures, which, when mentioned here, is meant to refer to the right 
of an asylum seeker to obtain access to all those procedures for the 
assessment of both refugee status under the Geneva Convention, and 
other forms of complementary protection - including subsidiary 
protection.  
One of this thesis’ main goals is to investigate whether the 
implementation of bilateral agreements linked to readmission can 
hamper refugees’ access to protection, and, as such, further 
clarifications are necessary. In the absence of a uniform definition of 
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‘protection’,52 this work depicts this term as an overarching concept 
shaped by the combination of non-refoulement and the right to access 
asylum procedures and effective remedies before return to the country 
where refugees originate from or have transited through before 
seeking asylum. There is, however, a need to pinpoint what the 
notion(s) of ‘protection’ stand for in international law.  
Under paragraph 1 of its Statute, the UNHCR ‘shall assume the 
function of providing international protection […] to refugees which 
fall within the scope of the present Statute and of seeking permanent 
solutions for the problem of refugees.’ However, the notion of 
‘protection’ has undergone notable interpretative changes over time, 
ranging from pure diplomatic assistance to more procedural and 
material aid in the light of the various challenges created by new 
refugee situations. The shift in the meaning of the notion of 
‘international protection’ can be summarized as follows: 
 
It has evolved from a surrogate for consular and diplomatic protection of 
refugees who can no longer enjoy such protection by their country of origin into a 
broader concept that includes protection not only of rights provided for by the 1951 
                                                 
52
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Convention and the 1967 Protocol but also of refugees’ human rights in general.
53
 
 
While recognizing that the meaning of ‘protection’ remains 
somewhat elusive because of the difficulty in determining the 
fundamental obligation at the core of protection,
54
 the refugee rights 
regime seems to comprise not only the 1951 Geneva Convention but 
also the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
55
 In Stevens’ words: 
 
The assurance of non-return facilitates the opportunity to access further rights, 
whether contained in the Refugee Convention or elsewhere. Though dependent on 
the approach of the asylum State, such access to rights is often deemed a form of 
protection that extends beyond pure territorial protection, and which might be 
described as ‘rights protection.’56 
 
At the EU level, the notion of ‘international protection’ has 
assumed its own legal significance referring to ‘refugee status and 
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subsidiary protection status.’57 What emerges from the foregoing is 
how the concept of ‘protection’ has elicited several mutually 
reinforcing meanings from refugee law, human rights law, 
humanitarian law, and EU law by encompassing all those ‘activities 
aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual.’58 In 
this regard, Chapter VII of the Qualification Directive identifies as 
part of the content of ‘international protection’ many other rights, 
which go beyond non-refoulement as the standard criterion of 
protection.
59
 
This thesis embraces all the abovementioned facets of the notion of 
‘protection’ outside the country of origin of the refugee. However, for 
the sake of this work’s clarity, ‘protection’ here is understood as an 
all-encompassing term that harmonically embodies the principle of 
non-refoulement and the right to access asylum procedures and 
effective remedies before return. The reasons for this can be easily 
understood. The principle of non-refoulement is paramount to the 
protection regime and remains the cornerstone of international refugee 
law. It is the primary obligation that States have to fulfil when dealing 
with a refugee, both at the border and beyond. Without it, protection 
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would become meaningless.  However, in order for non-refoulement 
to be satisfied, individuals need to be able to express their fear of 
return to their home country and have their claims fairly and 
thoroughly assessed on their merits. Therefore, the right to access 
asylum procedures and the right to an effective remedy against an 
unfavourable asylum decision or expulsion order amount to 
procedural entitlements and essential preconditions to non-
refoulement. As such, these three rights, despite their differences, are 
studied together as part of the notion of ‘protection’ in the host or 
would-be host EU Member State. 
 
1.5.2. Terms linked to readmission 
In the Annex of a 2002 EU Commission Communication, 
operational definitions are proposed in order to clarify the use of 
partially overlapping terms in the field of irregular migration.
60
 The 
notion of readmission refers to ‘the act by a State accepting the re-
entry of an individual (own national, third country national, or 
stateless person) who has been found irregularly entering to, being 
present in, or residing in another State.’61 
Return ‘comprises comprehensively the preparation or 
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implementation aiming at the way back to the country of origin or 
transit, irrespective of the question whether the return takes place 
voluntarily or forced.’62 Expulsion concerns an ‘administrative or 
judicial act, which terminates the legality of a previous lawful 
residence.’63 Removal is an ‘act of enforcement, which means the 
physical transportation out of the country.’64 Similarly, deportation 
refers to ‘the act of a State in the exercise of its sovereignty in 
removing an alien from its territory to a certain place after refusal of 
admission or termination of permission to remain.’65 For the sake of 
clarity of this thesis, the above terms are herein used, by and large, 
interchangeably.  
Extradition is, instead, a formal process concerning the surrender 
by the requested State to the requesting State of a person for the 
purpose of criminal prosecution or for the enforcement of a 
judgment.
66
 Extradition will be excluded from the ambit of this thesis 
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for two reasons: first, it is not an instrument intended to combat or 
prevent irregular migration; second, there is an inverted relationship 
between the two involved parties. Indeed, the State requesting 
extradition is also the same that will receive the surrender, while the 
requested State is the one that sends back the addressee.
67
 
Contrarily, in bilateral activities of migration control, the two 
actors involved in the ‘readmission’ process are the State that requests 
readmission and removes the unwanted migrant (requesting State) and 
the State that is requested to readmit (requested State). The third actor 
is represented by the person to be readmitted, who is, in theory, either 
an irregular migrant or a rejected asylum seeker deemed as a person 
who is not in need of international protection. However, as we will 
note throughout the course of this thesis, at times, refugees are also 
involved in either formal or informal return procedures. For the 
purpose of this study, the terms irregular (with no regular/legal status 
in the host country) and undocumented/unauthorized (without the 
required papers) migrant are accepted as synonyms and expanded to 
include also persons who cross an international border without valid 
documents.
68
 
To facilitate secondary movements from the host, or would-be 
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host, country to another State, the notion of ‘safe third country’ has 
been introduced. This concept - which will be discussed more in detail 
in Section 2.7 and 3.6 of this thesis - has been described as: 
 
A procedural mechanism for shuttling asylum seekers to other States said to 
have primary responsibility for them, thereby avoiding the necessity to make a 
decision on the merits because another country is deemed or imagined to be 
secure.
69
 
 
As removal of refugees whose status has not yet been determined 
can also take place to a third country, at least three actors are involved 
in such transfers: the country of origin (‘first’ country), the EU 
Member State where the asylum seeker makes, or is willing to make, 
her application (‘second’ country), and the country to which the 
individual is transferred (the ‘third’ country). This work moves across 
these States, following refugees on their way to Europe and their 
eventual move away from Europe. Emphasis is, however, on the 
‘second country’ whenever and wherever it encounters the refugee. 
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1.6. Methodological framework and research design  
 
1.6.1. Geographical scope 
Agreements linked to readmission are not a new phenomenon and 
have been adopted by several States worldwide. Although developing 
countries are home to four-fifths of the world’s refugees,70 wealthy 
States have concluded a great number of readmission agreements, 
bilateral accords to carry out pre-emptive migration controls at sea, 
and, to a lesser extent, MoUs providing diplomatic assurances to 
facilitate the deportation of addressees. These wealthy States can use 
their political and economic clout to gain collaboration from third 
countries, which often lack both the necessary resources and interest 
to tightly guard their land and sea borders.
71
 Within this general 
picture, EU Member States are those most involved in bilateral 
readmission cooperation with countries of origin and transit of 
immigrants, and rely upon bilateral agreements as a systematic and 
strategic tool to fight unauthorized entries.  
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With regard to the geographical scope of this work, Italy and the 
UK have been chosen as case studies for two interwoven reasons. 
Italy is one of the most involved EU Member States in bilateral 
cooperation linked to readmission. The UK, instead, has historically 
been less prone to conclude agreements with third countries of origin 
or transit of migrants, and has only begun cooperation on migration 
issues in the last decade. Nevertheless, these two States are 
experiencing a new process of diversification of bilateral cooperation 
agreements designed to facilitate the return and readmission of 
undesired immigrants and asylum seekers. Italy and the UK provide, 
indeed, some of the best examples of the typologies of arrangements 
falling under the ‘agreements linked to readmission’ definition.  
Whilst the UK has historically been regarded as an immigration 
country, Italy has traditionally been an emigration country. However, 
since the 1990s, Italy has started to face the challenge of massive 
regular and irregular immigration, with a significant impact of flows 
from Africa. Given its position in the Mediterranean, Italy has served 
as an important transit point for migrants moving toward Northern 
Europe.
72
 These non-legal factors may help explain Italy’s proclivity 
                                                 
72
 To read more on the patterns of emigration from Italy and to Italy, refer to, Robert 
Franz Foerster, From Labour Emigration to Labour Recruitment: the Case of 
Italy(Harvard University Press 1919); Jonathan Chaloff, ‘From Labour Emigration 
to Labour Recruitment: the Case of Italy’ in Migration for Employment: Bilateral 
Agreements at a Crossroads (OECD 2004); Asher Colombo and Giuseppe 
Sciortino, ‘Italian immigration: the Origins, Nature and Evolution of Italy’s 
Migratory Systems’ 9(1) 2004 Journal of Modern Italian Studies 49; Frank J 
Cavaioli, ‘Patterns of Italian Immigration to the United States’ (2008) 13 The 
Catholic Social Science Review 213. 
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in concluding agreements seeking to combat irregular entries and 
facilitate the return of undesired/unauthorized third country nationals.  
At the same time, the dearth of readmission agreements concluded 
by the UK shows that identical or similar challenges do not always 
result in the same outcomes, and can instead differ significantly. For 
instance, in the UK, as a consequence of the stark increase of asylum 
applications in the 1990s, new pieces of legislation were issued, 
which substantially increased the penalties of ‘illegal entry.’73 Thus, 
while Italy has opted for new compromises and agreements with 
countries of origin or transit of irregular immigrants, the policy of the 
UK has been more oriented toward ‘reinforcing traditional control 
structures shifting from external to internal logics of control.’74 
It also bears pointing out that this research by no means aims to 
conduct a comparative analysis of the return policies and national 
laws on migration in both Italy and the UK. Instead, this thesis seeks 
to analyse different case studies through a practical framework within 
the research’s subject matter. The results drawn from this study’s 
selective exercise are also relevant with regard  to the same typologies 
                                                 
73
 See e.g.,The Asylum and Immigration Act 1999 and the Nationality, Immigration, 
and Asylum Act 2002. 
74Vollmer Bastian, ‘Country Report UK: Undocumented Migration Counting the 
Uncountable. Data and Trends across Europe’, Clandestino Project 51 (July 2009) 
<http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/wp-
content/uploads/2009/11/clandestino_report_united-kingdom_final_2.pdf> accessed 
28 March 2013. 
 62 
 
of arrangements concluded by other countries in the world with the 
intent of removing or preventing the arrival of unwanted foreigners. 
 
1.6.2. Third countries’ selection 
The third countries selected for this thesis’ analysis are those with 
which Italy and the UK are cooperating on readmission of irregular 
migrants. Moreover, in view of increased coherence, clarity, and 
efficient time-management, I have reduced the scope of application of 
this research to those same countries that have also been identified as 
a priority by the EU. The EU has employed the following criteria in 
selecting which countries it should enter into readmission agreements 
with:  
 
Migration pressure from a third country concerned on a particular Member State 
or on the European Union as a whole, the cooperation on return by the third country 
concerned, as well as the geographical position of the third country concerned 
situated at a migration route towards Europe.
75
 
 
The EU and its Member States continue to simultaneously pursue 
their return policies. Given the system of shared competence in the 
                                                 
75
Draft Council Conclusions defining the European Union strategy on readmission, 
27 May 2011, para 4. 
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field of readmission,
76
 a better understanding of how national systems 
carry out matters relating to readmission matters becomes 
considerably important, as States remain the primary actors in the 
issuance and implementation of return decisions.
77
 It should also be 
observed that third target countries are selected with the intent of 
creating both a ‘buffer zone’ of States taking responsibility for transit 
migration around the EU and establishing relations with States 
producing higher migration pressure.
78
 
In placing agreements linked to readmission within the complex 
international and European human rights law landscape, the selection 
of specific countries may facilitate an understanding of the functions 
of these arrangements and shed light on critical issues for the 
protection of refugees subjected to formal or informal return 
decisions. A more in-depth study would certainly have been 
instructive. However, this was not feasible given the particular 
                                                 
76
 Since Article 4(2)(j) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) 
incorporates ‘Freedom, Security and Justice’ - which clearly encompasses also 
readmission - in the field of shared competence, the Union does not have the 
exclusive power to negotiate readmission agreements. The relationship between the 
EU and Member States is grounded on the principle of ‘sincere cooperation’ 
enshrined in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on the EU (TEU). 
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Hong Kong, Macao, Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Pakistan, Serbia, and Ukraine have entered into force. However, 
Algeria, China, Morocco, and Turkey have been invited to conclude a readmission 
agreement with the Union. On 21 June 2012, the negotiators of the EU Commission 
and of Turkey initialled a Readmission Agreement, which indicates the EU and 
Turkey shared interest in a more effective migration and border management. 
78
The only exceptions are Hong Kong and Macao, which do not present any 
strategic interest for the EU and its Member States. Readmission agreements with 
these two countries were concluded only in conjunction with the lifting of visa 
requirements. 
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circumstances of this thesis. Therefore, countries, such as Albania, 
Algeria, and Libya, have been incorporated into the analysis in the 
light of the fact they have concluded either readmission agreements 
(object of Chapter 5) or agreements for technical and police 
cooperation (object of Chapter 7) with Italy and the UK, respectively. 
The readmission agreements with Albania are among the most 
sophisticated and detailed pieces of legislation within the well-
assorted category of existing standard readmission agreements. 
Migration pressure and geographical position are the main reasons 
driving the EU Council to intensify relations on migration control 
issues with Libya standing as a key player in the Mediterranean 
region.
79
 On 20 January 2011, the European Parliament adopted a 
recommendation where it welcomes the opening of negotiations 
between the EU and Libya in respect of the EU-Libya Framework 
Agreement,
80
 and urges the Council and the Commission to conclude 
a readmission agreement with this key North-African partner.
81
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 See, JHA Council, ‘Conclusions on Cooperation with Libya on Migration Issues’, 
adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 2-3 June 
2005<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/8525
5.pdf>accessed 28 March 2013.See also, Steve Peers, ‘Readmission Agreements 
and EC External Migration Law’, Statewatch Analysis no 17 
<http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-17-readmission.pdf>accessed 28 March 
2013. Following the upraising in Libya in February 2011, the EU has started 
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needs, including security and migration control. See, European Union External 
Action, ‘Libya’, <http://eeas.europa.eu/libya/index_en.htm> accessed 28 March 
2013. 
80
European Parliament recommendation of 20 January 2011 to the Council on the 
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81
ibid, para 1(f). 
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It should also be noted that, by relying on its Italian proxy on the 
Southern front, the EU has strengthened its bilateral relations with 
Libya and indisputably supported a practice aimed at keeping 
migrants and refugees away from the EU’s borders by off-shoring or 
outsourcing migration controls to third countries. Diverse agreements 
for technical and police cooperation – among the main focuses of this 
analysis - have thus been concluded between Italy and Libya with the 
ultimate goal of intercepting migrants and asylum seekers at sea 
before they arrive to the gates of the EU. 
In the framework of the post 9/11 ‘War on Terror’ and the 
strengthening of migration policies, the European Commission has 
highlighted the gaps in the asylum system that could potentially be 
exploited by refugee seekers who are considered a threat for the 
security of the destination State, and urged EU Member States to 
adopt more restrictive border control policies to prevent refugees from 
exploiting such loopholes. It also underlined how the constraints 
posed by human rights law on the expulsion of suspected terrorists 
fostered a system where ‘the policy options for dealing with 
excludable but not-removable persons are a very unsatisfactory one.’82  
In this sense, the UK has responded unusually to the security dilemma 
by formalizing diplomatic assurances for individuals to be deported 
                                                 
82
Commission Response to Conclusion 29 of the Extraordinary Justice and Home 
Affairs Council Meeting of 20 September 2001, para 2.4 <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Notice.do?mode=dbl&lang=en&ihmlang=en&lng1=en,en&lng2=da,d
e,el,en,es,fi,fr,it,nl,pt,sv,&val=256736:cs> accessed 28 March 2013. 
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pursuant to MoUs. The assurances exchanged between the UK with 
Ethiopia, Lebanon, Jordan, and Libya are examples of such written 
agreements through which an EU Member State mediates and 
negotiates with third countries on issues related to how foreigners 
viewed as a threat to the safety of the sending State should be treated. 
UK’s MoUs are therefore part and parcel of this research (Chapter 6). 
Further details surrounding the rationale behind these case selections 
will be provided in the single Chapters in Part II. 
 
1.6.3. A study of law and practice 
In grasping divergences between legal and practical aspects of the 
same institution, attention should be focused on the way in which 
rules (in casu bilateral agreements linked to readmission) are applied 
in practice. The acquisition of knowledge cannot be limited to the 
study of legal texts. Rather, it is necessary to separately scrutinize 
how legal rules are operationalized, especially when the content of 
bilateral arrangements of migration control is kept secret or when a 
‘safe’ return is based only on diplomatic assurances, such as in the 
case of MoUs.  
Readmission discourse has been generally accompanied by a sense 
of bewilderment and fragmentation because of the plethora of 
instruments used by EU Member States both in removing 
undocumented migrants from their territory and in keeping them away 
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from the EU’s borders. Cooperation with third countries on migration 
control is today conceivable as a network composed of different 
institutional instruments, ranging from development aid and labour 
exchanges to technical and police cooperation, and from standard 
readmission agreements to carrier sanctions, visa-policy, and liaison 
officers to monitor migration at distance as well as directly in the 
countries of origin.
83
 
Despite this multifaceted apparatus of formal and informal 
measures of migration control, surveillance, and prevention, the scope 
of this thesis is limited to the main categories of bilateral agreements 
linked to readmission, which are analysed from an international law 
perspective. In so doing, attention is drawn to those instruments that 
address, more thoroughly, the issue of return of unauthorized migrants 
(including refugees whose claims have not yet been examined) to 
countries they originate from or transit through. These accords are 
standard readmission agreements, diplomatic assurances – whether or 
                                                 
83
 For an overview, see, James Hathaway, ‘The Emerging Politics of Non-Entré’ 
(1992) Refuge 40-41; Ferruccio Pastore, ‘Visas, Borders, Immigration: Formation, 
Structure, and Current Evolution of the EU Entry Control System’ in N Walker (ed), 
Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Oxford University Press 2004) 89-
142; Annalisa Meloni, ‘The Development of a Common Visa Policy under the 
Treaty of Amsterdam’ (2005) CMLRev (2005) 1357; Didier Bigo and Elspeth 
Guild, ‘Policing at a Distance: Schengen Visa Policies’ in Didier Bigo and Elspeth 
Guild (eds) Controlling Frontiers (Ashgate 2005) 233-263; Steve Peers, EU Justice 
and Home Affairs Law (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2006) 93-18; Steve Peers 
and Nicholas Rogers, EU Immigration and Asylum Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2006) 167-218; Violeta Moreno-Lax, ‘Carrier Sanctions’ in  S Peers S, E 
Guild E, D Acosta,  K Groenendijk and V Moreno-Lax (eds) EU Immigration and 
Asylum Law (2nd Ed., Vol. 2. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012). 
 68 
 
not inscribed within MoUs, and agreements for technical and police 
cooperation underlying pre-arrival interceptions.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether refugees’ access 
to protection can be hampered by the implementation of these 
bilateral accords. Therefore, a number of case studies have been 
incorporated as an integral element of the methodological framework, 
and, in particular, the accords entered into between Italy and the UK 
and non-EU third countries are studied against the backdrop of 
international refugee and human rights legal sources. As a first step, 
the terms of the selected agreements linked to readmission are 
described both comprehensively and separately, by means of an 
analytical approach. As a second step, State practice - through a 
narrative of the facts concerning the implementation of the accords in 
specific situations and emblematic cases - is brought into the picture 
in order to give more substance and shape to the theoretical 
discussion. Inevitably any enquiry into State practice is fraught with 
an unavoidable degree of uncertainty due to inaccessibility of relevant 
information, in particular with regard to communication between 
governments in the actual context of a maritime operation. Moreover, 
as States are not required to make public their use of diplomatic 
 69 
 
assurances in the field, for example, of suspected terrorists’ removal, 
State practice has commonly gone undocumented.
84
 
In order to fully understand the real impact of bilateral agreements 
linked to readmission on refugee rights, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that the study of legal texts alone would not suffice in 
gaining a sufficiently comprehensive approach. Rather, equal 
attention has also to be given to the implementation of the law. It is as 
when at theatre, actors, both protagonists and walkers-on, stand on the 
stage performing their drama. They all hold the same plot. But, then, 
what makes the show either captivating or unpleasant is not simply a 
good or bad storyline, but how that storyline is acted out; how much 
verve actors imprint in the words of their plot; how far they improvise 
the lines of their scripts and seize the scene. Within this framing, 
drama critics sit in the obscure stalls silently and attentively beholding 
the moves of the actors, their dialogues, how they interpret and play 
their roles. Similarly, legal scholars, as conscious spectators, observe 
and comprehend law in its theoretical and practical application. And 
in their critique, the pars destruens, which draws State practice and 
existing law into question, thus destabilizing the status quo, is 
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 70 
 
balanced by a pars construens that gives way to moments of the 
productivity and creativity.  
In this general landscape, there are not only texts, storylines, and 
scripts, but also scenes, (inter)actions, digressions, and detours. A 
theatrical show is usually the fruit of the intertwining between a given 
storyline - which aims to create a frame of certainty, a guideline for 
actors - and the actual performance, which is influenced by human 
inclination, sensibility, hitches, and contingencies. That is why a 
theatre artwork is fundamentally irreproducible. Accordingly, the 
impact of bilateral agreements linked to readmission on refugees’ 
access to protection is not only the upshot of a good or bad legal texty, 
but also the result of the mutable embrace between a standardized 
written accord and the implementation by State authorities of the 
terms of that accord in single and therefore ever-diverse instances.  
 
1.6.4. An overview of treaty law and methods of interpretation 
This study involves research in the field of treaty interpretation. 
The different actors involved in the process of interpretation - States 
parties, specified bodies and courts, or international bureaucracies - 
have the role of  establishing the meaning of treaty texts and to apply 
said interpretations  in different situations.
85
 Pursuant to Article 
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2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 
treaties may be defined as ‘international agreement[s] concluded 
between States in written form and governed by international law, 
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation.’86 The VCLT is 
the starting point for any study on the practice of treaties, as it 
establishes all of the procedures for making, bringing into force, 
amending, and terminating an international agreement (law of 
treaties). The International Law Commission (ILC), appointed by the 
UN General Assembly in 1947, was entrusted with the task of 
promoting a progressive development of international law and its 
codification. Thus, on the basis of a final set of draft Articles agreed 
to by the Commission in 1966, the UN Conference on the Law of 
Treaties adopted the Convention on 22 May 1969. 
The Convention applies both to multilateral and bilateral treaties - 
the latter meant as agreements between two States - and does not 
cover agreements falling under domestic jurisdiction and governed by 
national law.87 Furthermore, international agreements that have been 
concluded in a simplified manner or that are contained in a more 
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informal instrument, such as a Memorandum or an Exchange of 
Letters have the same legal effect of formal treaties, provided they 
meet all the criteria required by the definition of Article 2 of the 
VCLT.
88
 Article 102 of the UN Charter requires the registration of 
‘every treaty and every international agreement.’ However, since the 
concept of ‘international agreements’ is broader than the notion of 
‘treaties’, ‘all treaties are international agreements but not all 
international agreements are treaties.’89 This is to say that if an 
agreement satisfies all the criteria of Article 2(a), the specific 
designation of an international instrument as an act, agreement, 
charter, covenant, convention, declaration, exchange of notes, 
memorandum of understanding, pact, or protocol, has no particular 
legal meaning and does not automatically indicate its status as legally 
binding or not.
90
 Indeed, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
held in the South West Africa (Preliminary Objections) case, ‘there 
are many different types of acts to which the character of treaty 
stipulations has been attached.’91 
Furthermore, even though Article 2 does not restrict the freedom of 
                                                 
88
 See, Commentary on Draft Article 2 in (1996) YBILC, II, 173,188-9. 
89
Mark E Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff  2009) 77. 
90
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the parties to enter into a non-binding arrangement, the requirement 
that an agreement is governed by international law encompasses the 
intention of the parties to create international legal obligations.
92
 The 
intention to create obligations under international law is a conditio 
sine qua non of treaties and it must be inferred from the terms of the 
agreement and the context of its conclusion, rather than from 
subsequent statements of the parties that solely concern their 
purpose.
93
 The intent to create obligations under international law also 
distinguishes treaties from agreements governed by domestic law 
where the law of the contract is that of one of the Contracting States.
94
 
The VCLT does not require a treaty to be in a particular form or to 
use special wording, and it is up to the negotiating State to decide 
whether it will conclude a treaty, or something less.
95
 Since 
international law places the principal emphasis on the intentions of the 
parties, ‘the law prescribes no particular form [and] parties are free to 
choose what form they please provided their intention clearly results 
from it.’96 
Treaties can be concluded between States and other subjects of 
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 ILC Report 1966, YBILC 1966 II 189, para 6. See also, Villiger 2009, 81. 
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Qatar v Bahrain (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) ICJ Reports (1994) 121-22, paras 
26-27.  
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 See Francis A Mann, ‘Another Agreement between States under National Law?’ 
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 This issue will be addressed more in depth in Part II of Chapter 6, which deals 
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international law as well as between international organizations. The 
fact that an agreement is ‘concluded’ implies that from that point in 
time the instrument binds the parties under international law. Indeed, 
the purpose of treaties is to create legally binding relations between 
the parties giving rise to rights and obligations, which may be invoked 
or enforced before national and international courts of law.
97
 The 
conclusion of an agreement indicates that the treaty starts to produce 
legal effects and that the Parties consent to be bound by it as provided 
for in Articles 11–17 of the Vienna Convention. A bilateral treaty is 
considered as having been concluded once both Parties sign it. 
However, ‘conclusion’ and ‘entry into force’ are two distinct phases 
and a treaty will become legally binding only once it has entered into 
force for that State.
98
 Indeed, pursuant to Article 18,  
 
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and 
purpose of a treaty when: a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments 
constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall 
have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or b) it has 
expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the 
treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed. 
 
                                                 
97
 Villiger 2009, 78. 
98
 ibid 79. 
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The consent to be bound by a treaty may be expressed not only by 
heads of State but also by governments, ministries, and other State 
organs, provided they represent the State and are duly authorized to 
act on its behalf. In other words, other public bodies that have a legal 
personality separate from that of the State cannot express consent. 
Furthermore, for a treaty to enter into force in a certain country, it is 
necessary that it becomes part of its domestic law.
99
 The process of 
internalization of international norms assumes relevance in particular 
with regard to those treaties which confer rights to individuals, such 
as human rights treaties, or create obligations for States with regard to 
the rights of own nationals or third country nationals. Treaties that 
accord rights and obligations to individuals can be given effect only if 
they become part of national law and if they are provided with 
enforcement mechanisms. It is, then, up to the State to decide how to 
implement domestically international obligations.
100
 
With the aim to give concrete meaning to individual refugee rights 
and State obligations, Chapters 2, 3, and 4 will examine the principle 
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 Pursuant to the monist doctrine, treaties are internalized within the domestic legal 
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 76 
 
of non-refoulement and the individual’s right to have access to asylum 
procedures and effective remedies, as enshrined in international 
refugee and human rights treaties. Chapters 5, 6, and 7, instead, will 
analyse the text of the different typologies of agreements linked to 
readmission and their impact on core refugee rights. 
This thesis relies on the general rules of treaty interpretation as 
enshrined in Articles 31-33 of the VCLT.
101
 According to Article 31 
of the VCLT, ‘a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in light of its object and purpose.’102 Thus, a literal 
reading of the text taking into account the meaning that would be 
attributed to the treaty at the time of its conclusion shall be privileged. 
As inferred from the reading of a great number of decisions of 
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Article 33 of the VCLT is about interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or 
more languages. 
102
 Under Article 31(2) of the VCLT, ‘The context for the purpose of the 
interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its 
preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made 
between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any 
instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to 
the treaty.  
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent 
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) 
any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties.  
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended.’ 
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international courts and tribunals, the ‘ordinary meaning’ of a treaty is 
determined by reference to both everyday and technical language.
103
 
At the same time, the reference to ‘the object and purpose’ of the 
agreement also implies a teleological argumentation. ‘The object and 
purpose’ of an agreement – meant as a single lexical unit104- refers to 
the reasons for which the treaty exists, to the raison d'être of a 
treaty,
105
 as presumably conferred by the original lawmaker. The 
intentions held by the parties are the crucial element to determine the 
‘object and purpose’ of a treaty, which is always used in relation to 
the ‘ordinary meaning’, as a supplementary second step in the process 
of interpretation.
106
 As ‘object and purpose’ can vary according to the 
circumstances, it has been proposed that: 
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If it can be shown that the thing interpreted is a generic referring expression with 
a referent assumed by the parties to be alterable, then the telos of a treaty shall be 
determined based on the intentions held by the parties at the time when the treaty is 
interpreted. In all other cases, the telos shall be determined based on the intentions 
held at the time when the treaty was concluded.
107
 
 
Pursuant to Article 32 of the VCLT,  
 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the 
meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31: (a) leaves the meaning 
ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable. 
 
These interpretative rules apply to all treaties. And each treaty has 
its own telos. Thus, whilst, for example, the purpose of a readmission 
agreement is to facilitate the arrangements for persons’ movement and 
                                                                                                                                                   
276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) ICJ, 21 June1971, paras 66-7 (Namibia case). See 
also, Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (4
th
 edn Clarendon 1990) 
627; Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, (Vol 1, 9th 
ed Oxford University Press 1992) 1267; Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Principle of 
Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention’ (2005) 54 
ICLQ 287; Linderfalk 2007, 203. 
107
Linderfalk 2007, 211. 
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their readmission between both countries,
108
 a different treaty, such as 
the Genocide Convention, ‘was manifestly adopted for a purely 
humanitarian and civilizing purpose.’109 
Furthermore, subject to a dynamic and evolutive interpretation, a 
treaty should be conceived of as a living instrument in the light of the 
socio-political changes of each era.
110
 In support of this view, the ICJ, 
in its Advisory Opinion in the Namibia case, held that ‘an 
international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the 
entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation.’111 In 
conclusion, while the intentions of the parties are supplementary 
means of interpretation, the main methods remain textual, contextual, 
and teleological. 
 
1.7. The interrelation between international refugee law and 
human rights law 
This study rests on a premise. It is no longer possible to interpret 
and apply international refugee law, and more specifically, the 1951 
Geneva Convention in isolation from the text of international human 
                                                 
108
See, e.g., the Preambles to the readmission agreements concluded by the UK with 
Albania and Algeria. 
109
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Advisory Opinion) 28 May 1951, ICJ reports 1951, 23. 
110
 Rudolf Bernhardt, ‘Evolutive Treaty Interpretation, especially of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (1999) 42 German Yearbook of International Law 
12, 21. 
111
Namibia case, para 53. 
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rights treaties and the relevant case law.
112
 And, as some authors 
argue, the protection of refugees is a cornerstone of international 
human rights law.
113
 In this vein, the material and normative scope of 
the right to non-refoulement, the right to access asylum procedures, 
and the right to an effective remedy will be reconstructed by 
investigating the text of the relevant provisions of the Geneva 
Convention, the international human rights treaties, and the case law 
of their monitoring bodies (ECtHR, Committee against Torture, and 
Human Rights Committee (HRC)), as well as academic literature. 
In explaining why human rights law is herein handled alongside 
refugee law (without overlapping these two areas), it should be kept in 
mind that the rights enshrined in the Geneva Convention are subjected 
to a complex ‘structure of entitlement’, depending on their 
relationship with the State in which they are present.
114
 Thus, while all 
refugees falling under the de jure or de facto jurisdiction of a State 
party benefit from a number of core rights, additional and different 
entitlements accrue: i) as soon as they enter a State party’s territory; 
ii) as soon as they are lawfully within that State’s territory; iii) when 
                                                 
112
 See, e.g., Tom Clark and Francois Crépeau, ‘Mainstreaming Refugee Rights. The 
1951 Refugee Convention and International Human Rights Law’ (1999) 17(4) 
NQHR389, 389. Also the EXCOM Conclusion No. 95 (LIV) on International 
Protection (10 October 2003) which underlines the ‘complementary nature of 
international refugee and human rights law.’ 
113
 Cathryne Costello, ‘The Asylum Procedures Directive and the Proliferation of 
Safe Country Practices: Deterrence, Deflection and the Dismantling of International 
Protection?’ (2005) 7(1) EJML 35. 
114
 Hathaway 2005,154. See also Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, 154-92. 
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they are lawfully staying within that State’s territory: or iv) when they 
are permanently residing there.
115
 Moreover, under Article 3, the 
Geneva Convention applies without discrimination only as to ‘race, 
religion, or country of origin.’ In contrast, international human rights 
law is not grounded in the concept of nationality or territory, but in 
the concept of jurisdiction, and as such it pertains to any individuals, 
without discrimination, by virtue of their humanity.
116
 
It should also be observed that international human rights 
conventions have judicial or quasi-judicial treaty monitoring bodies, 
which can be used as redress mechanisms by both States and 
individuals whose rights have been violated. No such devices exist 
under the Geneva Convention on the basis of which alleged victims 
may only lodge a complaint to the UNHCR or seeking protection 
under domestic law. Human rights law would also embrace a wider 
number of potential victims of human rights abuses, since it applies to 
all persons in need of protection, regardless of their refugee status 
under Article 1(a)(2) of the Geneva Convention. 
The concept of ‘non-refoulement’embodied in Article 33 of the 
Geneva Convention is less broad than the one found in the human 
rights treaties, which, therefore, stand as a bulwark against the 
reliance on the regime of exceptions set forth in Article 33(2) of the 
                                                 
115
 Hathaway 2005, 154-5. 
116
 Alice Edwards, ‘Human Security and the Rights of Refugees: Transcending 
Territorial and Disciplinary Borders’ (2009) 30(3) MJIL763, 793. 
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Geneva Convention.
117
 For those States parties to the Geneva 
Convention that have also ratified more expansive international 
human rights treaties, exclusion from refugee status - even when an 
individual is considered a threat to national security of the destination 
State - shall always be applied restrictively bearing in mind that 
Article 33(2) exceptions can never be invoked when primary non-
derogable human rights are concerned.
118
 
Limitations of the 1951 Geneva Convention persuaded 
international human rights bodies to rely on  relevant treaties to 
establish complementary forms of protection to be accorded to 
individuals  falling outside the scope of the international refugee 
protection regime. By extending the basis of protection well beyond 
persecution to multiple situations in which serious harm is likely to be 
suffered, human rights law contributes to filling in the gaps created by 
the Geneva Convention, thus strengthening and reinforcing the overall 
safeguards afforded to individuals in need of protection outside their 
country of origin or habitual residence.
119
 
  The comprehensive approach of the international human rights 
bodies - especially the ECtHR - to the recognition of refugee rights 
                                                 
117
 Under Article 33(2) of the Geneva Convention, the principle of non-refoulement 
‘may not [. . .] be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for 
regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having 
been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a 
danger to the community of that country.’ 
118
 See, Chapter 2 on the relevant jurisprudence of international human rights 
bodies. See also, Hirsi v Italy, Concurring Opinion 42.  
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 Edwards 2009, 795. 
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and State obligations contributes to painting the content of 
‘protection’ as a mosaic composed of diverse but matching pieces. In 
order to be effective, protection must comprise not only guarantees of 
non-refoulement, but also the two procedural rights to access asylum 
procedures and effective remedies before return. 
 
1.8. The protection of human rights in EU Law 
The European paradigm of human rights protection constitutes a 
system where the coexistence of a plurality of domestic, international, 
and supranational regimes are engaged in promoting and safeguarding 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
120
 Over the past decades, we 
have witnessed more and more national courts seeking  guidance from 
the judgments of international and supranational courts when ruling 
on substantive legal issues concerning human rights. At the same 
time, international and supranational courts have also, even more 
frequently, relied on national courts’ jurisprudence through a dialogic 
and interactive process.  
                                                 
120
 For example, under Article 6(1) and (3) of the Treaty of the European Union 
(TEU), '[t]he Union recognizes the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [...] which shall have the 
same legal value as the Treaties.  
[...] Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general 
principles of the Union's law.' 
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Although EU law is not the focus of this thesis, some 
considerations are nonetheless noteworthy. After the numerous 
attempts of national constitutional courts to question the primacy of 
EC law vis-à-vis constitutional constraints,
121
 the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) felt the urgency to claim its title as the guardian of 
human rights in Europe, thus enhancing its new vitality within the 
European paradigm of human rights protection. The 
acknowledgement of the ECJ as a court able to deal with the 
protection of human rights occurred for the first time in the Stauder v 
City of Ulm case in 1969.
122
 A year later, in the Handelsgesellschaft 
case, the ECJ recognized human rights as fundamental principles 
derived by the constitutional traditions of Member States.
123
 In the 
Nold II case, the ECJ  stated that in addition to the constitutional 
traditions common to Member States, international human rights 
treaties should be used as guidelines for the interpretation of 
                                                 
121
 See e.g., Frontini case and Solange I. In the latter judgment the Court stated that: 
‘…As long as the integration process has not progressed so far that Community law 
receives a catalogue of fundamental rights decided on by a parliament and of settled 
validity, which is adequate in comparison with the catalogue of fundamental rights 
contained in the Basic Law, a reference to the Federal Constitutional Court [...] is 
admissible and necessary [...] in so far as [EC law] conflicts with one of the 
fundamental rights of the Basic Law.’ BVerfGE 37, 271: [1974] 2 CMLR 5. While 
in Solange I, the Court manifested its scepticism with regard to the capacity of the 
ECJ to provide an adequate protection for fundamental freedoms,
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 in Solange II, 
the German Constitutional Court gave up its reservation. See, Solange I, 29 May 
1974, BVerfGE 37, 271 [1974] 2 CMLR 540; Solange II case, BVerfGE 73, 339 
[1987] 3 CMLR 225. 
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 The Court affirmed that ‘interpreted this way the provision at issue contains 
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Stauder [1969] ECR 419. 
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Community law by the ECJ, thus underscoring the deference toward 
the ECHR as a source of inspiration within the Community legal 
order.
124
 
 While the relationship between the ECJ/CJEU (Court of Justice of 
the EU) and the ECtHR has not always been coherent, it seems to be 
governed by mutual cooperative interactions. On different occasions, 
the ECJ has tackled the same human rights set out in the ECHR. For 
instance, in the judgment European Parliament v Council, the Court 
held that the right to family life must be applied ‘in a manner 
consistent with the requirements flowing from the protection of 
fundamental rights.’125 It is also to be noted that, on 1 June 2010, the 
EU acceded to the ECHR following the entry into force of Protocol 14 
to the ECHR. The accession became a legal obligation under Article 6 
of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), which provides that the 
EU will accede to the ECHR, recognizes the rights and principles set 
out in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), and affirms that: 
 
 Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the 
                                                 
124
 Case 4/73 Nold II [1974] ECR 507. 
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 Case C–540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I—5769, para 104. Moreover, 
in dealing with the Family Reunification Directive in the field of migration law, the 
ECJ considered the right to family life (Article 8 of the ECHR) to be a key element, 
which should be taken into account by national authorities when determining the 
lawfulness of the refuted measure. See, Case C–60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I–
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constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general 
principles of the Union's law.
126
 
 
A few words should also be spent on the EU CFR, which sets out a 
whole range of civil, juridical, economic, and social rights and has 
become legally binding with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
on 1 December 2009.
127
 The incorporation of the CFR in the Treaty of 
Lisbon expands the power of the CJEU to interpret whether both the 
EU institutions and Member States follow human rights standards in 
making and implementing EU law, respectively.
128
 Indeed, while the 
Charter will certainly apply to EU institutions, it only applies to the 
Member States when they implement EU law. 
                                                 
126
 Pursuant to Article 2 of the TEU, ‘[the] Union is founded on the values of respect 
for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.’ Additionally,  
Article 21(1) of the TEU reads that: ‘[the] Union’s action on the international scene 
shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development 
and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the 
rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and 
respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.’ 
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 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, 
entered into force, 1 December 2009. 
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 See, Migration Watch UK, The Lisbon European Reform Treaty Impact on 
Asylum and Immigration Policy, 
<http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefingPaper/document/82> accessed 28 March 
2013. The Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom states that ‘nothing in Title 
IV of the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United 
Kingdom, except in so far as Poland or the United Kingdom has provided for such 
rights in its national law’ (Article 1(2)). 
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Additionally, the Lisbon Treaty also extends the CJEU’s 
jurisdiction over asylum and immigration policy,
129
 provides for the 
gradual introduction of an integrated management system for external 
borders,
130
 and empowers the EU to develop common policies for 
asylum and immigration.
131
 With regard to the legal effect of the 
Charter, it ranks now as primary Union Law and compliance with it 
has become a requirement for the validity and legality of the EU’s 
secondary legislation in the field of asylum. As established in Article 
51 of the Charter, its scope of application is limited to the areas in 
which Member States are implementing Union Law and it ‘does not 
establish any new power or task for the Community or the Union, or 
modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties.’132 
Although the TEU, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, provides  
that the Charter will have ‘the same legal value as the treaties’, it does 
not constitute, properly speaking, a treaty as a matter of international 
law, since it is not an agreement between States in the meaning of 
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 ECJ’s jurisdiction in immigration, asylum and civil law applies equally to all 
Member States, including the UK and Ireland, but only in so far as they have opted 
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Home Affairs (JHA) Law’ Statewatch Analysis No 4, EU Lisbon Treaty (26 June 
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 Article 6(1) TEU as amended by the Lisbon Treaty also states that the Charter 
‘does not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the 
Treaties.’ 
 88 
 
Article 2(a) of the VCLT. Indeed, the CFR has not been signed and  
ratified by the Member States, and has yet to have its provisions 
included in the Lisbon Treaty.
133
 
Pursuant to Article 52(4) of the Charter,  
 
Insofar as this Charter contains rights, which correspond to rights guaranteed by 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said 
Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law from providing more 
extensive protection.
134
 
 
Therefore, the provisions of the Charter shall be interpreted and 
applied in accordance with the ECHR principles as determined by the 
jurisprudence of the Courts of Strasbourg and Luxembourg. Other 
international human rights instruments can be considered sources of 
inspiration for provisions of the Charter. According to Article 53,  
 
                                                 
133
 The CFR was signed and proclaimed by the Presidents of the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission on behalf of their institutions at the 
European Council meeting in Nice on 7 December 2000. 
134
 According to the ‘Explanations’ to Article 52, ‘[t]he reference to the ECHR 
covers both the Convention and the Protocols to it. The meaning and the scope of 
the guaranteed rights are determined not only by the text of those instruments, but 
also by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. The last sentence of the paragraph is designed to 
allow the Union to guarantee more extensive protection. In any event, the level of 
protection afforded by the Charter may never be lower than that guaranteed by the 
ECHR.’ See, ‘Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2007/C 
303/02). 
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Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized, in their respective fields of 
application, by Union law and international law and by international agreements to 
which the Union or all the Member States are party, including the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by 
the Member States’ constitutions. 
 
The reading of Article 53 indicates how the Charter tends to 
expand rather than restrict human rights protection in the Union by 
also recognizing the relevance of international agreements to which 
Member States are a party for interpreting and enhancing human 
rights principles as enshrined in the Charter itself. Moreover, human 
rights protection within the EU area is also enhanced by the EU’s 
approach to jurisdiction. Being it functional rather than territorial, 
Article 51 requires Member States to adhere to their EU fundamental 
rights obligations whenever they act within the scope of EU law,
135
 
therefore even in extraterritorial contexts.
136
 
I mostly rely on EU law only when providing a background of the 
description of the legal instruments that apply to the rights of refugees 
in the European context. Although the reader would expect a more 
thorough analysis of the EU legal framework, this thesis is primarily 
                                                 
135
 See, Explanations to Article 51 EU CFR. ‘Explanations relating to the Charter of 
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about the standards of protection offered by international refugee and 
human rights law, in particular the ECHR. Nevertheless, EU law 
human rights principles are, in many cases, part and parcel of those 
standards and are discussed when appropriate. Despite the fact that 
EU law constitutes an additional regime of refugee protection engaged 
in dialogue and interaction with international refugee and human 
rights law, attention is herein shifted away from the CJEU and is 
instead focused on international refugee and human rights treaties and 
the case law of the relevant monitoring bodies. 
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Part I 
Refugees’ Admission and Readmission: International 
and European Protection Obligations 
 
Human rights law is important for asylum seekers because the focus on 
humanity transcends nationality in the construction of protection. The discourse of 
human rights envisages a community of entitlement based on notions of personhood 
rather than status.
137
 
Colin Harvey, ‘Seeking Asylum in the UK, Problems and Prospects’ 
 
 
In certain operative scenarios, especially in situations of 
extraterritorial migration controls, the practices of admission and 
readmission overlap. Through the lens of international human rights 
and refugee law, Part I of this thesis explores the scope of the relevant 
international refugee and human rights protection standards binding 
EU Member States each time they deal with the admission or 
readmission of refugees. The relevant international human rights and 
refugee law instruments - sought at two different levels concurrently 
in force in every EU Member State - encompass: i) at United Nations 
level, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva 
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Convention) and its 1967 Protocol, the UN Convention against 
Torture (CAT), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR); and, ii) at the Council of Europe level, the 1950 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR). 
The main question this thesis grapples with is whether the 
implementation of bilateral agreements linked to readmission may 
hamper refugees’ access to protection, which is understood here as the 
combination of the foundational principle of non-refoulement (either 
direct or indirect) and two correlated procedural entitlements: the right 
to access asylum procedures and the right to an effective remedy 
before return. Part I will investigate whether these core international 
and European legal norms apply to individuals transferred (or about to 
be transferred) to countries of origin or transit while seeking 
protection within the territory of an EU Member State, at its borders, 
or even on the high seas. Despite the fact that the abovementioned 
spectrum of rights is not meant to be exhaustive, these legal principles 
can, however, be regarded as the primary international obligations 
applying to refugees (regardless of whether their status has been 
recognized or not) in the phase of arrival at, and expulsion from, the 
State of destination (or even at sea) to third countries. 
 A comprehensive analysis of the different interpretative 
approaches used to reconstruct the meaning, scope, and legal content 
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of these international human rights principles would exceed the reach 
of this research. Rather, the following three Chapters aim to draw a 
general overview of the main international and European human 
rights law principles asylum seekers may invoke to enjoy protection 
from refoulement, and access to asylum procedures and effective 
remedies before return. The existence of a clear legal framework is 
particularly important when decisions are taken at the border, in 
transit zones, or beyond territorial borders with regard to an asylum 
seeker who is seeking to enter or has entered irregularly into an EU 
Member State’s territory.  
It is to be clarified that the international jurisprudence on non-
refoulement and the right to an effective remedy herein examined also 
draws on cases of expulsion/extradition where the applicant is not an 
asylum seeker—as long as they are functional for defining the content 
of these rights. Moreover, although space and time preclude the 
inclusion of the entirety of the EU legal regime of refugee protection, 
this thesis recognizes the salience of EU law in the protection of 
fundamental rights, and does not refrain from occasionally referring to 
the EU asylum directives and the CFR, as well as select cases without, 
however, delving much into the thriving jurisprudence of the ECJ and 
the CJEU.  
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Chapter 2. The Right to Non-refoulement 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This Chapter will examine the obligation of non-refoulement in 
light of international refugee and human rights law instruments. 
Whereas the Geneva Convention constitutes the necessary entry point, 
the ICCPR, the CAT, and the ECHR contribute, as mutually 
reinforcing instruments, to the description of the content of non-
refoulement. The EU CFR is also ultimately brought into the picture. 
Bearing in mind that scholars have not yet agreed upon a common 
definition of the legal content of non-refoulement, this issue will be 
explored with respect to international refugee and human rights law, 
being aware that protection obligations towards refugees and asylum 
seekers generally flow from implicit or explicit prohibitions of 
refoulement. Therefore, this thesis  will question whether the 
aforementioned international instruments can be complementary in 
the construction of a regime of refugee protection, and whether they 
should be read consistently with one another. According to Article 
33(1) of the 1951 Geneva Convention: 
 
No contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to 
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account 
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of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion. 
 
This thesis presents the principle of non-refoulement as an 
overarching term, which does not exhaust its meaning only in the 
Geneva Convention. Rather, this principle is constructed and 
understood also by means of diverse international human rights 
treaties, which either explicitly or implicitly prohibit the return of a 
person to a territory where she can suffer torture and other inhuman 
and degrading treatment, and where her life and liberty can be 
seriously threatened beyond the five grounds of persecution set in 
Article 33(1) of the Geneva Convention.  
The UN General Assembly has equipped the UNHCR with the 
power to supervise the application of the Geneva Convention and its 
Protocol by providing international protection to refugees, including 
shelter from refoulement, seeking durable solutions for the problem of 
refugees, and by promoting the ‘implementation of any measures 
calculated to improve the situation of refugees.’138 If the perimeter of 
its original mandate was limited to individuals with a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or 
political opinion, over time the UNHCR’s competence was expanded 
to also encompass  ‘persons who have fled their home country due to 
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 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
adopted by United Nations General Assembly, 14 December 1950. 
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armed conflicts, internal turmoil, and situations involving gross and 
systematic violations of human rights.’139 
Whilst Section 2.2 discusses non-refoulement as a norm of 
customary international law, Sections 2.3 and 2.4 reconstruct the legal 
content of non-refoulement in international refugee law and human 
rights law. Section 2.5 aims to examine whether the prohibition of 
refoulement applies beyond the territory of the signatory States to the 
Geneva Convention, the ECHR, the CAT, the ICCPR, and the CFR in 
relation to persons who claim protection at the border of a State party, 
or who are intercepted at sea. Section 2.6 provides an overview of the 
EU legal framework protecting the principle of non-refoulement. 
Section 2.7, separately, discusses the concept of ‘safe third country’ in 
international and EU law and its legality under international law. It 
also explores the procedural safeguards that must be in place in the 
readmitting country for a sending State that decides to transfer an 
asylum seeker. 
 
2.2. Non-refoulement as a norm of customary international law 
Whilst the arguments supporting the peremptory nature of non-
refoulement are less than compelling, State practice, since the 
adoption of the 1951 Geneva Convention, has provided persuasive 
                                                 
139
 See, UNHCR Note on International Protection, Thirty-sixth Session of the 
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, para 6, UN Doc. 
A/AC.96/660. 
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evidence that the principle has achieved the status of customary 
international law.
140
 Nevertheless, the customary status of this norm 
has been fiercely contested by part of the scholarship stressing how 
the fact that most countries have accepted some kind of non-
refoulement obligation does not imply that there is a universally 
applicable duty of non-refoulement that exists today. According to 
these critics, attention should be paid, to those States in Asia and the 
Near East that have decided not to be formally bound by the non-
refoulement obligation, and to all those countries that have opted not 
to accede to either the Geneva Convention or the 1967 Protocol.
141
 
If the prohibition of refoulement, embodied in treaty law, is 
binding upon all EU Member States, it needs to be verified if, as a 
matter of customary law, this principle is also binding on those few 
countries that have not ratified relevant international instruments on 
the protection of refugees. Indeed, all EU Member States are parties to 
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the Geneva Convention and its Protocol, which are now regarded as 
part of the acquis communautaire. 
Outside the European framework, the 1969 Organization for 
African Unity Convention on Refugees Problems in Africa (OAU 
Convention) and the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees have 
contributed to enlarge the core meaning of the ‘refugee’ notion as a 
matter of customary international law.
142
 The OAU Convention, for 
instance expands the traditional refugee definition to include those 
people who are obliged to leave their home country on account of 
external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events 
seriously disturbing public order.’143 Similarly, the Cartagena 
Declaration on Refugees extends its mandate to  
 
Persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety, or freedom have 
been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, 
massive violations of human rights, or other circumstances which have seriously 
disturbed public order.
144
 
 
The existence of non-refoulement as a conventional principle 
enshrined in different legal instruments does not only  not preclude 
                                                 
142
 Guy S Goodwin-Gill, ‘Non-refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers’ (1986) 
Virginia Journal of International Law 902.  
143
 Article 1(2) of the OAU Convention. 
144
 Article 3(3) of the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, 22 November 1984. 
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the creation of a custom of similar content, but can also contribute to 
the formulation of such a customary principle. In the North Sea 
Continental Shelf case,
145
 the ICJ identified three elements describing 
such a process of crystallization of customary rules into the general 
corpus of international law.
146
 Moreover, in the Nicaragua case, the 
ICJ held that ‘it is not to be expected that in the practice of States, the 
application of the [rule] in question should have been perfect [...]’147 
The Court has not considered that, for a principle to be established as 
customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolute rigorous 
conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of 
customary norms, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of 
States is generally consistent with such norms, and treats instances of 
State conduct inconsistent with a given rule as breaches of the existing 
principle, not as indication of the recognition of a new rule.
148
 
     With regard to the requirement of State support to the norm of 
non-refoulement, it should be observed that there exists, as 
                                                 
145
North Sea Continental Shelf Case,ICJ Reports (1969). 
146
 Firstly, the conventional norm ‘should be of a fundamentally norm-creating 
character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law’; 
secondly, ‘a very widespread and representative participation in the convention 
might suffice of itself, provided it included that of States whose interests are 
specially affected’; thirdly, ‘State practice, including that of States whose interests 
are specially affected, should be both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of 
the provision invoked—and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to 
show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved’ (paras 
72-74). For the purpose of this thesis, specially affected States are those nations 
which are most engaged in refugee-related issues, being either the States of refugee 
or the countries of origin or transit of migration fluxes. 
147
Military and Paramilitary Activities against Nicaragua Case (ICJ), Reports 1986, 
para 186. 
148
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aforementioned, a near universal acceptance of the principle, which 
goes further than a simple ‘widespread and representative’ 
participation in international conventions embodying the putative 
customary rule. At present, the major part of the 192 Members of the 
UN have ratified one or more binding international documents 
implicitly or explicitly incorporating the principle of non-
refoulement.
149
 Since these figures encompass those States whose 
interests are specially affected by refugee-related issues, and no State, 
including the remaining UN members, has objected to the principle of 
non-refoulement, it can be concluded that around 90 percent of UN 
membership has consented to the existence of such a norm.
150
 
Looking more specifically at the European context, all EU Member 
States are party to the Geneva Convention, the 1967 Protocol, the 
ICCPR, the CAT, the ECHR, and the CFR, which either directly or 
indirectly proscribe refoulement. 
Over the last sixty years, no State has formally or informally 
opposed the principle, and even non-signatory States, such as 
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Thailand, have hosted large numbers 
                                                 
149
 Reference is made only to conventions of a universal character: the 1951 
Convention, the 1967 Protocol, the CAT, and the ICCPR. 
150
 These figures do not include States such as Switzerland and Holy See, which are 
not members of the UN. However, while Switzerland has ratified the 1951 Geneva 
Convention, the 1967 Protocol, the ECHR and the ICCPR and the CAT, Holy See is 
party to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol.  
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of refugees, often in mass influx situations.
151
 Furthermore, in 
numerous cases, the UNHCR, in the exercise of its supervisory 
function, has been required to make representations to States, which 
were parties neither to the Convention nor to the Protocol. In these 
circumstances, the Office has made reference to the principle of non-
refoulement irrespective of any treaty obligation. It is interesting to 
note how approached governments have generally reacted by 
indicating national acceptance of the principle of non-refoulement as a 
guide for their action. These States have frequently sought to provide 
additional explanations or justifications of  their practices that have 
been inconsistent with the norm, by challenging, for instance, the 
refugee status of the individual concerned or by invoking issues of 
national security and public order. As held by the UNHCR itself, ‘the 
fact that States have found it necessary to provide such explanations 
or justifications can reasonably be regarded as an implicit 
confirmation of their acceptance of the principle.’152 
Bearing in mind that at the international law level, the practice of 
States on non-refoulement is fairly uniform, in a few cases, however, 
governments have shown their inability to manage mass influxes of 
                                                 
151
 See, UNHCR, ‘Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-
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International Law 
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refugees, or have adopted restrictive measures toward asylum 
seekers.
153
 Yet, in none of these cases have States publicly expressed 
unwillingness to respect the principle or to abide by such a duty. On 
the contrary, they have only referred to their inability to shelter 
refugees for a number of domestic reasons. The fact that governments 
offered justifications demonstrates that they recognized that the non-
refoulement obligation exists, and that their actions were in breach of 
humanitarian law and international law more generally.  
Recognizing the customary status of non-refoulement is essential 
for acknowledging how even those States which are not formally 
bound by any specific convention, are not free, yet, of customary 
international legal obligations toward refugees. In other words, such 
States are obliged not to return or extradite any person to a territory 
where her life or freedom would be seriously threatened. Furthermore, 
customary international law can be useful either to complement or 
supplement national legislation on non-refoulement, and to enable 
national courts  to apply norms of general international law on the 
treatment of refugees when there is no national legislation on the 
matter. All in all, the extensive participation of States in international 
human rights and refugee law instruments confirm the wide 
                                                 
153
 For instance, in 1995 the government of Tanzania closed its borders to a group of 
more 50,000 Rwandan refugees, justifying such a measure on grounds of regional 
tensions, national security, and serious risks to the environment. The same fate was 
up to Liberian refugees who, fleeing in 1996 a brutal civil war, were denied access 
by numerous West African ports, including Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Togo.  
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acceptance of non-refoulement as a customary international law 
principle, which has, therefore gradually moved beyond treaty law. 
 
2.3. The legal content of non-refoulement in international 
refugee law. 
Non-refoulement has developed in the two distinct contexts of 
international refugee law and human rights law, and it is the 
intersection of these two contexts that shapes the content of this 
principle. In relation to refugee law, the content of non-refoulement 
concerns the interpretation of Article 33 of the 1951 Convention 
whereby, ‘no Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where 
his life or freedom would be threatened […].’ It should be noted that: 
 
The practice known as refoulement in French did not exist in English language. 
In Belgium and France, however, there was a definite distinction between expulsion, 
which could only be carried out in pursuance of a decision of a judicial authority, 
and refoulement, which meant either deportation as a police measure or non-
admittance at the frontier.
154
 
 
The drafters of the Convention decided therefore to retain this 
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wider French interpretation of refoulement and keep it in brackets in 
the English version of Article 33(1) of the Convention. State practice 
and international jurisprudence have both endorsed this meaning of 
non-refoulement as prohibiting expulsion and non-admittance at the 
border
155
 resulting in the risk of persecution, threat to life, physical 
integrity, or liberty, and to a real risk of torture, cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment or punishment. 
The prohibition of refoulement is valid even in those cases in 
which refugees are sent back to a territory where they are exposed to 
the peril of being subsequently returned to another territory in which 
they would face serious risks to their own life.
156
 Given that the 
application of the principle of direct or indirect non-refoulement is 
made independently of any determination of refugee status, any 
decisions to transfer refugees to territories where their life or liberty 
might be put at risk would shift to the returning State the burden of 
proof with respect  to the situation in the country of origin.
157
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 For example, the OAU Convention expressly excludes rejection at the frontier in 
Article 2(3). Pursuant to the UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum, no refugee 
‘shall be subjected to measures such as rejection at the frontier [...].’ See, UN 
Declaration on Territorial Asylum (1967), GA Resolution 2312 (XXII); EXCOM 
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At this point, questions arise as to whether the words ‘where his 
life or freedom would be threatened’ are in fact broader than simply 
the risk of persecution, which is yet a very vague concept.
158
 In this 
respect, one is able to  observe how the UN General Assembly has 
extended UNHCR’s competence over the past sixty years to include 
those fleeing from more generalized situations of violence. 
Consequently, several Conclusions of the UNHCR Executive 
Committee have included within the scope of non-refoulement, 
‘measures to ensure the physical safety of refugees and asylum 
seekers,’ and protection from ‘a danger of being subject to torture.’159 
Although global State practice is not homogenous in that respect, 
in some circumstances, States have offered protection beyond the five 
grounds of persecution recognized by Article 1(a) of the Geneva 
Convention. Guarantees of non-refoulement have been granted, for 
instance, to persons who have a well-founded fear of facing serious 
threats to their life or freedom as a result of an armed conflict or 
generalized violence if they were returned to their home country.
160
 It 
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has therefore been argued that ‘in keeping with the humanitarian 
objective of the Convention, the protective regime of Article 33(1) 
must be construed liberally in a manner that favours the widest 
possible scope of protection consistent with its terms.’161 
Nevertheless, the 1951 Convention provides a set of exceptions on 
grounds of overriding reasons of national security and public 
safety.
162
 On the contrary, developments in the field of human rights 
law delineate a tendency to prohibit any derogation from the principle 
non-refoulement when it results in the transfer of a person to a country 
where she would risk being  tortured or may suffer from other forms 
of degrading and inhuman treatment. Article 33(2) of the 1951 
Convention does not affect, indeed, the obligation of the host State to 
respect the principle of non-refoulement in conformity with 
international human rights law, which permits no exceptions. All in 
                                                                                                                                                   
Helene Lambert discusses how Article 15(c) of the EU Recast Qualification 
Directive provides scope for broadening protection of a 'third country national or 
stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom 
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returned to his or her country of origin [...] would face a real risk of suffering 
serious harm as defined in Article 15 [...].’ Under Article 15, 'serious harm' includes 
any 'serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of 
indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.' See, 
Helene Lambert, ‘The Next Frontier: Expanding Protection in Europe for Victims of 
Armed Conflict and Indiscriminate Violence’ IJRL (advance access 5 June 2013). 
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and Asylum Policies in the European Union’ (2011) 10 Wash.U.Global Stud.L.Rev 
87, 121-31. 
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 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 2001, 125. 
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 For example, pursuant to Article 33(2), the benefits of non-refoulement ‘may not 
[…] be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a 
danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted 
by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the 
community of that country.’  
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all, whether or not a State is a party to the 1951 Convention, it is  
bound by non-refoulement as a principle of general international 
law.
163
 
When the return of an individual would result in the threat of 
torture, the absolute prohibition of refoulement can also be read as 
part of the ban on torture which has achieved the status of a jus 
cogens norm under international law.
164
 It means that all States, 
including those that have not ratified the relevant human rights and 
refugee law instruments, are bound to prohibit any acts or omissions 
having the effect of turning a refugee back to territories where the risk 
of persecution equates to, or may be regarded as being on a par with a 
danger of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment, and when it comes within the scope of other non-
derogable customary principles of human rights. In this case, an 
absolute prohibition on refoulement now exists.
165
 
The following sections will scrutinize to what extent human rights 
instruments - in particular the CAT, the ICCPR, and the ECHR - offer 
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a broader protection from refoulement in comparison with the 1951 
Convention. 
 
2.4. The legal content of non-refoulement in international 
human rights law 
 
2.4.1. The CAT and the ICCPR 
International human rights law provides further protection beyond 
that one offered by international refugee law. Indeed, States are bound 
not to transfer any individual to another country where there is a risk 
of being subjected to serious human rights violations, particularly 
arbitrary deprivation of life,
166
 or torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.
167
 For the purpose of this thesis, 
attention is mainly drawn on the prohibition of torture as a bar to 
refoulement. 
Article 3(1) of the CAT contains an explicit provision on non-
refoulement: 
 
                                                 
166
 The right to life is enshrined in Article 6 of the ICCPR and, for example, Article 
2 of the ECHR. 
167
 The right to be free from torture is guaranteed under Article 1 of the CAT, 
which, in Article 16, also prohibits other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. A prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment is provided by Article 7 of the ICCPR and Article 3 of the 
ECHR. 
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No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another 
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of 
being subjected to torture. 
 
This Convention applies non-refoulement safeguards to anyone, 
and not only to those asylum seekers who have ‘clean hands’ as long 
as there are substantial grounds to believe that the person will suffer 
torture upon removal. However, the present risk does not have to meet 
the test of being highly probable, but it must be ‘foreseeable, real, and 
personal.’168 According to the Committee, the prohibition of 
refoulmeent is non-derogable and applies in all circumstances,
169
 
including cases concerning terrorism.
170
 Moreover, the Committee has 
asserted that the phrase ‘another State’ in Article 3 implies the 
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 In the following cases concerning asylum seekers challenging a deportation 
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extension of protection from expulsion of a person to any country 
where the individual may subsequently be expelled, returned, or 
extradited to another dangerous State.
171
 
Under Article 22 of the CAT, States Parties can make an optional 
declaration recognizing ‘the competence of the Committee to receive 
and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals subject 
to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by a State 
Party of the provisions of the Convention.’ So far, the Committee 
against Torture has received a huge number of communications by 
asylum seekers falling outside the scope of the Geneva Convention’s 
persecution grounds. And, in many of these cases, it found that the 
forcible removal of the applicants would breach the prohibition of 
refoulement, inscribed in Article 3of the Convention.
172
 
For instance, Ms. Muzonzo, a Zairian citizen asylum seeker, 
lodged a complaint with the Committee against Torture after the 
Swedish Board of Immigration rejected her asylum application and 
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returned her to Zaire where she had been imprisoned, raped, and 
tortured because of her membership in the  UDPS, the opposition 
party to the Government party MPR. As confirmed by the Swedish 
Aliens Appeal Board, the political situation in Zaire had improved and 
Ms. Muzonzo was no longer at risk of being persecuted by the 
governmental authorities. The Committee against Torture concluded, 
instead, that the return to Zaire would constitute a violation of Article 
3 of the Convention as substantial grounds still existed for believing 
that the applicant would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
173
 
In this context, the Committee relied on the position of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, according to whom: 
 
Deportees who are discovered to have sought asylum abroad undergo 
interrogation upon arrival at Kinshasa airport, following which those who are 
believed to have a political profile are at risk of detention and consequently ill-
treatment. The Committee also notes that, according to the information available, 
members of the UDPS continue to be targeted for political persecution in Zaire.
174 
 
The Committee against Torture reached the same conclusion with 
regard to Ismail Alan, a Turkish citizen from Kurdish background, 
who applied for asylum in Switzerland. He claimed that because of 
his membership in an outlawed Kurdish marxist-leninist organisation, 
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he had been arrested several times, tortured, and interrogated about 
his organizational activities. According to the Committee, returning 
the applicant to Turkey would amount to refoulement in breach of 
Article 3 of the Convention. In the Committee’s view: 
 
The existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of 
human rights in a country does not as such constitute a sufficient ground for 
determining that a person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his 
return to that country; specific grounds must exist that indicate that the individual 
concerned would be personally at risk.
175 
 
The Committee continued by affirming that, in the instant case, 
 
The author's ethnic background, his alleged political affiliation, his history of 
detention, and his internal exile should all be taken into account when determining 
whether he would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return. The 
State party has pointed to contradictions and inconsistencies in the author's story, 
but the Committee considers that complete accuracy is seldom to be expected by 
victims of torture and that such inconsistencies as may exist in the author's 
presentation of the facts are not material and do not raise doubts about the general 
veracity of the author's claims.
176 
 
                                                 
175
 ibid, para 11.2. See also, CT and KM v Sweden, para 7.2; Tala v Sweden, para 
10.1. 
176
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As regards the State party's argument that the complainant could 
find a safe area elsewhere in Turkey, the Committee held: 
 
That the author already had to leave his native area, that Izmir did not prove 
secure for him either, and that, since there are indications that the police are looking 
for him, it is not likely that a ‘safe’ area for him exists in Turkey. In the 
circumstances, the Committee finds that the author has sufficiently substantiated 
that he personally is at risk of being subjected to torture if returned to Turkey.
177
 
 
Turning now to the ICCPR, Article 7 provides that ‘no one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment [...].’ Firstly, the Covenant encompasses in the list of 
proscribed acts, also cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and 
broadens the net of protection to include guarantees without 
distinction of any kind, against arbitrary arrest or detention, equal 
standing, and fair hearing. In its interpretation of Article 7, the HRC 
has explained that ‘States parties must not expose individuals to the 
danger of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment upon return to another country by way of their 
extradition, expulsion or refoulement.’178 Like the Committee against 
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Torture,  the HRC also considers that the prohibition of refoulement 
under the ICCPR applies in all circumstances,
179
 with regard either to 
the country to which removal is sought or any other country to which 
the person may subsequently be transferred.
180
 The enjoyment of the 
Covenant rights extends to all individuals, ‘regardless of nationality or 
statelessness, such as asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers, and 
other persons who may find themselves in the territory or subject to 
the jurisdiction of the State Party.’181 
Mr Mansour Ahani was an Iranian citizen who was granted refugee 
status by Canada in 1992. However, he was then designated as a 
suspected terrorist and assassin by Canadian authorities, who put him 
in detention pending his deportation to Iran, where Mr Ahani alleged 
he would be tortured and executed. The Committee found that the 
process leading to Ahani’s deportation was procedurally deficient, and 
thus decided not to determine the extent of the risk of torture to Ahani 
prior to his deportation, and whether he suffered torture or other ill-
treatment subsequent to his return. It is nevertheless important to 
stress that the Committee disagreed with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Suresh that deportation to torture could be justified in 
exceptional circumstances. It stated, indeed, that ‘the prohibition on 
                                                 
179
 See, e.g., HRC, General Comment no 29 on States of Emergency (Article 4) UN 
Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 31 August 2001, para. 11; Concluding 
Observations/Comments on Canada, UN Doc CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5, 20 April 2006, 
para. 15. See also, Alzery v  SwedenCCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (2006). 
180
 HRC, General Comment 31, para 12. 
181
 HRC, General Comment 31, para 10. 
 115 
 
torture, including as expressed in Article 7 of the Covenant, is an 
absolute one that is not subject to countervailing considerations.’182 
On 23 July 1992, Mr. C. filed an application for refugee status in 
Australia, on the basis of a well-founded fear of religious persecution 
in Iran as an Assyrian Christian.
183
 However, his application was 
refused both at first instance and in appeal. In June 1993, Mr. C. 
applied to the Minister for Immigration for interim release from 
detention pending the decision of the Federal Court on his refugee 
application. Indeed, his psychological conditions had seriously 
deteriorated following a lengthy incarceration. On 10 August 1994, he 
was released from detention on the basis of special (mental) health 
needs, and applied again for refugee status. In deciding Mr. C’s case, 
the HRC took into account his experiences in Iran as an Assyrian 
Christian, along with the worsening of the situation of that religious 
minority in his country of origin, and the ‘marked deterioration in his 
psychiatric status.’184 Hence, attaching particular weight to the fact 
that the Mr. C. was originally granted refugee status, the HRC stated 
that deporting him to Iran, where it is unlikely that he would receive 
                                                 
182
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the treatment necessary for his mental illness, would amount to a 
violation of Article 7 of the Covenant.
185
 
Mr Alzery was an asylum seeker claiming protection in Sweden.
186
 
However, for reasons of national security, he was deported to Egypt 
where he was seriously tortured, as acknowledged by the HRC in 
November 2006. According to the Committee, the diplomatic 
assurances given by Egypt on the fair treatment of the returnee were 
insufficient to reduce the risk of torture upon removal, and, that 
Article 7 of the Covenant had therefore been violated..
187
As a further 
example, the Zhakhongir Maksudov and Adil Rakhimov, Yakub 
Tashbaev and Rasuldzhon Pirmatov v Kyrgyzstancase concerned the 
extradition to Uzbekistan of four rejected refugees charged in absentia 
of terrorism. In its final views, the HRC held that extradition would 
amount to a breach of Article 7 because of the risk of torture in the 
country of origin.
188
 
 
2.4.2. The ECHR 
There is an increasing consensus among human rights scholars that 
                                                 
185
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Article 3 of the ECHR offers more protection from refoulement than 
other international refugee and human rights instruments for two main 
reasons: first, its ruling out in absolute terms of torture and inhuman 
or degrading treatment;
189
 second, the recognition that any kind of ill-
treatment - regardless of the reasons behind it – is forbidden. In 
addition, the judgments of the Court of Strasbourg can also influence 
other jurisdictions and not only the regional area represented by the 
Council of Europe States. Without excluding that other provisions of 
the ECHR can also afford protection against refoulement, the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence on this point has so far been primarily based 
on Article 3.
190
 Hence, for the purpose of this thesis, focus is placed 
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on Article 3 of the Convention. 
As a general premise, a State is responsible under the ECHR if it 
commits a violation with regard to a person who is on its territory, and 
clearly within its jurisdiction.
191
 Indeed, pursuant to Article 1 of the 
ECHR, ‘The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this 
Convention.’  
 The starting point for any analysis of breaches of Article 3 
resulting from extradition/expulsion is the Soering v UK case 
concerning a West German national who, after murdering his 
girlfriend’s parents in Virginia, fled to the United Kingdom.192 Since 
the UK Government decided to accept the request of extradition 
issued by the United States, Mr. Soering lodged a complaint with the 
European Commission of Human Rights which referred the case to 
the European Court. The latter held that: 
 
It would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the Convention, that 
‘common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law’ to 
which the Preamble refers, were a Contracting State knowingly to surrender a 
fugitive to another State where there were substantial grounds for believing that he 
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would be in danger of being subjected to torture, however heinous the crime 
allegedly committed.
193
 
 
A State is responsible under the Convention if it renders a person 
to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that she 
will face a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. However, as a mere possibility of 
inhuman treatment is not sufficient for a violation of Article 3 to be 
established,
194
 the applicants must show that they would be exposed to 
a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment upon 
return.
195
 According to the Court, ‘Article 3 does not refer exclusively 
to the infliction of physical pain but also of mental suffering, which is 
caused by creating a state of anguish and stress by means other than 
bodily assault.’196 Moreover, once the applicant has adduced evidence 
proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that 
deportation would expose her to a real risk of torture and inhuman 
treatment, it is then for the respondent State to dispel any doubt about 
it.
197
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A few years later, the European Court drew on the Soering 
principle in the Chahal v UK case by asserting that: 
 
The prohibition provided by Article 3 against ill-treatment is equally absolute in 
expulsion cases […]. In these circumstances, the activities of the individual in 
question, however undesirable or dangerous cannot be a material consideration. The 
protection afforded by Article 3 is thus wider than that provided by Articles 32 and 
33 of the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.
198
 
 
Saadi v Italy is a landmark ruling grounded on the same principles 
established by the ECtHR in both Soering and Chahal.
199
 Saadi v Italy  
contributes to the reaffirmation of non-refoulement, in cases dealing 
with  expulsions to unsafe third countries, as a principle having an 
absolute value, particularly in an international climate calling on 
States to strike a balance between fundamental individual rights and 
the collective right for security threatened by terrorist violence.
200
 On 
the basis of detailed reports surrounding the precarious situation of 
human rights in Tunisia, the Court concluded that the decision to 
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deport the applicant to Tunisia would breach Article 3 of the Convention 
if it were enforced.201 
On 11 August 2006, Mr Saadi requested political asylum in Italy. He 
alleged that he had been sentenced in absentia in Tunisia for political 
reasons and  that he had a real risk of  being subjected to torture and 
‘political and religious reprisals’ in his home country. However, his 
request was declared inadmissible on the ground that the applicant was a 
danger to national security.202  
According to the ECtHR, 
 
Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is 
permissible under Article 15, even in the event of a public emergency threatening 
the life of the nation. [...] The nature of the offence allegedly committed by the 
applicant is therefore irrelevant for the purposes of Article 3.
203
 
 
 The ECtHR thus rejected the argument advanced by the Italian 
Government, by asserting that diplomatic assurances did not provide 
secure and effective long-term protection against the risk of ill-
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treatment, and as a result, these assurances did not eliminate the risk 
of refoulement.
204
 
Judge Zupancic asserted that the increased terrorist threat cannot 
call into question the absolute value of Article 3 even if: 
 
From the policy point of view it is clear that the expelling State will in such 
situations be more eager to expel. The interest of a party, however, is no proof of its 
entitlement. The spirit of the ECHR is precisely the opposite. The Convention is 
conceived to block such short circuit logic, and protect the individual from the 
unbridled ‘interest’ of the executive branch or sometimes even of the legislative 
branch of the State.
205
 
 
The implicit prohibition of refoulement under Article 3 of the 
ECHR was extended from the context of extradition in the Soering 
case to the context of asylum with the Cruz Varas judgment 
concerning Sweden’s  expulsion of a Chilean protection seeker back 
to Chile. In the 2011 joint case of Sufi and Elmi v UK, the ECtHR, 
following NA v the United Kingdom,
206
 argued that the sole question 
to consider in the case of expulsion of an asylum seeker is: 
 
                                                 
204
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 Whether, in all the circumstances of the case before it, substantial grounds have 
been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned, would face a real 
risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. If the 
existence of such a risk is established, the applicant’s removal would necessarily 
breach Article 3, regardless of whether the risk emanates from a general situation of 
violence, a personal characteristic of the applicant, or a combination of the two 
(emphasis added).
207
 
 
Therefore, in the case at issue, it ruled that the removal of Mr. Sufi 
and Mr. Elmi to Somalia would put them at risk of ill-treatments 
prohibited by Article 3.
208
 Indeed, the current situation of generalized 
violence in Mogadishu was of sufficient intensity to create such a 
risk.
209
 
Moreover, the ECtHR offers remarkable opportunity in terms of 
protection of refugee rights because of the protection it ensures, in 
exceptional circumstances, against expulsion to countries where the 
applicants do not have adequate medical treatment or an adequate 
standard of living.
210
 For example, in the MSS v Belgium and Greece 
case, the Court held that the conditions in which the asylum seeker 
was living in Greece reached the Article 3 threshold. The lack of food, 
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hygiene, and shelter made his state of serious deprivation and want 
wholly incompatible with human dignity.
211
 
Article 3 of the Convention also forbids indirect refoulement to the 
country of origin via another State. In the TI v United Kingdom case, 
the ECtHR elaborated this principle in respect to a Contracting Party 
to the Convention.
212
 The case concerned a Sri Lankan asylum seeker 
- persecuted by a Tamil terrorist organization - who challenged the 
decision of the UK government to transfer him to Germany under the 
Dublin Convention. The Court determined that the UK would be 
responsible if the return to Germany had put into motion a chain of 
events resulting, then, in an indirect removal to the country of origin 
where the applicant could be subjected to torture or inhumane and 
degrading treatment.
213
 Nevertheless, it declared the case 
inadmissible, since there was no real risk that Germany would expel 
the applicant to Sri Lanka without the opportunity to apply for 
asylum. Because Germany did not consider persecution by non-state 
actors as a ground for granting refuge, Mr. TI did not feel safe, and 
after the Court’s decision disappeared once for all.214 
By referring to its previous case law in the context of expulsions, 
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in Hirsi v Italy, the Court confirmed that the prohibition of torture 
implies an obligation not to remove the individual in question where 
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the returned 
person would face a real risk of treatments banned by Article 3.
215
 
Thus, the fact that Italian authorities pushed intercepted refugees back 
to Libya without assessing their protection claims indeed exposed 
those persons to direct and indirect refoulement, because of the risk of 
inhumane and degrading treatment in Libya and in their countries of 
origin, Eritrea and Somalia. In line with Hirsi v Italy, the ECtHR 
issued an interim measure against Malta to halt the deportation to 
Libya of 102 Somali refugees who were intercepted on 9 July 2013 by 
Maltese Armed Forces and brought to an onshore detention centre.
216
 
In Hirsi v Italy, the Court reaffirmed the absolute nature of the 
prohibition of indirect refoulement by imposing upon the transferring 
State the obligation of  verifying - before the actual transfer - whether 
the intermediary country ensures adequate guarantees against the 
removal of the persons concerned to their countries of origin. This 
duty becomes even more compelling when the receiving country is 
not a party to the ECHR.
217
 With regard to the Hirsi v Italy case, the 
UNHCR and several reports of human rights NGOs had clearly 
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depicted the risks for migrants and refugees returned to Somalia and 
Eritrea after irregularly leaving their home countries. The Court tried 
to establish whether Italian authorities could reasonably expect that 
Libya was able to offer safeguards against arbitrary repatriation. As 
this question was answered in the negative, it therefore concluded that 
the applicants were exposed to the risk of arbitrary repatriation, and 
that Italian authorities knew or should have known that Libya did not 
provide any guarantees against such a risk.
218
 
Another important issue to consider concerns whether procedural 
requirements exist fleeing from the ECHR that could prevent onward 
expulsions from one State to another without substantive examination 
of the asylum claim anywhere. Analyzing the jurisprudence of the 
Court would serve to assess whether the continuous shuttling of 
migrants between different States may result in a violation of Article 3 
of the ECHR. Onward expulsions of an asylum seeker to a third 
country inevitably carry with them a certain degree of uncertainty 
regarding the level of protection offered by the third States involved. 
Even if the latter are considered safe countries providing guarantees 
against refoulement, insecurity still remains and the perspective of a 
certain dreaded event along with the ‘ever present and amounting 
anguish of anticipating’ could bring the treatment within the scope of 
Article 3 of the ECHR. This issue will be better discussed below in 
                                                 
218
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the section on the right to access asylum procedures. 
In sum, the cases examined so far do not only demonstrate how 
individuals can challenge expulsion to countries where their life may 
be threatened or where they risk undergoing indirect refoulement, but 
also how international human rights bodies serve to counterbalance  
the leeway given to governments to unduly emphasize uncertain and 
flexible national security interests to the detriment of the protection of 
refugees’ fundamental rights.  
 
2.5. Extraterritorial applicability of the principle of non-
refoulement 
The ensuing Sections are aimed at examining whether the 
prohibition of refoulement applies beyond the territory of the 
signatory States to the Geneva Convention, the ECHR, the CAT, the 
ICCPR, and the CFR in relation to persons who claim protection at 
the border of a State party, or who are intercepted at sea.
219
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2.5.1. (…) Under international refugee law  
What is certain is that there is no consensus on the geographical 
scope of Article 33 of the Geneva Convention. The travaux 
préparatoires, despite their supplementary character as means of 
interpretation, can be of some utility in understanding the 
disagreement concerning the applicability ratione loci of the 
Convention. What has emerged from the discussions taking place 
within the ad hoc Committee composed of thirteen government 
representatives entrusted with the writing of a draft text, is that whilst 
the decision to leave out a provision on admission was amply 
shared,
220
 the majority of the drafters supported an inclusive reading 
of non-rejection at the border.
221
 The French term ‘refoulement’ was 
thus meant to include not only return from the territory but also non-
admittance at the border.
222
 
In particular, the participants emphasized that the principal aim of 
the provision is to prohibit the refugee’s return ‘in any manner 
whatsoever’ ‘to the frontiers of territories’ where her life or freedom 
would be endangered,
223
 thus leaving room also for an interpretation 
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encompassing ‘rejection at the border.’224 Indeed, as long as a refugee 
has approached a border guard at the border of the country of refuge, 
she has already left the country of persecution, which, therefore, will 
no  longer be able to place the refugee under its control without 
violating the sovereignty of the State where the refugee expects to 
find safety. The same reasoning also applies  to cases where  a refugee 
arrives by plane and is held in the transit zone of international 
airports.
225
 
By contrast, at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries in July 1951, 
any extraterritorial applicability of the Convention under Article 33 
was rejected. Such a restrictive approach found validation in the oft-
quoted Sale v Haitian Centres Council case - grounded in a textual 
interpretation of the Treaty - where the US Supreme Court refused the 
extraterritorial relevance of Article 33(1). It construed Article 33(1) of 
the Geneva Convention as having no extraterritorial applicability and 
conclusively established that refugees claiming asylum outside the US 
borders were not entitled to alleged procedural protection, or to escape 
repatriation, even in the face of persecution at the hands of their 
governments.
226
 This judgement, however, has been sharply criticized, 
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inter alia, by the dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun,
227
 several 
scholars,
228
 the Inter-American Commission,
229
 as well as the 
UNHCR according to which Article 33(1) does not have any 
geographical limitation.
230
 While, indeed, specific territorial 
limitations have been set forth in other Articles of the Treaty, no such 
restriction is embodied in paragraph 1 of Article 33.
231
 
A case raising similar issues, but in a different context, is the 
Prague Airport case, considering the applicability of the Geneva 
Convention to a pre-clearance procedure carried out by the British 
immigration authorities in the Czech Republic, with the purpose of 
intercepting Czech nationals of Roma origin who attempted to leave 
the country to claim asylum abroad.
232
 The English Court of Appeal 
convened that Sale was ‘wrongly decided’ as it shall be 
‘impermissible to return refugees from the high seas to their country 
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of origin.’233 Even if no Convention provision absolved States from 
controlling the movements of third country nationals outside their 
borders, the same reasoning was upheld by the majority of Lords in 
the 2004 judgement.
234
 
Beyond the drafting history of the Geneva Convention, it is notable 
how the issue of the applicability ratione loci of the prohibition of 
refoulement has fueled a vivid doctrinal legal debate. State authorities 
have tried to temper the claim for extraterritorial application of Article 
33 of the Geneva Convention by picking those arguments that would 
not bind them to respect non-refoulement wherever a refugee is 
found.
235
 It follows, therefore, that extensive or restrictive readings of 
the Convention will depend on the interpretative methods used.  
One of the main points of discussion concerns the expression ‘in 
any manner whatsoever’ contained in Article 33(1). From the drafting 
history and the travaux préparatoires, it emerges that this reference 
was not inserted to extend the geographical application of the 
Convention. Rather, it was included with the idea of covering any 
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kind of refoulement (e.g., expulsion, refusal of admittance, removal, 
extradition) by judicial or administrative authorities.
236
 
Although the language of Article 33(1) does not concede any 
explicit indication of its extraterritorial applicability, scholars have not 
refrained from expanding the reach of this provision beyond situations 
at the border—for example, in situations of interception on the high 
seas or in the case of pre-screening measures undertaken by a State’s 
immigration officials at the airport of another State.
237
 They have 
argued, for instance, that ‘the ordinary meaning of refouler is to drive 
back, repel, or re-conduct, which does not presuppose a presence in-
country’, thereby encouraging the view that Article 33(1) would 
encompass rejection at the border, in transit zones, and on the high 
seas.
238
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Some commentators have put the accent on where the refugee is 
sent to rather than where she is sent from. This reading would be 
supported by the inclusive wording of Article 33(1) whereby ‘[n]o 
Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened (emphasis added).’239 One would expect 
that any action of migration control (wherever undertaken) resulting 
in refoulement to the borders of such territories would amount to a 
breach of Article 33(1).
240
 In this regard, it has been noted that: 
 
The word used is ‘territories’ as opposed to ‘countries’ or ‘States.’ The 
implication of this is that the legal status of the place to which the individual may be 
sent is not material. The relevant issue will be whether it is a place where the person 
concerned will be at risk.
241
 
 
Also the context of the treaty and ‘the social and humanitarian 
character of the problem of refugees’242 - as stated in the Preamble - 
would speak for a wider interpretation of the Geneva Convention and 
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the widest possible exercise of the rights therein enshrined.
243
 It has 
also been argued that the lack of emphasis on the extraterritorial scope 
of Article 33 can be due to the absence of any historical precedents, 
since the Convention was drafted mainly as a response to the plight of 
Jewish refugees in Europe during the Second World War.
244
 
As we will better explore in the next Chapter, refusing to grant an 
asylum seeker access to the territory of the intercepting State for the 
purpose of examining protection claims can never be automatic. 
Therefore, regardless of whether interception takes place at the border 
or on the high seas, it is always necessary to assess the  safety of the 
place to which the refugee is to be sent . By stressing that the decisive 
criterion is whether a person is subject to that State’s effective control 
and authority, the UNHCR itself is of the view that:  
 
The purpose, intent, and meaning of Article 33(1) are unambiguous and establish 
an obligation not to return a refugee or asylum seeker to a country where he or she 
would be at risk of persecution or other serious harm, which applies wherever a 
State exercises jurisdiction, including at the frontier, on the high seas, or on the 
territory of another State (emphasis added).
245
 
 
                                                 
243
 Andreas Fischer Lescano and Tillman Lohr, Border Control at Sea: 
Requirements under International Human Rights and Refugee Law (European 
Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights 2007) 14. 
244
 Hathaway 2005, 337. See also, Justice Blackmun in  Sale, 7. 
245
 UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-
refoulement, 12 para 24. 
 135 
 
This extraterritorial reading of Article 33(1) of the Geneva 
Convention would also be in line with the developments within 
human rights law, which have placed particular emphasis on where 
the refugee is sent to, rather than where the action is initiated.
246
 The 
complementarity between international refugee law and human rights 
law can be grounded in Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT whereby, in 
interpreting a treaty, ‘any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties’ shall be taken into 
account together with the context. According to the ILC,  
 
Article 31(3)(c) also requires the interpreter to consider other treaty-based rules 
so as to arrive at a consistent meaning. Such other rules are of particular relevance 
where parties to the treaty under interpretation are also parties to the other treaty, 
where the treaty rule has passed into or expresses customary international law or 
where they provide evidence of the common understanding of the parties as to the 
object and purpose of the treaty under interpretation or as to the meaning of a 
particular term.
247
 
 
Therefore, with regard to non-refoulement what matters is whether 
a certain conduct giving rise to a breach of a primary obligation is 
attributable to the State, and not whether it takes place within or 
beyond its borders. A State will therefore be responsible for 
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complying with the obligation of non-refoulement each time a person 
is subject to or is within its jurisdiction—that is to say that that 
individual is within the territory of the State concerned, under its 
effective control, or affected by organs acting on behalf of that 
State.
248
 Accordingly, the duty to respect Article 33(1) ‘inheres 
wherever a State exercises effective or de facto jurisdiction outside its 
own territory.’249 
Additionally, given the lack of a clause explicitly restricting the 
geographical scope of Article 33 to the territory of the Contracting 
Parties, no reason exists to exclude its applicability anytime a State 
exercises jurisdiction over a refugee, even in extraterritorial 
contexts.
250
 Jurisdiction is triggered ‘wherever a person is under the 
effective control of, or is directly affected by those acting on behalf 
of, the State in question.’251 Therefore, upholding a broader 
understanding of Article 33 would not only be in line with evolving 
State practice to carry out migration controls beyond territorial 
borders, 
252
 but  would also prevent the establishment of a double 
system where refugees who are able to elude migration controls, thus 
claiming asylum within borders, would obtain greater protection than 
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those intercepted before reaching the territory of the destination State 
where they expect to find refuge.
253
 
 
2.5.2. (…) Under the ICCPR and the CAT 
The extraterritorial relevance of the prohibition of refoulement has 
been endorsed, in several instances, by the UN human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies in relation to Article 7(1) of the ICCPR and Article 
3(1) of the CAT.  
Pursuant to Article 2(1) of the ICCPR, ‘[e]ach State Party to the 
present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant.’ A restrictive and cumulative interpretation 
whereby the ICCPR only applies to people who are at the same time 
physically in the territory and under the jurisdiction of the country is 
supported neither by doctrine nor by the HRC jurisprudence,
254
 and 
would significantly curb human rights protection. In this regard, 
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Tomuschat’s opinion, attached to the Lopez Burgos v Uruguay and 
Celiberti de Casariego v Uruguay cases, can be instructive in order to 
better understand the intentions of the drafters of the Covenant: 
 
To construe the words ‘within its territory’ pursuant to their strict literal meaning 
as excluding any responsibility for conduct occurring beyond the national 
boundaries would, however, lead to utterly absurd results. The formula was intended 
to take care of objective difficulties which might impede the implementation of the 
Covenant in specific situations. [...] It was the intention of the drafters, whose 
sovereign decision cannot be challenged, to restrict the territorial scope of the 
Covenant in view of such situations where enforcing the Covenant would be likely 
to encounter exceptional obstacles. Never was it envisaged, however, to grant States 
parties unfettered discretionary power to carry out willful and deliberate attacks 
against the freedom and personal integrity of their citizens living abroad. 
Consequently, despite the wording of Article 2(1), the events, which took place 
outside Uruguay, come within the purview of the Covenant.
255
 
 
 Therefore, a State party to the ICCPR is responsible for 
guaranteeing the rights of the Covenant to all individuals who are 
present either within or outside its territory provided they fall within 
its jurisdiction.
256
 From the case law of the HRC and its General 
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Comment 31, it emerges that what is decisive in establishing State 
responsibility is the relationship between the individual and the State 
- whether then, a person is under the jurisdiction or the effective 
control of the Contracting State, regardless of her location, and in 
relation to a violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.
257
 
In the Lopez Burgos v Uruguay case, the Committee explains how the 
reference to ‘individuals subject to its jurisdiction’ under Article 2(1) 
of the Covenant, ‘is not to the place where the violation occurred, but 
rather to the relationship between the individual and the State in 
relation to a violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant, 
wherever they occurred.’258 It should also be observed that for 
protection under the Covenant to be invoked, it is not necessary that 
the individual be a national of the responsible State: indeed, in the 
case against Uruguay, the applicant was affected by the conduct of 
Uruguayan agents acting on foreign territory. Furthermore, in a 
number of Concluding Observations, the Committee has upheld the 
dogma that a State party is responsible toward anyone within the 
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effective control and power of the State in question, regardless of the 
place where the violation occurred.
259
 
The jurisprudence of the Committee seems to confirm the 
extraterritorial scope of the Covenant to the non-refoulement 
obligation where individuals are under the power or actual control of 
the State itself. This also implies a prohibition on returning a person 
where reliable grounds exist to believe that she will suffer irreparable 
harm either in the readmitting country or in any other country to 
which  she could subsequently be removed.
260
 Indeed, in its 
Concluding Observations on the United States, the HRC argues that: 
 
The State party should take all necessary measures to ensure that individuals, 
including those it detains outside its own territory, are not returned to another 
country by way of, inter alia, their transfer, rendition, extradition, expulsion, or 
refoulement if there are substantial reasons for believing that they would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.
261
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The HRC confirms the extraterritorial applicability of the 
prohibition of refoulement in the more recent case of Munaf v 
Romania, where it found no breach of the Covenant’s articles with 
regard to the handover of an Iraqi-American dual national criminal 
suspect from the Romanian Embassy in Baghdad to the custody of the 
multinational forces in Iraq.
262
 Nonetheless, the Committee took the 
opportunity to recall ‘its jurisprudence that a State party may be 
responsible for extraterritorial violations of the Covenant, if it is a link 
in the causal chain that would make possible violations in another 
jurisdiction.’263 
The extraterritorial applicability of the ICCPR has also been 
upheld by the ICJ in the case on the Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory where 
the Court observed that: 
 
While the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be 
exercised outside the national territory. Considering the object and purpose of the 
[ICCPR], it would seem natural that, even when such is the case, States parties to 
the Covenant should be bound to comply with its provisions.
264
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Similarly, the Committee against Torture maintains that the non-
refoulement obligation inscribed in Article 3 of the CAT applies in 
any territory under a State party’s jurisdiction—that is to say ‘all areas 
under the de facto effective control of the State party, by whichever 
military or civil authorities such control is exercised.’265 For example, 
in the context of Guantánamo Bay, the Committee expressed its 
concern ‘that the State party considers that the non-refoulement 
obligation, under Article 3 of the Convention, does not extend to a 
person detained outside its territory […].’266 Indeed, the provisions of 
the CAT that have an extraterritorial scope ‘apply to, and are fully 
enjoyed, by all persons under the effective control of its authorities, of 
whichever type, wherever located in the world.’267 
The CAT offers a vast range of guarantees to people subjected to a 
removal decision: no restriction, indeed, is made on the personal 
scope of Article 3 according to which no State party can extradite, 
return, or expel a person to another State where she would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture. Scholars such as Nowak and 
McArthur have clarified that the refrain ‘another State’ does not 
encompass only the country of origin but shall be broadly interpreted 
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as referring ‘to any transfer of a person from one State jurisdiction to 
another.’268 
Although this Convention does not contain any general provision 
on the territorial scope of Article 3, the textual meaning of the terms 
‘expel’ and ‘return’ implicates both a territorial and extraterritorial 
application of the principle of non-refoulement. A different and more 
restrictive interpretation, as previously explained in the case of Article 
33(1) of the Geneva Convention would justify the decision of States 
parties to send back to the risk of persecution any individual who has 
not managed to reach or to enter their territory.
269
 Therefore, the 
decisive factor is the de facto causal relationship between the State 
and the individual and the capacity of the former to affect or protect 
the rights of the latter.  
As formulated by the Committee in the Concluding Observations 
on the United States,  
 
The State party should recognize and ensure that the provisions of the 
Convention expressed as applicable to ‘territory under the State party’s jurisdiction’ 
apply to, and are fully enjoyed, by all persons under the effective control of its 
authorities, of whichever type, wherever located in the world.
270
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It can thus be inferred that Article 3 of the CAT is pertinent also in 
all those situations in which the denial of access to the territory at the 
border has as a direct consequence the return of a person to a territory 
where she risks being subjected to torture.
271
 
The Committee against Torture has specifically addressed the issue 
of the applicability of Article 3(1) of the Convention in situations of 
non-refoulement at sea. In the 2008 JHA v Spain (Marine I) case, the 
Committee against Torture found that the responsibility of the 
respondent State with regard to non-refoulement was a consequence 
of both Spain’s interdiction programme and the extraterritorial 
examination of asylum claims.
272
 The case was declared inadmissible 
because the complainant was not properly authorized to represent the 
alleged victims. Nonetheless, the Committee emphasized the 
responsibility of Spain as it exercised control over the intercepted 
people from the outset - by providing assistance in the context of 
search and rescue after receiving the distress call from the vessel - and 
throughout their detention in Mauritania and the process of 
repatriation. In issuing its final views, the Committee against Torture: 
 
Recalls its General Comment No 2, in which it states that the jurisdiction of a 
                                                 
271
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State party refers to any territory in which it exercises, directly or indirectly, in 
whole or in part, de jure or de facto effective control, in accordance with 
international law. [. . .] It considers that such jurisdiction must also include 
situations where a State party exercises, directly or indirectly, de facto or de jure 
control over persons in detention [. . .]. In particular, the State party exercised, by 
virtue of a diplomatic agreement concluded with Mauritania, constant de facto 
control over the alleged victims during their detention in Nouadhibou. 
Consequently, the Committee considers that the alleged victims are subject to 
Spanish jurisdiction [. . .] (emphasis added).
273
 
 
A similar reasoning was followed by the Committee against 
Torture in the Sonko v Spain case
274
 concerning the death of a migrant 
intercepted by the Spanish Civil Guard while swimming in an effort to 
enter the Autonomous City of Ceuta. Mr. Sonko was pulled out of the 
water along with other migrants while still alive and brought into 
Moroccan territorial waters, where he was thrown into the sea after 
the Civil Guard officers had punctured his dinghies.
275
Although one 
of the officers jumped into the water to help him and save him from 
drowning, Mr. Sonko died shortly thereafter. The Committee held that 
the concept of jurisdiction as ‘effective control and authority’ is 
applicable in respect of all the provisions of the CAT. It concluded 
that the Civil Guard officers were exercising effective control over the 
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persons on board – even if the vessel was in Moroccan territorial 
waters – and were therefore responsible for the safety of the 
intercepted migrants.
276
 
 
2.5.3. (…) Under the ECHR 
As a preliminary note, the emphasis of this thesis will primarily lie 
on State responsibilities regarding the treatment of refugees arriving 
by sea. Nonetheless, conclusions drawn from this analysis are also 
pertinent for other forms of extraterritorial immigration controls. It is 
also worth adding that the above-discussed cases of extradition and 
expulsion resulting in refoulement should not be confused with the 
issue of extraterritorial application of human rights treaties,
277
 since 
they do not concern the actual exercise of a State’s jurisdiction 
abroad.  
In human rights treaties, ‘jurisdiction’ refers to an ‘actual exercise 
of control and authority’ by a State over persons or territory.278 Every 
time a State exercises this power, it must protect and ensure the rights 
of people under its control. Whilst in Hirsi v Italy, the ECtHR dealt 
                                                 
276
 ibid, para 10.3 
277
 Marko Milanovic, The Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties 
(Oxford University Press 2011) 8. 
278Theodor Meron, ‘Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties’ (1995) AJIL78-83; 
Pasquale De Sena, La nozione di Giurisdizione Statale nei Trattati sui Diritti 
dell’Uomo’ (Giappichelli 2002); George Ress, ‘Problems of Extraterritorial Human 
Rights Violations. The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights’(2002) 
IYIL51-67; Milanovic 2011, 8. 
 147 
 
with the question of the extraterritorial interpretation of ‘jurisdiction’ 
somewhat briefly, it did develop its previous jurisprudence by 
affirming that the ratione loci scope of the Convention extends also to 
the high seas, provided that the State exercises effective control and 
authority through its organs over the individuals concerned. And in 
the instant case, the Court held the respondent State exercised 
jurisdiction.
279
 
 Pursuant to Article 1 of the ECHR, ‘The High Contracting Parties 
shall secure to everyone [therefore even refugees, stateless persons, 
and undocumented migrants] within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.’ Since the phrase of 
Article 1 ‘under its jurisdiction’ is not geographically limited, it could 
be interpreted as  exceeding the territorial borders of the State in 
question. However, it is beyond doubt that the concept of ‘jurisdiction 
as a threshold criterion of responsibility’ for human rights breaches is 
awkward, especially when complaints stem from extraterritorial acts 
or omissions.
280
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     The jurisprudence of the European Commission on Human 
Rights and the Court has contributed to clarifying the terms of an 
enduring debate on the geographical scope of the Convention by 
enhancing an understanding of jurisdiction as applicable also outside 
the territory covered by the Council of Europe Member States.
281
 A 
heated debate on the extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR has 
unfolded in the wake of the Bankovic v Belgium case where the Court 
rejected the responsibility of the respondent States with regard to the 
NATO bombing of Serbia, a country that was considered as not 
falling within the legal space of the ECHR Contracting Parties.
282
 
  However, the Court has accepted the extraterritorial jurisdiction 
and, therefore, the consequent responsibility of governments for 
actions performed by their authorities outside their borders in several 
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other cases concerning three different circumstances:
283
 i) cases 
‘where the acts of State authorities produced effects or were 
performed outside their own territory’;284 ii) cases in which a 
contracting party ‘exercised effective control of an area outside its 
national territory’ as a consequence of military action;285 iii) cases 
involving the activities of a contracting party’s ‘diplomatic or 
consular agents abroad and on board craft and vessels registered in, or 
flying the flag of, that State.’286 
In several other instances where States acted outside of ECHR 
space, the Court found violations of Convention rights.
287
Although, in 
Hirsi v Italy, the Court reaffirmed that the jurisdiction of a State is 
essentially territorial,
288
 it upholds legal precedents by endorsing the 
view that for extraterritorial jurisdiction to be triggered, ‘a direct and 
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immediate link’289 bringing the rights and freedoms recognized by the 
Convention under the actual power of the State itself, is sufficient.
290
 
Therefore, where exceptional circumstances exist justifying a finding 
by the Court that the State extraterritorial jurisdiction is indeed 
triggered, it has to be determined with reference to the full and 
exclusive control exercised by the State over a prison or ship.
291
 
 To translate this debate into the issue of the protection owed to 
people intercepted on the high seas while striving to touch European 
soil, the Court in Hirsi v Italy was eager to show that its decision was 
consistent with its previous jurisprudence. For instance, in Al-Skeini v 
UK, it recognized that full and exclusive control over individuals was 
sufficient for triggering the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the acting 
State.
292
 The six individuals killed in Iraq in the course of security 
operations fell under the jurisdiction of British authorities who had 
responsibility for maintaining security in South East Iraq. Indeed, 
from the removal of the Ba’ath regime and until the accession of the 
Interim Government, the UK and the USA - by virtue of the relevant 
UN Security Council Resolution and Regulations of the Coalition 
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Provisional Authority in Iraq
293
 - took on the exercise of some public 
powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government.
294
 
Similarly, in the Al Saadoon and Mufdhi v UK case, the ECtHR 
held that the UK exercised jurisdiction when it handed over the 
applicants in its custody in Iraq to the authorities of the host country. 
The Court held that ‘given the total and exclusive de facto, and 
subsequently also de jure, control exercised by the British authorities 
over the premises in question, the individuals detained there, 
including the applicants, were within the UK’s jurisdiction’,295 despite 
the existence of a bilateral agreement with Iraq obliging the British 
authorities to hand over the detainees.
296
 Considering the lack of a 
binding assurance that the death penalty would not be executed, the 
Court stated that: 
 
 The referral of the applicant’s cases to the Iraqi courts and their physical 
transfer to the custody of the Iraqi authorities failed to take proper account of the 
United Kingdom’s obligations under [the Convention] since, throughout the period 
in question, there were substantial grounds for believing that the applicants would 
face a real risk of being sentenced to death and executed.
297
 
 
                                                 
293
 ibid paras 143-8. 
294
 ibid para 149. 
295
Al-Saadoon v UK, para 88. 
296
 ibid paras 126-8, 140-5. 
297
 ibid para 143. 
 152 
 
Therefore, the Court concluded that: 
 
Whatever the eventual result, […] it is the case that through the actions and 
inaction of the United Kingdom authorities the applicants have been subjected […] 
to the fear of execution by the Iraqi authorities. [As] causing the applicants 
psychological suffering of this nature and degree constituted inhuman treatment, 
[…] there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.298 
 
The European Commission on Human Rights has also dealt with 
cases concerning  extraterritorial non-refoulement from an embassy in 
the territory of a non-Contracting Party to the ECHR. For example, 
the WM v Denmark case concerned 18 citizens from the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) whose permission to emigrate to the 
West was denied.
299
 They therefore decided to enter the Danish 
embassy to request the Danish Ambassador to assist them in 
negotiations with the GDR. The Ambassador decided, instead, to hand 
the applicants over German authorities at the hands of whom the 
applicants complained to have suffered treatments that violated  
Article 5. Although the Commission found that ‘what happened to the 
applicant at the hands of the [GDR] authorities [could] not in the 
circumstances be considered to be so exceptional to engage the 
                                                 
298
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responsibility of Denmark’,300 in its admissibility decision, it held 
that: 
 
An act or omission of a Party to the Convention may exceptionally engage the 
responsibility of that State for acts of a State not party to the Convention where the 
person in question had suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of the guarantees 
and rights secured to him under the Convention.
301
 
 
The Al-Jedda v UK case concerned an Iraqi national that - for 
imperative reasons of security in Iraq - in October 2004 was arrested 
on suspicion of involvement in terrorism and subsequently detained 
for over three years at a detention facility in Basra (Iraq) run by 
British forces. When major military operations in Iraq were declared 
complete in May 2003, a United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq 
(UNAMI) was established and the UK became an occupying power. 
According to the ECtHR, although the UN Resolution 1511, adopted 
on 16 October 2003, authorized ‘a multinational force under unified 
command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the 
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq’, the acts of soldiers 
within the Multi-National Force continued to be attributable to the 
troop-contributing nations, and not to the UN.
302
 Moreover, the US 
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and the UK, through the establishment of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority, ‘continued to exercise the powers of government in 
Iraq.’303 Therefore, because the UK exercised continuous authority 
and control over Mr. Al-Jedda throughout his internment, which took 
place within a detention facility controlled exclusively by British 
forces, the applicant clearly fell under the jurisdiction of the UK for 
the purpose of Article 1 of the Convention.
304
 
Whilst de jure jurisdiction refers to the lawful exercise of authority 
extraterritorially, 
 
De facto jurisdiction can arise in at least three ways. The first is a territorial 
conception based on the occupying power-type scenario. The second scenario is 
personal and involves individuals subject to the State’s physical power or control. 
The third reflects a combination of the territorial and personal elements of the first 
two, with an emphasis on the background exercise of governmental authority.
305
 
 
To recapitulate, the extraterritorial applicability of the Convention 
can be established only on a casuistic basis every time either de jure 
or de facto jurisdiction arises. The inclusion of ‘de facto jurisdiction’ 
implies that accountability under human rights law can be established 
also when there is no entitlement to act under general international 
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law. 
 
   2.5.3.1. (…) In migration control activities beyond borders 
The arguments made above in favor of the extraterritorial 
applicability of the Convention on territories outside the geographic 
area  of the Council of Europe imply that even protection claims made 
at the border of the destination State fall under its jurisdiction. 
Therefore, under the Convention, a  State shall be responsible for any 
act or omission concerning the protection claimant and the entry 
request.
306
 In these circumstances, no difference exists between 
removal and denial of entry, given that both situations would 
potentially expose the individual to proscribed ill-treatment.
307
 Hence, 
the prohibition of refoulement implicit in Article 3 shall be applied to 
people claiming protection within the territory of a State party to the 
Convention, as well as to those intercepted at the border, without 
distinction.
308
 
Whereas the applicability of the principle of non-refoulement to 
protection seekers claiming asylum at the border is quite evident, the 
applicability of this principle to people intercepted at sea during 
offshore migration controls is less conclusive. To shed light on this 
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issue, it may help to go back to the views adopted by the Court in 
previous cases. In Xhavara and Others v Italy and Albania, the Court 
held that Italy had a responsibility toward intercepted individuals 
during the performance of border surveillance measures on the high 
seas - and a fortiori for the protection of the principle of non-
refoulement.
309
 The case was declared inadmissible due to failure to 
exhaust domestic remedies. Nonetheless, the Court clarified that the 
sinking of a boat carrying Albanian migrants following a collision 
with an Italian warship - deployed in the framework of an agreement 
authorizing the Italian Navy to board and search Albanian vessels - 
could not exclude the international responsibility of Italy.
310
 
Hirsi extends the decision in Xhavara in so far it is the first case in 
which the Court was called on to deal with persons claiming refuge 
against refoulement on the high seas, further away from the territory 
of a Contracting Party. In Xhavara, Albanians did not seek such 
protection, and as a consequence, the Court did not investigate what 
obligations Italy may have had in this respect. But, as recognized by 
the ECtHR, in the 2009 push-backs, individuals in distress on the high 
seas were entitled to protection and to have their protection claims 
assessed. Indeed, they were, de facto, under the actual control of 
Italian authorities, which were therefore in the position to either 
                                                 
309
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protect or violate their rights. 
The Hirsi reasoning on jurisdiction is grounded on the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence concerning interdiction of vessels on the high seas. In 
the 2010 Medvedyev and Others v France decision, the Grand 
Chamber considered whether the jurisdiction of France could be 
entertained in the case concerning crew members on a Cambodian 
ship intercepted by the French Navy near Cape Verde after obtaining 
the assent of the Cambodian government through a diplomatic note.
311
 
It concluded that the respondent State violated the Convention. Since 
France had continuously exercised full and exclusive control over 
both the Cambodian ship and its crew, even ordering the rerouting of 
the boat, the crew remained de facto, from the time of its interception, 
under the control of French authorities, falling within France’s 
jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1.
312
 In its reasoning, the Court 
also added that: 
 
The special nature of the maritime environment [. . .] cannot justify an area 
outside the law where ships’ crews are covered by no legal system capable of 
affording them enjoyment of the rights and guarantees protected by the Convention 
which the States have undertaken to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction, any 
more than it can provide offenders with a ‘safe haven.’313 
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In the Women on Waves and Others v Portugal case, the ECtHR 
found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention (freedom of 
expression) as the three applicant associations were not allowed by 
the Portuguese government to campaign in favor of the 
decriminalization of abortion.
314
 What is interesting is that activities, 
such as informative meetings on the prevention of sexually 
transmitted diseases or family planning were scheduled to take place 
on board the ship, which was chartered by the three NGOs for the 
purpose of holding their sessions at sea. On 27 August 2004, their 
vessel was banned from entering Portuguese territorial waters through 
the intervention of a Portuguese warship. The Court found a breach of 
the Convention as the interference by the authorities had been 
disproportionate to the informative aims pursued by the applicants.
315
 
In the Hirsi v Italy case, in spite of the fact that the interception 
occurred in international waters, the Italian government had never 
disputed the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 1 of the 
Convention. The applicants were, indeed, put onboard ships whose 
crews were composed of Italian military personnel who exercised a 
‘continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control’ over the 
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314
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intercepted people.
316
And, in line with the Medvedyev principle, this 
deduction would be valid even in  circumstances in which the 
passengers were simply escorted to Tripoli. 
By stressing that the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction must be 
resolved with reference to the particular facts,
317
 the Grand Chamber 
held that intercepted individuals were under the complete, effective, 
and exclusive control of Italian organs. Therefore, it rejected the 
Italian government’s argument that it ‘was not responsible for the fate 
of the applicants on account of the allegedly minimal control 
exercised by the authorities over the parties concerned at the material 
time.’318 As the Court put it: 
 
The exercise of jurisdiction is a necessary condition for a Contracting State to be 
able to be held responsible for acts or omissions imputable to it, which give rise to 
an allegation of the infringement of rights and freedoms set forth in the 
Convention.
319
 
 
Thus, it concluded that Hirsi constituted ‘a case of extra-territorial 
exercise of jurisdiction by Italy capable of engaging that State’s 
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responsibility under the Convention.’320 Despite the fact that the 
Court’s reasoning is not exhaustive on this point, the Hirsi case gives 
room to contend that also a minimal control would be sufficient to 
trigger  the jurisdiction of the State exercising migration controls. 
Indeed, 
 
The Court cannot subscribe to the Government’s argument that Italy was not 
responsible for the fate of the applicants on account of the allegedly minimal control 
exercised by the authorities over the parties concerned at the material time.
321
 
 
A possible interpretation of the ‘effective control’ element would 
link it to the establishment of physical contact between intercepting 
authorities and intercepted people.
322
 However, shifting emphasis 
from State action per se to the consequences of such action, it seems 
fitting to argue that jurisdiction (and potentially responsibility) under 
international human rights law can also be engaged in those 
operations of looser-control at sea - such as intimidating a boat to 
modify its course by screaming or steaming nearby until it  leaves the 
territorial waters or the contiguous zone; as well as conducting or 
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escorting the ship to a third country - which result in the return of 
migrants and refugees to countries where their life and liberty can be 
seriously threatened.
323
 
 The ‘minimal control threshold’ was also applied in the Al-Skeini 
case in respect of one of the six persons killed in Iraq by British 
authorities. According to the applicant, he and his family were sitting 
around the dinner table when there was a sudden burst of machine-
gunfire from outside the building and bullets struck his wife in the 
head.
324
 The Court here held that: 
 
The third applicant's wife was killed during an exchange of fire between a patrol 
of British soldiers and unidentified gunmen and it is not known which side fired the 
fatal bullet. The Court considers that, since the death occurred in the course of a 
United Kingdom security operation, when British soldiers carried out a patrol in the 
vicinity of the applicant's home and joined in the fatal exchange of fire, there was a 
jurisdictional link between the United Kingdom and this deceased also (emphasis 
added).
325
 
 
From the joint reading of these cases, it emerges that the concept of 
‘effective control’ also involves State actions that fall short of 
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arresting or detaining the individuals concerned.
326
 ‘Effective control’ 
indeed implies any coercive conduct imposed on a person through the 
use of direct force (i.e., by shooting or bombing), ‘but also less 
intrusive measures like forcing a boat off of its course’,327 or killing 
someone in an exchange of fire where it is not known which side fired 
the fatal bullet.
328
 
Turning back to the context of migration controls at sea, if 
preventing entry into territorial waters does not automatically amount 
to refoulement, violations of this principle arise if refugees are 
returned to the borders of a dangerous and unsafe country. Therefore, 
interdicting authorities shall always determine whether a specific third 
States is ‘safe, accessible, and reachable for the boat in question.’329 
By referring to its previous case law in the context of expulsions, in 
Hirsi, the Court confirmed that the prohibition of torture implies an 
obligation not to remove the individual in question where substantial 
grounds have been shown for believing that the returned person would 
face a real risk of treatments banned by Article 3.
330
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Additionally, in Hirsi, the Court had the possibility of commenting 
on positive human rights obligations incumbent upon States during 
and after naval interdiction. By stating that the return by Italy of 
interdicted migrants and refugees to Libya, in the absence of any 
procedural safeguards, was impermissible, the Court built on an 
emerging trend in international human right law. As we will see in the 
next Chapters, the salience of Hirsi is not limited to the contribution it 
gave to the refinement of the concepts of jurisdiction and non-
refoulement in extraterritorial contexts, but extends also to the 
discussion on the right to access asylum procedures and effective 
remedies even when migrants and refugees are intercepted on the high 
seas. 
 
2.6. EU law and non-refoulement 
Before starting this Section, the reader should be reminded that this 
thesis will not substantively engage with the study of EU law. 
However, a general overview of the main provisions concerning the 
principle of non-refoulement (as well as the later-assessed right to 
access asylum procedures and effective remedies) is offered as a 
background in the description of the legal instruments applying to the 
rights of refugees in the European context. 
Pursuant to Article 78(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
EU (TFEU),  
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The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and 
temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-country 
national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the 
principle of non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the Geneva 
Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the 
status of refugees, and other relevant treaties. 
 
While Article 4 of the EU CFR provides that ‘no one shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’, the prohibition of refoulement is explicitly recognized 
by Article 19(2) of the EU CFR whereby ‘no one may be removed, 
expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or 
she would be subjected to death penalty, torture or other inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.’331 The ‘Explanations’ to the CFR 
– which applies as long as States are implementing EU law, whether 
or not their actions take place within, at, or beyond the territorial 
borders - affirm that Article 19 incorporates the case law of the 
ECtHR regarding Article 3 of the relevant Convention.
332
 
The EU Schengen Border Code (SBC) refers, in its Preamble, to 
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the rights and principles recognized by the EU CFR.
333
Whilst Article 
3 sets forth that the Code is to be applied without prejudice to ‘the 
rights of refugees and persons requesting international protection, in 
particular as regards non-refoulement’, Article 5(4)(c) allows for 
derogation from  normal entry criteria on account of humanitarian 
grounds or other  international obligations. The Schengen Border 
Code is an EU migration law instrument of special significance by 
virtue of its application in extraterritorial immigration control 
scenarios.
334
 It describes the border in geographical terms (Article 
2(2)) and defines ‘border guards’ as public officials performing their 
surveillance functions ‘along the border or the immediate vicinity of 
that border.’ At the same time, when outlining the different control 
devices, the ratione loci of the Code exceeds the territorial perimeter 
of EU Member States, since extraterritorial controls, either in airports, 
which do not hold the status of international airports, or in the 
territory of a third country are envisioned as possible solutions.
335
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In the Hirsi case, the ECtHR attached particular weight to the 
content of a letter written on 15 May 2009 by Mr Jacques Barrot, 
Vice-President of the European Commission, called to elaborate on 
the material scope of application of the Schengen Border Code.
336
 He 
argued that Italy-Libya push-backs amounted to border surveillance 
operations falling within the purview of the Code by virtue of Article 
12 whereby border surveillance measures are aimed at preventing 
unauthorized border crossings. Therefore, in the wake of the 
Commission’s reasoning, where engaging in interception activities, 
Italy, as an EU Member State, shall always comply with its 
international obligation of non-refoulement as required by the ECHR 
and the Schengen Border Code, whether such activities  are conducted 
in its territorial waters or on the high seas.
337
 
It is also worth adding that Article 21(1) of the Recast 
Qualification Directive clearly confirms the extraterritorial scope of 
non-refoulement, since it obliges Member States to respect this 
principle ‘in accordance with their international obligations.’ 
Contrarily, Recital 21 and Article 3(1) of the Recast Procedures 
Directive limit its scope to territory, border, territorial waters, and 
transit zones.  
                                                 
336
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2.7. Defining the concept of ‘safe third country’  
Over the last two decades, EU Member States have elaborated 
various mechanisms to shift responsibility for asylum seekers to other 
countries either within or outside the EU. Whilst internal transfers of 
responsibility within the EU are governed by the Dublin 
Regulation,
338
 external transfers to non-EU third countries are 
performed through the concepts of ‘safe third country’ - primary focus 
of this Section - and ‘first country of asylum.’339 Yet, most of the 
time, no formal agreement on attribution of State responsibility for 
refugees exists between an EU Member State and a third country, thus 
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conceding ample margin of discretion to governments to discern when 
a State is safe enough to assume responsibility for refugees. 
Readmission agreements, agreements for technical and police 
cooperation, and diplomatic assurances for removing people who are 
considered inconducive to the public good, are some of the bilateral 
arrangements EU Member States have traditionally relied upon to 
implement ‘safe third country’ policies.  
The concept of ‘safe country’ has been described as: 
 
A procedural mechanism for shuttling asylum seekers to other States said to 
have primary responsibility for them, thereby avoiding the necessity to make a 
decision on the merits because another country is deemed or imagined to be 
secure.
340
 
 
Article 31(1) of the Geneva Convention has been frequently 
adduced as a possible legal basis for ‘safe third country’ practices. It 
reads as follows:  
 
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal 
entry or presence, on refugees, who, coming directly from a territory where their life 
or freedom was threatened, enter or are present in the territory without authorization 
[…].  
                                                 
340
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As the next Section will discuss, Article 31(1) solely aims to 
regulate the benefit of non-penalization, without creating any rule 
obligating the asylum seeker to file a protection claim in ‘first 
countries of asylum’ or ‘safe third countries.’341 
The notion of ‘safe third country’, now integrated into the EU 
Recast Procedures Directive and the asylum legislation of almost all 
EU Member States,
342
 continues to be very controversial.
343
In 
delimiting the contours of the term ‘safe’, Article 38 of the Recast 
Procedures Directive allows Member States to apply the ‘safe third 
country’ concept only where the competent authorities are satisfied 
that a person seeking asylum will be treated in accordance with the 
following principles in the third country concerned:  
 
a) Life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion; b) there is no risk of 
serious harm as defined in Directive 2011/95/EU; c) the principle of non-
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refoulement in accordance with the Geneva Convention is respected; (c) the 
prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law, is respected; and 
d) the possibility exists to request refugee status and if found to be a refugee, to 
receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention.
344
 
 
Article 38(2)(a) requires the existence of a reasonable connection 
with the third country that could justify transfer to that State. 
However, it fails to specify what exactly a ‘reasonable’ connection 
means, thereby leaving it to Member States to determine whether even 
mere transit could per se be a sufficient reason for that person to be 
returned to that country.
345
 Moreover, under Article 38(2)(b), Member 
States may decide either to adopt a case-by-case method to determine 
the safety of a country or to apply a more perfunctory approach based 
on national designation of countries generally considered to be safe.
346
 
With regard to the concept of ‘effective protection’, Article 7(2) of 
the 2011 Recast Qualification Directive provides that: 
 
                                                 
344
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Protection against persecution or serious harm must be effective and of a non-
temporary nature. Such protection is generally provided when the actors mentioned 
under points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 take reasonable steps to prevent the 
persecution or suffering of serious harm, inter alia, by operating an effective legal 
system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting 
persecution or serious harm, and when the applicant has access to such protection.
347
 
 
Doctrine and jurisprudence widely endorse the legality of the ‘safe 
third country’ notion as long as a refugee can be returned to a third 
country that  guarantees either ‘comparable’ or ‘equivalent’ protection 
to that granted in the sending State.
348
 It has also been argued that an 
adequate country of first asylum has to provide refugee protection of a 
quality, and at a level, in conformity with the protection scheme laid 
down in the [Geneva] Convention (emphasis added).’349 However, the 
                                                 
347
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Refugees’ Choice versus State’s Exclusion’ in Frances Nicholson and Patrick M 
 172 
 
principle of non-refoulement as enshrined in Article 33 of the Geneva 
Convention ‘is a necessary, but not in and of itself a sufficient, 
criterion to establish a State as a genuine country of first asylum.’350 
Destination States do not examine the substance of the protection 
claim, if an asylum seeker has transited – either with or without 
authorization - through a ‘safe third country’ that is willing to readmit 
her. Applying a sort of admissibility criterion, a State can remove an 
asylum seeker without an examination in the merits as long as the 
foreigner is treated - before return - as she was entitled to protection 
from refoulement. Accordingly, the readmitting country can be 
considered safe only if the individual will have access to effective 
protection, ‘will be treated in accordance with international 
standards’,351 and will have the possibility to seek and enjoy 
asylum.
352
 Thus, the literature has so far focused on the following 
questions: i) whether it is de facto possible for the second State to 
determine the safety of the third country without carrying out a 
particularized assessment of the claim; and ii) whether the mere 
ratification of international refugee and human rights instruments is 
sufficient to infer safety. 
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Regimes (Cambridge University Press 1999) 279. 
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Burgeoning literature has addressed the shortcomings of ‘safe third 
country’ policies. For instance, it has been pointed out how its 
implementation ‘is a misguided approach to asylum which creates 
new problems and avoidable instances of refoulement.’353 Moreover, 
the transfer to ‘safe third countries’ is time-consuming and implies a 
waste of resources for both the States and asylum seekers involved.
354
 
For example, in most instances, third countries make clear that they 
are only able to grant temporary stays to refugees without 
expectations of permanent integration.
355
 As a consequence, asylum 
seekers may be shunted from one State to another, each of which must 
somehow examine individuals’ protection claims before returning 
them to another ‘responsible’ third country. The inevitable risk is to 
increase the number of refugees ‘in orbit’ repeatedly sent from 
country to country without receiving a determination on the merits of 
their claims.
356
 
  Other pitfalls of the ‘safe third country’ policy, as outlined by 
doctrine, derive from both the difficulty in determining the ‘safety’ of 
a third State and in finding a remedy for the problem of chain 
                                                 
353
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deportations, which can result in refoulement. This policy falls within 
States’ efforts, for reasons of ‘procedural economy’,357 to 
expeditiously transfer asylum seekers on the basis of general 
assessments of ‘safety.’ Such a risk increases as long as EU Member 
States enforce return by means of bilateral readmission agreements 
without examining the merits of asylum applications. If requested 
States have concluded readmission arrangements with other countries 
lying earlier in the transit chain, then, conditions would be created to 
send asylum seekers back to the region of origin with serious risks to 
their life or liberty.
358
 
Without rebuffing their protection obligations toward refugees, 
second States argue they fulfil their protection duties by transferring 
asylum seekers to a responsible third country.
359
 Oblivious of the 
consequences, this approach could entail the refusal of asylum 
seekers’ access to the second country’s legal system for both a 
determination of their protection claims and a review of any negative 
decision on their status. Therefore, the assessment of a third country’s 
safety is a conditio sine qua non for EU Member States to avoid 
                                                 
357
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triggering international responsibility for violations of the 
fundamental rights of the returnees. 
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR has recognized, on several 
occasions, that ‘safe third country’ transfers must always comply with 
non-refoulement.
360
 However, the risk of infringements of 
fundamental rights cannot a priori be excluded when they are 
transferred to countries where torture of detainees and migrants is a 
systematic practice or where a national regulatory framework for 
asylum is either totally absent or unduly rudimentary. In addition, if 
these States have concluded readmission agreements with notoriously 
unsafe countries, refugees would run the risk being divested of their 
entitlement to remain in the territory because of the possibility to be 
returned right to the borders of those countries from which  they were 
originally fleeing.  
Some have emphasized how the rights acquired by refugees 
through their presence in the territory of the second State cannot be 
‘removed’ by means of ‘safe third country’ transfers.361 In the Amuur 
v France case concerning a group of Somalis applying for asylum in 
France and forced to stay at the Paris airport waiting for their 
deportation to Syria, the ECtHR held that: 
 
                                                 
360
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[The] possibility [for asylum seekers to leave voluntarily the country] becomes 
theoretical if no other country offering protection comparable to the protection they 
expect to find in the country where they are seeking asylum is inclined or prepared 
to take them in.
362
 
 
The assessment of whether the readmitting third country is actually 
safe does not include only the verification of whether efficient asylum 
procedures are in place, or whether international human rights and 
refugee law instruments have been ratified, but also the ascertainment 
of whether no peril exists for people in need of international 
protection to be onwards sent back into the arms of their 
persecutors.
363
 For example, in the Hirsi v Italy case, the ECtHR held 
that Italy had a duty to verify, before return, that in the receiving 
country, the returned refugees would be able to find protection from 
direct and indirect refoulement.
364
 
 ‘Protection elsewhere’ policies become particularly problematical 
when EU Member States decide to engage in the negotiation of 
agreements linked to readmission with countries that have a doubtful 
track record in human rights or are not bound by the same 
international human rights instruments. Some of these countries are, 
indeed, either among the largest ‘producers’ of refugees and 
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protection claims, or do not have adequate facilities to process 
applications and grant asylum.
365
 For example, although North 
African countries, such as Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia - 
with which either Italy, and to a lesser extent the EU have plunged 
into bilateral cooperation on readmission - are part of the main 
international and regional instruments of refugee protection, they have 
not yet adopted national refugee legislation or established 
comprehensive asylum procedures that conform to  international 
standards. However, even if a State is considered generally safe 
because of the presence of adequate asylum procedures and judicial 
oversight, every individual is entitled to rebut the presumption of 
safety of that country for him or her in the particular case.
366
 
 
2.7.1 Rebutting presumption of safety and legality? 
Despite widespread criticism, the ‘safe third country’ principle 
continues to be inscribed within both the Dublin Regulation and the 
Recast Procedures Directive,
367
 and EU Member States regularly 
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transfer asylum seekers to countries that are presumably safe. 
Scholars have generally criticized an absolute presumption of safety, 
not open to rebuttal, thereby requiring  not only de jure, but also de 
facto compliance with international refugee and human rights law in 
the readmitting country for a safe transfer of responsibility to take 
place.
368
 However, in practice, presumption of safety might not 
always be rebuttable, especially with regard to those States that have 
created lists of countries considered irrefutably safe.
369
 
National and international jurisprudence shows how presumption 
of safety must be rebuttable. Accordingly, the safety of EU Member 
States, such as France, Germany, and Greece has been challenged 
more than one time. For instance, in the cases Adan, Subaskaran and 
Aitseguer, the Court of Appeal of the UK deemed unlawful the 
decision of the Home Secretary to remove two asylum seekers to 
France and Germany, both of which had already rejected their 
applications on the ground that persecution was perpetrated by non-
State actors.
370
 In these cases, therefore, France and Germany were 
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regarded as ‘non-safe third countries’ since they adopted a more 
restrictive interpretation of the grounds for protection as compared to 
the Geneva Convention, which extended protection also to cases of 
non-State actors persecution.
371
 But Italy has also been labelled as 
unsafe by German administrative tribunals because of the risk that 
asylum seekers would not be able to properly lodge their applications 
once sent back to Italy.
372
 
In a number of cases, the ECtHR issued interim measures to halt 
the return of individuals to other European countries. For instance, in 
the landmark MSS v Belgium and Greece case, the Court of 
Strasbourg held that the transferring State must always assure that the 
asylum system in the readmitting country of transit affords sufficient 
guarantees to avoid that an asylum seeker is returned to her country of 
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origin without a substantive assessment of her protection claim under 
Article 3.
373
 Accordingly, by exposing the applicant to the risks of 
deficient asylum procedures and appalling reception conditions in 
Greece, the Court found that both the sending country (Belgium) and 
the receiving country (Greece) violated Article 3 of the ECHR.
374
 
The Court held the view that Belgian authorities should not have 
automatically relied on the presumption of safety inscribed in the 
Dublin Regulation, and that it was for them ‘not merely to assume that 
the applicant would be treated in conformity with the Convention 
standards but [...] to first verify how the Greek authorities applied 
their legislation on asylum in practice.’375 The mere ‘existence of 
domestic laws and accession to international treaties [...] are not in 
themselves sufficient to ensure adequate protection against the risk of 
ill-treatment […].’376 Most importantly, the Court argued that sending 
States should take into consideration not only the deficiencies of the 
asylum system in the readmitting country, but also ill-treatments that 
might result from poor detention and living conditions in Greece.
377
 
When the reality in the readmitting country is well-known, the 
                                                 
373
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374
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sending State has an obligation to take positive measures to avoid 
infringements of Article 3 and to disprove the risk of an Article 3 
violation. Indeed, according to the Court, if Belgian authorities had 
verified how the Greek authorities applied their legislation on asylum 
in practice, ‘they would have seen that the risks the applicant faced 
were real and individual enough to fall within the scope of Article 
3.’378 
On 21 December 2011, the ECJ delivered its judgement in the joint 
cases of NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department and ME 
and Others v Refugee Applications Commissioner under the 
preliminary ruling procedure.
379
 It held that in transferring an asylum 
seeker to another EU Member State under the Dublin Regulation, 
national courts must always follow the rebuttable presumption that in 
the readmitting country that individual will be treated in consonance 
with fundamental rights, and will not be exposed to the risk of onward 
expulsions to a persecuting State, in line with the Geneva Convention, 
the ECHR, and the CFR.
380
 It means that asylum seekers should 
always be given the procedural possibility to rebut that 
presumption.
381
 However, unlike the ECtHR, the EU Court 
                                                 
378
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particularly relied on the principles of ‘mutual confidence’ among 
Member States and ‘presumption of compliance’ with fundamental 
rights.
382
 It also asserted that ‘minor infringments’ of EU asylum law 
and violations of rights other than the prohibition of torture do not 
suffice to suspend a transfer under the Dublin Regulation.
383
 
Whilst only few academics have dealt with the lawfulness of the 
‘safe third country’ notion from an international refugee and human 
rights law perspective
384
 - but without reaching any conclusive answer  
- Moreno-Lax has soundly pushed her criticism to the point of 
rejecting the legality of this concept because of its inherent 
incompatibility with international refugee law in light of universal 
rules of treaty interpretation.
385
 In this view, the implementation of 
‘safe third country’ policies -  whether carried out through 
readmission agreements, push-backs, bilateral or regional 
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arrangements on the distribution of refugees – would be inconsistent 
with the obligations owed by the destination State to refugees who are 
present in its territory or who fall under its jurisdiction. 
To better grasp this argument, a number of points need to be 
highlighted. First, none of the Geneva Convention provisions provide 
a solid legal basis for  the ‘safe third country’ principle. Article 1(e) of 
the Geneva Convention has been invoked as a basis to buttress the 
decision of a State to reject protection of those refugees who have 
already found asylum in one country and that can, therefore, be 
returned there.
386
 It provides that ‘this Convention shall not apply to a 
person who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country 
in which he has taken residence as having the rights and obligations 
which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that 
country.’ Therefore, exclusion from the protection of the Convention 
is justified only if the person concerned has taken residence 
somewhere else and enjoys the rights and obligations attached to 
citizenship. The question is thus whether the protection granted to 
refugees is less than that provided to nationals. To answer this 
question, it can be observed, for example, that whilst citizens and 
persons assimilated to nationals cannot be expelled,
387
 refugees can be 
                                                 
386
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deported under certain circumstances, such as those listed in Article 
32 of the Geneva Convention.
388
 Therefore, invoking Article 1(e) of 
the Geneva Convention as the legal basis for the removal of an 
asylum seeker to an allegedly ‘safe third country’ where she does not 
have residence and does not enjoy the spectrum of rights attached to 
nationality would amount to an extensive interpretation, which goes 
far beyond the ordinary meaning of that provision.
389
 
With regard to Article 31(1) of the Geneva Convention, aalthough 
the term ‘coming directly’ is not sufficiently clear,390 a contextual 
interpretation implies that even a refugee falling outside the scope of 
protection of this provision shall benefit from the prohibition of non-
refoulementunder Article 33(1).
391
 The benefits of this provision shall 
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therefore be accorded to any refugee, with the only exception of those 
who have obtained refugee status and lawful residence in a ‘safe third 
country’ of transit.392 In this view, ‘the real question is whether 
effective protection is available for that individual in that country.’393 
Relying on Article 31(1) to justify pre-procedures removal to a ‘safe 
third country’ would also shift attention to the travel route, rather on 
the reasons motivating the refugee to flee her country and seek 
protection abroad.
394
 
Moreover, the Preamble to the Geneva Convention exhorts 
Contracting Parties to ‘international cooperation’ to alleviate the 
‘unduly heavy burdens’ on certain States that receive the highest 
number of asylum applications.
395
 Therefore, in the light of the 
humanitarian and cooperative purpose of the Geneva Convention, 
penalization of those who might potentially find protection in a transit 
country would shift the reception burden to certain countries 
geographically closer to States of origin, thus bolstering tensions and 
practices contrary to the Convention.
396
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The second point adduced to underline the problematic nature of 
the ‘safe third country’ notion as a legal concept argues that the 
failure of the Geneva Convention to include an explicit right to choose 
the country of refuge cannot automatically displace Convention 
obligations accruing at ‘simple presence’ level.397 None of the 
Convention’s provisions require refugees to seek asylum at any 
particular location or in the first safe country possible.
398
 It cannot 
therefore be excluded that a certain ‘element of choice is indeed open 
to refugees as to where they may properly claim asylum.’399Third, 
presumed transit countries, especially developing countries, have 
often denied responsibility for asylum seekers on the basis of transit 
through their territory and have required a stronger link with the 
refugee in order to assume responsibility.
400
 Fourth, even the EU does 
not offer a uniform definition of the notion of ‘transit’. Whereas some 
Member States insist that months’ long residence in a third country is 
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necessary, others consider even a mere passage, or disembarkation 
into a transit zone sufficient to trigger the responsibility of the third 
country. Fifth, using the EU cooperative framework as a reference 
point, it can be observed that ‘safe third country’ procedures are 
installed by EU Member States pursuant to the Procedures Directive 
through a renvoi to domestic law and national lists of safe 
countries.
401
 Hence, no bilateral agreement exists between the sending 
and the receiving country through which the latter expressly gives its 
consent to readmit an asylum seeker and to  enforce the  same 
obligations the sending country should have fulfilled as a consequence 
of its direct contact with the asylum seeker.  
Considering that the ‘safe third country’ principle cannot be 
inferred from the Geneva Convention, and that States involved in 
‘safe third country’ transfers have never informed the other 
Contracting Parties to the Geneva Convention of their decision to 
modify their obligations inter se, these practices can also be deemed 
inconsistent with Article 41 of the VCLT.
402
 As ‘safe third country’ 
                                                 
401
 See, Article 27(2) of the Procedures Directive and Article 38(2) of the recast 
version.   
402
 Under Article 41 of the VCLT, 1, ‘Two or more of the parties to a multilateral 
treaty may conclude an agreement to modify the treaty as between themselves alone 
if: (a) the possibility of such a modification is provided for by the treaty; or (b) the 
modification in question is not prohibited by the treaty and: (i) does not affect the 
enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of 
their obligations; (ii) does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is 
incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a 
whole. 
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agreements can facilitate the risk of refoulement based on an absolute 
presumption of safety of the readmitting country, ‘the erga omnes 
character of protection obligations under the Refugee Convention pre-
empts the conclusion of subsequent inter se agreements which are 
incompatible with them.’403 
Moreover, the crucial issue is not whether the individual has a right 
to choose the country of asylum, but whether the State under whose 
jurisdiction the asylum seeker stands has any international obligations 
in her regard.
404
 As with other international human right treaties, the 
fact that refugees have transited through other countries before 
reaching the State where they claim asylum is immaterial from the 
perspective of the responsibility of that State.
405
 A State  cannot be 
absolved from its obligations ex nunc toward refugees who are under 
its jurisdiction on the ground that a transit country in the past may 
have become responsible and has failed to act.
406
 The fact that an 
                                                                                                                                                   
2. Unless in a case falling under paragraph 1(a) the treaty otherwise provides, the 
parties in question shall notify the other parties of their intention to conclude the 
agreement and of the modification to the treaty for which it provides.’  
403
 Moreno Lax 2013, 34. See, in this regard, Barcelona Traction (Second phase), 
[1970] ICJ Rep. 3, 32.   
404
 Jean-Francois Durieux, ‘Protection Where? Or When?’ (2009) 21 IJRL75, 76.   
405
 See, e.g., MSS v Belgium and Greece, para 218; Chahal v UK, para. 79; and 
Saadi v Italy, paras 127 and 138-139.   
406
 See, NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v Minister of Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 6, para 84. Contra: Bugdaycay v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [1987] 1 AC 514. In this decision, Bridge of Harwich LJ, 
by relying on ‘the assumption that all countries which adhere to the [Geneva] 
Convention may be trusted to respect their obligations under it’, affirmed that: ‘if a 
person arrives in the United Kingdom from country A claiming to be a refugee from 
country B, where country A is itself a party to the Convention, there can in the 
ordinary case be no obligation on the immigration authorities here to investigate the 
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asylum seeker has illegally crossed the borders of the destination State 
or has transited through another safe country, does not satisfy the 
prima facie conditions related to protection needs as described within 
Article 1(a) of the Geneva Convention.
407
 
 
2.8. Conclusion 
Chapter 2 described the principle of non-refoulement as an 
overarching term whose full meaning can be reconstructed only 
through the use of different international refugee and human rights 
instruments. For the purpose of this thesis, the relevant provisions are 
Article 33(1) of the Geneva Convention, Article 3 of the CAT, Article 
7 of the ICCPR, Article 3 of the ECHR, and Article 19(2) of the CFR, 
which either explicitly or implicitly endorse the prohibition of 
refoulement. This principle entails that expulsion, removal, or 
extradition to a country where an individual can be subjected to death 
penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment should be outlawed. The jurisprudence of the HRC, the 
Committee against Torture and the ECtHR have also upheld the 
application beyond borders of the relevant treaties when States deal 
                                                                                                                                                   
matter … he will be returned to country A, whose responsibility it will be to 
investigate his claim to refugee status and, if it is established, to respect it.’    
407
Moreno-Lax 2013, 26. Further discussion on the ’safe third country’ principle 
will be conducted in Section 3.6 of this thesis, in particular with regard to refugees’ 
access to asylum procedures in the third country as a safety condition. 
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with individuals who risk being subjected to torture or ill-treatment if 
sent back to their home country. 
Scholars of international law are not ready to agree on a common 
qualification of the legal nature of the principle of non-refoulement. 
Notwithstanding, State practice, since the adoption of the 1951 
Geneva Convention, has provided persuasive evidence that this norm 
has achieved the status of customary international law. Indeed, its 
enclosure in fundamental international instruments of both refugee 
and human rights law, as well as into national legislation testifies 
consistent practice and strong opinio juris. 
 In examining whether the ECHR provides for procedural 
requirements preventing onward expulsions from one State to another 
without substantive examination of the protection claim anywhere, 
this Chapter has shown how Article 3 of the ECHR has been 
interpreted as also forbidding indirect refoulement via another 
contracting State.
408
 Onward expulsions of a refugee to a third country 
inevitably carry with them a certain degree of uncertainty regarding 
the level of protection offered by the third States involved. Even if the 
latter are considered safe countries providing guarantees against 
refoulement, insecurity remains and the perspective of a certain 
dreaded event could bring the treatment within the scope of Article 3 
of the ECHR. 
                                                 
408
 See, e.g., TI v UK  and Hirsi v Italy. 
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Chapter 2 also analyzed the concept of ‘safe third country’ as EU 
Member States are not required to examine the substance of the 
protection claim, if a ‘safe third country’ exception applies. A State 
can expel an asylum seeker without an examination on the merits as 
long  it both establishes that the third country will ensure effective 
protection, and that the foreigner is treated - before return - as if she 
were entitled to protection from refoulement. Doctrine and 
jurisprudence widely endorse the view that a refugee may be returned 
to a third country only if the latter guarantees either ‘comparable’ or 
‘equivalent’ protection to that granted in the sending State. It is 
argued here that the principle of non-refoulement is a necessary, but 
not in and of itself a sufficient, criterion to establish the safety of a 
third country. Moreover, whilst the presumption of safety should 
always be open to rebuttal, de jure and de facto compliance with 
international refugee and human rights law in the readmitting country 
is always required for a safe transfer of responsibility to take place.
409
 
However, regardless of the procedural safeguards in place in the 
readmitting States, this Chapter takes into  consideration the reasons 
why the legality of the ‘safe third country’ principle has to be 
challenged under international law. 
Another issue analyzed throughout the course of this Chapter is 
whether the prohibition of refoulement applies beyond the territory of 
                                                 
409
 Noll 2001, 161-182. 
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the States that are signatories of the Geneva Convention, the CAT, the 
ICCPR, the ECHR, and the CFR in relation to persons who claim 
protection at the border of a State party, or who are intercepted at sea. 
With regard to the Geneva Convention, since it is silent on the issue 
of its extraterritorial application, room for contestation is ample.  
The extraterritorial applicability of the principle of non-
refoulement – including in contexts of interception on the high seas – 
is increasingly gaining recognition in the case law of the Committee 
against Torture, the HRC, and the ECtHR. A stated in Hirsi v Italy, 
jurisdiction under Article 1 of the ECHR is mainly, but not 
exclusively, territorial. States’extraterritorial human rights obligations 
are triggered, therefore, wherever they exercise jurisdiction (effective 
control and authority), which includes the high seas. The ECtHR has 
indeed found violations of direct and indirect refoulement. 
The logic of cross-fertilization between human rights and refugee 
law has led the UNHCR and an even greater number of scholars and 
domestic courts to uphold that the principle of non-refoulement as 
enshrined in Article 33(1) of the Geneva Convention applies in 
extraterritorial contexts as well. From the text of this provision it 
emerges that the ‘essential purpose’ of non-refoulement is to ban 
refugees’ removal, extradition, or expulsion, in any manner 
whatsoever, to countries where their life and liberty may be 
endangered. Hence, Article 33(1) can be interpreted as to include non-
 193 
 
rejection at the border or at sea on the ground that ‘the ordinary 
meaning of refouler is to drive back, repel, or re-direct, which does 
not presuppose a presence in-country.’410 A wider interpretation of 
Article 33(1) attempting to ensure the widest possible exercise of the 
rights therein enshrined and also keeping abreast of the evolution of 
both migratory phenomena and border control techniques would also 
find cogency in the Preamble of the Geneva Convention recognizing 
‘the social and humanitarian character of the problem of refugees.’ 
To sum up, through the reading of the Geneva Convention and the 
‘case law’ of the Strasbourg organs and UN Human Rights 
Committees, this Chapter reconstructed the material and normative 
scope of the principle of non-refoulement by establishing its territorial 
and extraterritorial applicability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
410
 Coleman 2009, 253. 
 194 
 
Chapter 3.   The Right to Access Asylum Procedures 
before Return 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The Executive Committee of the UNHCR has often emphasized 
‘the need to admit refugees into the territories of States, which 
includes no rejection at frontiers without fair and effective procedures 
for determining status and protection needs.’411 Pursuant to Article 14 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), ‘Everyone 
has the right to seek and enjoy asylum.’412 Whilst at the EU level, 
Article 18 of the CFR provides for ‘the right to asylum’, Article 22(7) 
of the American Convention on Human Rights recognizes ‘the right to 
seek and be granted asylum’, and Article 12(3) of the African Charter 
guarantees the right of every individual ‘to seek and obtain asylum.’ It 
has therefore been argued that ‘the right to asylum becomes a right of 
individuals, which coexists with the already established right of States 
to grant it.’413 
 This Chapter analyzes the right to access asylum procedures as a 
principle corollary to that of non-refoulement, which can only be 
                                                 
411
 EXCOM Conclusions No 82 Safeguarding Asylum (1997) para d(3). 
412
 UNGA Resolution 217 A (III), 10 December 1948. 
413
 Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union and the Right to be Granted Asylum in the Union's Law’ (2008) 27(3) RSQ 
33, 39. 
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ensured if an individual has access to a fair procedure that thoroughly 
assesses her protection claims. Hence, States shall grant individuals 
invoking international protection access to the territory and to asylum 
procedures, since preventing a refugee from accessing such 
procedures can have the equivalent effect of refoulement.
414
 As 
Costello argues, ‘access to asylum depends practically on access to a 
place of refuge. And securing access to territory means overcoming 
both physical and legal barriers (emphasis added).’415 
It is worth clarifying that, in examining the right to access asylum 
procedures as a pre-removal procedural entitlement, I refer to the 
assessment of refugee status under the Geneva Convention, but also to 
other forms of complementary protection - including subsidiary 
protection - accorded by international human rights law and EU law to 
persons falling outside of the five grounds of persecution of the 
international refugee protection regime.  
The right to access asylum procedures before removal, as a 
precondition to non-refoulement, is still subject to debate. Because 
undertaking status determination is not an express obligation of the 
Geneva Convention, some claim ‘expulsion may take place without a 
prior substantive examination of the protection claims.’416 Indeed, the 
                                                 
414
 Geoff Gilbert, ‘Is Europe Living Up to Its Obligations to Refugees?’ (2004) 15 
EJIL 963, 966. 
415
 Costello 2012, 338. 
416
 Coleman 2009, 238. 
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drafting history of the Convention reveals a deliberate omission of 
any duty of States to undertake status determination.
417
 Nonetheless, 
as the following sections illustrate, access to asylum procedures is a 
necessary procedural pre-requisite to the principle of non-refoulement. 
The 1951 Geneva Convention, the ICCPR, the CAT, the ECHR, and 
the EU CFR will assist us in the reconstruction of this right’s 
normative content.  
 
3.2. Access to asylum procedures under international refugee 
law  
Owing to the declaratory (and not constitutive) nature of refugee 
status, the principle of non-refoulement – enshrined in Article 33(1) of 
the Geneva Convention and examined in Chapter 2 – does not only 
cover recognized refugees but also asylum seekers whose status as 
refugees has not been determined yet. It means they enjoy a prima 
facie refugee status, pursuant to Article 1(a) of the Geneva 
Convention, until a full examination of their status by the State 
discredits their claims.
418
 Including asylum claimants within the 
personal scope of Article 33(1) is the only way to ensure that the 
principle of non-refoulement is respected in practice.  
                                                 
417
 Zwaan 2003, 15-16. 
418
 Thus, once an individual fulfils the requirements of Article 1 of the Geneva 
Convention, she is entitled to some Convention benefits, regardless of her status 
having been determined or not. Battjes 2006, 465. 
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The Geneva Convention sets up no procedural rule concerning how 
the examination of asylum claims should take place. However, as the 
UNHCR states in its intervention in the IM v France case before the 
ECtHR,  
 
While [the Geneva Convention] does not specifically regulate the asylum 
procedure, the enjoyment of the rights it provides for requires that the States Parties 
establish fair and efficient asylum procedures, which allow them to identify the 
persons in need of international protection (emphasis added).’419 
 
UNHCR’s Handbook, which it published pursuant to its mandate 
under Article 35 of the Geneva Convention, is evidence itself of the 
key role that asylum procedures play to secure compliance with the 
treaty as a whole. Issued in 1979, reprinted several times, and last 
reedited in December 2011, the Handbook is a key reference for 
refugee status determination around the world. Indeed, it assists 
government officials, judges, practitioners, and UNHCR staff in 
applying a uniform interpretation of the refugee definition.
420
 
To avoid  unfair asylum procedures that cause  an unjustifiably 
                                                 
419
 UNHCR’s oral intervention at the ECtHR Hearing of the case of IM v France 
App no 9152/09 (ECtHR, 17 May 2011) (English translation of the French version 
as delivered), 1 <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&amp;docid=4dde1a882> 
accessed 31 October 2013. 
420
 UNHCR, Handbook on procedures and criteria for determining refugee status 
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 
HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 3, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4f33c8d92.pdf> 
(UNHCR Handbook on RSD) accessed 31 October 2013. 
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high number of refugees to be returned to their persecutors, in breach 
of Article 33(1), the Geneva Convention ‘shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose’, as 
provided by Article 31 of the VCLT. At the national level, domestic 
courts have confirmed the same principle. For example, the Appeals 
Court of The Hague (the Netherlands) in its judgement on the 
compatibility of the Dutch fast track procedure with Article 33(1) of 
the Geneva Convention affirmed that: 
 
 The Refugee Convention itself contains no provisions on the procedure that the 
Contracting States should follow in order to determine who is a refugee in the sense 
of the Convention. But the prohibition on refoulement of Article 33 Refugee 
Convention does entail that a Contracting State must not establish this procedure in 
such a way that an asylum seeker has insufficient opportunity to show that he or she 
is a Convention refugee, with the result that refugees in the sense of the Convention 
run a disproportionate risk of refoulement.
421
 
 
Thus, in the absence of procedures established by international law 
for the granting of protection, States may apply domestic procedural 
rules giving, however, ‘full effect’ to international asylum law in both 
                                                 
421
 Appeals Court The Hague 31 October 2002, RV 2002, 22 (VAJN and NJCM v 
The Netherlands), para 5.2. Translation  made by Hemme Battjes. 
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at first instance and appeal procedures.
422
 The duty to disembark 
refugees in a place of safety and examine their protection claims shall 
also apply, as an obligation implicit in the principle of non-
refoulement, in cases of extraterritorial migration controls and rescue 
operations on the high seas. In three experts Roundtables convened by 
the UNHCR since 2002, the participants agreed that ‘refugee 
protection issues […] must be addressed as part of the broader 
response to irregular maritime migration, and asylum must effectively 
be made available in such situations for those requiring it (emphasis 
added).’423 Accordingly, they concluded that: 
 
 Persons claiming asylum should be allowed to enter the national asylum 
procedure without delay; in countries where no asylum procedure exists, they 
should be referred to UNHCR. The State providing for disembarkation will 
generally be the State whose refugee protection responsibilities are first engaged.
424
 
 
                                                 
422
 Battjes 2006, 293. 
423
 UNHCR, The treatment of persons rescued at sea: conclusions and 
recommendations from recent meetings and expert round tables convened by the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Report of the Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 11 April 2008, 
A/AC.259/17, para 6 <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49997aeb27.html> 
accessed 31 October 2013. For a wider debate on the State responsible for 
disembarkation in a place of safety, see Chapter 7. 
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 UNHCR, The treatment of persons rescued at sea, 11 April 2008. See also, Kees 
Wouters and Marteen Den Heijer (2010) 22(1) IJRL 1, 7-8. 
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Although the UDHR does not provide for a right ‘to enter any 
country’,425 the right to leave any country and the right to seek asylum 
are complementary in the refugee context.426 If the Geneva 
Convention does not expressly require States to guarantee access to 
status determination procedures, it is also true that depriving refugees 
of an individual examination of their condition would be tantamount 
to accepting the risk that these persons could be erroneously 
refouled.
427
 Providing refugees with fair and effective procedures for 
determining status without rejection at the border  has also been 
recognized by the UNHCR as a pivotal element of international 
protection,
428
 thus  reinforcing the view that Article 14 of the UDHR 
is ‘a necessary adjunct to non refoulement.’429 
In particular, a fair refugee determination procedure is based on 
two underlying aspects: the first is privacy, and the second concerns 
safeguards toward refugees with special vulnerabilities. Keeping 
information on the personal condition of the asylum seeker 
                                                 
425
 Louis Henkin, ‘An Agenda for the Next Century: The Myth and Mantra of State 
Sovereignty’ (1994) Virginia J. Int’l L. 115, 117. 
426
 In Edward’s view, for instance, ‘it would make nonsense of the 1951 Convention 
if this was not intended, at least for the purposes of refugee status determination, 
especially where an individual has reached a country’s territory, such as its 
territorial seas or a waiting zone in an international airport.’ See, Edwards 2005, 
302. 
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 See, Stephen H Legomsky, ‘Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of 
Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection’ (2003) 
15 IJRL 567, 654. 
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 Excom Conclusions No 82Safeguarding Asylum (1997) para d(3) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,EXCONC,,,3ae68c958,0.html> accessed 31 
October 2013. 
429
 Gilbert 2004, 966.  
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confidential is meant to avoid exposure of the applicant and her 
family to the risk of recrimination by the country of origin, to permit a 
frank testimony, and to shield the applicant from humiliation 
stemming  from revelations of torture or other inhuman and degrading 
treatments. With regard to refugees’ vulnerabilities, in guaranteeing 
the fairness of the determination, it is important to bear in mind that 
certain subgroups of refugees (women, children, elderly, stateless 
persons, and physically or mentally disabled persons) have additional 
special protection needs.
430
 
The application of the term ‘refugee’ in a declaratory sense is made 
clear by the fact that the prohibition of refoulement enshrined in 
Article 33(1) also pertains to asylum seekers (whose refugee status 
has not been determined yet) applying at the borders of the 
Contracting States. It has also been argued that the Geneva 
Convention may implicitly require States to carry out status 
determinations. In particular, this obligation may flow from the duty 
of States to perform treaty obligations ‘in good faith’ in light of  the 
object and purpose of the Convention, as laid down in the 
Preamble.
431
 For it to be effective, non-refoulement must also involve 
an obligation of  assessing whether the return of a person would 
                                                 
430
 See, UNHCR Global Consultations in Budapest Conclusions, para 15 
<http://www.unhcr.org/3b83b7314.html> accessed 3 February 2013. 
431
 H Meijers, ‘Refugees in Western Europe, “Schengen” Affects the Entire Refugee 
Law’ (1990) 2(3) IJRL 428, 433. 
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endanger her life and freedom.
432
 It follows that States have to put in 
place appropriate procedural safeguards - according to their 
constitutional and administrative structures - to ensure that a refugee 
is not sent to an unsafe country.
433
 
As suggested by the UNHCR Handbook, the principle of non-
refoulement would entail a positive obligation to grant refugees a right 
to enter the territory of the State, at least on a temporary basis, in 
order to submit the protection claim to a competent authority in 
charge of ascertaining whether any risk upon return can be 
excluded.
434
 Refugees should, moreover, be informed that their 
irregular position will not affect the outcome of their protection 
claims.
435
 Although Article 33(1) does not confer any right to be 
granted asylum, States are required ‘to adopt a course that does not 
amount to refoulement. This may amount to removal to a “safe third 
country” [quite a questionable alternative, in my view] or some other 
solution, such as temporary protection of refugees.’436 
In order to avoid the risk of refoulement, refugees cannot be 
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returned to their country of origin without ascertaining that their claim 
to protection is well-founded.
437
 Whether, however, they are entitled 
to choose the country in which they will claim refugee status is still a 
debated issue. Although some scholars advocate such an option on the 
ground of the existence of family ties, language, or cultural linkages, 
no claim is made that they reflect binding principles of international 
law.
438
 An exception might be represented, in the EU context, by the 
principle of family unity whose salience is emphasized by Article 9 of 
the 2013 Recast Dublin Regulation. It provides that: 
 
Where the applicant has a family member, regardless of whether the family was 
previously formed in the country of origin, who has been allowed to reside as a 
beneficiary of international protection in a Member State, that Member State shall 
be responsible for examining the application for international protection, provided 
that the persons concerned expressed their desire in writing.
439
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None of the provisions of the Geneva Convention requires individuals 
to seek asylum in any particular State or lodge an application at any 
specific place.440 Therefore, even in the absence of an explicit right to 
pick out the country of asylum, it cannot be excluded that a certain 
‘element of choice is indeed open to refugees as to where they may 
properly claim asylum.’441 
The fact that States can return asylum seekers without a prior 
examination on the substance of the protection claim, both within and 
outside the Dublin system, shows how de facto the Geneva 
Convention does not prevent States from putting into place chain 
transfers of refugees from one country to another, as long as the 
principle of direct and indirect refoulement is respected. However, the 
practice of onward expulsions is a nerve-racking and time-consuming 
experience that implies an increasing uncertainty for both the 
governments and the refugees involved.
442
 The latter may thus be 
shunted from one State to another, each of which must somehow 
examine their individual protection claims before returning them to 
another third country that is considered safe. The inevitable risk is to 
increase the number of refugees ‘in orbit’ repeatedly sent from 
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country to country without receiving a determination on the merits of 
their claims.  
The innumerable and conflicting arguments put forward by 
scholars and government authorities over the last sixty years distance 
the reaching of a unequivocal and clear interpretative position, and 
offer room for contestation. However, in the light of the text and the 
object and purpose of Article 33(1) of the Convention - examined 
more in detail in Chapter 2 - it emerges how the right to non-
refoulement and the right to seek asylum are closely connected with 
the right to have a protection claim examined, regardless of the place 
where the refugee is first found. It can thus be sustained that the 
principle of non-refoulement: 
 
Provides a basis for procedural rights to refugee status determination insofar as it 
obliges States to determine whether a person they want to send back to the country 
of origin is a refugee. However, as such procedural rights are not provided for by 
the wording of the 1951 Convention, their precise scope and content remains 
unclear, meaning that Article 33 compensates for the lack of provisions on refugee 
status determination procedures in the 1951 Convention to a limited extent only.
443
 
 
The gaps in  the Geneva Convention with regard to the existence of 
an express right to access refugee status determination procedures can 
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be compellingly filled by the synergic contribution of human rights 
law to the refinement of the meaning and scope  of the non-
refoulement obligation. To be more clear, despite the lack of an 
explicit right to access asylum procedures under the Geneva 
Convention, an implied entitlement to have access to a substantive 
determination of protection claim can be considered a procedural 
corollary to the prohibition of non-refoulement enshrined in Article 
33(1). As we will observe in the ensuing sections, the case law of 
international human rights bodies has confirmed the existence of such 
a right with respect to non-refoulement obligations under the relevant 
treaties. 
 
3.3 Access to asylum procedures under the ICCPR and the 
CAT  
Neither the ICCPR nor the CAT contains stand-alone obligations 
on the right to asylum. However, the views expressed in some cases 
by their monitoring bodies seem to contain an implied positive 
obligation to ensure access to asylum procedures, if it is functional to 
effective protection from refoulement.  
The HRC has pointed out that States parties to the ICCPR must 
always ensure that each claim for protection is subjected to a 
particularized assessment, irrespective of individual’s country of 
origin. In the XHL v The Netherlands case, concerning a 12 year-old 
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Chinese minor seeking asylum in the Netherlands, the HRC 
concluded that: 
 
By deciding to return the author to China without a thorough examination of the 
potential treatment that the author may have been subjected to as a child with no 
identified relatives and no confirmed registration, the State party failed to provide 
him with the necessary measures of protection as a minor at that time (emphasis 
added).
444
 
 
Concerns about the real possibility for a refugee to substantiate her 
claim in the context of speedy asylum procedures have been 
expressed also by the Committee against Torture in its Concluding 
Observations on the Netherlands.
445
 In X v Spain, the Committee held 
that its authority ‘does not extend to a determination of whether or not 
the claimant is entitled to asylum under national laws of a country, or 
can invoke the protection of the Geneva Convention […].’446 Despite 
the lack of such a right in the text of the CAT, investigating a need for 
protection assumes special relevance in the context of alleged 
violations of Article 3 upon removal, including situations of mass 
                                                 
444
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influxes.
447
 
The CAT does not indicate any specific procedural safeguards 
concerning the determination procedure, but the Committee has 
frequently urged States parties to adopt such safeguards in their 
national legislation allowing, for instance, the individual to have a 
formal hearing, due process, and transparent and impartial 
proceedings.
448
 In its Recommendations to Italy, the Committee was 
concerned that some asylum seekers might have been denied the right 
to apply for asylum and to have their asylum claims assessed 
individually by means of a fair and satisfactory procedure. It held, 
accordingly, that: 
 
The State party should adopt appropriate measures to ensure that all asylum 
seekers have access to a fair and prompt asylum procedure. In this respect, the 
Committee recalls the obligation of the State party to ensure that the situation of 
each migrant is processed individually, and the Committee further recommends that 
the State party proceeds with the adoption of a comprehensive legislation on 
political asylum (emphasis added).
449
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Noting that Hungary’s asylum legislation does not require that 
foreigners wishing to enter (or already present in the country) be 
personally interviewed, in its Recommendations to Hungary in 2006, 
the Committee against Torture recommended the following: 
 
The State party should ensure that it complies fully with Article 3 of the 
Convention and that individuals under the State party’s jurisdiction receive 
appropriate consideration by its competent authorities and guaranteed fair 
treatment at all stages of the proceedings, including an opportunity for effective, 
independent and impartial review of decisions on expulsion, return or extradition 
(emphasis added).
450
 
 
In its Observation to Greece in June 2012, the Committee 
expressed its concern regarding the widespread reluctance by asylum 
seekers to lodge applications because of an ‘absence of a safe 
complaints mechanism, insufficient number of interpreters, and a lack 
of trust in authorities.’451 In addition, it criticized that: 
 
                                                 
450
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Asylum seekers face serious obstacles in accessing the asylum procedure due to 
structural deficiencies and non-functioning screening mechanisms at the Greek 
border areas and at the Attika Aliens’ Police Directorate.452 
 
Therefore, this lack of access to effective procedural guarantees, 
legal remedies, and asylum procedures has been seen as a concrete 
risk of refoulement.
453
 
 
3.4 ECHR: Access to asylum procedures before expulsion  
 
Does Article 3 of the ECHR require States to undertake asylum 
procedures before expelling an asylum seeker to his or her country of 
origin? If so, what are the requirements for the examination of a 
protection claim that flow from this provision? Although the ECHR 
does not contain a general obligation to provide a substantive 
examination of asylum applications, the analysis of the jurisprudence 
of the Court proves the insistence of the latter on a positive obligation 
to status determination in order to assess the consequences of the 
expulsion of an individual to the country of origin. More specifically, 
Article 3 per se has been used to support a right of access to asylum 
procedures in order to prevent applicants’ return to territories where 
they can suffer torture and other inhuman and degrading treatment. 
                                                 
452
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The fact that the status of protection seekers under the ECHR is of a 
declaratory nature enables States parties to the ECHR to freely decide 
whether to grant residence or a temporary stay, regardless of a formal 
procedure for status determination. This Section will also show how 
the Court has interpreted Article 3 as requiring a ‘rigorous scrutiny’ of 
a protection claim,
454
 and how such scrutiny would not be possible 
without a determination of the claim itself. 
 
In the Jabary v Turkey, the ECtHR found that:  
 
Having regard to the fact that Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental 
values of the democratic society and prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment, a rigorous scrutiny must necessarily be 
conducted of an individual’s claim that his or her deportation to a […] country will 
expose that individual to treatment prohibited by Article 3.
455
 
 
The Court considered that the automatic application of a short time 
limit for submitting an asylum application (five days of the arrival in 
Turkey) without the possibility of undertaking a substantive 
examination of the claim would be at variance with the protection of 
the fundamental value of democratic societies embodied in Article 3 
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of the Convention.
456
 Indeed, in the Court’s view, the applicant risked 
being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if returned to Iran 
where national authorities still may decide punish adultery by stoning 
the individual found guilty of such a crime.  
Although the ECHR does not contain a general obligation to 
provide a substantive examination of asylum applications, the analysis 
of the jurisprudence of the Court proves the insistence of the latter on 
a positive obligation to status determination in order to assess the 
consequences of the expulsion of an individual to the country of 
origin. Furthermore, the fact that the status of protection seekers under 
the ECHR is of a declaratory nature makes States parties to the ECHR 
able to freely decide whether granting residence or temporary stay, 
regardless of a formal procedure for status determination.  
The Court has also insisted on a careful factual assessment of the 
asylum application. For instance, in D and Others v Turkey, the Court 
stated that the UNHCR erred in its refugee status determination of a 
woman sentenced by an Iranian Islamic court to 100 lashes.
457
 
UNHCR's Ankara office denied her application for refugee status by 
assuming that she would only receive a symbolic punishment. 
Notwithstanding, the Court found that expulsion would breach Article 
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3 of the ECHR as there was no evidence that the Iranian authorities 
intended to reduce the 100 lashes punishment.
458
 
A host of cases need to be mentioned here. First, Diallo v Czech 
Republic concerns a complaint lodged by two Guinean asylum seekers 
who alleged that their applications had been denied by the Czech 
authorities without first examining them on the merits. In concluding 
that Czech Republic should not have expelled the two asylum seekers 
to their home country, the Court held that ‘none of the domestic 
authorities examined the merits of the applicants’ arguable claim 
under Article 3 of the Convention.’459 It thus found a violation of the 
right to an effective remedy in conjunction with Article 3 as: 
 
The applicants’ claims that there was a real risk of ill-treatment in their country 
of origin were not subjected to close and rigorous scrutiny by the Ministry of the 
Interior as required by the Convention, or in fact to any scrutiny at all.
460
 
 
 The second case in question is ZNS v Turkey where the Court was 
not persuaded that the national authorities had conducted a 
meaningful assessment of the applicant’s asylum claim. The Court, 
therefore found, in the light of the UNHCR’s assessment of the risk 
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for the life of the applicant in the country of origin, that Article 3 had 
been violated.
461
 Third, in Abdolkhani, the Court held that: 
 
By failing to consider the applicants’ requests for temporary asylum, to notify 
them of the reasons for not taking their asylum requests into consideration and to 
authorize them to have access to legal assistance [. . .], the national authorities 
prevented the applicants from raising their allegations under Article 3 [. . .].
462
 
 
In Gebremedhin v France, the Court criticized French legislation 
whereby administrative authorities could refuse to grant leave to enter 
the country if an asylum application is considered ‘manifestly 
unfounded.’463 In its reasoning, the Court highlighted the importance 
of having access to asylum procedures as a means toward non-
refoulement. It noted, indeed, that ‘a decision to refuse leave to enter 
the country acts as a bar to lodging an asylum application’,464 and 
results in having the person immediately removed to the country from 
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which she claims to have fled.
465
 
From the cases examined above it emerges how ‘a rigorous 
scrutiny must necessarily be conducted of an individual’s claim that 
his or her deportation will expose that individual to treatment 
prohibited by Article 3 (emphasis added).’466 Already in TI v UK, the 
Court took the opportunity to clarify that claims of violations of 
Article 3 must always be considered on their merits before carrying 
out expulsions and, as a consequence, all the circumstances 
surrounding an Article 3 claim must be subjected to a ‘rigorous 
scrutiny.’467 
The TI v UK judgment concerns a Sri Lanka national claiming 
international protection in Germany for suffering persecution by non-
state agents in his home country. Since Germany did not recognize 
actions or omissions by non-state actors as grounds for receiving 
international protection, the applicant fled to the UK, but the 
Secretary of State refused to examine the substance of the new asylum 
claim and removed the applicant back to Germany. Germany was 
deemed by the UK as the State responsible for processing the asylum 
application at issue on the basis of the attribution of responsibility 
                                                 
465
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established by the Dublin Convention. The Court considered that 
Germany would have not expelled the applicant to Sri Lanka in 
breach of Article 3 of the Convention, and consequently, the United 
Kingdom had not violated this provision by deciding to remove the 
applicant to Germany.
468
 Nevertheless, the Court clarified that claims 
of violations of Article 3 always require a substantive examination 
before carrying out any type of expulsion. 
The TI v UK case - delivered four months before the Jabary v 
Turkey judgment - also raises the issue of the relationship between the 
Dublin Convention and the ECHR. The automatic removal of an 
asylum seeker either to another EU Member State in accordance with 
the Dublin Convention, or to a country outside the Dublin area risks 
undermining international protection, especially when there is a high 
presumption of safety.
469
 Indeed, 
 
The Court notes […] that, while the Dublin Convention may pursue laudable 
objectives, its effectiveness may be undermined in practice by the differing 
approaches adopted by Contracting States to the scope of protection offered.
470
 
 
Furthermore, the Court noted that: 
                                                 
468
TI v UK, 16. 
469
On the approach of the ECtHR with regard to the presumption of safety in the 
Dublin context, see, Section 3.6. 
470
 ibid 15. 
 217 
 
 
It has not heard substantial arguments from either the United Kingdom or 
German governments as to the merits of the asylum claim. Nevertheless, it considers 
that the materials presented by the applicant at this stage give rise to concerns as to 
the risks faced by the applicant, should he be returned to Sri Lanka […].471 
 
 Although the Court does not clearly establish that a pre-removal 
full examination of the merits be carried out, this passage can be 
interpreted as implying a duty to examine the substance of an asylum 
application before expelling a person to a third country, if the 
situation in the country of origin ‘gives rise to concerns.’472 
 
3.4.1. The extraterritorial applicability of the right to access 
asylum procedures under the ECHR 
As recent as 2000, the ECHR was identified as providing ‘a rather 
impressive inherent right to access.’473 Over the last 13 years, the 
ECtHR has tackled several cases concerning extra-territorial State 
activities, thus letting the Convention stand out as a reliable 
instrument for securing access to protection in Europe.
474
 This Section 
will indulge in the jurisprudence of the Court, which has generally 
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interpreted the prohibition of refoulement as requiring access to an 
effective and rigorous examination of protection claims, even beyond 
borders. In the Amuur v France decision, the ECtHR asserted that 
effective access to asylum procedures must also be ensured with 
respect to asylum seekers retained in the international zone of an 
airport.
475
However, it also clarified that, despite its name, the 
‘international zone’ of an airport does not have extraterritorial 
status.
476
 
Hirsi v Italy is the first case where the ECtHR ruled on the 
possibility of guaranteeing access to status determination when 
refugees are intercepted on the high seas. Greater attention will be, 
therefore, placed on this decision, where the Court was keen to stress 
that preventing people from lodging their protection claims would 
both heighten the risk of refoulement and indirectly lead to a violation 
of Article 3 of the Convention. Thus, by delivering its views on 
asylum, the impression is that the Grand Chamber intended to 
contribute to strengthening and refining the content of extraterritorial 
States’ obligations toward protection seekers.477 
In 2009, migrants and refugees were pre-emptively pushed back 
after interception in international waters and handed over to Libya 
without having the possibility of being transported to safe European 
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ports for identification and examination of asylum claims. Any 
attempt to claim protection or to receive information was thus 
rendered nugatory. The Hirsi case could set a critical precedent for 
those European States that try to shift the burden of responsibility for 
examining asylum applications to third countries, also with the help of 
bilateral agreements for technical and police cooperation used to 
intercept migrants and refugees before their physical arrival at 
Europe’s borders. 
Confusingly, in Hirsi, the Court seems to suggest the possibility of 
accessing asylum procedures on the high seas.
478
 However, for a 
number of reasons, this reading is problematic. First of all, it is 
unrealistic that lawyers and translators may be made readily available 
for all the different nationalities of migrants and refugees on the high 
seas. But even if it were the case, does the lack of an explicit 
recognition by the Court of a free standing obligation to 
disembarkation imply that asylum procedures can be effectively 
performed at sea? 
Despite the lack of an explicit hint by the Grand Chamber with 
regard to the possibility of applying for asylum either on the vessels 
or on the mainland, boats should not be considered an appropriate 
environment for processing asylum claims. Refugees cannot be fairly 
interviewed in the intimidating atmosphere of a warship after an 
                                                 
478
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exhausting journey.
479
 They should have time to recover, collect 
evidence, and be ready to disclose the reasons of their getaway and 
the possible ill-treatment they suffered in their country of origin. 
However, a question springs up spontaneously. If, hypothetically, 
intercepting vessels (not necessarily military crafts) were fully-
equipped with all the facilities necessary for carrying out assessment 
of asylum applications, would they become appropriate places for a 
rigorous scrutiny of protection claims?  
It would not be hard to imagine that passengers would be detained 
for long periods of time far away from any courts where challenging a 
negative decision on asylum or an expulsion order. Despite video 
recording or other types of communication could be entertained 
between at-sea and in-shore State authorities, ‘the personnel, temporal 
and infrastructure preconditions to carry out proceedings [would not 
be] fulfilled in a way that would be possible for domestic official 
proceedings.’480 Since refugees would end up being retained against 
their will on board of floating detention camps,
481
 ships should be 
unreservedly dismissed as suitable loci for examining individual 
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situations and assessing protection claims. Such a solution would 
engender a further question. If massive capitals were employed to 
endow vessels with all the necessary facilities to guarantee access to 
asylum procedures and effective remedies, I would expect executing 
governments to provide more than a reasonable explanation - in terms 
of real economy and policy efficiency - to justify their choice to 
preserve two parallel systems duplicating roles, personnel, resources, 
and functions in order to accomplish identical objectives. 
Advising refugees on their legal position and on the procedures to 
be followed to claim asylum is necessary if a State wishes to identify 
those genuinely in need of protection among interdicted persons. 
Refugees intercepted at sea, for instance, normally do not possess any 
knowledge of either local legislation or language, thus making access 
to an interpreter or to independent legal assistance a fundamental 
requirement for obtaining effective protection.
482
 
It has been suggested that people intercepted at sea should always 
be asked to explain both why they fear their return to the country from 
which they embarked and whether they want to apply for asylum.
483
 
States should do this driven by their awareness that both the life of 
intercepted migrants and refugees could be in danger, and that, as 
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States, they possess a capacity to save people from harm.
484
 Mutatis 
mutandis, such a contention would be in line with the doctrine of 
‘
positive obligations’ adopted by the Court in Osman v UK. Although 
the Osman case dealt with very different issues, and no asylum seeker 
was involved, the Court ruled that Article 2(1) of the ECHR embodies 
both the duty of States to refrain from the intentional and unlawful 
taking of life, and the duty to take measures to protect the life of 
people under their jurisdiction if State authorities knew or ought to 
have known, at the time, of the existence of a real and immediate risk 
to the life of an identified individual or individuals.
485
 More recently, 
in the Al Saadoon v UK case, the Court stressed that 
 
 A Contracting Party is responsible under Article 1 of the Convention for all acts 
and omissions of its organs regardless of whether the act or omission in question 
was a consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with international 
legal obligations. Article 1 makes no distinction as to the type of rule or measure 
concerned and does not exclude any part of a Contracting Party's “jurisdiction” from 
scrutiny under the Convention.
486
 
 
In light of the foregoing, must States ensure, under the ECHR, 
access to asylum procedures with regard to those refugees who have 
                                                 
484
 Thomas Spijkerboer, ‘The Human Costs of Border Control’ (2007) 9 EJML 138. 
485
Osman v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 245, para 116. 
486
Al-Saadoon v UK, para 128. 
 223 
 
not managed to enter their territory, but are considered to be within 
their ‘jurisdiction’? This critical question seems to be answered in the 
affirmative.  
It is important to note that, in Hirsi, the respondent State did not 
actually challenge the existence of a right to seek asylum on the high 
seas and the duty of Italian authorities to handle asylum applications. 
But, as claimed by the Italian government, since no migrant, once on 
the intercepting ships, expressed her intention to apply for asylum,
487
 
there existed no need to detect, during search and rescue operations, 
the identity and nationality of returned passengers. Had migrants 
manifested their willingness to apply for asylum, they would have 
been taken to the mainland to examine their protection claims.
488
 
On this point, the ECtHR replied that Italy could not circumvent 
‘jurisdiction’ and human rights obligations under the Convention by 
labelling activities at sea as search and rescue operations.
489
 Such a 
distinction is immaterial under international human rights law. 
Additionally, a ‘rescue’ mission can be considered fully accomplished 
only when the stowaways are disembarked in a ‘place of safety’, 
meant also as a place where the lives and freedoms of those alleging a 
                                                 
487
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well-founded fear of persecution, torture, and ill-treatment would not 
be threatened.
490
 
In this regard, the intercepted refugees clearly expressed their fear 
of returning to Libya, a country that cannot be considered, in any 
manner whatsoever, a safe haven because of the well-documented 
inadequacy of its response to flows of migrants and asylum seekers. 
Moreover, according to the respondent State, the possibility of 
bringing migrants to Europe to identify them and examine their 
individual situation and asylum claims within a reception centre is 
only an option—not the only option. Accordingly, the fact that 
intercepted migrants explicitly voiced their desire not to be returned to 
the Libyan guardianship was not considered by Italian authorities as 
an international protection request. In this regard, it could be argued - 
as the Court does in Hirsi - that European States have a duty to verify, 
before return, that the receiving country is actually safe for the 
returned refugees.  
Considering the significant amount of information provided by 
human rights organizations, Italy knew or should have known that, as 
irregular migrants and refugees, the applicants would be exposed to 
                                                 
490
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treatments contrary to the ECHR in Libya,
491
 and would not be given 
any form of protection against arbitrary repatriation to Somalia and 
Eritrea.
492
 In this regard, the existence in Libya of domestic law or the 
ratification of international human rights instruments would not be 
sufficient, per se, to justify a presumption of safety.
493
 It is exactly on 
this point that the radical nature of the Court’s ruling on the asylum 
policies of EU Member States becomes most striking. The Grand 
Chamber affirmed that:  
 
Italy is not exempt from complying with its obligations under Article 3 of the 
Convention because the applicants failed to ask for asylum or to describe the risks 
faced as a result of the lack of an asylum system in Libya. It reiterates that the 
Italian authorities should have ascertained how the Libyan authorities fulfilled their 
international obligations in relation to the protection of refugees.
494
 
 
A virtual distinction between people actively seeking international 
protection and people in need of international protection would be in 
line with the Court’s contention that no automatic negative conclusion 
should be drawn from the absence of either an explicit asylum claim 
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or the substantiation of an asylum application.
495
 It could be the case 
that individuals fleeing generalized violence or persecution in their 
home country are traumatized and have no knowledge of their own 
rights or the procedures that need to be fulfilled to claim asylum 
abroad. The positive obligation to act proactively by informing 
refugees of the possibility to claim asylum overtly emerges from the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
496
 States shall also take all necessary 
measures to ensure de facto compliance with the principle of non-
refoulement - the overarching goal of the asylum regime - thereby 
avoiding the delivery of refugees back to their persecutors as a 
consequence of States’ omissions.497 In demonstrating the intimate 
link between non-refoulement and the procedural right to access fair 
status determination mechanisms, in 2010, the UNHCR stated that: 
 
A fair refugee status determination procedure, wherever undertaken, requires 
submission of international protection claims to a specialized and professional first 
instance body, and an individual interview in the early stages of the procedure. 
Recognized international standards further include providing a reasoned decision in 
writing to all applicants, and ensuring that they have the opportunity to seek an 
                                                 
495
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independent review of any negative decision, with any appeal in principle having a 
suspensive effect (emphasis added).
498
 
 
According to the ECtHR, the non-refoulement obligation attaches 
to any persons in need of international protection who suffers a real 
risk of exposure to ill-treatment if returned (therefore regardless of 
whether they have sought asylum or are yet to have expressed their 
desire to be protected).
499
 More specifically, ‘compliance with non-
refoulement is only ensured if its prerequisite, refugee status [...] is 
adequately examined.’500 The positive duty of States to provide 
information and to investigate the risks for the individuals subjected 
to a return decision is even more compelling when the level of danger 
in a certain receiving country is ascertainable from a wide number of 
sources. 
As stated in MSS, the lack of information was considered by the 
Court as one of the major obstacles in accessing fair and effective 
asylum procedures. Considering the irreversible consequences of an 
unsafe removal, in Hirsi the Court stated that ‘anyone should be 
entitled to obtain sufficient information enabling them to gain 
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effective access to the relevant procedures and to substantiate their 
complaints.’501 Thus, the Court’s decision that the summary return of 
interdicted refugees, on 6 May 2009, without access to a proper 
determination procedure and without granting them a hearing both to 
ascertain their status and challenge their removal, amounted to a 
violation of Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention and Article 4 of 
Protocol 4 was wholly consistent with the purpose of the ECHR.
502
 
 
3.5. EU law and the right to access asylum procedures 
An instrument of great significance for the rights of people seeking 
protection in Europe is the CFR, whose Preamble reads as follows:  
 
 
The Charter reaffirms […] the rights as they result, in particular, from the 
constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member 
States, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Union and by the 
Council of Europe and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
and of the European Court of Human Rights. 
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 It is clear that the Charter is mainly concerned with fundamental 
rights of individuals and that to this effect there is no provision that 
makes an explicit reference to the rights of States. In addition, the 
right to asylum is to be conceived of as a right belonging to 
individuals, rather than one belonging to States.
503
 In this regard, 
Article 18 of the CFR establishes that: 
 
 
The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the 
Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to 
the Status of Refugees and in accordance with the Treaty on European Union and 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (emphasis added). 
 
 
 Thus, for the first time, a European supranational instrument 
recognizes not only the right to seek asylum, but also the right to be 
granted asylum, which becomes legally binding primary law in the 
Union. This interpretation emerges also from the travaux 
préparatoires where the drafters of the Charter expressly avoided 
limiting the scope of Article 18 to the right to seek asylum. Since the 
                                                 
503
 The right of individuals to be granted asylum is enshrined only in regional 
treaties, such as Article 22 of the American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 
22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 114 UNTS 123; Article 12(3) 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, 
entered into force 21 October 1986), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 ILM 58 
(1982).  
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right to asylum has not been recognized in any international treaty to 
which EU Member States are parties, its content must be inferred 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, 
which inspired the drafting of the Charter. Many of these countries, 
for instance, have interpreted the right to asylum as an entitlement 
both to seek and receive protection.
504
 
 
In this regard, Article 13 of the 2011 Recast Qualification 
Directive, by reasserting its compliance with the CFR, establishes that 
‘Member States shall grant refugee status to a third country national 
or stateless person who qualifies as a refugee.’ In addition, Article 18 
of the same Directive provides that ‘Member States shall grant 
subsidiary protection status to a third country national or a stateless 
person eligible for subsidiary protection.’505 It has therefore been 
argued that the Qualification Directive confers ‘a subjective right to 
be granted asylum’,506 as recognized also by Advocate General 
Maduro in Elgafaji.
507
 
 
                                                 
504
 Examples are the constitutional traditions of France, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Spain. See Gil-Bazo 2008, 47. 
505
 For an analysis of the Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC and the right to 
asylum, see, Gil-Bazo, ‘Refugee Status and Subsidiary Protection under EC Law: 
The Qualification Directive and the Right  to be Granted Asylum’ in H Toner, E 
Guild and A Baldaccini (eds), Whose Freedom, Security And Justice?: EU 
Immigration and Asylum Law And Policy (Hart Publishing 2007) 237. 
506
 Gil-Bazo 2008, 48. 
507
 C-465/07, Elgafaji v Saatssecreteris van Justitie [2009] ECR I-0000, Opinion, 
para 30. 
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The ‘Explanations’ to Article 18 of the CFR affirm that the text of 
the Article has been based on Article 78 of the TFEU according to 
which the Union must respect, inter alia, the Geneva Convention on 
Refugees. The reference to Article 78 assumes relevance in so far as it 
states that: 
 
 
 The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and 
temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-country 
national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the 
principle of non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the Geneva 
Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the 
Status of Refugees, and other relevant treaties. 
 
 
This provision seems to recognize the right to be granted asylum to 
all those refugees who meet the criteria for refugee status embodied in 
Article 1(a) of the Geneva Convention or entitled to subsidiary 
protection. The question is, however, whether this is the only category 
of individuals to whom Article 18 of the CFR applies or whether other 
categories of people might be entitled to the protection offered by 
Article 18. In this regard, Gil Bazo notes that: 
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 Asylum in the Charter is to be construed as the protection to which all 
individuals with an international protection need are entitled, provided that their 
protection grounds are established by international law, irrespective of whether they 
are found in the Refugee Convention or in any other international human rights 
instrument.
508
 
 
 
 With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the right to asylum 
has become a ‘subjective and enforceable right of individuals under 
the Union's legal order’509 and will be directly applicable in national 
legal orders without further incorporation and transposition.
510
 
Moreover, since Article 51 of the CFR does not expressly provide for 
any territorial limitation, Member States shall comply with it every 
time they are implementing Union law, regardless of the place where 
the activity is carried out.
511
 
This Chapter focuses on the assessment of whether a right to 
access asylum procedures can be inferred from international human 
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 Gil-Bazo 2008, 50. 
509
ibid, 33. 
510
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 See, Explanations to Article 51 of the CFR in: Explanations relating to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007/C 303/02). See also, Directorate General for 
Internal Policies, Implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its 
Impact on EU Home Affairs Agencies: Frontex, Europol and the European Asylum 
Support Office (European Parliament 2011) 48-9. 
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rights and refugee law treaties, thus casting aside a more detailed and 
comprehensive analysis of EU asylum procedures. Nevertheless, at 
this juncture, it is worth noting that procedural safeguards inscribed 
within the EU Recast Qualification and Procedures Directives are 
considered determinative for fair and effective asylum procedures in 
line with international human rights and refugee law standards.
512
 For 
instance, asylum applications must be submitted to competent 
authorities bearing in mind that the authorities that receive the claims 
and those in charge of examining the application should not be the 
same. Lamentably, asylum applications are often submitted to 
immigration or border police officers who do not have an adequate 
training in human rights and asylum procedures, and who are not 
competent to examine the merits of an asylum claim. Article 4(4) of 
the Recast Procedures Directive provides that ‘Member States shall 
ensure that the personnel of that authority have the appropriate 
knowledge or receive the necessary training to fulfil their obligations 
when implementing this Directive.’513 Also, first-instance decision-
makers should be fully trained with respect to relevant standards 
applicable in the field of asylum and refugee law, should be 
independent from the Member States governments, and clearly 
                                                 
512
 This Section aims to provide only a general overview of the standards Member 
States should comply with when dealing with asylum applications. For a detailed 
analysis of  the minimum requirements Member States’ asylum procedures must 
satisfy to respect international and European standards, see, inter alia, Da Lomba 
2004, c V; Battjes 2006;  Costello 2012. 
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 This Article replaces Article 4(3) of the 2005 Procedures Directive. 
 234 
 
identified to ensure that decisions are taken individually, objectively, 
and impartially. 
Another example could regard language. Since communication is a 
critical aspect of a fair and effective access to international protection, 
refugees shall always be entitled to the services of a competent 
interpreter in all the phases of the asylum procedure and not only 
when the initial interview takes place.
514
 Furthermore, applicants shall 
receive informed advice from lawyers specialized in immigration and 
asylum issues as well as from other sources, such as refugee councils. 
Nonetheless, while the right to free legal assistance to appeal 
procedures against an unfavourable decision is guaranteed by Article 
20(1) of the Recast Procedures Directive, effective access to legal 
advice is often hampered by financial problems and cuts in public 
funding.
515
 
Moreover, applicants should be informed as early as possible of 
their right to submit their protection claim. They also need guidance 
on the procedure to be followed before the proceedings are initiated. It 
is also paramount that first instance proceedings have suspensive 
effect to avoid a violation of the principle of non-refoulement as a 
consequence of the removal of asylum seekers to third countries while 
                                                 
514
 On this issue see, UNHCR Handbook on RSD, para 192 (IV). See also, Article 
12(1)(b) of the Recast Procedures Directive replacing Article 10(1)(b) of the 2005 
Procedures Directive. 
515
 See also, Article 22(1) of the Recast Procedures Directive replacing Article 15(2) 
of the 2005 Procedures Directive. 
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their claim is being examined. Under the Recast Procedures Directive, 
applicants are allowed to remain in the Member State only pending a 
decision in the first instance, and only few exceptions in respect of 
cases of subsequent applications are possible.
516
 The right to appeal 
against unfavourable decisions with a suspensive effect is central to 
fair and effective asylum procedures, but it is frequently put into 
question by the application of accelerated mechanisms of 
identification, examination of asylum claims, and expulsion.
517
 
 
3.6. Access to asylum procedures in the third country as a 
safety condition  
Despite the soundness of the arguments against the legality of the 
‘safe third country’ concept in international law, it is unlikely that this 
practice will disappear anytime soon from the migration containment 
policies of Western States, and EU Member States, in particular. For 
this reason and in view of eliminating the baleful impact of ‘safe third 
country’ mechanisms on refugee rights, removing States must take a 
number of concrete measures. As already highlighted in Sections 2.7 
and 2.7.1, sending States have a duty to both verify that the asylum 
seeker will have access to effective protection in the readmitting 
                                                 
516
Article 9(1) of the Recast Procedures Directive replacing Article 7(1) of the 2005 
Procedures Directive. Exceptions are laid down in Article 9(2). 
517
 The right to an effective remedy will be discussed in Chapter 4.  
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country, and to guarantee that, in any case, this presumption of safety 
is rebuttable.  
Pragmatically speaking, sending States must assure, before 
removal, that readmitting countries offer effective protection from 
indirect refoulement either by granting permission to stay, or access to 
an examination procedure.
518
 The first option would satisfy the 
prohibition of indirect refoulement without requiring access to asylum 
procedures. According to Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, ‘substantive 
evidence of admissibility’ in the readmitting State is a key 
requirement for permitting return under international refugee law.
519
 If 
then, a residence permit is not provided in the third country, the 
sending State should ascertain that the transferred person will be 
granted access to examination procedures upon removal. 
 If there is no prospect of a durable solution in the third country 
because of the foreseeable risk of expulsion to a fourth State, the 
second State would fail to provide effective protection from 
refoulement.
520
 As reckoned by the UNHCR EXCOM Conclusion 
from 1998, the third State should offer the refugee the possibility ‘to 
                                                 
518
 Battjes 2006, 398. 
519
Guy S Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law 
(Oxford University Press 2010) 395; see also Hélène Lambert (2012), ‘Safe Third 
Country’ in the European Union: An Evolving Concept in International Law and 
Implications for the UK’ 26(4) Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 
318. 
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 Battjes 2006, 400. 
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seek and enjoy asylum.’521 This entitlement to a durable solution 
would not amount to a right to asylum by itself, but would be, rather, 
a side effect of the principle of non-refoulement, as applicable also to 
refugees who fall under the jurisdiction of an EU Member State, 
whether they apply at the border or beyond the border.
522
 
With regard to pre-removal procedures, although the ECHR does 
not recognize a right to asylum, the Court holds the view that access 
to status determination is a fundamental element to avoid ‘immediate 
or summary removal’ to an unsafe country. An individual 
determination of the safety of a readmitting country for the asylum 
seeker concerned is deemed necessary to minimize the risk of 
irremediable damages to the person subject to a removal order. For 
example, in TI v the UK, the Court of Strasbourg, led by the concern 
to evaluate whether Germany did indeed provide effective procedural 
safeguards shielding the applicant from being removed to Sri Lanka, 
eventually found that Germany was ‘safe’ for Mr. TI to return to. 
Indeed, as Germany ensured a re-examination of the asylum claim, 
the Court stated: 
 
While it may be that on any re-examination of the applicant’s case the German 
authorities might still reject it, this [was] largely a matter of speculation and 
                                                 
521
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522
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conjecture.’523 The procedural safeguards provided by Germany explain why the 
responsibility of the UK was excluded.  
 
While according to the Court, ‘there [was] considerable doubt that 
the the applicant would either be granted a follow up asylum hearing 
or that his second claim would be granted’,524 it was satisfied by 
Germany’s assurances that the claim would be examined before 
issuing a new deportation order. Thus, ‘the apparent gap in protection 
resulting from the German approach to non-State agent risk [was] 
met, to at least some extent, by the application [...] of section 53(6) [of 
the German Aliens Act] (emphasis added).’525 With regard to the right 
to an effective remedy, since in TI v UK, the assessment of the 
procedural safeguards of the third country did not expressly involve 
Article 13, it could be argued that an effective application of Article 3 
of the Convention would entail both a ‘meaningful assessment’ of the 
claim for protection and the offer of an effective remedy against a 
unfavourable decision.
526
 While, therefore, the TI v UK confirms that 
the presumption of safety among the States of the Dublin system is 
                                                 
523
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524
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525
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526
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not absolute, Mr. TI’s claims were rejected as manifestly unfounded 
and the application was found to be inadmissible.
527
 
By contrast, in KRS v UK, by disregarding substantive evidence 
adduced by the UNHCR of the risks of ill-treatment for the applicant 
upon removal to Greece, the Court relied on an absolute presumption 
of safety. It actually stated that: 
 
Where States establish [...] international agreements, to pursue co-operation in 
certain fields of activities, there could be implications for the protection of 
fundamental rights. It would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the 
Convention if Contracting States were thereby absolved from their responsibility 
under the Convention in relation to the field of activity covered by such 
attribution.
528
 
 
However, it then gave excessive credit to Greece’s formal 
obligations under both the ECHR and EU law, and argued that ‘[i]n 
the absence of any proof to the contrary’ it had to be presumed that 
Greece would act consistently with its obligations under the 
Convention.
529
 
                                                 
527
TI v UK, 20. 
528
KRS v UK App no 32733/08 (ECtHR, 2 December 2008) 16 citing Waite and 
Kennedy v Germany App no 26083/94, para 67, ECHR 1999-I. 
529
KRS v UK, 18. For a comprehensive analysis of TI v UK and KRS v UK in relation 
also to MSS v Belgium and Greece, see, Violeta Moreno-Lax, ‘Dismantling the 
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The refutability of the presumption of safety was reaffirmed in 
concreto by the ECtHR inMSS v Belgium and Greece where the 
ECtHR found that: 
 
There has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction 
with Article 3 because of the deficiencies in the Greek authorities' examination of 
the applicant's asylum request and the risk he faces of being returned directly or 
indirectly to his country of origin without any serious examination of the merits of 
his asylum application and without having access to an effective remedy (emphasis 
added).
530
 
 
The elements the UNHCR has focused upon to infer safety before 
removal are the express consent of the third State to readmit, 
protection against direct and indirect refoulement, respect for 
fundamental human rights, and access to a fair refugee status 
determination procedure.
531
 Therefore, sending States must verify, on 
an individual basis, whether the readmitting country effectively 
respects safety criteria. Moreover, sending States must also receive 
formal assurance in advance that the third country expressly consents 
to the transfer by accepting both to admit the asylum seeker into its 
territory and to examine her protection claim.
532
 It is thus not enough 
                                                 
530
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that EU Member States provide the claimant with a notification 
informing the third country that the application of the individual they 
are being asked to take back has not been examined on its merits. The 
readmitting State should also expressly consent to assess the merits of 
the protection claim made by the individual.
533
 In order to reduce the 
risk of irremediable mistakes in the overall procedure, the asylum 
seeker should also be entitled to challenge, with a suspensive effect, 
the transfer decision by contesting the safety of the readmitting 
country. Although these safeguards can be inferred from the EU 
Recast Procedures Directive and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, they 
do not always find application in practice. 
The analysis of the readmission practices of Italy and the UK with 
third countries - carried out in Part II of this thesis - will aim to 
observe whether sending States ensure both access to protection 
before removal, and scrupulously assess whether readmitting 
countries are required to effectively guarantee safety criteria and 
procedural safeguards to returned asylum seekers. 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
Although the Geneva Convention does not expressly require States 
to guarantee access to a fair refugee status determination procedures, 
                                                 
533
On the issue of express consent by the readmitting State, see, Section 5.10.1 on 
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it is also true that depriving refugees of an individual examination of 
their claims would be tantamount to accepting the risk that these 
individuals could be erroneously refouled either directly or indirectly 
through onward expulsions that could jeopardize their fundamental 
rights. 
There is no uniformity in literature on whether undertaking status 
determination is an implied obligation under the Geneva Convention. 
According to some, this obligation can be implicitly derived from the 
duty of States to perform treaty commitments in good faith in 
compliance with the object and purpose of the treaty itself. Such an 
obligation can also be implicitly inferred from the principle of non-
refoulement (Article 33(1)), whose content and scope needs to be 
shaped through the accrual of international human rights law 
instruments. Therefore, not only should refugees be entitled to 
substantiate their protection claims before competent authorities at the 
border, but they should also be permitted to disembark in a safe place 
and receive access to fair and effective asylum procedures.
534
 
The ECHR does not contain a general obligation to provide access 
to a substantive examination of asylum applications. However, the 
analysis of the jurisprudence of the Court of Strasbourg proves that ‘a 
rigorous scrutiny must necessarily be conducted of an individual’s 
claim to exclude the risk that this person could be subjected to 
                                                 
534
 Da Lomba 2004, 10. 
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treatments contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR once returned in his 
home country.’535 This implies also a duty to scrutinize the substance 
of an asylum application before expelling a person to a third State 
different from the country of origin, if the situation in the home 
country gives rise to concerns for her life and liberty.
536
 Therefore, 
from the case law of the ECtHR, it emerges that access to asylum 
mechanisms is considered a fundamental element to avoid both 
‘immediate or summary removal’ to the country of origin, and to 
determine the safety of the third country. 
At the EU level, Article 18 of the CFR - enshrining the right to 
asylum - has been interpreted as involving both a right to seek and a 
right to be granted asylum, which has become legally binding primary 
law in the Union. Accordingly, the 2011 Recast Qualification 
Directive - by reasserting its compliance with the CFR and Article 18 
in particular - establishes that Member States shall grant either 
refugee status or subsidiary protection to a third country national or 
stateless person who qualifies as a refugee or as a person eligible for 
subsidiary protection, respectively. Furthermore, with the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, the right to asylum embodied in Article 18 
of the CFR has become a ‘subjective and enforceable right of 
individuals under the Union's legal order’,537 directly applicable 
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within domestic legal systems without further incorporation and 
transposition. 
This Chapter also discussed the procedures EU Member States 
shall put into place to reduce the baleful impact of ‘safe third country’ 
mechanisms – whose legality under international law is here 
questioned - on refugee rights. Sending States, for instance, have a 
duty to both verify that the asylum seeker will have access to effective 
protection in the readmitting country, and to guarantee that, in any 
case, this presumption of safety is rebuttable. They must, thus, assure, 
before removal, that readmitting countries offer effective protection 
from indirect refoulement either by granting permission to stay, or 
access to an examination procedure.
538
 
In a process of cross-fertilization between different legal regimes, 
there is an increasing consensus among human rights scholars that 
international human rights law can provide a wider and more 
generous protection to asylum seekers than international refugee law, 
even when the violation is likely to occur outside European 
territory.
539
 The Hirsi ruling confirms this trend by imposing upon 
States the duty to inform refugees about their rights, ensure access to 
asylum procedures, and assess the safety of the third country. The 
elaboration of an adequate system of access to asylum procedures in 
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line with international standards of refugee and human rights law 
becomes even more compelling in light of the trend aimed to 
delocalize migration controls and asylum models outside the Union 
far from the procedural and substantive protection standards 
guaranteed within the European borders. 
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Chapter 4.  The Right to an Effective Remedy before 
Return  
 
4.1. Introduction 
This Chapter will investigate how the right to an effective remedy 
is governed by international refugee and human rights treaties, such as 
the Geneva Convention, the ICCPR, the CAT, and the ECHR, and 
how the relevant monitoring bodies ensure its availability and 
accessibility. As already explained in relation to the right to access 
asylum procedures, the right to an effective remedy here is understood 
as a procedural entitlement, a pre-condition to non-refoulement, that 
remains the cornerstone of refugee law. An effective remedy can 
imply the right to appeal against a decision to refuse asylum in the 
first instance, as well as the right to challenge an expulsion order in 
view of either repealing the decision to expel or suspend the return if 
there is a serious risk of ill-treatment for the person concerned.  
Whilst Section 4.2 introduces the right to an effective remedy 
under international refugee law, Section 4.3 reconstructs its substance 
and meaning through the analysis of international human rights 
treaties, such as the ICCPR and the CAT. Section 4.4 elaborates 
further on the right to an effective remedy under the ECHR and 
discusses the extraterritorial applicability of Article 13 of the 
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Convention, which therefore applies also in the context of maritime 
interception of migrants and refugees. Finally, Section 4.5 briefly 
outlines the main EU law norms regulating the access to legal 
remedies for asylum seekers claiming protection in one of the EU 
Member States.   
 
4.2. The Right to an effective remedy under refugee law 
The Geneva Convention does not contain an express provision on 
the right to an effective remedy against breaches of the rights 
provided therein. However, pursuant to Article 16(1) ‘[a] refugee shall 
have free access to the courts of law on the territory of all Contracting 
States’ (emphasis added). Whilst paragraph 1 contains a general 
guarantee of access to courts regardless of the refugee’s presence on 
the territory of the State, paragraph 2 provides for specific guarantees 
aimed at rendering this right effective for all refugees with habitual 
residence: ‘[a] refugee shall enjoy in the Contracting State in which he 
has habitual residence the same treatment as a national in matters 
pertaining to access to the Courts, including legal assistance and 
exemption from cautio judicatum solvi.’ 
This right – which applies to any type of legal proceedings, as 
confirmed by the lack of any restriction in the text
540
 - does not seem 
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to have raised much debate since its entry into force. Additionally, 
part of the doctrine has rejected the applicability of Article 16 to the 
determination of refugee status under first instance procedures as the 
Geneva Convention generally leaves procedural issues to the States.
541
 
Nevertheless, it can impact the right of a refugee to access fair status 
determination procedures by providing a remedy, in principle, against 
an unfavourable decision, thereby preventing States from excluding 
refugees from their territories.
542
 This subjective right – as testified by 
the wording ‘shall have’ in Article 16(1) – does not require physical 
presence in the country the refugee intends to access and no reference 
to recognized refugees is made in its text. As Elberling explains,  
 
This interpretation relies on the wording ‘territory of all Contracting States’—
obviously a refugee would not be able to be present on the territory of all 
contracting States at the same time. [...] The reference to territory in Article 16(1) 
thus can only be understood as a standard territorial clause, limiting the right to 
access to courts in keeping with the territorial application of the 1951 Convention to 
the State in question in general. Thus, where the 1951 Convention is not applicable 
to certain overseas territories of a State, Article 16 does not guarantee access to 
                                                                                                                                                   
refugee should have the opportunity of bringing or defending civil proceedings’ as 
cited in Björn Elberling, ‘Article 16. Access to Courts’ in Zimmermann 2011, 939. 
541For some examples, see Pieter Boeles, ‘Effective Legal Remedies for Asylum 
Seekers according to the Convention of Geneva of 1951’ (1996) 43 NILR 291, 302. 
See also, UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures, para 12 (ii). 
542
 Thomas Spijkerboer, ‘Higher Judicial Remedies’ in Geoffrey Care and Hugo 
Storey (eds), Asylum Law: First International Judicial Conference on Asylum Law 
(1995) 217 ff; Boeles 1996, 302. 
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courts in those territories.
543
 
 
As there is no requirement that the asylum seeker be physically on 
the territory of one of the Contracting Parties to trigger the right to 
have free access to court, this right can be enjoyed even if the refugee 
is kept in ‘international’ or ‘transit’ zones or is brought to a third 
country.
544
 Article 16(1) requires States to ensure ‘free access’ to 
courts, thus precluding any limitation based on refugee status, as 
recognition is purely declaratory and not constitutive of refugee 
status.
545
 As ‘free access’ is also meant to be effective, any measures, 
such as both excessively strict time frames and formal requirements, 
would defy the substance of this right.
546
 An asylum seeker shall have 
time to prepare her claim, collect evidence, appeal against a negative 
decision, and if detained, to challenge that detention in court. ‘Free 
access’ does not, mean, however, free of payment, and States can ask 
refugees to pay court fees as any other national in the same 
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circumstances.  
Although the Convention does not specify how access to courts can 
be ensured in practical terms, it seems, however, that the right to 
access a court of law, even before admission to a status determination 
procedure, shall not be undermined by acts or omissions of the host 
State, such as the failure to provide legal aid services to refugees, as 
provided by Article 16(2).
547
 This obligation belongs to Contracting 
Parties. The UNHCR cannot offer legal aid services, but can use its 
good offices to ensure that States comply with their obligations 
toward refugees, or assist refugees to pay their lawyers’ bills.548 
Moreover, as Hathaway observes, ‘to the extent that the State is 
willing, UNHCR may, of course, provide direct assistance to refugees 
to enforce their rights in the asylum country.’549 
Article 16(2) requires habitual residence, which is less stringent 
than domicile and does not create any requirement of legality or 
acceptance. Rather it implies a factual element, which ‘simply allows 
States to base the choice of legal system to which the standard of 
treatment should attach on the individual refugee’s situation.’550 
Refugees do not need to have a permanent stay or a plan to make their 
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stay permanent,
551
 but there is a need for some form of ‘willed 
connection’ between the refugee and the State,552 which can also be 
based on State’s decision to grant the refugee access to the territory. 
As discussed in respect to Article 16, paragraph 1, recognition of 
refugee status is thus not required for the guarantees of paragraph 2 
come into force, namely legal assistance and exclusion from payment 
of cautio judicatum solvi, which shall be available under the same 
conditions as those applied to nationals.
553
 Therefore, to act in 
compliance with Article 16(2), States must grant access to legal aid 
even to people involved in the refugee status determination process. 
With regard to ‘refugees in orbit’, in order to make the rights 
protected by Article 16 effective rather than illusory in nature, the 
State of habitual residence should be considered that one where the 
refugee is present at the material time in which access to court is 
sought.
554
 
It is also to be observed that the wording of Article 16(1) regards 
only ‘courts of law’ as opposed to administrative agencies,555 which, 
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instead, are included in Article 32(2), which provides for access to a 
competent authority, and regulates access to remedies for refugees 
subjected to an expulsion decision. Article 32(2) requires that the 
decision to expel a refugee on grounds of national security or public 
order be taken ‘in accordance with due process of law’ and that: 
 
Except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the 
refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be 
represented for the purpose before a competent authority or person or persons 
specially designated by the competent authorities.
556
 
 
Any reader would notice the margin of both overlapping and 
divergence between Article 33 on non-refoulement and Article 32 on 
expulsion. First, whereas Article 32 applies only to refugees who are 
lawfully on the territory of one of the Contracting Party, Article 33 
encompasses all refugees within the jurisdiction of this State, 
regardless of their regular or irregular status. Second, Article 32 refers 
to expulsion enforced on the basis of an order to leave the country, 
while Article 33 pertains to a factual removal of refugees to the 
                                                                                                                                                   
UNHCR EXCOM Conclusion no 8 (1977) which recommends that an applicant for 
refugee status ‘should be permitted to remain in the country while an appeal to a 
higher administrative authority or to the courts is pending.’ UNHCR EXCOM 
Conclusion no 22 (1981) emphasizes that asylum seekers ‘are to be considered as 
persons before the law, enjoying free access to courts and other competent 
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frontiers of territories where their life or freedom would be threatened 
on one of the five grounds of Article 1(a). Third, State authorities 
have to comply with both Articles 32 and 33 when expelling a 
refugee. In other words, they have to issue an expulsion order only for 
reasons of national security and public order (as required by Article 
32(1)), act in accordance with the procedural guarantees of Article 
32(2) on due process and also ensure that the actual removal does not 
result in refoulement, prohibited by Article 33. Finally, Article 32 
does not pertain to those refugees falling under the cessation clause in 
Article 1(c) of the Geneva Convention, or those persons deemed 
unworthy of refugee status and excluded from the benefits of the 
Convention under Article 1(f).
557
 However, the fact that Article 32 
applies to refugees who are lawfully in the territory of one of the 
Contracting Parties does not have to lead States to assume that it is 
confined only to refugees with a permanent residence. Rather, its 
scope of application extends also to ‘refugees whose stay is, at the 
material time, perceived as temporary and precarious’,558 and 
potentially also to asylum seekers who are scheduled to be removed to 
‘safe third countries.’559 
The first element of the procedural safeguards contained in Article 
                                                 
557
 On the intertwining between Articles 32 and 33, see, Ulrike Davy, ‘Article 32: 
Expulsion’ in Zimmermann (ed) 1294-5.  
558
 Davy 2011, 1324. 
559
 ibid, 1324. 
 254 
 
32(2) is ‘due process of law,’ which implies a number of constraints 
on the liberty of States when deciding matters relating to deportation 
and removal. The notion of ‘due process’ has been articulated in a 
number of deportation cases. It has been defined as a standard for 
national legislation, which must always be accessible and foreseeable 
and able to protect against arbitrary actions, as required by 
international human rights law.
560
 Moreover, deportation ‘must be 
reasonable, not arbitrary and must rest upon some ground [...] having 
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all 
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’561 
As the ‘due process’ standard varies according to the nature of the 
endangered individual right, the rights listed in the second sentence of 
paragraph 2 – right to submit evidence to clear oneself, right to appeal 
and to be represented before competent authority - is not meant to be 
exhaustive.
562
 While collecting and submitting evidence pertains to 
the decision-making procedure at first instance, the other two rights 
apply to an appeal procedure before an administrative authority. The 
                                                 
560
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right to submit evidence also implies the possibility to access 
competent translation services, but not the right to free legal 
assistance, the right to a hearing in person or a right to cross-examine 
witnesses.
563
 
It is worth clarifying that, according to the drafting history of the 
right ‘to appeal’, the expulsion decision was not meant to entitle 
refugees to access a judicial body in charge of examining all questions 
of law and of fact anew, but rather access to a less specific proper 
authority.
564
 However, in light of the development of human rights 
law and refugee law as two interrelated disciplines, the scope of 
Article 32(2) cannot today be limited to a mere opportunity ‘à 
présenter un recours’ before a court of law,565 which conducts a mere 
formal examination of the case. The requirement of due process of 
law is satisfied only if an individual is informed of the possibility of 
lodging an appeal and her complaint is examined by an independent 
and impartial body that can determine both questions of law and 
fact.
566
 Moreover, the refugee has the benefit of adversarial 
proceedings, that is to say the possibility to present her point of view 
and contest the arguments put forward by the State authorities that 
                                                 
563
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have ordered her expulsion.
567
 Finally, once domestic remedies have 
been exhausted and the expulsion order is issued – the refugee is 
entitled to have her deportation order delayed for a ‘reasonable 
period’ in order to seek admission into another country (paragraph 3). 
Another aspect that cannot be neglected is that the rights of Article 
32(2) can be withdrawn on ‘compelling reasons of national security.’ 
This introductory clause was inserted to deal with situations where 
disclosure of information in case concerning national security could 
impair State interests, as national courts would find them obliged to 
reveal sensitive or classified information.
568
 As we will analyze in 
detail in Chapter 6, national courts, in Western States engaged in the 
war on terrorism, frequently rely on evidence that is under seal 
(closed evidence) when dealing with refugees who are to be deported 
on national security grounds, thus raising continuous concerns on the 
risk to curtail the procedural rights of foreigners pending deportation.   
Next Sections will review the guarantees international human 
rights treaties put at the disposal of refugees to allow them to 
challenge an unfavourable decision on their status or an expulsion 
decision. 
 
                                                 
567
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4.3.   The right to an effective remedy under the ICCPR and 
the CAT 
The right to an effective remedy is explicitly recognized by Article 
2(3) of the ICCPR whereby: 
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any 
person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an 
effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons 
acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy 
shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or 
legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal 
system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To 
ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted 
(emphasis added). 
 
Pursuant to Article 7 of the ICCPR, ‘no one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ In 
its interpretation of Article 7, the HRC has explained that  
 
States parties must not expose individuals to the danger of torture and cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by 
way of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement.
569
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The HRC has also added that the prohibition of refoulement entails 
the right to have a review or appeal of a negative decision that is 
available in law and practice, and imposes upon competent national 
authorities the duty to assess the substance of a claim and grant 
appropriate relief.
570
  A remedy can be ‘effectively assured by the 
judiciary, administrative mechanisms, and national human rights 
institutions.’571 However, the HRC maintains that priority shall be 
placed on judicial remedies, as ‘decisions made solely by political or 
subordinate administrative organs do not constitute an effective 
remedy within the meaning of paragraph 3(b).’572 
In the Alzery v Sweden case, the HRC stressed that Article 7, read 
in conjunction with Article 2 of the Covenant, requires an effective 
review prior to expulsion in order to avoid both irremediable damages 
to the individual returned to the territories of a third State where she 
might be subjected to torture, and the risk of rendering ‘the review 
otiose and devoid of meaning.’573 
In the Judge v Canada case, the Committee stated that:  
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By preventing the author from exercising an appeal available to him under 
domestic law, the State party failed to demonstrate that the author's contention that 
his deportation to a country where he faces execution would violate his right to life, 
was sufficiently considered. The State party makes available an appellate system 
designed to safeguard any petitioner's, including the author's rights and in particular 
the most fundamental of rights - the right to life. […] The decision to deport the 
author to a State where he is under sentence of death without affording him the 
opportunity to avail himself of an available appeal, was taken arbitrarily and in 
violation of Article 6, together with Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant 
(emphasis added).
574
 
 
If we read the Judge v Canada case in light of the case law of the 
HRC on the right to an effective remedy, it can be argued that the 
right to appeal under domestic law shall be guaranteed by the sending 
State to any applicants whose rights risk to be violated upon 
deportation. The HRC requires, indeed, that ‘the State party makes 
available an appellate system designed to safeguard any petitioner's 
(including the author's) rights and in particular - the right to life. 
Therefore, the language used by the HRC is not exclusive with regard 
to the right to life, but it is implicitly open to a broader protection, 
including torture or instances of persecution.  
In the XHL v The Netherlands case, concerning a 12 year-old 
Chinese minor seeking asylum in the Netherlands, the HRC 
                                                 
574
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considered that: 
 
The State party is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective 
remedy by reconsidering his claim in light of the evolution of the circumstances of 
the case, including the possibility of granting him a residence permit. The State 
party is also under an obligation to take steps to prevent similar violations occurring 
in the future.
575
 
 
In another case regarding two asylum seekers who risked 
deportation to Sri Lanka, the HRC concluded that further analysis of 
the protection claims of the applicants should have been carried out. 
Indeed, the ‘removal order issued against the authors would constitute 
a violation of Article 7 of the Covenant if it were enforced.
576
 
Therefore, it stressed that: 
 
The State party is under an obligation to provide the authors with an effective 
remedy, including a full reconsideration of the authors’ claim regarding the risk of 
torture, should they be returned to Sri Lanka, taking into account the State party‘ s 
obligations under the Covenant (emphasis added).
577
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With regard to the CAT, the right to an effective remedy can also 
be implicitly derived from Article 3 on the prohibition of refoulement. 
The requirements of effective, independent and impartial 
administrative or judicial review must always be respected even if 
national security concerns entail no possibility for review of the 
decision to expel.
578
 In the Agiza v Sweden case, the Committee 
against Torture affirmed that:  
 
The right to an effective remedy for a breach of the Convention underpins the 
entire Convention, for otherwise the protection afforded by the Convention would 
be rendered largely illusory. [...] In the Committee's view, in order to reinforce the 
protection of the norm in question and understanding the Convention consistently, 
the prohibition on refoulement contained in Article 3 should be interpreted the same 
way to encompass a remedy for its breach, even though it may not contain on its 
face such a right to remedy for a breach thereof. […] The nature of refoulement is 
such, however, that an allegation of breach of that Article relates to a future 
expulsion or removal; accordingly, the right to an effective remedy contained in 
Article 3 requires, in this context, an opportunity for effective, independent and 
impartial review of the decision to expel or remove, once that decision is made, 
when there is a plausible allegation that Article 3 issues arise (emphasis added).
579
 
 
A remedy that is effective in law and practice also warrants the 
State to ensure adequate time to appeal. For instance, in the Iratxe 
                                                 
578
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Sorzábal Díaz v France case, the time between the serving of the 
ministerial order and the enforcement of the expulsion was so short 
that it made it impossible for the applicant to obtain an effective 
remedy. In these circumstances, also an appeal against the ministerial 
decision ‘would not have been effective or even possible.’580 
The Josu Arkauz Arana v France case concerned a claim lodged by 
an individual who alleged that France violated his rights under Article 
3(1) by deporting him to Spain. The Committee against Torture first 
declared the communication admissible because the applicant was not 
granted sufficient time to appeal against a deportation order, which 
was enforced immediately after the notification thereof.
581
 In its 
decision, it then held that: 
 
There had also been suspicions, expressed in particular by some non-
governmental organizations, that other persons in the same circumstances as the 
author had been subjected to torture on being returned to Spain and during their 
incommunicado detention. The deportation was effected under an administrative 
procedure, which the Administrative Court of Pau had later found to be illegal, 
entailing a direct handover from police to police, without the intervention of a 
judicial authority and without any possibility for the author to contact his family or 
his lawyer. That meant that a detainee's rights had not been respected and had 
                                                 
580
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placed the author in a situation where he was particularly vulnerable to possible 
abuse (emphasis added).
582
 
 
In the light of these considerations, the Court finally found a 
violation of Article 3 of the Convention. 
 
4.4.   The right to an effective remedy under the ECHR 
Pursuant to Article 13 of the ECHR,  
 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are 
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding 
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity. 
 
 As Article 6 (Right to a Fair Trial) is inapplicable in migration 
cases, Article 13 is the relevant provision for the right of appeal of 
asylum seekers. An ‘effective remedy’ is meant as a tool ‘available 
and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged’583 
and apt to allow the competent authority ‘both to deal with the 
substance of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant 
appropriate relief.’584 It must be able to quash the decision to expel 
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and to suspend the enforcement of the deportation order.
585
 To be 
effective, it is not necessary that the authority offering the remedy is a 
judicial authority in the strict sense, but its independence and 
impartiality are necessary for the remedy to be effective.
586
 
Furthermore, the ECtHR's surveillance of State compliance with the 
Convention must always be subsidiary to the surveillance carried out 
by domestic courts.
587
 As stated in Gebremedhin v France, 
 
Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at national level of a 
remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever 
form they may happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The effect of 
Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the 
substance of an ‘arguable complaint’ under the Convention and to grant appropriate 
relief.
588
 
 
The relevant moment in time for the Court's own assessment of the 
risk is at the material time of deportation. If the foreigner has already 
been deported, this assessment must be made primarily with reference 
to those facts that were known or ought to have been known to the 
                                                 
585
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deporting State at the moment of deportation.
589
 In considering the 
case, the ECtHR can also collect information on its own initiative,
590
 
including material that was unknown to the respondent State at the 
moment it decided to deport the foreigner.
591
 
The ECtHR has spoken up for the need to extend the requirement 
of rigorous examination to legal remedies at the national level against 
expulsion in violation of Article 3 in order to ensure a more thorough 
assessment of the claim made by the applicant and the reasons of her 
fear to return.
592
 It emerges, therefore, that the procedural guarantees 
offered by Articles 13 are functional to protection under Article 3, 
given that the principle of non-refoulement and the right to an 
effective remedy are tightly interdependent. The latter is not, indeed, a 
freestanding right, but rather an accessory right to be read in 
conjunction with Article 3 of the ECHR.
593
 In Jabari v Turkey, the 
Court held that: 
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Given the irreversible nature of the harm that might occur if the risk of torture or 
ill-treatment alleged materialized and the importance which it attaches to Article 3, 
the notion of an effective remedy under Article 13 requires independent and 
rigorous scrutiny of a claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk 
of treatment contrary to Article 3 and the possibility of suspending the 
implementation of the measure impugned.
594
 
 
Therefore, the Court found a violation of Article 13 as the judicial 
review proceedings relied on by the Government did not provide any 
of the aforementioned safeguards.  
A ‘rigorous scrutiny’ implies a thorough examination of the merits 
and the substance of the protection claim in order to verify real risks 
of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. The 
term ‘independent’ is used in relation to the scrutiny by a decision 
maker,
595
 which becomes essential when considering the irreversible 
nature of the harm that might occur if the asylum seeker is physically 
sent back to a country where she risks ill-treatment. While attaching 
experience to national authorities in examining asylum claims in a 
thorough manner,
596
 the ECtHR has also explicitly indicated that its 
role is to provide a rigorous examination of a risk of ill-treatment in 
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breach of Article 3.
597
 Such an evaluation implies the possibility to 
assess the credibility of an asylum seeker whose claims seem 
implausible.
598
 
Beyond Article 3 claims, the ECtHR has recognized violations of 
the right to an effective remedy also in many cases where State’s 
failure to allow an individual to challenge a refusal of entry or an 
order of expulsion jeopardized the applicant's right to respect for 
family life.
599
 For instance, in the Al-Nashif v Bulgaria case, the 
ECtHR found a violation of Article 8 because Mr. Al-Nashif’s 
deportation in 1999 interfered with his family life. The ECtHR also 
added that, in cases where the government invokes national security 
grounds, domestic authorities or courts should be able properly to 
balance the interests of the individuals with the general interest of 
governments.
600
 That said,  
 
Even where an allegation of a threat to national security is made, the guarantee 
of an effective remedy requires as a minimum that the competent independent 
appeals authority be informed of the reasons for the decision, even if such reasons 
were not publicly available. The authority had to be competent to reject the 
                                                 
597
 See, e.g., Vilvarajah v the UK, para 108; Chahal v the UK, para 96; TI v. UK, 14. 
598
Said v The Netherlands App 2345/02 (ECtHR, 5 July 2005) para 50; N v Finland, 
para 152; Nasimi v Sweden App no 38865/02, 7. 
599
Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v UK Apps nos 9214/80, 9473/81, and 
9474/81 (1995) Series A no 94. See also, Al-Nashif v Bulgaria. 
600
Al-Nashif v Bulgaria, para 137. 
 268 
 
executive's assertion that there was a threat to national security where it found it 
arbitrary or unreasonable.
601
 
 
This case concerns, however, an Article 8 claim. No balancing 
between national interests and the fundamental rights of the individual 
is possible in cases regarding the risk of violation of Article 3.
602
 
 In the Conka v Belgium case concerning the detention and 
deportation of a Roma family that requested political asylum in 
Belgium, the Court singled out certain elements, which significantly 
affected the accessibility of remedies. The factors considered by the 
Court included the lack of proper communication of the reasons for 
detention, the absence of an interpreter, and the lack of 
understandable information on the available remedies.
603
 Although the 
Court declared that no violation existed of Article 13 in connection 
with Article 3, it found a violation of the right to an effective remedy 
in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol 4 (prohibition of collective 
expulsions). The relevance of this judgement with respect to the rights 
of asylum seekers subjected to a decision of expulsion can be 
deduced, inter alia, from the following passage:  
                                                 
601
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The notion of an effective remedy under Article 13 requires that the remedy may 
prevent the execution of measures that are contrary to the Convention and whose 
effects are potentially irreversible. Consequently, it is inconsistent with Article 13 
for such measures to be executed before the national authorities have examined 
whether they are compatible with the Convention, although Contracting States are 
afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their 
obligations under this provision.
604
 
 
This means that national courts or authorities shall be able to 
suspend measures that might produce irremediable results entailing 
egregious infringements of Article 3. In the Conka judgement, the 
Court also significantly expanded the right to an effective remedy to 
include the duty to provide an appeal with suspensive effect for a 
minimum reasonable period. If in the Jabari case, the Court 
cautiously considered the suspension of the physical expulsion as a 
possibility rather than as an obligation of governments,
605
 in 
Gebremedhin v France, the Court stressed State obligation to provide 
for suspensive effect ‘de plein droit’ for a remedy to be effective.606 
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Mr. Gebremedhin was an Eritrean asylum seeker who arrived, on 
29 June 2005, without any identity documents, at Charles de Gaulle 
airport in Paris. He applied for leave to enter France on grounds of 
asylum but his application was dismissed by the Ministry of the 
Interior which gave directions for his removal to ‘Eritrea, or if need be 
to any country where he may be legally admissible.’ Mr. 
Gebremedhin therefore lodged an appeal, which was dismissed on 8 
July 2005 by the urgent applications judge of the Cergy-Pontoise 
Administrative Court. As a last resort, the claimant filed an 
application with the ECtHR, which indicated to the French 
government an interim measure under Rule 39 aimed at staying 
execution of the removal to Eritrea pending a decision by the Court. 
On 20 July 2005, the French authorities granted Mr. Gebremedhin 
leave to enter France and then issued him with a temporary residence 
permit. A few months later, OFPRA granted him refugee status.
607
 
The applicant alleged a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in 
conjunction with Article 3, as under French law there was no remedy 
with suspensive effect against decisions refusing leave to enter or 
ordering removal. On 26 April 2007, the ECtHR held that: 
 
The requirements of Article 13, and of the other provisions of the Convention, 
take the form of a guarantee and not of a mere statement of intent or a practical 
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arrangement. That is one of the consequences of the rule of law, one of the 
fundamental principles of a democratic society, which is inherent in all the Articles 
of the Convention. […] In view of the importance which the Court attaches to 
Article 3 of the Convention and the irreversible nature of the damage which may 
result if the risk of torture or ill-treatment materialises, this finding obviously 
applies also to cases in which a State Party decides to remove an alien to a country 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she faces a risk of that 
nature: Article 13 requires that the person concerned should have access to a remedy 
with automatic suspensive effect. The Court therefore concludes in the instant case 
that, as the applicant did not have access in the ‘waiting zone’ to a remedy with 
automatic suspensive effect, he did not have an ‘effective remedy’ in respect of his 
complaint under Article 3 of the Convention. There has therefore been a violation of 
Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 3.
608
 
 
From the case law of the ECtHR, it emerges how the right to an 
effective remedy can be invoked not only when a serious violation has 
taken place, but also when the asylum seeker makes an ‘arguable’ 
claim of such a violation. A claim is ‘arguable’ when it is ‘sufficiently 
credible for the Court to consider that it raised an issue of substance 
under Article 3. It follows that [...] the applicant is entitled in principle 
to rely on that provision in conjunction with Article 13.’609 If an 
asylum seeker has an arguable claim, she has a prima facie case, 
                                                 
608
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meaning that her application cannot be dismissed on formal grounds, 
even if the author made procedural errors.
610
 An infringement of 
Article 13 can, therefore, be invoked not only when a serious violation 
has already taken place, but also when an individual (including an 
asylum seeker), makes an ‘arguable’ claim that such a violation may 
occur upon return to a third country. The Court also added that Article 
13 of the ECHR requires an effective remedy before expulsion – even 
when removal takes place at the border after refusal of leave to enter - 
unless the claim is ‘manifestly unfounded’ with no prima facie risk 
that the expulsion would imply a breach of Article 3.
611
 
In Diallo v Czech Republic, already discussed in Chapter 3, the 
Court held that: 
 
None of the domestic authorities examined the merits of the applicants’ arguable 
claim under Article 3 of the Convention and there were no remedies with automatic 
suspensive effect available to the applicants regarding the authorities’ decision not 
                                                 
610
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to grant them asylum and to expel them. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds 
that there has been a violation of Article 13 […] taken in conjunction with Article 3 
of the Convention.
612
 
 
In Conka, the Court explained what exactly it considered to be an 
‘effective’ remedy. After asserting that a remedy ‘must be effective in 
practice as well as in law,’ it clarified that such a factor: 
 
Does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant. Nor 
does the ‘authority’ referred to in that provision necessarily have to be a judicial 
authority; but if it is not, its powers and the guarantees which it affords are relevant 
in determining whether the remedy before it is effective. Also, even if a single 
remedy does not by itself entirely satisfy the requirements of Article 13, the 
aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law may do so.
613
 
 
According to the Court, the effectiveness of a remedy can be 
assessed also in light of the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies 
as set forth in Article 35 of the ECHR. Indeed, Article 13 guarantees:  
 
The availability at national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the 
Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to be secured 
in the domestic legal order. The effect of this Article is thus to require the provision 
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of a domestic remedy allowing the competent national authority both to deal with 
the substance of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant appropriate relief 
[…].614 
 
National authorities must also be able to afford applicants ‘a 
realistic possibility of using the remedy’, as stated by the Court in the 
Conka decision.
615
 In the Bahaddar v The Netherlands, case, the 
Court reasoned that short time limits for lodging asylum claims can 
hamper the access to an effective remedy if they are too short or 
applied too inflexibly to keep the applicant from supplying evidence 
proving her claim.
616
 In this case, however, the Court found that 
domestic remedies were not exhausted before applying to the 
Commission, and no reason existed absolving the applicant from 
complying with the four-month time limit for lodging an appeal. For 
this reason, it declared the case inadmissible.  
In its Jabari v Turkey judgment, the ECtHR found a violation of 
Article 13 caused by the lack of assessment of the asylum claim. In 
criticizing the absolute requirement that an asylum application be 
submitted within five days after the applicant's arrival in the country, 
it held that:  
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The automatic and mechanical application of such a short time-limit for 
submitting an asylum application must be considered at variance with the protection 
of the fundamental value embodied in Article 3 of the Convention’.617 
 
Rejecting an asylum application (including repeat applications) on 
formal grounds might lead to a violation of Article 3 if deportation is 
enforced to the borders of territory where the life or freedom of the 
claimant can be put at risk. Asylum seekers, as anybody else, must 
comply with procedural rules. Judicial scrutiny of an arguable claim 
under Article 3 must always be ensured, and procedural mistakes 
should not automatically prevent applicants from obtaining access to 
an effective remedy. The Court does not disapprove, for instance, a 
time frame requiring that an asylum application be submitted within 
five days. Rather, the Court’s reasoning suggests that:  
 
The problem is not primarily in the rules themselves (procedural rules are formal 
by their very nature), but in their application. [...] Making the application of 
procedural rules in some way conditional on the merits of the case itself is the only 
way to reach a compromise between the procedural autonomy of States parties on 
the one hand, and the subsidiary role of the Court in examining applications based 
on Article 3 on the other.’618 
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In several other cases, the ECtHR ruled that the fact that an 
applicant did not have the chance to appeal the decision of expulsion 
or extradition led to a violation of Article 13. In the Shamayev and 
Others v Georgia and Russia case, for instance, the applicants did not 
have access to the files submitted by the Russian authorities and were 
not informed of the decision to expel them. The Strasbourg Court’s 
reasoning underlined that the fact that applicants' lawyers were not 
granted sufficient information in time prevented them from 
challenging the extradition order. It therefore found a violation of 
Article 13 as national authorities unjustifiably hindered the exercise of 
the right to appeal. In sum, the Court maintained that: 
 
Where the authorities of a State hasten to hand over an individual to another 
State two days after the date on which the order was issued, they have a duty to act 
with all the more promptness and expedition to enable the person concerned to have 
his or her complaint under Articles 2 and 3 submitted to independent and rigorous 
scrutiny and to have enforcement of the impugned measure suspended. The Court 
finds it unacceptable for a person to learn that he is to be extradited only moments 
before being taken to the airport, when his reason for fleeing the receiving country 
has been his fear of treatment contrary to Article 2 or Article 3 of the Convention.
619
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
context of machinery for the protection of human rights.’ Therefore, procedural 
rules ‘must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive 
formalism [...]’  (para 44). 
619
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Similarly, in Gorabayevv Russia, the Court held that:  
 
The notion of an effective remedy under Article 13 requires that the remedy may 
prevent the execution of measures that are contrary to the Convention and whose 
effects are potentially irreversible. Consequently, it is inconsistent with Article 13 
for such measures to be executed before the national authorities have examined 
whether they are compatible with the Convention, although Contracting States are 
afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their 
obligations under this provision.
620
 
 
The same line of reasoning was followed by the Court in the 
Baysakov and Others v Ukraine case, which confirmed how Article 
13 embodies both the requirement of an independent and rigorous 
scrutiny of the claim that expulsion could result in ill-treatment 
contrary to Article 3, and the need for a remedy with automatic 
suspensive effect.
621
 However, in the present case, the Court found 
that the national procedure of consideration of extradition requests by 
the prosecutor was inconsistent with the right to an effective remedy 
under Article 13. Indeed, the prosecutor’s regulations did not provide 
for a 
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Thorough and independent assessment of any complaints of a risk of ill-
treatment in case of extradition, [and did] not provide for a time limit by which the 
person concerned is to be notified of an extradition decision or a possibility of 
suspending extradition pending a court’s consideration of a complaint against such a 
decision.
622
 
 
 Therefore, a remedy will be effective in preventing removal from 
the country only if it has an automatic suspensive effect.
623
 In the case 
Olaechea Chuas v Spain, the applicant’s transfer was scheduled for 
the day after the  decision of the ECtHR to issue an interim measure 
pursuant to Rule 39.
624
 The Court considered as unacceptable the 
justification that the Spanish government had not had enough time to 
suspend the extradition after receiving the notification of the decision 
to apply interim measures, since this behaviour would risk hindering 
the effective exercise of the right of individual application.
625
 
Two other judgments deserve to be mentioned with regard to the 
right of refugees to access asylum procedures and effective remedies 
against expulsion before removal: the IM v France and the Singh and 
Others v Belgium. The IM v France case concerns a Sudanese asylum 
seeker arrested for ‘unlawful entry’ and for ‘using forged documents’ 
in France. After the denial of his asylum claim, and despite his appeal 
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to the Cour nationale du droit d’asile (CNDA), Mr. IM was taken by 
French police officers to the Consulate of Sudan to obtain travel 
documents for deportation. Mr. IM then filed an application with the 
ECtHR on the ground that his removal to Sudan would violate Article 
3 and Article 13 of the Convention. The same day, the president of the 
5th Section issued a Rule 39 order requesting France to suspend the 
deportation of the applicant pending a decision of the Court. Finally 
on 12 February 2012, the ECtHR found that Articles 13 and 3 of the 
Convention had been violated because of France’s failure to provide 
satisfactory legal assistance from the lawyer in charge of the case, as 
well as adequate language interpretation by the NGO Cimade, an 
association usually entrusted with the assistance of foreigners in 
detention.
626
 The Court added that for a detained asylum seeker, the 
use of accelerated procedures (5 days to claim asylum and 48 hours to 
appeal the deportation order), the lack of suspensive effect of the 
return decision,
627
 and the difficulty to gather evidence,
628
 severely 
hindered his access to domestic effective remedies.
629
 
The Singh and Others v Belgium case regards an Afghan family 
arriving in Belgium on a flight from Moscow. As they did not have 
the legally required documents, they were refused entry and an 
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expulsion order was issued against them. The applicants, at the same 
time, applied for asylum. But since they were unable to provide 
evidence of their Afghan nationality at both the first instance and 
appellate phases, their applications were rejected and the removal 
decision became enforceable. On 30 May 2011 the applicants applied 
to the ECtHR for an interim measure, under Rule 39, to have their 
removal to Russia suspended. The Court found a violation of Article 
13 in connection with Article 3 as the applicants were not granted the 
possibility to both explain their fears of indirect refoulement through 
Russia, and to defend their allegations of ill-treatment they would face 
in Afghanistan as members of the Sikh minority. 
Neither the Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and 
Stateless Persons (CGRA) nor the Aliens Disputes Board (CCE) had 
sought to ascertain, even incidentally, whether the applicants faced the 
proscribed risks in Afghanistan. Additionally, no measures were taken 
to authenticate the identity documents submitted by the applicants, 
and no weight was given to the statements from the UNHCR 
certifying that the applicants had been registered as refugees under the 
supervision of the UNHCR.
630
 Considering the irreversible nature of 
the potential harm if the risk of ill-treatment materialized, the fact that 
Belgian authorities refused to carry out an examination of the 
applicants’ fears led the ECtHR to hold Belgium in violation of 
                                                 
630
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Article 13 in relation to Article 3.
631
 Depriving applicants’ documents 
of any probative value without verifying their authenticity was 
inconsistent with the obligation to guarantee a rigorous scrutiny of the 
merits of the applicants’ arguable complaints under Article 3, thereby 
violating their right to an effective remedy.
632
 
 
4.4.1. The extraterritorial applicability of the right to an 
effective remedy under the ECHR 
In the Hirsi judgment, the ECtHR found the Italian Government in 
breach of Article 13 in combination with Article 3 of the Convention 
and Article 4 of Protocol 4 (prohibition of collective expulsion). 
Given the particular circumstances of the case, it was clear that the 
applicants, intercepted on the high seas, did not have the slightest 
chance of lodging a claim before a national court to challenge the 
decision to divert them to Libya. Thus, the question before the Grand 
Chamber was whether foreigners, including undocumented migrants 
and refugees who had not managed to enter the territory of the 
destination country, were entitled to have access to an effective 
remedy against the (informal) return decision, taken by the Military 
Navy officials outside the procedural framework provided by 
domestic law. 
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Over the years, the Court has developed the requirement of 
effective remedies at the national level against the potential effects of 
a decision of expulsion in the light of Article 3. In the Abdolkhani and 
Karimnia v Turkey decision, the Court established a violation of 
Article 13 as a consequence of the lack of a formal return decision, 
which consequently deprived applicants of their right to seek a 
procedural review of the expulsion order, to receive an individual 
examination of their claims, and to obtain legal assistance.
633
 
Similarly, in Hirsi, the applicants were not channelled into procedures 
of identification and assessment of their personal circumstances; no 
interpreters and legal advisors were put at the disposal of intercepted 
persons on board the ships; no information was provided by the Italian 
military personnel about their final destination; and no advice on how 
to challenge their diversion to Libya was supplied.
634
 
 Strengthening its previous stance in MSS v Belgium and Greece, 
the Court in Hirsi reiterates the importance of providing anyone 
subjected to a removal decision with adequate information to enable 
her both to gain access to asylum procedures and to substantiate her 
complaints under Article 3 of the Convention and Article 4 of 
Protocol 4.
635
 Moreover, for the first time since Conka, the Court 
acknowledges a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 4 
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of Protocol 4.
636
 No effective remedy with a suspensive effect of the 
deportation order was in fact provided to prevent collective 
expulsions. National authorities must always afford applicants ‘a 
realistic possibility of using the remedy.’637 A remedy that is 
‘effective’ in practice and in law does not need to bring about a 
favourable outcome for the claimants, nor does the ‘national 
authority’ referred to in Article 13 necessarily have to be a judicial 
one.
638
 
In Hirsi, the Grand Chamber did not review its previous case law 
on the issue. However, its decision complements and supplements 
established jurisprudence, which is analyzed earlier in this Chapter. If 
the Court recognizes that States enjoy a certain leeway with respect to 
the manner in which they comply with the obligations stemming from 
Article 13, it also upholds the principle that obstacles to the right to an 
effective remedy, because of accelerated procedures of expulsion or 
denial of effective status determination measures (including appeal), 
are unjustifiable. However, Chapter 3 of this thesis shows how the 
right to seek asylum on the high seas and the prohibition of torture 
and ill-treatment imply the obligation for State authorities to detect 
the identity or the nationality of intercepted persons, and guarantee 
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them access to the mainland to examine their protection claims.
639
 If 
refugees are entitled to an in-country right to access asylum 
procedures, it follows that they also have a right to judicial review of 
an unfavourable decision with suspensive effect of the return order, 
and within reasonable time limits.  
The violation of Article 13 in the case of interception on the high 
seas and diversion to the country of embarkation results from the lack 
of mechanisms through which intercepted migrants can seek review, 
before an independent national authority, of the ‘expulsion’ decision, 
and through which they can substantiate their claims on the risk of 
torture and inhuman treatments if diverted to Libya. The infringement 
of Article 13 in Hirsi is the consequence of the lack of an accessible 
remedy granted to boat-migrants, who were not allowed to seek 
review of the push-back order informally issued by the Italian 
authorities on the high seas. Since such a remedy belongs to any third 
country nationals subjected to a decision of expulsion from the 
territory of the host country, a double system of protection would be 
created, which differentiates between those who have crossed the 
borders and those who are intercepted before entering the territorial 
jurisdiction of a European State. 
As examined above, in Gebremedhin v France and Abdolkhani and 
Karimnia v Turkey, the Court held that Article 13 requires access to 
                                                 
639
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appeals ‘with automatic suspensive effect’, especially considering the 
irreversible nature of the damage if the risk of torture or inhumane 
treatments materializes in the receiving country.
640
Appeals submitted 
from abroad make the system of protection overly complex, first, 
because the possibility for the asylum seeker to lodge her recourse 
from the third country is not secured, and second, because a 
successful appeal would render otiose the attempts of the government 
to remove the applicant to a third country. As Legomsky posits,  
 
To meet its obligations under the 1951 Convention, a destination State may not 
return an asylum seeker to a third country until the entire determination process, 
including appeal, has been completed. Only then, can there be adequate assurances 
that the person’s convention rights, including the right to non-refoulement, will be 
observed.
641
 
 
The same reasoning can also be applied to remedies under the 
ECHR. 
In the Al-Saadoon v UK case, the ECtHR considered that ‘any 
appeal to the House of Lords was unjustifiably nullified as a result of 
the Government's transfer of the applicants to the Iraqi authorities [in 
Iraq].’642 By transferring the detainees out of the UK’s jurisdiction, 
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the applicants were exposed to a serious risk of irreparable harm, even 
for the lack of a binding assurance against the use of the death 
penalty. Therefore, in the Court’s view, the UK did not take all steps 
that could reasonably have been taken in order to comply with the 
interim measure issued by the Court, thereby breaching Articles 13 
and 34 of the Convention.
643
 
In line with its previous jurisprudence, the decision in Hirsi 
corroborates the view that States can be held responsible under the 
Convention even for actions carried out by or on their behalf outside 
the space of the Convention.
644
 Therefore, if States set in motion 
offshore mechanisms of either non-admission or removal after 
interdiction at sea, which limit the possibility of individuals to 
challenge State decisions, a violation of the right to an effective 
remedy under Article 13 of the ECHR could take place. The Court 
also asserted that the possibility for the applicants to apply to the 
Italian criminal courts upon their arrival in Libya was not feasible. 
Indeed, even if such a remedy was accessible in practice, criminal 
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proceedings against military personnel who were onboard the warship 
would not meet the criterion of suspensive effect of the deportation 
order, which has a primary, and not subsidiary, nature.
645
 
Moreover, once returned to third countries, it would be overly 
complex for the applicants to claim asylum, bring proceedings against 
an offending State, or collect sufficient evidence and adequate 
information to support any such legal challenge. In a poignant 
illustration of the difficulties of bringing proceedings from third 
countries, the Hussun v Italy case - concerning the expulsion of a 
group of migrants, in 2005, from the Italian territory to Libya - is 
illuminating.
646
 The applicants complained, before the Court of 
Strasbourg, of the risk to which expulsion to Libya exposed them, the 
lack of an effective remedy against the deportation orders, their 
collective expulsion as foreigners, and also of having been deprived of 
their right to apply to the Court. In any event, the Court struck the 
case from the list because of the lack of authentic powers of attorney. 
What is relevant for this Chapter is that the legal representatives had 
lost contact with all of the applicants, so it was unable to know 
exactly where in Libya the group concerned had been expelled to, or 
what kind of reception the Libyan authorities had given them. 
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4.5. Legal remedies in EU immigration and asylum law 
The Tampere Conclusions adopted in October 1999 by the Heads 
of EU governments stated that common policies on asylum and 
immigration ‘must be based on principles which are both clear to our 
own citizens and also offer guarantees to those who seek protection 
in, or access to, the European Union.’647 This means procedural 
guarantees shall be provided not only to those lawfully residing in the 
EU but also to those third country nationals seeking protection in one 
of the EU Member States. A number of EU instruments on 
immigration and asylum law, adopted on the basis of former Title IV 
of the TEC, tackle the issue of the effective remedy at the disposal of 
asylum seekers subjected to a decision of expulsion or removal.  
An important instrument of immigration law - which needs to be 
mentioned before going into the details of specific bodies of 
legislation on asylum - is the Schengen Borders Code adopted by a 
decision of the European Council in 2006 and replacing the Schengen 
Common Manual on Border Controls.
648
 Article 13(2) of the final text 
of the Regulation sets up that States may refuse entry to a third 
country national only with a substantiated decision indicating the 
procedures for appeal. Hence, the person refused entry shall have a 
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right to appeal in accordance with national law. However, ‘lodging 
such an appeal shall not have suspensive effect on a decision to refuse 
entry.’649 
In particular, the Schengen Border Code - which applies 
extraterritorially, as explained in Section 2.6 of this thesis - contains a 
standard refusal form that assumes relevance for third country 
nationals denied entry at the borders. Indeed, border guards must 
provide such individuals with a refusal form that, on the one hand, 
explicitly states that the third country national ‘may appeal against the 
refusal of entry as provided for in national law,’650 and on the other 
hand, requires that Member States motivate the decision of refusal and 
indicate which national legal remedies individuals may rely upon.
651
 
The standard refusal form also draws an exhaustive list of all the 
grounds for prohibiting access to the EU territory so that people 
involved are able to know the reasons for refusal as well as to appeal 
against a refusal of entry. 
Of relevance is also Article 46(1) of the Recast Procedures 
Directive, which embodies an explicit right to access an effective 
                                                 
649
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remedy before a court or tribunal.
652
 It also provides that the 
guarantees it offers shall be claimed before the national courts of EU 
Member States. As indicated in Section 2.6, although the Recast 
Procedures Directive does not have an extraterritorial reach, it can 
nonetheless be applied at the border, including the territorial sea of the 
Member States. This right may be exercised not only against decisions 
to consider an application inadmissible or unfounded, but also with 
regard to decisions to withdraw international protection status, or 
against refusals to reopen an examination. The Directive contains a 
number of procedural guarantees for the asylum seeker, such as the 
right to be informed of the procedure, the right to a personal 
interview, and the right to an interpreter and legal aid.
653
 It leaves, 
however, the issue of suspensive effect unsatisfactorily resolved as it 
does not strictly require States to allow applicants to remain in the 
territory pending the outcome of their remedy.
654
 Under Article 
46(4)(5), 
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Member States shall provide for reasonable time limits and other necessary rules 
for the applicant to exercise his/her right to an effective remedy pursuant to 
paragraph 1. The time-limits shall not render such exercise impossible or 
excessively difficult.
655
 
[…] Member States shall allow applicants to remain in the territory until the 
time limit within which to exercise their right to an effective remedy has expired or, 
when this right has been exercised within the time limit, pending the outcome of the 
remedy.
656 
 
Pursuant to Article 47 of the CFR, which is primary Union law,  
 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are 
violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the 
conditions laid down in this Article.  
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
                                                                                                                                                   
Recent Supranational Jurisprudence Explored’ (2012) 12(2) HRLR 287, 337; 
UNHCR, Comments on the European Commission’s Amended  roposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Common Procedures 
for Granting and Withdrawing International Protection Status (Recast) COM 
(2011) 319 final, Geneva,  January 2012. 
655
 Ex Article 39(3) of the 2005 Procedures Directive. 
656
 As already explained for the right to non-refoulement and the right to access 
asylum procedures, this Section only aims to provide a general overview of the legal 
background underpinning the right to an effective remedy under EU law. A more 
detailed discussion on the limits of the Recast Procedures Directive with regard to 
the right to an effective remedy will be provided in Section 5.10.1 of this thesis. 
Although I have not been able to read Renneman’s PhD thesis on ‘EU Asylum 
Procedures and the Right to an Effective Remedy’ – which will be published online 
on 15 January 2014 – that text is recommended to have an overview of the legal 
remedies available to refugees under the law of the EU. See, Anne Marcelle 
Renneman, ‘EU Asylum Procedures and the Right to an Effective Remedy’ (PhD 
Thesis, University of Leiden 2014). 
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independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall 
have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. 
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far 
as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice. 
 
According to the ‘Updated Explanations’ to Article 47, the 
interpretation of the right to an effective remedy under the Charter 
departs from the interpretation of the ECtHR according to which the 
right to a fair trial (Article 6 of the Convention) is not applicable to 
asylum cases.
657
 Indeed, as the Explanations read:  
 
In Union law, the right to a fair hearing is not confined to disputes relating to 
civil law rights and obligations. That is one of the consequences of the fact that the 
Union is a community based on the rule of law. Nevertheless, in all respects other 
than their scope, the guarantees afforded by the ECHR apply in a similar way to the 
Union.
658
 
 
Therefore, Article 47 of the CFR expands the procedural 
guarantees applicable to asylum seekers under the ECHR. Indeed, the 
right to access to a court will apply to any claim concerning a Union 
                                                 
657
Maaouia v France App 39652/98 (ECtHR 10 October 2000). 
658
 See, case C-294/83 Les Verts v European Parliament [1986]. 
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right,
659
 including administrative proceedings, such as asylum 
procedures.
660
 
The ‘Explanations’ to Article 47 confirm that the right to an 
effective remedy shall be interpreted in accordance with the criteria 
developed by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR with regard to Article 
13. The need to comply with the ECHR has also been stated by the 
CJEU and the EU amended treaties according to which the Union is 
based on the rule of law and the respect of human rights as moulded 
in the ECHR.
661
 Additionally, the criteria developed by the ECtHR on 
the basis of Article 13 and incorporated in Article 47 of the CFR, can 
be equally invoked in national procedures in which domestic 
authorities apply EU law.  
To sum up, the recognition of the right to an effective remedy 
entails the right of every person to be defended, represented, and 
advised. For these reasons, it assumes notable relevance in the case of 
refugees whose applications have been refused, subjected to an 
                                                 
659
 See e.g., Benthem v The Netherlands (1985) Series A no 97 para 32. 
660
 On Article 6 of the ECHR as part of Article 47 CFR, see, Opinion A-G Alber, 24 
October 2002, C-63/01 (Samuel Sidney Evans v The Secretary of State for the 
Environment,  ransport and the Regions and  he Motor Insurers’ Bureau) para 85. 
661
 The Court of First Instance (CFI) referred to the right to an effective remedy as a 
general principle of Community law, based on the constitutional traditions common 
to the Member States, on Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR, and on Article 47 of the 
CFR. See, the CFI in Case T–177/01 Jégo-Quéré v Commission (2002) ECRII–236, 
paras 41–42. According to the ECJ, in order to ensure effective judicial protection, 
the appeal body must be a court or tribunal as defined by Community law. The 
appellate body shall satisfy the following criteria: being established by law, being 
permanent, independent, and impartial, exercising a compulsory jurisdiction, and 
holding an inter partes procedure. See, Case C-506/04, Graham Wilson [2006] 
paras 47-8. 
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exclusion order, or who have received a return decision at the border 
(or beyond the border) without the possibility of seeking international 
protection. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
The right to an effective remedy is guaranteed by international 
treaties relevant to asylum cases, such as the ICCPR, the CAT, and 
the ECHR. However, with the development of the Common European 
Asylum System, asylum procedures are also partly governed by 
Union law, including Article 47 of the CFR of the EU. Of particular 
relevance are the 2005 Procedures Directive and the Recast 
Procedures Directive, which enshrine an explicit right to an effective 
remedy before a court or tribunal and provide that the guarantees they 
offer shall be claimed before the national courts of EU Member 
States. 
With regard to human rights law, Article 2(3) of the ICCPR 
explicitly recognizes the right to an effective remedy. From the 
wording of the HRC, it emerges that States shall always allow an 
individual to challenge an expulsion order, in particular if appeal 
proceedings are available under domestic law. Moreover, according to 
the Committee, States parties shall establish judicial and 
administrative mechanisms for addressing alleged breaches of rights 
and guarantee full reconsideration of a protection claim. The lack of 
 295 
 
such remedies would imply a violation of the prohibition of torture 
(Article 7) because the applicants could be directly or indirectly 
removed to their country of origin,  where they risk being subjected to 
ill-treatment.
662
 
Whilst the CAT does not contain a specific provision on the right 
to an effective remedy, it can be implicitly derived from Article 3 on 
the prohibition of refoulement. The Committee against Torture has 
indeed made clear that the right to an effective remedy underpins the 
entire Convention. Therefore, the requirements of effective, 
independent, and impartial administrative or judicial review must 
always be respected before expulsion or removal, when there is a 
plausible allegation that Article 3 issues arise.  
The right to an effective remedy enshrined in Article 13 of the 
ECHR requires independent and rigorous scrutiny of the applicant’s 
claim that a real risk exists of ill-treatment exists contrary to Article 3 
in the readmitting country. This right has also been interpreted as 
requiring a right to challenge a decision of expulsion before an 
independent and impartial authority. Such an appeal must have 
automatic suspensive effect of the enforcement of the deportation, in 
order to prevent the execution of measures that are contrary to the 
Convention and whose effects are potentially irreversible.
663
 The 
                                                 
662
Alzery v Sweden, para 11.8. 
663
  See, e.g., Gebremedhin v France, para 66-7; Garabayev v Russia; Baysakov and 
Others v Ukraine, para 71; Muminov v Russia, para 101. 
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ECtHR has emphasized how the right to have a review of an 
unfavourable decision on refugee status or an expulsion order should 
not be hindered by national procedural rules, such as short notice or 
short time limits for lodging an appeal. The recognition of an effective 
remedy as a human right implies the right of every person to be 
defended, represented, and advised. It follows that time limits for 
bringing proceedings shall not be too short, so that the asylum seeker 
may have sufficient time to appeal an expulsion measure before the 
order is enforced.   
The lonely Opinion of Judge de Albuquerque in the extraterritorial 
context of the Hirsi case would tell States that the enforcement of 
non-refoulement has two procedural consequences: the duty of the 
State to advise the individual in question about her entitlement to 
obtain international protection, and the duty to provide access to 
individualized and fair asylum procedures and effective remedies. 
Non-refoulement and access to fair and effective procedures are ‘so 
intertwined that one could say they are two sides of the same coin.’664 
As explained in Chapter 2, for these procedural guarantees being 
effective, they need to be ensured onshore in respect of every asylum 
seeker, regardless of whether she is able to claim protection within the 
borders of the destination State, at a State border, on the high seas 
                                                 
664
Hirsi v Italy, Concurring Opinion 44. 
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after being rescued, or intercepted by the authorities of an EU 
Member State.
665
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
665
 See on this point also, Hirsi v Italy, Concurring Opinion 45; Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, ‘Resolution 1821 (2011) on the Interception 
and Rescue at Sea of Asylum Seekers, Refugees, and Irregular Migrants’, paras 9.3–
9.6. 
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Part II 
Agreements Linked to Readmission and Refugee 
Rights: A Story in Three Parts 
 
Part II is the core of this thesis. It intends to review, in three 
different Chapters, the main categories of agreements linked to 
readmission that have been identified as instruments of bilateral 
cooperation between EU Member States and third countries: standard 
readmission agreements, diplomatic assurances – especially those 
inscribed within MoUs - and agreements for technical and police 
cooperation to preventively intercept undocumented migrants at sea.  
Readmission agreements and agreements for technical and police 
cooperation can be questionably used to remove asylum seekers 
before their asylum procedures are initiated. Instead, diplomatic 
assurances aim to create a legally sustainable way for the deportation 
of both individuals who have been excluded from refugee status under 
Article 1(f) of the Geneva Convention and refugees who can be 
removed on national security grounds under Article 33(2) of the same 
Convention. A further item of divergence needs to be pointed out. 
Whereas standard readmission agreements and diplomatic assurances 
are designed to smooth the return process from the territory of an EU 
Member State to a third country - thereby when the concerned 
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individuals are clearly under the territorial jurisdiction of the sending 
State - agreements for technical and police cooperation lie at the 
margins of jurisdiction. They apply, indeed, to migrants and refugees 
intercepted and pushed-back before entering the territorial jurisdiction 
of an EU Member State. The existence of different loci in which all 
these bilateral arrangements encounter the refugee explains the 
sequence of Chapters 5, 6, and 7 in Part II of this thesis. 
As explained in Chapter 1, this work intends to contribute to the 
current academic debate by adding legal coherence to a subject that 
has often been fraught with a certain level of confusion and partiality 
from both a terminological and substantive point of view. Hence, it 
aims to convey conceptual coherence of the subject of readmission by 
systematizing the three different classes of bilateral arrangements in 
light of their underlying purpose. Agreements linked to readmission 
are thus attentively perused to assess whether their implementation 
can hamper refugee access to protection, which is understood here as 
the combination of the foundational principle of non-refoulement and 
two procedural entitlements: the right to access asylum procedures 
and the right to an effective remedy before return. This serves to join 
Parts I and II of this thesis. 
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Chapter 5.  Readmission Agreements and Refugee 
Rights  
 
5.1. Introduction 
In the framework of the bilateral cooperation on migration control 
between EU Member States and third countries, readmission 
agreements stand as key tools in the removal of unauthorized migrants 
and asylum seekers supposed to undergo asylum procedures 
elsewhere. Therefore, this Chapter examines the intersection between 
migration control and core refugee rights by investigating whether the 
implementation of standard readmission agreements may hamper 
access to protection for asylum seekers subject to a return procedure.  
A preliminary question, which permeates the ensuing analysis is 
whether general international law generates upon States an obligation 
to readmit their own and foreign nationals, and, if so, how this 
obligation relates to readmission agreements (Section 5.2). After an 
overview of readmission agreements (Section 5.3), Section 5.4 
attempts to reach an as precise and complete understanding as 
possible of the technical content of these treaties in order both to 
increase knowledge about the substance of these instruments and 
assess their relationship with the decision to return irregular migrants 
and asylum seekers to countries of origin or transit. The accords 
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concluded by Albania with Italy and the UK, respectively, are taken 
as units of analysis. They are, indeed, among the most sophisticated 
and detailed pieces of legislation within the well-assorted category of 
standard readmission agreements. 
Since competence in the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ 
remains shared and the EU and Member States continue to pursue 
their readmission procedures in a parallel manner, this study focuses 
on the bilateral arrangements of individual Member States with third 
countries, which constitute the bulk of the instruments in this field. 
Whilst Section 5.5 describes the relationship between the readmission 
policies of the EU and individual Member States, Section 5.6 draws 
an overview of the EU Return Directive
666
 and the Asylum Recast 
Procedures Directive,
667
 which regulate, respectively, the transfer of 
unauthorized migrants and asylum seekers to ‘safe third countries.’ 
As readmission agreements do not generally include separate 
provisions on refugees, a real risk exists of removing asylum seekers, 
as unauthorized migrants, to allegedly ‘safe third countries.’ This 
work will accordingly examine whether the mild reference to human 
rights in the body of the agreements is enough to guarantee the 
                                                 
666
 Council Directive 2008/115/EC, [2008] on common standards and procedures in 
Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (Return 
Directive). 
667
Directive 8260/2/13 of 7 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and 
withdrawing international protection status (Recast) (Recast Procedures Directive). 
Reference is also made to the previous Council Directive 2005/85/EC [2005] on 
minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing 
refugee status (Procedures Directive).  
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observance of the applicable safeguards. In this regard, the insertion 
of non-affection provisions is described as an instructive technique to 
resolve normative conflicts in practice (Section 5.7).  
In the first comprehensive manuscript on EU readmission 
agreements, Coleman concludes that a formal application of these 
treaties follows a decision of national law, in compliance with EU 
law, on the return of a protection-seeker either on ‘safe third country’ 
grounds or after the denial of/exclusion from, refugee status.
668
 Thus, 
readmission agreements do not provide the legal basis for returning 
asylum seekers,
669
 and are not ‘safe third country’ agreements.670 
Rather, they are administrative arrangements designed only to 
facilitate the execution of an expulsion decision, which must always 
be taken in consonance with international and European refugee 
obligations.
671
 
This Chapter agrees with Coleman’s conclusion that no issue of 
incompatibility with refugee and human rights law seems to stem 
                                                 
668
 Nils Coleman, European Readmission Policy: Third Country Interests and 
Refugee Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 314. 
669This Chapter refers to the term ‘legal basis’ as used by Coleman to explain the 
relationship between readmission agreements and the return decision. See, Coleman 
2009,305, 315. 
670
 An example of a bilateral ‘safe third country’ agreement is the Agreement 
between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of 
America for cooperation in the examination of refugee status claims from nationals 
of third countries, 5 December 2002 
<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/laws-policy/safe-third.asp> accessed 2 
May 2013.   
671
 ibid. 
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from the text of readmission agreements
672—purely administrative 
tools used to articulate the procedures for a smooth return of irregular 
migrants and rejected refugees. Nevertheless, this work adds another 
piece to the readmission puzzle. Instances of informal practices of 
border return, including situations of emergency and mass arrivals, are 
brought into the analysis in order to observe whether the existence of 
a readmission agreement, in spite of saving clauses inscribed therein, 
may boost the employment of cursory identification and return 
procedures in dissonance with human rights and refugee law (Section 
5.8).  
Section 5.9 explores the reasons that might drive two States 
concluding a readmission agreement to tie their hands with more 
stringent procedural human rights clauses requiring monitoring and 
compliance with refugee law standards. These interrogatives hint at 
the political costs of a drafting process aimed to supplement the 
content of readmission agreements with procedural human rights 
clauses. Finally, after examining why the incorporation of procedural 
human rights clauses adding extra safeguards for removable refugees 
is to be hailed as an added value, Section 5.10 outlines some ways 
                                                 
672
 Coleman’s research regards, however, EU readmission agreements. See, 
Coleman 2009. 
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forward for draft provisions within reformed readmission 
agreements.
673
 
 
5.2 Obligation under international law to readmit persons 
 
5.2.1. Readmitting own nationals 
A comprehensive analysis of readmission agreements implicates 
the primary duty to investigate on which basis the obligation to 
readmit a person is grounded. This Section addresses, therefore, the 
following question: does general international law create upon States 
an obligation to readmit their own and foreign nationals? If so, how 
does this obligation relate to readmission agreements? Four distinct 
categories of people must be identified when dealing with readmission 
obligations under international law: own nationals, third country 
nationals, former nationals, and stateless persons. However, for the 
purpose of this thesis, attention will be paid to the first two groups 
and, in particular, third country nationals. Despite asylum seekers 
cannot avail themselves of the protection of their home country, 
                                                 
673
 Part of the analysis of this Chapter has already been published in Mariagiulia 
Giuffré, ‘Readmission Agreements and Refugee Rights: from a Critique to a 
Proposal’ (2013) 32(3) RSQ 79. 
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readmission agreements are nevertheless used to return the concerned 
persons to a ‘safe third country’ of transit.674 
 According to part of the doctrine, the obligation to readmit own 
nationals is traditionally derived from the right of every State to expel 
foreigners and the right of everyone to return to one’s country.675 The 
right to return has been enshrined in several international instruments. 
For instance, pursuant to Article 13(2) of the UDHR, ‘Everyone has 
the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his 
country.’676 Article 12(4) of the ICCPR provides that ‘No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country’ while Article 
5(d)(ii) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) recognizes ‘The right of 
everyone [...] to equality before the law [...] in the enjoyment of the 
right to leave any country, including one’s own, and to return to one’s 
own country.’677 Finally, pursuant to Article 3(2) of Protocol 4 of the 
ECHR, ‘No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of 
the State of which he is a national.’ 
                                                 
674The grounds under which an asylum seeker is transferred to a ‘safe third country’ 
are illustrated in Sections 2.7 and 3.6 of Chapters 2 and 3, respectively. 
675
See, Kay Hailbronner, ‘Comments on the Right to Leave, Return and Remain’ in 
V Gowlland-Debbas (ed) The Problem of Refugees in the Light of Contemporary 
International Law Issues  (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1996); Kay Hailbronner, 
‘Readmission Agreements and the Obligation of States under Public International 
Law to Readmit their Own and Foreign Nationals’ (1997) 57 Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 2-5; Coleman 2009, 28. 
676
 UDHR, adopted 10 December 1948, UNGA Res. 217A(III).  
677
 ICERD, adopted 4 January 1969, entered into force 7 March 1966, 660 UNTS 
195. 
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In this view, State obligation to readmit nationals who are not 
allowed to remain in the territory of the host country is held toward 
individuals as beneficiary of the right to return by virtue of the 
principle of nationality.
678
 According to Weis: 
 
Nationality in the sense of international law is a technical term denoting the 
allocation of individuals, termed nationals, to a specific State - the State of 
nationality - as members of that State, a relationship which confers upon the State of 
nationality […] rights and duties in relation to other States.
679
 
 
However, the theory whereby the obligation to readmit depends on 
the individual right to return erroneously conflates the relationship 
between individuals and the State with the obligation owed by a State 
to another State. Hence, another line of doctrinal thought sustains that 
international obligations to readmit one’s own nationals on one hand, 
and foreign nationals on the other, have to be distinguished from the 
right of an individual to return.
680
 In this view, the duty to readmit 
would rest on the sovereign right of States to regulate access to and 
expulsion from their territory. Therefore, the refusal of a country to 
readmit its own nationals expelled from the territory of another State 
would entail a breach of the territorial sovereignty of the host State 
                                                 
678
 See Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts, Oppenheim's International Law 
(Longman 1992) 857; Coleman, EU Readmission Policy, 29.  
679
 Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law (Kluwer 1979) 59.  
680
 Hailbronner 1997, 45. 
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and jeopardize the right of this State to expel foreigners.
681
 The 
obligation of a State to reaccept its nationals also lays in the principle 
of responsibility of a State for the welfare of its nationals who have 
been expelled from the territory of the host country.
682
 
A contrasting position is held - at the EU level - by the Legal 
Service of the Council of Ministers, which contests the existence of an 
international legal obligation to readmit involuntary returnees. In this 
view,  
 
It is doubtful whether, in the absence of a specific agreement [to readmit] 
between the concerned States, a general principle of international law exists, 
whereby these States would be obliged to readmit their own nationals when the 
latter do not wish to return to their State of origin.
683
 
 
 Moreover, the right to leave - enshrined in several international 
instruments, such as Article 13(2) of the UDHR, Article 12(1) of the 
ICCPR, Article 5(d)(ii) of the ICERD, and Article 2(2) of Protocol 
No. 4 of the ECHR - would be frustrated prima facie by the 
application of an international norm obliging States to readmit 
                                                 
681
 ibid 8, 11-12. 
682
 ibid 7. 
683
 Council Legal Service Opinion, Council Doc 6658/99, cited in Statewatch, Lome 
Convention Used to Impose Repatriation on the World’s  oorest Countries, 
Statewatch Bulletin, 7 June 2000, para 6 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/jul00/01lome.htm> accessed 3 May 2013. 
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involuntary returnees.
684
 Without pushing this argument further, it is, 
however, worth noting that the existence of norms regulating State 
sovereignty as well as access, residence, and expulsion of aliens 
seems to support the view that ‘interstate obligations to readmit 
nationals exist also independently of an individual’s willingness to 
return.’685 In the Duyn case, the ECJ affirmed that ‘a principle of 
international law’ prevents States from refusing the right of entry or 
residence to its own nationals.
686
 
The obligation of a State to readmit its own nationals is deemed as 
a firmly established norm of customary law because of the 
coexistence of opinio juris and consistent State practice.
687
  While 
only in few exceptional circumstances States have refused to readmit 
their citizens,
688
 home States are usually obliged to expeditiously 
cooperate in the readmission of their own nationals by issuing, for 
                                                 
684
 Gregor Noll,‘The Non-Admission and Return of Protection Seekers in Germany’ 
(1997) 9(3) IJRL, n 7. 
685
 Coleman 2009, 32. 
686
  Case 41-74 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337, para 22.  
687
 See, Hailbronner 1997; Coleman 2009, 32-33. Goodwin-Gill, less specifically, 
refers to the obligation to readmit nationals as ‘firmly fixed within the corpus of 
general international law.’ See, Goodwin-Gill, International Law and the Movement 
of Persons between States (Oxford University Press 1978) 137. Weis describes the 
obligation to readmit as ‘universally recognized’ and ‘generally accepted.’ Weis 
1979, 47-48; David Martin, ‘The Authority and Responsibility of States’ in 
Alexander Aleinikoff and Vincent Chetail (eds), Migration and International Legal 
Norms (TMC Asser Press 2003) 31–45; Marion Panizzon, ‘Readmission 
Agreements of EU Member States: a Case for EU Subsidiarity or Dualism?’ (2012) 
31(4) RSQ 107. 
688
 Hailbronner, for instance, reports the case of the 1928 Turkish legislation that 
considered the readmission of an expellee to her country of origin a punishable 
offence. See, Hailbronner 1997, 7 n 18. 
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instance, any necessary papers within reasonable time.
689
 As Coleman 
explains, although different factors can challenge the customary status 
of this norm - such as ‘practical and procedural obstacles to 
readmission imposed by requested States, the proliferation of 
readmission agreements reiterating the obligation to readmit own 
nationals, and the fact that readmission agreements are concluded on 
the basis of  uid pro  uo’690 - the customary value of this norm may 
be presumed to persist.  At the same time, it is to be asked to what 
extent the proliferation of treaty law in the field of return of irregular 
migrants influences the customary status of the obligation to readmit. 
Does the fact that States tend to conclude the highest number of 
readmission agreements, deemed indispensible for executing 
expulsion, indicate that readmission is governed by these bilateral 
treaties rather than by a customary norm? 
Treaties play an important role in determining the existence of 
customary international law because they help shed light on how 
States view certain rules of international law. In the North Continental 
Shelf case, the ICJ confirmed that treaties may codify pre-existing 
customary international law, but may also lay the foundation for the 
development of new customs based on the norms contained in those 
                                                 
689
 Hailbronner 1997, 45. 
690
Coleman 2009, 33. 
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treaties.
691
 Among the various ways in which treaties may interplay 
with customary law, the Court affirmed that treaty negotiating process 
may crystallize an emerging customary rule. 
In this regard, readmission agreements can be seen as confirming 
and putting into concrete terms the existence of the general 
international law obligation to readmit.
692
  Indeed, codification of a 
norm in treaty law does not put into question its customary status. A 
rule can continue to exist under both customary and treaty law as long 
as the two criteria of consistent State practice and opinio juris are 
fulfilled. At the same time, the presence of several bilateral 
agreements on the same subject might be considered evidence of a 
customary norm.
693
 
It is thus imperative to assess whether the modalities in which 
readmission agreements are concluded prevent the existence of a 
customary norm because of the lack of an opinio juris. This risk can 
be run when States condition the conclusion of agreements concerning 
the readmission of own nationals to the granting of benefits. In reality, 
with Italy as the only exception - which tends to tie the conclusion of 
a readmission agreement with labour accords establishing yearly or 
                                                 
691
North Sea Continental Shelf Case, ICJ Reports (1969). See also, Ian Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law (4
th
 edn, Oxford Clarendon Press 1990) 13. 
692Hailbronner 1997, 8, 14; Martin Schieffer, ‘The Readmission of Third Country 
Nationals within Bilateral and Multilateral Frameworks’ in Boer M den (ed) The 
Implementation of Schengen, First the Widening, Now the Deepening (European 
Institute of Public Administration 1997) 100; Coleman 2009, 36. 
693
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seasonal immigration quotas - EU Member States do not generally 
offer compensatory incentives to persuade third countries to sign an 
arrangement, if it regards own nationals.
694
 Readmission of a State’s 
own nationals constitutes, indeed, a customary norm the existence of 
which would be endangered if States agreed to negotiate it.
695
 
Readmission agreements are generally drafted with reciprocal 
language where contracting parties accept mutual and identical 
obligations. Nonetheless, a majority of treaties of last generation 
involve States with different economic backgrounds where requested 
States do not share the same interest in the return of migrants as 
compared to requesting States. In these circumstances and in the 
absence of explicit means of compensation, the interest countries of 
origin may have in collaborating in the readmission of own nationals 
resides in the possibility to improve their political and economic 
relations with the country of destination.
696
 
The fact that the conclusion of a readmission agreement implies a 
quid pro quo does not undermine ipso facto the customary status of 
the obligation to readmit. Two States can decide, indeed, to negotiate 
an agreement to set up clear and explicit procedures facilitating the 
                                                 
694Commission (EC), ‘Study on the Links between Legal and Illegal Migration’ 
(Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions) 
COM(2004) 412 final 14, 4 June 2004. 
695
 Hailbronner 1997, 48-49. 
696
See, Nordic Joint Advisory Group 1999, Council doc 7707/99, 18. See also, 
Coleman, European Readmission Policy 39. 
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actual transfer of unauthorized migrants.
697
 Therefore, any incentive 
requested States receive from requesting States in exchange of the 
conclusion of a readmission agreement may be read as a sort of 
compensation for the limitation of their sovereignty due to the fact 
that the agreement lays down a set of precise procedures, time limits, 
and administrative constraints establishing how readmission is to be 
implemented.
698
 Therefore, the granting of either explicit or implicit 
reciprocal benefits does not per se preclude States from having an 
opinio juris regarding their obligation to readmit own nationals. 
 
5.2.2. Readmitting third country nationals 
If compelling arguments buttress the view that readmitting own 
nationals is a customary norm, it cannot be likewise safely argued that 
there exists a norm of customary law requiring States to readmit 
foreign persons. Hailbronner has attempted to derive such a norm 
from the principle of neighbourliness, which would lead States to 
control unauthorized migratory flows to impede their transit across the 
territories of neighbour countries.
699
 Readmission, in this perspective, 
would be a sort of reparation for failing to prevent irregular migrants 
                                                 
697
 Coleman 2009, 40. 
698
 ibid. 
699
 Pursuant to Article 74 of the UN Charter, Members of the United Nations […] 
agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which this Chapter applies, no 
less that in respect of their metropolitan areas, must be based on the general 
principle of good-neighbourliness, due account be taken of the interests and well-
being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters. 
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from crossing the border. Accordingly, readmission agreements would 
codify the penalization of third States through which migrants have 
transited before reaching the destination country. Although the lack of 
both a well-established State practice and opinio juris testify to the 
absence of an obligation of general international law to readmit third 
country nationals, Hailbronner believes a customary norm in status 
nascendi would be inferred from the proliferation of readmission 
agreements concerning the return of both nationals and third country 
nationals. 
However, several objections have been made to the application of 
the principle of neighbourliness to the control of migratory flows. In 
this regard, Lammers argues that: 
 
Neighbourship law in principle involves an obligation for a State to abstain from 
conduct—or to take such positive action as is necessary to convince private persons 
or entities in its territory to abstain from conduct […]. It purports to enable 
neighbouring States to coexist by setting certain limits to the exercise and enjoyment 
of their territorial sovereignty and it does not in principle compel them to undertake 
positive action for the benefit of other States or to improve their mutual condition 
through cooperation. 
 
The present description of the concept of neighbourliness, based on 
‘harmonious reciprocal relations between States, consisting of 
corresponding obligations and rights’, proves how this notion cannot 
 314 
 
be used to create upon States a positive obligation to control borders 
since this would be an unbalanced allocation of responsibility.
700
 
Furthermore, the legal concept of neighbourliness is likely to be open 
to political and subjective interpretations. While, on the one hand, 
requesting States might interpret it as imposing upon transit countries 
the duty to readmit third country nationals, on the other hand, transit 
countries could be damaged by the new migratory burden, which 
causes a shrinking of national sovereignty.
701
 
Therefore, the view that no customary rule requiring readmission 
of foreign persons exists is more convincing, as demonstrated by the 
fact that States usually agree to collaborate to fight irregular 
immigration - by readmitting third country nationals - under the 
incentive of good political and economic relations, visa facilitations, 
financial and technical aid, and development assistance.
702
 States’ 
obligation to readmit does not apply, under general international law, 
to citizens of third countries or stateless persons who have transited 
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2008), organized by the Mediterranean Program of the Robert Schumann Centre for 
Advanced Studies at the European University Institute 7, 9-10; Florian Trauner and 
Imke Kruse, ‘EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements: Implementing a 
New EU Security Approach in the Neighbourhood’ (23 April 2008), CEPS Working 
Documen t<http://www.ceps.eu/book/ec-visa-facilitation-and-readmission-
agreements-implementing-new-eu-security-approach-neighbour> accessed 2 May 
2013; Coleman 2009, 62. 
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through the requested State or have been granted a stay permit.
703
 In 
particular, governments can refuse to accept readmission of 
undocumented persons whose nationality can be difficult to establish. 
In these circumstances, readmission agreements can turn out to be 
very helpful, since they generally formalize the obligation of States to 
readmit both their own nationals and third country nationals who are 
irregularly present in the territory of the other contracting party.
704
 
The decisive factor is the issue of transit, as well as the granting of a 
visa or other title of residence by the requested State.
705
All in all, 
while readmission of own nationals finds a legal basis in general 
international law, readmission of third country nationals can be 
grounded only in treaty law.  
A further issue points to the lack in the text of readmission 
agreements of specific obligations concerning refugees and stateless 
persons, being these categories of people summarily subsumed under 
the same terms as ‘third country nationals.’ However, under the 1951 
Geneva Convention and the 1960 Convention relating to the Status of 
                                                 
703
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Stateless Persons,
706
 a State must readmit recognized refugees and 
stateless persons to whom it has issued a travel document in keeping 
with Article 28 of these Conventions. Indeed, a State must readmit 
refugees and stateless persons if they have received by the country in 
question travel documents ‘for the purpose of travelling outside their 
territory, unless compelling reasons of national security or public 
order otherwise require […].’707 
 
5.3. Readmission agreements: an overview 
In the framework of the three-pronged categorization of bilateral 
agreements linked to readmission, this Chapter concentrates on 
standard readmission agreements, which are defined as:  
 
Agreements between the EU and/or a Member State with a third country, on the 
basis of reciprocity, establishing rapid and effective procedures for the identification 
and safe and orderly return of persons who do not, or no longer, fulfil the conditions 
for entry to, presence in, or residence on the territories of the third country or one of 
the Member States of the European Union, and to facilitate the transit of such 
persons in a spirit of cooperation.
708
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707
 Article 28 of the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1960 Convention relating to 
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Therefore, without impinging on the rights of those who are 
legitimately entitled to stay, readmission agreements aim to create a 
legal framework for forced returns. By providing for readmission 
without formalities, these bilateral arrangements allow border 
authorities to handle transfers of third country nationals without the 
involvement of diplomatic channels.
709
 
This thesis does not aim to describe the readmission legislation and 
return policies of the selected countries through a comparative enquiry 
of the national measures of removal. Rather, it purports to investigate, 
from an international law perspective, whether the implementation of 
bilateral readmission agreements - although designed to contrast 
unauthorized migration - might also hamper refugees’ access to 
protection.  
Today, readmission is a network composed of different 
institutional instruments, ranging from development aid to visa 
facilitation, from technical cooperation for the externalization of 
migration controls to labour exchanges. However, this Chapter 
concentrates on standard readmission agreements seen as a 
fundamental component of the numerous and various national policies 
of expulsion, removal, and repatriation of people who have an 
irregular status in the destination country, or who have sought to 
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irregularly enter the territory of a State. The effectiveness of the 
whole system of expulsion/removal rests upon efficient modalities of 
execution of return decisions. Since readmission of irregular migrants 
depends on a profitable cooperation between destination States and 
countries of origin or transit of migrants, it is imperative to shed light 
on bilateral agreements, which facilitate the carrying out of all the 
procedures necessary for guaranteeing the readmission of own 
nationals and third country nationals. 
Return of irregular migrants can be voluntary or forced. Voluntary 
return is generally recommended and consists of providing the 
migrant with adequate assistance and reasonable time for 
autonomously complying with the removal order. It is generally less 
costly and involves less protracted procedures. Instead, forced return, 
which follows a compulsory administrative or judicial act, occurs 
when the individual refuses to voluntarily comply with the removal 
order. 
In 1994 and 1995, the Council of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
of the EU adopted two recommendations concerning, respectively, a 
specimen bilateral readmission agreement between a Member State 
and a third country, and guiding principles to be followed in drafting 
protocols on the implementation of a readmission agreement.
710
 More 
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 See, Recommendation concerning a specimen bilateral readmission agreement 
between a Member State of the European Union and a third country, adopted on 30 
November and 1 December 1994, SN 10339/94. Any provisions on the rights of 
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specifically, the purpose of the specimen agreement was to help EU 
Member States standardize their readmission procedures with third 
countries. While no significant differences may be detected in the text 
of the readmission agreements separately concluded by EU Member 
States with third countries, a certain degree of variation in wording 
and substance is, however, inevitable, as their negotiation is 
significantly dependent on the political relations between the two 
involved parties.  
 
5.4. The content of standard readmission agreements: the case 
of Albania 
In sketching out the different sections of standard readmission 
agreements, this Chapter takes as units of analysis the accords 
concluded by Albania with Italy and the UK, respectively. Albania 
constitutes a special case insofar it was the first country in Europe to 
execute a readmission agreement with the European Community (now 
the EU). At the same time, this case study reveals the salience of 
interstate readmission strategies. Indeed, the negotiation process 
between the EU and Albania took so long that Italy lost interest in the 
EU’s initiatives and decided to boost its own cooperation with 
Albania, thus realizing that the activities taken at bilateral level had, 
                                                                                                                                                   
refugees and asylum seekers contained in previous draft were abandoned in the 
finalized version of the text. See, Elspeth Guild and Jan Niessen, The Developing 
Immigration and Asylum Policies of the European Union (Kluwer 1996) 407.   
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de facto, significantly contributed to stem massive irregular inflows 
from the Balkans.
711
 Additionally, the accords concluded separately 
by Albania with Italy and the UK are among the most sophisticated 
and detailed pieces of legislation within the well-assorted category of 
existing standard readmission agreements.  
There are several reasons why Albania has been of great import for 
EU Member States: first, it had the highest migration rate in Central 
and Eastern Europe; second, it was a transit country for Kosovo 
refugees and asylum seekers who have reached the EU’s borders in 
massive numbers; third, thousands of other third country nationals 
cross Albania daily en route to the EU; fourth, it is considered a 
reliable buffer State through which returning third country nationals, 
including asylum seekers, who have transited through Albania before 
getting to an EU Member State; fifth, it is in the EU’s interest to 
control an unstable area in the heart of Europe, which has been 
shuttered for a long time by economic and corruption problems, as the 
exodus of thousands of people, provoked by the crisis in the nineties, 
demonstrates.
712
 In particular with regard to Italy, Albania has always 
acted as one of the most reliable partners, and its active collaboration 
                                                 
711See, Federico Maria Piddu, ‘Le Missioni in Albania della Marina Militare’ (1998) 
Rivista Marittima 49; Jonathan Chaloff, ‘Lessons from the Italy-Albania 
Readmission Agreement’, in C Mackenzie (ed) Return and Readmission to Albania: 
the Experience of Selected EU Member States (August 2006) 112 
<http://www.albania.iom.int/en/E-Library/Books/EC%20research.pdf> accessed 2 
May 2013.  
712
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in the fight against undocumented migration has been rewarded 
through development aid (including military and police 
cooperation),
713
 and a system of preferential quotas for single foreign 
workers. 
 
5.4.1. Readmission of nationals and third country nationals 
Readmission agreements - bilateral treaties that aim to regulate the 
readmission of undocumented migrants between the two involved 
parties – are the main points of focus of this Chapter. In keeping with 
Article 31 of the VCLT, a literal reading of the text taking into 
account the meaning that would be attributed to the treaty at the time 
of its conclusion should be privileged. Thus, a literal reading of the 
text that takes into account the terms of the agreement will suffice to 
understand its technical and legal content.  
Notwithstanding the differences in the content of any readmission 
agreements, which depend on the relationship between the two 
involved countries, the arrangements concluded separately by Albania 
with Italy and the UK are rather homogeneous. Scrutiny of the text of 
readmission agreements is a stepping stone, not only for the 
acquisition of further knowledge on the content of the treaties, but 
also to better understand their relationship with other sources of EU 
                                                 
713
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law as well as international and European refugee and human rights 
law. Moreover, the description of the technical content of readmission 
agreements will also be instructive for the debate on the opportunity 
to inscribe human rights procedural clauses in the text of these 
bilateral accords as a further guarantee for the rights of refugees and 
asylum seekers. This Section outlines the main aspects of standard 
readmission agreements taking as units of analysis the accords 
concluded by Albania with Italy and the UK, respectively, and 
indicating differences in their wording only where relevant. 
Beside a Preamble, the Italy-Albania readmission agreement is 
composed of five numbered and titled sections. Section I describes the 
readmission obligations of the two Contracting Parties; Section II lays 
down the readmission obligations of third country nationals; Section 
III indicates the readmission procedure for Contracting Parties’ 
citizens; Section IV regulates admission in transit for the purpose of 
returning third party nationals to another country; Section V contains 
general dispositions. 
The structure of the agreement between Albania and the UK is 
slightly different, but the substance is almost the same.
714
 The 
Preamble is followed by a first Article on definitions; Section I (so-
called Part) concerns the readmission of citizens and people with a 
                                                 
714
In the UK-Albania Readmission Agreement, ‘Sections’ are named ‘Parts.’ 
However, we will continue to use the terms ‘Sections’ to render easier their joint 
reading with the Sections of the Readmission Agreement between Albania and Italy. 
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right to abode; Section II deals with the readmission of third country 
nationals; Section III defines transit operations; Section IV sets out 
general and final provisions. Additionally, both agreements have an 
Executive Protocol attached to the main text of the accords. 
 Both the Preambles generally point out the objective of the 
agreements, namely the strengthening of the bilateral cooperation 
between the two Contracting Parties - having regard to the need to 
abide by human rights as recognized by international instruments - in 
order to combat irregular immigration and facilitate the return of 
persons whose residence or presence in the territory is unauthorized. 
The Italian accord also refers to the intent of both parties to regulate 
readmission on the basis of the principle of reciprocity and in a spirit 
of cooperation. 
Article 1 of the agreement with the UK lists definitions of key 
terms, such as  ‘Residence Permit’, ‘Citizen’ and ‘Citizenship’, ‘Right 
of Abode’, ‘Visa’, ‘Third Party National’, ‘Working Day’, ‘Children’, 
‘Requesting and Requested Parties’, ‘Competent Authorities’, and 
‘Permission to Transit’, which means any authorization to enable a 
third party national to transit through the territory of the requested 
State for the purpose of return to another country, or pass through the 
transit zone of a port or airport. 
In both the Italy and UK readmission agreements, Part I determines 
that the requested Contracting Party shall readmit without particular 
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formalities any persons who do not meet, or who no longer meet the 
conditions for entry or residence on the territory of the requesting 
State, provided that the individual is properly identified and it is 
proven or reasonably presumed that the individual is a citizen of the 
requested country.
715
 The UK’s readmission agreement includes also 
persons with right of abode in the requested contracting party, or 
people who were citizens of the requested party but have subsequently 
relinquished their citizenship without acquiring a new one. Moreover, 
the requesting State shall readmit, at the request of the requested 
Contracting Party any person who formerly departed from its own 
territory, if subsequent checks reveal that at the time of departure, that 
person was not a citizen of the requested Contracting Party, nor had a 
right of abode in said country.
716
 
Section II of both agreements sets up the obligation to readmit, 
without unnecessary formalities, third country nationals - persons who 
do not have the nationality of either of the Contracting Parties to the 
agreement - if they do not fulfil, or no longer fulfil, regulations of 
entry or residence on the territory of the requesting State. Pursuant to 
the UK-Albania arrangement, the obligation to readmit is conditional 
upon proof: i) that the unauthorized migrant holds, or held at the time 
                                                 
715
 Article 2(1) of the UK’s Readmission Agreement and Article 1 of Italy’s 
Readmission Agreement. 
716The latter option applies only to the the UK’s readmission agreement. See, Article 
2(1)(2) of the UK’s Readmission Agreement and Article 1(3) of Italy’s Readmission 
Agreement. 
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of her unlawful entry into the territory of the requesting party, a visa 
or a valid residence permit issued by the requested State; ii) that the 
irregular migrant meets the requirements of the requested State’s 
national legislation for entry and residence of aliens.
717
 Each 
Contracting Party shall also readmit on the territory of its State if it is 
reasonably presumed that the third party national had entered or 
resided on the territory of the requested State.
718
 The accord with the 
UK adds that, in cases in which both Contracting Parties have issued a 
visa or residence permit, responsibility shall reside with the State 
whose visa or residence permit expires last (Article 7(2)). 
The same exemptions from the obligation to readmit third country 
nationals are envisaged by the two arrangements in a number of 
situations in which the third party national: i) has been granted 
refugee status by the requesting party; ii) is a citizen of, or 
permanently reside in, a State bordering the territory of the requesting 
Contracting Party; iii) has been previously returned by the requested 
State to her country of origin or a third country; iv) has held a valid 
residence permit issued by the requesting Contracting Party for a 
period of more than six months.
719
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 Article 7(1) of Section II of the UK’s Readmission Agreement. 
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5.4.2. Readmission procedure 
As far as the UK-Albania readmission agreement is concerned, 
Part I addresses some aspects of the readmission procedure of citizens 
and individuals with a right of abode, while Part II lays down the 
readmission procedure of third country nationals. Pursuant to Article 
4, any request for readmission shall be made in writing to the 
competent authority of the requested State, and shall contain 
information as set out in Article 1 of the annexed protocol. Therefore, 
such a request shall incorporate, inter alia, the name and the address 
of the two competent authorities, the personal data of the returnee, 
certified copies of original documents constituting means of proof, or 
means for establishing a presumption of, citizenship or right of abode 
of the person to be readmitted, the planned itinerary, and data relating 
to health and possible diseases. In cases concerning readmission of 
both nationals and third country nationals, the reply to the request for 
readmission will be given in writing within fifteen working days.
720
 
Article 3 of the agreement lists the means of evidence for 
establishing identity and citizenship of persons to be readmitted, 
provided that they are citizens or other persons with a right of abode 
in the requested Contracting Party. The agreement distinguishes 
between two types of evidence. The first one is ‘proof’, which can 
                                                                                                                                                   
the requesting State a valid stay permit for a period of more than three months 
(Article 3(b)). 
720
 See Articles 6(2) and 10(3). 
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include documents with an official status, such as identity cards, 
passports, substitute travel documents, or service record books and 
military passes. The second one is ‘prima facie evidence’, used to 
‘reasonably presume’ identity and citizenship.721 Unlike ‘proof’, 
‘prima facie evidence’ is rebuttable. 
Entry or residence of the third party national in the territory of the 
requested State shall be proven by the application of border seals or 
other proper annotations in their travel documents by border 
authorities at entry or departure from the territory of the requested 
country (Article 9(1)). Instead, entry or residence may be reasonably 
presumed on the basis, for example, of transport documents, proof of 
payment for hotel, medical service, as well as reliable statements of 
both bona fide witnesses and the third country national in question 
(Article 9(2)). 
Under Article 1 of the Albania’s agreement with Italy, citizenship 
may be ascertained through citizenship certificates or any other 
naturalization documents, identity cards, passports, seaman’s books, 
and children travel documents in lieu of passports. The annexed 
protocol sets up all the procedures for the readmission of both 
nationals and third country nationals by establishing the competent 
                                                 
721
This elaborated category may include expired documents ascribed to the person, 
driving licences, minute evidence duly supplied by bona fide witnesses or by the 
migrant in question, the language she speaks, seamen’s books, extracts from the 
Civil Status Office’s records, bargemen’s identity documents, photocopies of the 
above-mentioned documents, as well as any other evidence acceptable to both 
Contracting Parties. 
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authorities and the timetable to reply to a readmission request in order 
to avoid overly lengthy bureaucratic mechanisms. For instance, both 
third country nationals and individuals whose citizenship of one of the 
Contracting Parties is presumed may be immediately readmitted - 
through direct contact between the Border Police Offices of both 
countries - if apprehended while irregularly crossing the border of the 
requesting party. 
However, third country nationals should possess a valid stay permit 
issued by the requested State, or travel documents containing proper 
annotations by border authorities of the requested country.
722
 If the 
unauthorized presence of third country nationals is detected when they 
already are within the territory of the requesting State, readmission 
may be executed within 8 days starting from the date of receipt of the 
readmission application, which will take place even in the absence of 
a formal reply to the readmission request.
723
 For nationals whose 
citizenship is presumed, the time limit is 7 days.
724
 It should be 
observed that in lack of a specific provision requiring the requested 
State to send an acknowledgement of receipt of the application, the 
fate of the returned migrant might be put at risk by a transfer executed 
on the basis of a request that has never been received. 
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5.4.3 Further dispositions  
Both Section III of the readmission agreement between Albania 
and the UK and Section IV of the agreement between Albania and 
Italy regulate the issue of transit for return purposes. In other words, 
each Contracting Party shall, at the request of the other Contracting 
Party, generally permit transit through its territory, of third country 
nationals for the purpose of readmission to their country of origin or 
to a third party State.
725
 Italy’s accord explicitly lays down a 
safeguard for asylum seekers by establishing that transit may be 
refused if the readmitted person is at risk of being subjected, in the 
country of destination, to persecution for nationality, religious, and 
sexual reasons, as well as membership in a particular social and 
political group (Article 9). The costs of transit and the costs related to 
readmission shall be borne solely by the requesting Contracting Party, 
as provided by Article 19 of the UK’s agreement and Articles 6 and 7 
of the Italy’s accord. 
Article 13 of the readmission agreements Albania concluded with 
the UK and Italy, respectively, provides that any controversies 
surrounding the interpretation of the treaty shall be resolved through 
diplomatic channels. Every year, representatives of the two 
contracting parties meet in order to discuss problems concerning the 
implementation of the agreements, and to jointly formulate new 
                                                 
725
 See, Article 13 of the UK’s Agreement and Article 7 of Italy’s Agreement. 
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proposals and amendments.
726
 The content of standard readmission 
agreements is highly technical, and consensus between the two 
Contracting Parties on detailed procedural and evidence requirements 
is necessary  for a smooth readmission of unauthorized migrants. It is 
also worth observing that:  
 
Negotiations with Albania did not generally address how people would be 
returned and how their returns would be sustained over time. Rather they focused on 
definitions of who should be returned, on methods of verifications, on provision of 
documents for persons to be returned, and the time required for the return 
process.
727
 
 
However, of greater relevance for this thesis is that both texts of 
the readmission agreements contain a non-affection clause that 
regulates the relation of these instruments with other treaties – 
including human rights treaties - and international obligations. For 
instance, Article 11 of the Italy’s accord indicates that the agreement 
at issue does not affect the Contracting Parties’ obligations on 
admission or readmission under any other international treaties, but it 
does not specifically refer to human rights and refugee law 
                                                 
726
 See, Articles 14 and 15 of Italy’s Agreement. 
727
 See, Lynellyn D Long and Sanja Celebic, ‘Perspectives on the EC/Albanian 
Readmission Agreement’ in C Mackenzie (ed) Return and Readmission to Albania 
(IOM 2006) 25. 
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instruments.
728
 Instead, Article 21 of the UK Agreement refers to a 
number of international human rights and refugee law instruments 
Contracting Parties shall comply with when readmitting a person.
729
 
Since both these conventions and readmission agreements are 
international treaties with no hierarchical relationship under general 
international law, potential conflicts between a readmission agreement 
and any other treaty obligations binding the EU Member State or the 
third country in question would be solved in favor of the international 
instruments listed in the non-affection clause.
730
 
 
5.5 The relationship between interstate and EU readmission 
agreements  
The EU’s readmission policy constitutes the general framework 
placed above and beyond the broad cobweb of bilateral readmission 
agreements agreed to between EU Member States with third 
                                                 
728
 Pursuant to Article 11 of the Italy-Albania Readmission Agreement, ‘Le 
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730
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countries.
731
 The interrelatedness between national and supranational 
readmission policies is corroborated by the fact that Member States 
continue to pursue their readmission procedures in parallel with the 
EU strategy, as solicited by paragraph 7 of the Preamble of the Return 
Directive, which underlines ‘the need for Community and bilateral 
readmission agreements with third countries to facilitate the return 
process.’ 
Readmission has therefore turned out to be an underlying 
component of the EU immigration and asylum policy, which has been 
progressively defined and consolidated after the entry into force of 
both the Amsterdam and the Lisbon Treaties. In addition, the 
Stockholm Programme – an Open and Secure Europe Serving and 
Protecting the Citizens, adopted in December 2009, portrays 
readmission agreements, at both bilateral and supranational level, as a 
building block in EU migration management. Article 79(3) of the 
TFEU expressly gives authority to the EU to stipulate agreements 
with third States for the readmission of third country nationals who do 
not or who no longer fulfil the conditions for entry, presence, or 
residence in one of the Member States. 
The issue of division of competences has stirred up a heated debate 
over the years, and Member States have openly contested an alleged 
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exclusive competence of the EU.
732
 In this regard, after examining the 
different claims to exclusive and shared competence, Panizzon 
concludes that ‘shared competence over readmission, and as a result, 
‘agreements dualism’, should, in principle, remain unencumbered.’733 
Although recognizing the dual commitment of the EU and individual 
Member States in this area, Panizzon however suggests that shared 
competence may trigger a race to the bottom over human rights 
standards. The reasons why EU readmission agreements would be 
better tools in safeguarding the rights of the returnees are twofold:
734
 
i) in 2011 the EU Commission proposed that future directives 
negotiating readmission agreements will not cover third country 
nationals;
735
 ii) according to the same proposal, EU arrangements will 
contain a safeguard clause requiring suspension of the treaty if the 
readmitting country does not respect human rights.
736
 
Yet, as long as the EU does not provide incentives (such as labour 
quotas) for source countries, States of transit of migrants will 
inevitably prefer concluding agreements with individual EU Member 
States. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty does not bestow upon the Union 
                                                 
732
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the exclusive power to negotiate readmission agreements. Indeed, 
Article 4(2)(j) of the TFEU incorporates ‘Freedom, Security and 
Justice’ – which clearly encompasses readmission – in the field of 
shared competence. Therefore, the relationship between the EU and 
Member States continues to be shared and grounded on the principle 
of ‘sincere cooperation’ enshrined in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on the 
EU (TEU).
737
 
In case of coexistence of previous state-negotiated arrangements, 
they continue to be in force and used, but, by virtue of the ‘safeguard 
clause’, EU readmission agreements take precedence over state-
negotiated ones in case of incompatibilities.
738
 The JHA Council of 
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May 1999 sustained that a Member State must always notify the 
Council of its intention to negotiate a bilateral readmission 
arrangement, and can carry on with the process only if the European 
Community has not already stipulated a treaty with the concerned 
third State or ‘has not concluded a mandate for negotiating such an 
agreement.’739 Exceptions are represented by the instance in which 
Member States require more detailed arrangements to compensate a 
EU agreement or a negotiating mandate containing only general 
statements. However, ‘Member States may no longer conclude 
agreements if they might be detrimental to existing Community 
agreements.’740 To put it differently, they  
 
Shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its 
competence. The Member States shall again exercise their competence to the extent 
that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence.
741
 
 
Should a State contravene this obligation, the European 
Commission could bring an infringement procedure before the Court 
                                                 
739
 JHA Council, ‘Conclusion on Readmission Agreements – Consequences of the 
Entry into Force of the Amsterdam Treaty’, 27–28 May 1999 (JHA Council 1999) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-99-168_en.htm> accessed 2 May 2013. 
For an appraisal of the EU readmission policy, see Carol Billet, ‘EC Readmission 
Agreements: A Prime Instrument of the External Dimension of the EU’s Fight 
against Irregular Immigration. An Assessment after Ten Years of Practice’ (2010) 
12 EJML 45; Mariagiulia Giuffré, ‘The European Union Readmission Policy after 
Lisbon’, 1 Interdisciplinary Political Studies Journal (2011) 7. 
740
 JHA Council 1999. 
741
Article 2(2) TFEU. 
 336 
 
of Justice of the EU under Article 258 of the TFEU. 
 
5.6. What legal basis for return decisions? The Return and the 
Recast Procedures directives in context 
The primary question of this Chapter is whether refugees’ access to 
protection might be impaired by the implementation of standard 
readmission agreements. In order to address this issue, a preliminary 
sub-question needs to be answered first. It asks whether these bilateral 
accords stand as the legal basis for ‘safe third country’ return 
decisions. In this regard, readmission follows the return stage, which 
refers to the actual decision, under national law and EU law, to 
remove an irregular migrant or an asylum seeker against her will. In 
this chain, readmission agreements are administrative instruments 
acting as a bilateral conduit between the requesting and the requested 
State in view of facilitating the transfer and readmission of persons 
who have been found irregularly entering to, being present in, or 
residing in the territory of the requesting State. They therefore address 
the horizontal relationship between two States involved in the 
readmission policy, and are put into action only once the return 
process ends.  
Before proceeding with the question on the relationship between 
agreements linked to readmission and the return decision, attention 
has to be focused on Article 38 of the Recast Procedures Directive, 
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which allows States to return asylum seekers to ‘safe third countries’ 
for the purpose of examining asylum claims. The connection between 
readmission agreements and both ‘safe third country’ practices and 
accelerated procedures for returning unauthorized migrants 
apprehended at the EU borders has raised various doubts and concerns 
in the international community.
742
 Whilst burgeoning literature has 
addressed the shortcomings of the ‘safe third country’ practice,743 
Moreno-Lax has pushed her criticism to the point of rejecting 
altogether the legality of the ‘safe third country’ notion because of its 
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inherent incompatibility with international refugee law in light of 
universal rules of treaty interpretation.744 
The ‘safe third country’ concept implies that access to an effective 
asylum procedure can be denied if individuals have transited through 
another ‘safe third country’ before reaching the State in which they 
are ultimately soliciting protection. In this view, refugees should 
request asylum in the first safe country they are able to reach. Since 
transfer of responsibility for asylum seekers to another ‘safe’ country 
does not find a legal basis in general international law, readmission 
agreements are commonly relied upon by the EU and its Member 
States to obtain the necessary cooperation for readmitting third-
country nationals. They do not only regulate the return of irregular 
migrants but also that of rejected refugees and asylum seekers whose 
application was not examined on its merits on the basis of a ‘safe third 
country’ exception.  
                                                 
744
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EU Member States may also decide to engage in the negotiation of 
readmission agreements or in other kinds of informal cooperation on 
migration control with countries that have a doubtful track record in 
human rights. Some of these countries are either among the largest 
‘producers’ of refugees and protection claims, or do not have adequate 
facilities to process applications and grant asylum.
745
 Nevertheless, 
rebuttal of the safety of a country in individual circumstances is a 
protection imperative.
746
 
As far as irregular migrants are concerned, the main EU instrument 
regulating the removal of unauthorized aliens is the Return Directive. 
This Directive sets out common rules concerning removal, return, 
detention standards, safeguards for returnees, and re-entry bans for 
people subjected to a return decision.
747
 The Recast Procedures 
Directive is, instead, the instrument used by EU Member States to 
determine the measures for granting or withdrawing refugee status 
and to ascertain whether asylum seekers can be removed to a ‘safe 
third country’ responsible for the examination of their asylum 
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claims.
748
 The legal status of asylum seekers is thus assessed during 
an initial phase following their arrival in the territory of one of the EU 
Member States.  
Readmission agreements do not provide the legal basis for the 
return of refused/excluded refugees. They are only used to enable the 
transfer to the country of origin or transit of all those people whose 
protection claims have been denied on the grounds set in the 
Procedures and Qualification Directives.
749
 It should also be 
underlined that, formally, the ‘safe third country’ exceptions 
envisaged by the Procedures Directive and its Recast version have 
been rarely used by Member States. Indeed, the latter have usually 
had difficulties in obtaining the cooperation of the readmitting country 
and have tended to examine individual circumstances prior to 
expulsion.  
Nevertheless, nothing prevents EU Member States from using 
                                                 
748
 For an overview of the Recast Procedures Directive, see, UNHCR, Comments on 
the European Commission’s Amended  roposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Common Procedures for Granting and 
Withdrawing International Protection Status (Recast) COM (2011) 319 final, 
Geneva,  January 2012; European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), 
Comments from the European Council on Refugees and Exiles on the Amended 
Commission Proposal to Recast the Asylum Procedures Directive, COM (2011) 319 
final, September 2011; ILPA, Comments on the Revised Commission Proposal of 1 
June 2011 on Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing International 
Protection status (Recast) COM(2011) 319 final, 5 December 2011; and Steve 
Peers, Revised EU Asylum Proposals, Lipstick on a Pig (Statewatch 2011) 
<http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-132-asylum.pdf> accessed 2 May 2013; 
Cathryne Costello, ‘Courting Access to Asylum in Europe: Recent Supranational 
Jurisprudence Explored’ (2012) 12(2) HRLR 287, 337. 
749
Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals as refugees or as persons who 
otherwise need international protection, OJ L 304/12, 30 September 2004 
(Qualification Directive). 
 341 
 
readmission agreements to enforce ‘safe third country’ policies. In 
this respect, asylum seekers can be subject to readmission procedures 
as third country nationals. If there is proof that a person has already 
been recognized as a refugee in a third country, she should be returned 
to that country by means of a readmission agreement. A similar 
reasoning pertains to asylum seekers who have transited through, or 
resided in, a ‘safe third country.’ Indeed, Article 33(2)(c) of the 
Recast Procedures Directive overtly requires that Member States 
consider an application for asylum inadmissible if a country, which is 
not a Member State, is considered to be a ‘safe third country’ for the 
applicant.
750
 Whereas a protection claimant is rejected on substantive 
grounds, an EU Member State may request readmission to the country 
of origin as its own national, or to any other State as a third-country 
national. 
A further issue giving cause for concern appertains to the potential 
violation of refugee rights as a consequence of accelerated procedures 
of expulsion, laid down in the major part of readmission agreements, 
including those selected for the present analysis. For instance, the 
Italy-Albania readmission agreement provides that both third-country 
nationals and individuals whose citizenship of one of the contracting 
parties is presumed may be immediately readmitted if apprehended 
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while irregularly crossing the border of the requesting party.
751
 While 
the end of the unauthorized presence of third country nationals 
apprehended when they are already within the territory of the 
requesting State can be executed within eight days,
752
 for nationals 
whose citizenship is presumed the time limit is, instead, of seven 
days.
753
 In both circumstances, readmission will take place even in the 
absence of a formal reply to the readmission request.
754
 
If it holds true that Member States can decide not to apply all the 
procedural safeguards of the Return Directive to people apprehended 
in the external border region,
755
 it should also be noted that swift 
mechanisms of expulsion cannot be executed in all those cases in 
which intercepted persons claim to be refugees.
756
 Additionally, 
Article 43 of the recast Procedures Directive requires that Member 
States shall provide for procedures, in accordance with the basic 
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principles and guarantees of Chapter II, in order to decide at the 
border or in transit zones on asylum applications made at such 
locations.
757
 Such guarantees include the right to remain pending the 
examination of an asylum application at first instance (Article 9).
758
 
From the above-mentioned provisions, it appears that, in principle, 
asylum seekers cannot be removed to a third country until their 
asylum application has been examined, and an unfavourable decision 
handed down. Therefore, return should not give rise to concerns as 
long as the safety of the readmitting country is individually 
established and the safeguards contained in national and EU 
legislation – in primis the Return Directive and the Recast Procedures 
Directive – are scrupulously and fairly observed. However, whilst a 
return decision can be pronounced or enforced only once the 
protection claim has been rejected at first instance, Member States 
have always shown a certain reluctance to accept as a general rule that 
appeals can have suspensive effect on the expulsion order (either 
automatic or upon request).
759
 Within this procedural gap – which the 
Recast Procedures Directive has not been able to fulfil – EU Member 
States have a certain margin of manoeuvre in deciding to return 
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asylum seekers who have not completed the appeal phase with regard 
to their protection claims. 
Scholarship has traditionally labelled bilateral readmission 
agreements as detrimental to refugee rights. Notwithstanding, in line 
with Coleman, this Chapter concludes that no issue of incompatibility 
with refugee and human rights law seems to stem from their technical 
content. Readmission agreements constitute purely administrative 
tools serving the purpose of smoothing the final stage of the return 
procedure for irregular migrants and rejected refugees. These bilateral 
instruments do not define criteria for the legality of a person’s 
presence in an EU Member State. This assessment is made by national 
authorities in compliance with domestic administrative law and in full 
respect of the procedural safeguards enshrined in international and EU 
law. Moreover, international law offers technical tools to solve 
conflicts of treaties and attribute precedence to human rights 
instruments.  
Nevertheless, readmission agreements can also be used, in practice, 
to smooth the return of asylum seekers whose claims will be 
examined elsewhere, and asylum seekers waiting for the outcome of 
their appeal against denial of their protection claims at first instance. 
As Section 5.8 will show, once we shift from law to the 
implementation of law, the relationship between readmission 
agreements and refugee rights turns out to be not as coherent and 
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consistent as previously imagined. And it is on this tension that I 
intend to build up my main contribution. 
 
5.7. Conflicts of treaties and non-affection clauses: readmission 
agreements versus international human rights treaties  
Readmission agreements are designed to regulate the transfer of 
persons only between the two Contracting Parties. In studying the 
relationship between readmission agreements and international human 
rights treaties, it is to be emphasized that States cannot contract out 
their pre-existing obligations under international refugee and human 
rights law by concluding a subsequent agreement on the readmission 
of irregular migrants. Pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, 
enshrined in Article 26 of the VCLT, States must respect their 
agreements. Since Article 34 of the VCLT provides that ‘a treaty does 
not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its 
consent’, changes to multilateral refugee law instruments cannot be 
created by a new treaty binding only a few States of the international 
community. Therefore, the obligations of States derived from all 
international refugee and European human rights instruments remain 
unaltered, even after the conclusion of a bilateral readmission 
agreement. Moreover, Article 41 of the VCLT provides that: 
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Two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude an agreement to 
modify the treaty as between themselves alone if the [modification in question] is 
not prohibited by the treaty and does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of 
their rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations. 
 
     A correlated question is whether conflicts may arise between a 
readmission agreement and other international conventions 
concerning refugee and human rights protection. This treaty relation 
would actually not be problematic if both the national decision on the 
legal status of the asylum seekers and the order to return those with no 
title to stay in the EU territory were taken in full compliance with 
European and international law standards. Moreover, as provided in 
the EU specimen agreement, bilateral readmission arrangements 
sometimes contain a non-affection clause requiring the Contracting 
Parties to comply with rights and duties under other refugee and 
human rights conventions. It is thus unlikely that requesting States 
encounter a situation where they would have to choose between 
contrasting obligations when implementing a bilateral readmission 
agreement. The rationale is that Contracting Parties do not intend to 
affect their previous obligations under international refugee law when 
they agree to mutually control irregular migration. 
However, first, not all readmission agreements contain non-
affection clauses requiring States to comply with international human 
rights treaties, and, second, the implementation of bilateral 
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agreements of migration control – as we will better observe later in 
this thesis – enhances the risk of direct and indirect refoulement and 
may lead to violations of refugee rights as a consequence of asylum 
seekers’ transfer to third countries without examination of their 
protection claims. Therefore, despite the existence of non-affection 
clauses, their de facto compatibility with, for example, the object and 
purpose of the Geneva Convention remains doubtful. If ‘the effective 
execution’ of the original treaty cannot be guaranteed, and these inter 
se arrangements impair the performance of erga omnes protection 
obligations under the Geneva Convention, Article 41 VCLT would be 
breached.  
 The proliferation of treaties inevitably insinuates the possibility of 
norms’ conflicts and doubts as to the agreement to be applied when 
the same State is party to two or more treaty regimes with diverging 
purposes. Despite no generally accepted definition of what constitutes 
a conflict between treaties, it could be affirmed that a conflict in the 
strict sense exists when a State is not able to simultaneously comply 
with all the requirements of two norms.
760
 Beyond Article 30 VCLT – 
which, however, sets the precedence only of successive treaties with 
the same subject-matter, and cannot therefore address all the problems 
concerning the priority of a particular treaty – all other applicable 
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maxims hardly seem to provide a response to the resolution of 
normative conflicts.  
For instance, whilst a certain rule, such as lex prior, may place 
focus on earlier treaties, another equally valid rule may take into 
account the evolving intent of the parties within a dynamic legal 
system by prioritizing the most recent treaty (lex posterior derogat 
legi priori). This rule is usually applicable when the parties have not 
expressed any indication as to the way in which conflicts should be 
resolved. Recent discourses have focused on the lex specialis doctrine 
whereby the more narrowly precise treaty governing a specific subject 
matter overrides a treaty regulating more general issue-areas.
761
 While 
at times, some of these diverging principles may be used concurrently 
(when, for instance, the subsequent treaty is also the more specific 
one), in many other cases, the unclear relationship among these 
canons implies an inevitable conflict and uncertainty about the rule to 
be favoured.
762
 
Any reader would realize that no single rule among those 
abovementioned could be applied satisfactorily to situations involving 
various partners, and the VCLT is de facto incapable of resolving 
                                                 
761
 See e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Study in the Function and the Scope of the Lex 
Specialis Rule and the Question of ‘Self-Contained’ Regimes’, UN Doc. 
ILC(LVI)/SG/FIL/ CRD.1 and Add.1., 4 and 7 May 2004; Anja Lindroos, 
‘Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrines of Lex 
Specialis’ (2005) 74 NJIL  27. 
762
 Lindroos 2005, 41. 
 349 
 
serious conflicts between treaties.
763
 Some authors have thus endorsed 
the flexible ‘principle of political decision’ whereby it is up to the 
State concerned (in particular decision-makers) to make a political 
decision regarding which commitment it prefers.
764
 Since State 
practice remains de facto ambiguous and ‘no particular principle or 
rule can be regarded as of absolute validity’,765 I consider non-
affection clauses as an instructive legal technique for resolving 
potential conflicts between treaties. 
By intervening at the very drafting stage, the incorporation of 
saving (non-affection) clauses might be helpful for establishing either 
the priority of the treaty in question or the priority of another treaty.
766
 
These clauses should however be only used when a first attempt to 
reconcile concurrent norms has failed, thus obliging States to give 
precedence to one of the two conflicting provisions.
767
 
In order to avoid a general scheme of substantive hierarchization of 
treaties, saving clauses could be used to indicate that a certain current 
treaty is in casu hierarchically superior or inferior to a previous 
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one.
768
 By increasing coherence in the international legal system, such 
a solution would ensure certainty that either a specific agreement will 
be honoured, or mechanisms of legal recourse can be put in motion in 
case of infringement.
769
 Considering treaties as agreements setting 
forth norms of expected behaviour, non-affection clauses would swell 
predictability of outcomes as to which treaty would be applicable in 
case of conflict.
770
 
In point of fact, readmission agreements are not consistent in the 
use of non-affection clauses. According to Coleman, these clauses are 
not imperative and have a purely declaratory value insofar as they 
cement the applicability of international obligations to the extent to 
which such obligations already bind Contracting Parties.
771
 In sum, 
they do not create obligations for the two involved States, and may be 
considered, at most, as an additional safeguard to avoid the 
application of readmission agreements after deciding to expel an 
asylum seeker in breach of international law.  
However, when a proviso on the precedence of human rights 
treaties is formulated in a more detailed fashion, not only does it 
generate more stringent and definite obligations than those derived by 
customary international law, but it also distinctly articulates how the 
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agreement at hand can be enforced in accordance with earlier human 
rights treaties. The readmission agreement between the UK and 
Albania contains a sophisticated articulation of human rights 
instruments. Indeed, Article 21 prescribes that: 
 
The provisions of this Agreement shall not affect the Contracting Parties’ rights 
and duties under: a) other international agreements on extradition, transfer of 
convicted persons, mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and readmission or 
transit conveyance in cases of removal of persons generally; b) the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 as amended by 
the Protocol done at New York on 31 January 1967; c) any international agreement 
on human rights; d) international agreements on asylum, in particular the 
Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum 
lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities, done at Dublin 
on 15 June 1990; e) any other international agreement.
772
 
 
The mandatory character of this provision – confirmed by the use 
of the word ‘shall’ – seems to indicate that respect for all rights and 
principles proclaimed in the Geneva Convention and its 1967 
Protocol, as well as in any other international agreement on human 
rights and asylum constitute an underlying component of the 
agreement itself.  
                                                 
772
 Such a provision follows the content of the non-affection clause inserted in the 
Council Recommendation concerning a specimen bilateral readmission agreement 
between a Member State and a third country, OJ C 274 (EU specimen readmission 
agreement).  
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An interpretation whereby all the norms of the abovementioned 
instruments are incorporated by reference is mostly significant insofar 
as we consider that not all of the norms of the Geneva Convention and 
relevant human rights treaties amount to customary international 
law.
773
 Therefore, non-affection clauses may create obligations that 
are more onerous than those deriving from general international law. 
Given that the international legal system is a cobweb of interrelated 
agreements that affect each other, thoughtful drafting of saving 
clauses is more likely to foresee and avoid potential conflicts among 
treaties.
774
 Because of the risk of asylum seekers being affected by the 
application of a readmission agreement, it would be opportune to 
insert specific references to the duty of States to comply with 
international refugee and human rights treaties without altering the 
scope and objective of the bilateral accords, which are clearly aimed 
at expediting the return of irregular migrants to countries of origin or 
transit. 
As a matter of public international law, it is also particularly 
important to decode the value of references to human rights and 
democracy in the Preamble of any bilateral readmission agreement in 
order to gauge whether they either constitute mere assumptions on 
which the accord is predicated or the real objectives of the treaty. This 
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 A norm unquestionably amounting to customary law is the principle of non-
refoulement. 
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 Borgen 2005, 637.  
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interpretative exercise is particularly salient with regard to those 
agreements not containing saving clauses. In this respect, the role of 
the Preamble can be misleading since it is often used as a location 
where Contracting Parties declare their common values, especially in 
agreements of a political character. 
The text of bilateral readmission agreements generally contains 
preambular references to human rights, but seldom to specific 
international human rights instruments.
775
 Rather than the genuine 
objectives of the treaty, the impression is that they constitute a 
statement of shared values to the effect that the parties attach 
importance to human rights and democratic principles. A slightly 
more accurate example, but still restricted in its scope, is the 1997 
Agreement between Italy and Albania on the readmission of people at 
their borders. While in the Preamble, the Parties bear on the respect of 
international conventions on human rights protection and in particular 
on the rights of migrant workers, in Article 3(d), the Parties exclude 
from the personal scope of the Agreement both nationals of third 
countries who have been recognized as refugees under the 1951 
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 To give an example, in the Preamble of the readmission agreement between Italy 
and Algeria, the two Contracting Parties declare to be desirous ‘to improve the 
arrangements for persons’ movement between both countries, within the respect of 
the rights and guarantees provided for by their internal legislation and international 
conventions which apply to both States.’ The same broad and unspecific reading can 
be found in the Preamble of the Readmission Agreement between the UK and 
Algeria on the Circulation of Persons and Readmission, London, 11 July 2006. 
Additionally, the UK and Albania agree on the readmission of third country 
nationals ‘[h]aving regard to the need to abide by basic human rights and freedoms, 
guaranteed by their national legislation and by international agreements in force for 
the Contracting Parties.’ See, Preamble (Recital 4) of the UK-Albania Readmission 
Agreement. 
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Geneva Convention, as amended by the 1967 Protocol, and stateless 
people pursuant to the 1954 New York Convention.  
It is crucial to highlight that EU Member States remain bound by 
international refugee and European human rights obligations 
whenever they return a person to a third country. Therefore, 
expulsions executed by means of readmission agreements do not 
automatically entail an increased risk of refoulement, if the return 
decisions are taken in consonance with the whole gamut of safeguards 
enshrined in the Recast Procedures Directive, as well as the legally 
binding international human rights instruments ratified by the EU 
Member States as a whole. In this regard, non-affection clauses 
intervene to ensure legal certainty and confer precedence to human 
rights and refugee law treaties. However,  
 
There [is] […] no sufficient guarantee that the authorities would treat asylum 
applicants differently than any other illegal aliens, or any explicit commitment by 
the requested State to examine an asylum claim of a readmitted individual.
776
 
 
Moreover, as the next Section will discuss, informal practices of 
border control can at any time be performed by State authorities, thus 
dismantling the spectrum of guarantees and rights owed to asylum 
seekers under bilateral and multilateral international treaties.  
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5.8. Informal border practices: when refugees become invisible 
Readmission agreements per se cannot be expected to eliminate 
return problems. Much will depend on the goodwill of requested 
States to cooperate, supply documents, reply to the application 
request, and assist third-country nationals readmitted in their territory, 
including asylum seekers who should be channelled into procedures 
of assessment of their protection claims. Moreover, the possibility of 
informal border return operations and diverging State practices 
creating tensions with protection obligations cannot be excluded in 
absolute terms. In this respect, Coleman’s conclusion is that more 
quantitative and qualitative studies would be required in relation to 
informal border practices. Although such a dual-pronged analysis 
mapping in detail formal and informal readmission practices would be 
beyond the scope of this Chapter, a host of examples stretching from 
East to the South can be illustrative of the risks run by refugees 
disorderly knocking at EU doors.  
Slovakia, for instance, returns migrants and asylum seekers to 
Ukraine on a regular basis – the two countries concluded a 
readmission agreement in 2004. According to Slovak officials 
interviewed by Human Rights Watch (HRW), people claiming 
protection do not know, in most cases, that they have to explicitly 
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utter the word ‘asylum’ when interrogated.777 But even using the word 
‘asylum’, summary removal from Slovakia is not automatically out of 
the question, given that the system of access to asylum procedures 
remains very defective. There is no individual assessment of each 
returnee’s identity and status, interpreters and lawyers are not 
provided to assist the returnees, and there is no way to challenge the 
decision to return.
778
 
Such a practice of informal removal is mainly due to a deficiency 
of the domestic asylum system and of the procedural guarantees 
toward refugees, rather than to the existence of specific provisions 
within the bilateral agreement with Ukraine expressly authorizing the 
readmission of asylum seekers.
779
 Similarly, Poland almost 
automatically implements its readmission agreement with Ukraine by 
sending back all migrants and asylum seekers who have irregularly 
crossed the Polish border, even if they have transited through other 
States.
780
 But Ukraine does not possess the legal and policy 
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framework necessary for receiving a high number of migrants and 
ensuring access to asylum procedures. For instance, as denounced by 
Ukrainian lawyers, the asylum applications of six Somali asylum 
seekers, sent back to Ukraine from Poland (although they entered 
Poland from Belarus), were rejected by the Ukrainian Committee on 
Nationalities and Migration on the ground that they should have 
claimed asylum in Poland.
781
 
By the same token, a group of nine Chinese individuals, transferred 
from Poland to Ukraine by means of the existing readmission 
agreement, were detained for months, subject to ill-treatment, sexual 
harassment, and seizure of their belongings by Ukrainian guards 
without receipt. Deprived also of their right to apply for asylum, most 
of them desperately asked to return home.
782
 Thus, some argue that 
Ukraine, country of transit for migrants and refugees attempting to 
enter the EU from East, ‘runs the risk of becoming a centre for 
refoulement for Europe’s refugees [and] asylum seekers.’783 
To give another example, on 26 October 2010, Italy implemented 
its readmission agreement with Egypt by returning 68 migrants 
claiming to be Palestinian refugees. They were sent back on a charter 
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flight to Cairo without being given the possibility of lodging an 
asylum application. An Egyptian consular official was even present at 
Catania’s airport for identifying her own nationals.784 The text of the 
2007 agreement between Italy and Egypt does not provide for 
accelerated procedures of identification and readmission.
785
 
Moreover, it contains a non-affection clause requiring the two 
involved States to comply with international human rights treaties and 
the Geneva Convention.
786
 Therefore, swift practices of identification 
and return resulted from an informal implementation of the agreement 
itself within the framework of patterns of border control in dissonance 
with well-established rules of international and European law. 
On the basis of a MoU signed with the UNHCR in 1954, Egypt has 
entrusted the UN Agency with the examination of all asylum 
applications in the country. However, Egyptian officers often deny the 
UNHCR access to detention camps where migrants and people willing 
to apply for refugee status are confined. On several occasions – in 
2008, 2009, and 2011 – Egyptian guards have also forced Eritrean 
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refugees to sign documents for their ‘voluntary’ return to their country 
of origin where they would suffer persecution as deserters from the 
army.
787
 In September 2013, two Syrian refugees were killed by 
Egyptian coastguards while trying to flee the country by boat. As 
denounced by international media and human rights organizations, 
Egypt is not a safe country for thousands of Syrian refugees who are 
subject to a campaign of persecution and harassment, resulting also in 
detention and repatriation to their country of origin devastated by a 
violent civil war.
788
 
 In 2011, masses of undocumented migrants and refugees, 
following the upheavals in North Africa, landed in Italy in disarray. 
As denounced by several NGOs, a large number of these individuals, 
especially Tunisians, were denied access to Eurodac and to the 
informative mechanisms offered by UNHCR.
789
 They were confined 
for a long time in either overcrowded detention centres or on board of 
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ships,
790
 subjected to summary identification procedures by their 
consular officials, or rapidly expelled to their countries of origin 
beyond any standards envisaged by the EU Asylum Directives, the 
Return Directive, or bilateral readmission agreements.
791
 As 
denounced by Fortress Europe, in 2011, 3,592 individuals were 
repatriated to Tunisia and 965 to Egypt in the name of the efficiency 
required by the implementation of the readmission agreements 
between Italy and the two relevant North-African countries.
792
 For 
example, since the start of 2011, 183 persons have been speedily 
repatriated to Egypt, a few hours after their arrival in Italy.
793
 
Although the Schengen Border Code (SBC) and the Return Directive 
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require notification of expulsion decisions, a majority of migrants are 
not been notified about the removal order or the location to which 
they are being sent. In addition, they were not given any chance to 
challenge the return decision and to suspend execution of the 
expulsion. 
Cursory readmission procedures have been provided by both the 
1998 Exchange of Notes between Italy and Tunisia on the entry and 
stay of nationals of the two countries, and their 2009 bilateral accord 
on the readmission of third-country nationals without a stay permit.
794
 
Nevertheless, States are still required to execute these accelerated 
procedures in accordance with international and European human 
rights law, as well as refugee law. Otherwise, there exists a deficiency 
in the domestic system of admission and readmission; and this 
constitutes the starting point for any possible reform initiatives. 
Readmission agreements are not the per se cause of informal border 
practices, but they are executed in a context of structural protection 
deficiency. The existence of a readmission agreement may therefore 
amplify the presumption of the requesting State that it will obtain the 
full cooperation of the requested country – with which it has 
established positive relations in many other areas related to 
readmission – regardless of the status of the removed person. This 
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becomes particularly glaring when a self-proclaimed state of 
emergency ‘imposes’ agile, rapid, and informal return practices to 
face mass arrivals of displaced people. Consequences for asylum 
seekers are predictable.  
A pertinent example regards the new unpublished agreement 
signed on 5 April 2011 between Italy and Tunisia. The accord 
contains provisions to accelerate the readmission of unwanted 
migrants without formalities after the identification by a consular 
official, or after a cursory reconstruction of nationality (which in 
practice was also performed on the basis of both the westerly 
provenance in respect to Lampedusa, and the somatic traits of 
migrants).
795
 The existence of good relations between requesting and 
requested States – consecrated in the negotiation of such an informal 
and unpublished readmission agreement – is considered sufficient to 
expel people, regardless of the unstable social, political, and economic 
situation in their home countries. Therefore, the fast-track procedures 
of identification provided by the agreement allow for the summary 
and collective expulsion of groups of the same nationality.  
As asserted by the former Italian Ministry of the Interior, ‘those 
                                                 
795
 Martina Tazzioli, ‘Cronologia degli Accordi Italia-Tunisia’ Storie 
Migranti,December 2011 <http://www.storiemigranti.org/spip.php?article1004> 
accessed 2 May 2013. From 1 to 21 August 2011, 4,637 people arrived in 
Lampedusa from Libya, while 497 came from Tunisia. See, Raffaella Cosentino, 
Respingimenti in Atto da Mesi sulla Rotta Tunisia-Lampedusa, Terrelibere.org,2011 
<http://www.terrelibere.org/4318-respingimenti-in-atto-da-mesi-sulla-rotta-tunisia-
lampedusa> accessed 2 May 2013. 
 363 
 
who come from Tunisia are economic migrants, who do not have the 
requirements to be considered refugees or asylum seekers.’796 In this 
vein, readmission agreements have been invoked by representatives of 
the Ministry of the Interiors to solicit Italian judges to validate 
accelerated measures of forced return in the absence of the traditional 
set of safeguards offered by the domestic system.
797
 
It should also be noted that readmission agreements generally 
establish that their implementation shall not affect the contracting 
parties’ duties under other readmission or transit conveyance accords 
on the removal of persons.
798
 Such a clause implies the risk of 
Contracting Parties not being obliged to apply the standard 
readmission treaty. They can use further formal or informal 
cooperation arrangements to expel unauthorized migrants and asylum 
seekers, such as MoUs, Exchange of Letters, as well as ad hoc 
Exchanges of Notes between diplomatic or consular authorities. These 
instruments do not generally contain the same safeguards of 
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readmission agreements, and are also not subjected to public scrutiny 
and monitoring.
799
 
 
5.9. Protecting human rights through readmission agreements: 
which ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ for requesting and requested States? 
Whilst Section 5.7 outlined non-affection clauses as a proper and 
elegant legal technique to avoid treaty conflicts, conferring primacy to 
international human rights and refugee law instruments, Section 5.8 
has thereupon dragged us back to the reality of informal practices of 
border control where refugees become even more invisible, even more 
vulnerable. Therefore, it remains to be asked whether there is a need 
to create, beyond non-affection clauses, more precise procedural 
human rights clauses within the text of readmission agreements. 
The incorporation of non-affection clauses and procedural human 
rights safeguards within existing or future readmission agreements 
would impose upon sending States the duty to more attentively 
scrutinize whether asylum seekers can be involved in the readmission 
process without due guarantees, and to ascertain, through a 
monitoring mechanism, whether the readmitting State de facto 
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complies with agreed standards of refugee protection.  
 At this point, however, the reader would ask: first, why should 
requesting and requested States tie their hands by agreeing to more 
stringent procedural human rights clauses requiring monitoring and 
compliance with refugee law standards? Second, what incentives 
might requesting States have in seeking the termination or suspension 
of a readmission agreement as a consequence of human rights 
violations? These questions hint at the political costs of a drafting 
process aimed to supplement the content of readmission agreements 
with procedural human rights clauses. Regrettably, the answers given 
will be nothing but the outcome of a – sometimes unbalanced – trade-
off where no ‘right’ solution can be smoothly proffered that would 
serve to accommodate the diverging interests of two different and 
competing actors.  
 
5.9.1. Requested States 
Readmission amounts to a bilateral cooperation based on 
asymmetric costs and benefits where requesting and requested States 
clearly share different interests. Despite the fact that readmission 
agreements are in principle framed on grounds of reciprocity, they are 
de facto founded on unbalanced reciprocities mostly biased in favor 
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of the sending States’ interests.800 It means that their mutual 
obligations cannot apply equally to both parties. Indeed, the 
implementation of these arrangements has a different impact for the 
populations, the economy, the structural institutional and legal 
capacity of the two involved countries, in terms of enforcement of 
readmission decisions, reception of migrants, and compliance with 
human rights and refugee law, as required by non-affection clauses. 
Thus, to compensate for the unbalanced reciprocities underlying the 
cooperation on readmission and removal, the conclusion of 
readmission agreements is always motivated by expected benefits that 
are however differently perceived by the two parties.
801
 
Far from being an end in itself, readmission agreements are 
generally used to enhance cooperation in other strategic areas, such as 
labour quotas, development aid, special trade concessions, visa 
facilitations or the lifting of visa requirements, financial assistance, 
police cooperation, border security, or the construction of reception 
capacity in readmitting countries that generally lack the administrative 
and legal background as well as the infrastructure to receive 
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immigrants and assess protection claims.
802
 For instance, the 2007 
Italy-Egypt readmission agreement was accompanied by a bilateral 
debt swap agreement highly beneficial for Egypt, as well as by trade 
concessions and temporary entry quotas for Egyptian nationals in 
Italy. France also conditioned the implementation of the 2005 
agreements on development, science, and environment to the 
acceptance by Pakistan of a readmission agreement.
803
 
A typical model of cooperation in readmission is that of Albania, 
which became in turn a recipient of Italian development aid and 
technical and military assistance. Italy and Albania signed on the 
same day (18 November 1997) a readmission agreement and a labour 
agreement setting planned quotas for Albanian workers.
804
 Likewise, 
the 2006 readmission agreement between the UK and Algeria was 
signed in the context of tight negotiations, including such strategic 
issues as police cooperation, energy, and technical assistance in the 
war on terrorism.
805
 
Migration salience, geographic proximity, and incentives have 
been emphasized as the three factors influencing the conclusion of 
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standard readmission agreements.
806
 This consideration brings 
contingency to the above question on why should requested States 
accept to bind themselves with non-affection clauses and more 
stringent procedural human rights clauses while performing 
readmission. In this respect, it could be argued that third countries 
tend to cooperate more efficiently when compensated. Therefore, the 
arsenal of expected benefits so far utilized to conclude readmission 
agreements might once again constitute the most powerful political 
and economic ‘weapons’ EU Member States have at their disposal to 
persuade third countries to accept the costs of readmission in 
compliance with human rights and refugee law standards.  
 
5.9.2. Requesting States 
After examining the do ut des component of readmission 
agreements from the readmitting country standpoint, another general 
question arises: what motivation the requesting State may have in 
endorsing the political and financial costs of more ‘individual-
centred’ and ‘human rights-oriented’ treaties delineating extra 
reciprocal obligations for the involved States? 
It should first be emphasized how the insistence on both wide-
ranging priority clauses and procedural human rights clauses can 
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prevent (or postpone) the conclusion of further agreements with 
countries that possess a dismal record of human rights and democracy. 
In this sense, they could have an ‘anticipatory’ effect by pushing the 
third country to respect human rights and certain procedural 
safeguards toward asylum seekers before ratification is deposited. 
Indeed, it has been argued how ‘it is much easier to use the pending 
ratification of a treaty as a means of persuasion than to rely on the 
human rights clause after ratification […].’807 
Despite acknowledging the understandable reluctance of a 
requesting State to accept the burden of a drafting process that would 
impose additional legal ties, human rights clauses and non-affection 
provisions permit governments and border authorities to be 
confronted with ‘in law’ well-defined obligations, mostly when return 
decisions are taken at the border and in transit zones. As signatories of 
refugee and human rights law conventions, requesting States should 
have an obvious interest in taking all necessary measures to avoid that 
asylum seekers are excluded from accelerated return procedures, and, 
if it happens, to ensure that fundamental rights are not infringed as a 
consequence of a misguided removal to an unsafe third country of 
transit. The political costs the sending State could incur in case, for 
instance, of refoulement to a place where the asylum seeker does not 
have access to a fair assessment of her protection claim (thus running 
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the risk, for example, of being returned to her home country) would 
undoubtedly be higher than the costs deriving from monitoring the 
readmitting State.  
In this regard, Article 10(3)(b) of the Recast Procedures Directive 
also requires that EU Member States ensure determining authorities 
examining asylum applications to have access to  
 
Precise and up-to-date information […] obtained from various sources, such as 
EASO and UNHCR and relevant international human rights organisations, as to the 
general situation prevailing in the countries of origin of applicants and, where 
necessary, in countries through which they have transited, and that such information 
is made available to the personnel responsible for examining applications and taking 
decisions.
808
 
 
Thus, providing for a monitoring mechanism within the framework 
of a readmission agreement would give substance and contextual 
specificity to one of the rules of the Recast Procedures Directive, 
thereby confirming how the supervision of the viability of safe havens 
in third countries has an overall beneficial impact on ‘safe third 
country’ policies. The cooperation of third countries is a pre-condition 
for the effective implementation of ‘safe third country’ exceptions, 
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and readmission agreements are key tools to implicitly obtain such 
cooperation, despite they do not usually mention asylum seekers and 
refugees in their text.
809
 
From a mere State-sovereignty and migration-control perspective, 
the ability of a government to show that its return policy is 
implemented effectively can bring about a lowering in the number of 
irregular arrivals. Indeed, a smooth transfer of unauthorized migrants 
and asylum seekers to ‘safe third countries’ might send the dissuasive 
signal to third country nationals that obtaining permanent residence or 
access to asylum procedures in an EU Member State may not be that 
easy. At the same time, it is noteworthy that restrictive measures of 
border control and pre-arrival interceptions have so far hardly deterred 
people from migrating and fleeing their countries, even at the cost of 
their own life.  
It should additionally be considered that making non-affection 
clauses and procedural human rights clauses essential elements of a 
readmission agreement would also be in line with Article 60(1) of the 
VCLT, which provides that ‘a material breach of a bilateral treaty by 
one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground 
for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in 
part.’ However, it remains to be asked what interest EU Member 
States – which generally play the role of sending countries – may 
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have in agreeing to suspend or terminate a treaty whose purpose is to 
alleviate migration pressure in their territories. 
 On the one hand, it can be contended that a suspension clause 
would turn out to be beneficial for the requested State, well aware that 
maintaining a situation of human rights violations in its own territory 
would lighten the readmission burden. On the other hand, suspending 
or terminating a readmission agreement de jure or de facto would 
strengthen the international image of the requesting State as a credible 
and reliable actor in the protection of human rights. It would 
moreover be the most pervious alternative to obviating the damage 
incumbent upon both returned individuals and sending State if an 
unsafe removal takes place, especially when the human rights 
situation in the readmitting country precipitously deteriorates. In these 
circumstances, not only would States discredit their international 
standing, but they would also run the risk of engaging their 
international responsibility for the commission of an international 
wrongful act on grounds of refoulement. 
To sum up, a handful of answers can be offered to address the 
question why States should accept to embark into the lengthiness of 
differently crafting new readmission agreements. In primis, in an era 
of treaty congestion, the insertion of non-affection provisions stands 
as a bulwark against treaty conflict, and has a flywheel effect in 
increasing legal certainty for both governments involved in the return 
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process. Moreover, by making a clear manifesto of their human rights 
commitments within the text of readmission agreements, Contracting 
Parties would reinforce their image as credible players in the human 
rights arena, seriously committed to abiding by international 
obligations toward returned migrants and asylum seekers. 
 
5.10. Looking ahead: aims and functions of proposed 
procedural human rights clauses in readmission agreements 
The following questions are examined in this Section: beyond non-
affection clauses, is there a need to create more precise procedural 
human rights clauses within the text of readmission agreements? Or 
would this constitute a superfluous iteration by virtue of the fact that 
EU Member States have already agreed to be bound by human rights 
law? Would these provisions impose obligations upon States, beyond 
those already binding them under customary and treaty law?  
The system of protection of refugee rights within the text of 
bilateral readmission agreements is quite rudimentary. This is 
essentially due to the fact that they do not discipline the legal status of 
migrants and asylum seekers, and do not authorize the return decision. 
However, some of these instruments, such as the readmission 
agreement between the UK and Albania contain a non-affection 
clause committing the parties to respect the rights of migrants in 
accordance with international refugee and human rights treaties.  
 374 
 
The existence of preambular references to human rights in the text 
of readmission agreements is not always sufficient to reduce the risk 
of grave violations. Moreover, these general principles do not form 
part of the operative components of bilateral treaties that are essential 
for the achievement of the purpose and object of the agreement.
810
 
Generic mention of human rights generates only programmatic 
principles rather than specific obligations that could be invoked as 
conditions for the implementation of the treaty and for justifying its 
suspension in case of material breaches of the treaty itself. 
My concern does not contemplate those cases where a readmission 
request follows an expulsion decision regularly issued by a judicial or 
administrative authority, or those cases where border authorities 
remove a person with no title to stay in the territory of the requesting 
State after ascertaining that no claim for asylum has been expressed 
and no risk of refoulement exists. Rather, I have an uneasy feeling 
about readmission agreements in two particular circumstances: first, 
when asylum seekers are apprehended while irregularly crossing the 
border, especially in situations of emergency with massive arrivals of 
mixed influxes and lack of adequate monitoring by NGOs, 
international organizations, lawyers, and media; second, when access 
to asylum procedures is denied to those asylum seekers who have 
transited through a ‘safe third country’ before soliciting protection 
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within the borders of a EU Member State. 
There is no doubt that major efforts are being made to restore the 
structural deficiencies of the asylum and migration control systems of 
EU Member States. However, whereas the protection net does result 
in some leaks in practice, specific procedural human rights clauses – 
intended as provisions setting State duties toward returned migrants 
and asylum seekers – could be encompassed in the text of readmission 
agreements to avert, ad residuum, possible human rights violations in 
the implementation of a readmission procedure. For the purpose of 
this Chapter, attention is intentionally and selectively placed on 
asylum seekers in need of protection.  
On the one hand, it can convincingly be contended that 
embellishing readmission agreements with clauses framing in detail 
State obligations with regard to the rights of returned migrants and 
asylum seekers could operate as a ‘window dressing.’ It would indeed 
give the impression that agreements are comprehensive, well-drafted, 
and therefore potentially exempt from further scrutiny. On the other 
hand, these provisions could nonetheless be an effective tool in the 
hands of EU Member States to require third countries (and vice versa) 
to fulfil clear procedures ensuring compliance with international 
human rights and refugee law standards.  
Proponents of standard readmission agreements argue that such 
agreements are harmless, highlighting their neutrality as one of the 
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reasons. If these bilateral arrangements do not formally provide a 
legal basis for removal, and the national decision to return an asylum 
seeker to a ‘safe third country’ is mainly taken pursuant to the criteria 
set in the Recast Procedures Directive, it is also undeniable that this 
Directive does not create obligations for the third, readmitting State. 
As Costello observes, the lack of communication between the two 
Contracting Parties may simply ‘shift “disorder” from one arena to 
another.’811 
It could also be contended that laying out, as a prerequisite for 
readmission, that third countries respect human rights and ensure 
access to asylum procedures would be an incentive for readmitting 
States not to respect such standards in order to prevent unwanted 
returns. The response to this argument will state the obvious: the fact 
that the requested party decides not to comply with human rights and 
refugee law standards for receiving fewer migrants and asylum 
seekers should warn the requesting State that its potential partner is 
actually not that safe for returnees. Therefore, before negotiating an 
agreement, sending States should ensure that receiving countries have 
not only ratified, but have also correctly implemented relevant 
international instruments concerning refugee rights. A system of 
regular monitoring and reports related to both the human rights 
situation in readmitting countries and the legal guarantees they offer 
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to refugees could be useful to complement the action of the requesting 
parties. 
 
5.10.1.Proposal on specific procedural human rights clauses 
Enhancing protection of asylum seekers subjected to a readmission 
procedure requires a comprehensive approach involving, above all, an 
overhaul of the EU asylum regime.
812
 My contribution, however, is 
limited to scrutinizing the role readmission agreements might play in 
this context and propose measures that States might agree upon in a 
bilateral framework. Therefore, some selective and concrete ways 
forward for draft provisions adding extra procedural safeguards for 
removable refugees are sketched out as a platform for further 
discussion. Although these clauses derive from my examination of the 
agreements’ text, they are in line with similar (though not identical) 
proposals made by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe and the European Commission with regard to EU readmission 
agreements.
813
 
Taking note of the 2011 Communication of the Commission on the 
evaluation of the EU readmission agreements, the Council has 
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reasserted the importance of EU readmission agreements in order to 
tackle illegal immigration.
814
 However, it did not make any explicit 
reference to the human rights provisions recommended by the 
Commission in February 2011.
815
 Therefore, the policy debate 
continues to be open, as readmission agreements are a very sensitive 
and novel topic in EU affairs, and negotiations with certain partners, 
such as Russia, can be difficult to conclude.
816
 Although the 
Commission’s proposals have not been operationalized at the EU 
level yet, there is a need to make human rights part of the ordinary 
discourse and bilateral readmission practices of EU Member States 
with third countries, especially with regard to the involvement of 
asylum seekers and third country nationals.  
A great risk exists for individuals apprehended at the border 
(including airports) to be returned through fast-track procedures, as 
provided in the text of several readmission agreements. A clause 
which clearly excludes individuals in need of protection from the 
personal scope of these bilateral instruments would be opportune, 
especially in chaotic situations of mass mixed influxes, where the 
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rights of newly arrived migrants are be easily prejudiced. Building on 
a recommendation of the EU Commission regarding, however, EU 
readmission agreements,
817
 the first proposed clause would appear as 
follows: 
 
1) Before the Requesting Contracting Party removes the 
individual apprehended at the border to the territory of the Requested 
Contracting Party, it shall ensure that accelerated readmission 
procedures are conditional on the information, collected by Border 
Authorities, that persons seeking protection are not involved.  
 
 
Readmission agreements are to be considered international treaties, 
setting reciprocal obligations between Contracting Parties. They are 
not, therefore, the suitable loci for EU Member States to grant an 
individual right to an effective remedy against an expulsion decision 
or a denial of asylum at first instance. The right to appeal the removal 
order with a suspensive effect must be established in national 
legislation in accordance with the ECHR and EU law, in particular the 
                                                 
817
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CFR, the Return Directive, and the Recast Procedures Directive, as far 
as asylum seekers are concerned. Therefore, efforts should be directed 
toward, first, a more stringent monitoring of national police activities 
during frontier operations (to avoid asylum seekers being involved in 
cursory readmission procedures), and second, the prompt 
implementation by States of the Recast Procedures Directive as 
adopted in June 2013. The 2005 Procedures Directive does not uphold 
the automatic suspension of the leaving order in case of appeal.
818
 
Therefore, the overall situation will be improved once States  enforce 
the Recast Procedures Directive at the domestic level, which provides 
that: 
 
Member States shall allow applicants to remain in the territory until the time 
limit within which to exercise their right to an effective remedy has expired or, 
when this right has been exercised within the time limit, pending the outcome of the 
remedy.
819
 
 
Having said that, the practices of EU Member States are 
characterized by accelerated procedures that make it overly difficult to 
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access effective remedies. For example, asylum seekers detained in 
the UK under the ‘detained fast-track procedure’ only have two 
working days to challenge a negative asylum decision. In Hungary, a 
request for judicial review must be lodged within three days if the 
asylum application is declared inadmissible, as is the case when a 
person has transited a ‘safe third country’ before claiming asylum in 
the destination State.
820
 
With regard to third-country nationals more generally, Article 
13(2) of the Return Directive provides that a competent judicial or 
administrative authority or a competent body can decide to 
temporarily suspend the enforcement of a return decision, while 
Member States shall always postpone removal when it would violate 
the principle of non-refoulement (Article 9(1)(a)). No reference is 
however made to the suspension of the execution of return and the 
deferral of the request for readmission in case of pending appeals 
against negative decisions on asylum at first instance. 
Although both the Return Directive and the Recast Procedures 
Directive contain, to a different extent, rules on the suspensive effect 
of appeals,
821
 there might be de facto attempts by States to informally 
return a person when an appeal is still pending, thereby ‘undermining 
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legal safeguards at both the procedural and substantive level.’822 
Indeed, the recast Procedures Directive does not provide that appeals 
against unfavourable asylum decisions taken in accelerated 
procedures have full automatic suspensive effect.
823
 This is at odds 
with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on Article 13, which, in several 
cases has recognized the importance of suspensive effect of 
expulsion/deportation orders pending appeals.
824
 ECRE’s analysis of 
the amended Article 46(6) is illustrative of the main obstacles 
regarding the access to an effective remedy under the Procedures 
Directive: 
 
Essentially, in its examination of whether an appeal in those cases would have 
suspensive effect, the court or tribunal would begin examining the merits of the 
appeal, but would only later complete the examination and rule on the appeal itself. 
This process creates double scrutiny of the same material, burdening the already 
stretched judicial systems. Moreover, if the court or tribunal decided, on the basis of 
the preliminary assessment, that the asylum seeker need not remain in the territory, 
but after a full examination of the appeal concluded that the asylum seeker is 
nevertheless in need of international protection, the individual may have already 
                                                 
822
 See, Byrne, Noll and Vedsted-Hansen 2002, 12. 
823
 See Article 46(6) in conjunction with Article 31(8) of the Recast Procedure 
Directive. 
824
 See, e.g., Conka v Belgium (2002) 32 EHRR 54; Olaechea Chuas v Spain App 
no 24668/03 (ECtHR, 10 August 2006);  Gebremedhin v France App no 25389/05 
(ECtHR, 26 April 2007) para 66; Muminov v Russia App no 42502/06 (ECtHR, 11 
December 2008) para 101; Abdolkani and Karimnia v Turkey App no 30471 
(ECtHR, 22 September 2009) para 108; Baysakov and Others v Ukraine App no 
54131/08 (ECtHR, 18 February 2010) para 71; IM v France App no 9152/09 
(ECtHR, 17 May 2011). 
 383 
 
been returned and subjected to irreversible harm. As a result, the appeal could be 
disadvantaged on the basis of a rapid, incomplete assessment of the case.
825
 
 
States are not obliged to halt the readmission request and its 
enforcement until the entire application of the asylum seeker, 
including the appeal, has been completed. As the Procedures Directive 
gives States full discretion to allow the asylum seeker to stay in the 
territory pending an appeal against an unfavourable decision taken in 
accelerated procedures, readmission agreements could contribute to 
ensure legal certainty complementing the safeguards of the 
Procedures Directive. They might thus be seen as the proper loci to 
reiterate the duty of border authorities to allow migrants and asylum 
seekers to await the outcome of their appeals before removing them to 
third countries.
826
 This would be an additional, clear-cut, and residual 
safeguard in case States decide to either formally or informally return 
a person while a judicial review of an unfavourable decision at first 
instance is still pending.   
The main purpose of readmission agreements is to speed up the 
process of return of irregular migrants without formalities, and on the 
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basis of prima facie valid pieces of evidence. To obviate any risk for 
involved asylum seekers, the second proposal – in line with the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe – would be the 
following: 
 
2) The Requesting Contracting Party shall stay the request 
for readmission and the enforcement of readmission until the 
Competent Authorities have ruled on the asylum seeker’s application, 
including the appeal. 
 
Readmission agreements do not discipline the treatment owed to 
asylum seekers, given the distinction between asylum procedures and 
readmission procedures. However, at times, the contours of these two 
spheres of action can blur, especially when asylum seekers are 
removed to a ‘safe third country’ before their admission procedures 
have been accomplished. So far, the Recast Procedures Directive only 
requires that the applicant is ‘admitted to the territory’ of the third 
country, and that she is provided with a document informing the 
authorities of the readmitting country that her application has not been 
examined in its substance.
827
 Under Article 38(4) of the Recast 
Procedures Directive, EU Member States are required to channel the 
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asylum seeker into asylum procedures when the requested country 
refuses to let her ‘enter its territory.’828 
However, the requesting State has no obligation to take charge of 
the removed asylum seeker again if it is ascertained that the requested 
State, despite permitting admission to its territory, has subsequently 
prevented the applicant from accessing asylum procedures. Therefore, 
return should not be undertaken without the assurance – exchanged 
within the communication channels set up in the framework of a 
bilateral treaty – that the third country has explicitly agreed to readmit 
the individual concerned as an asylum seeker whose protection claim 
will be examined in its merits. 
Beyond informing the authorities of the requested State that the 
asylum application of the returnee has not been examined in its 
substance - as provided by Article 38(3)(b) of the Recast Procedures 
Directive - States shall ensure that the agreement to readmit non-
nationals amounts to consenting to grant access to status 
determination procedures pursuant to the Geneva Convention. Silence 
or failing to respond to the informative note sent by the requesting 
State should not be considered as constituting consent as to the 
willingness of the requested State both to readmit and provide 
protection.
829
 Claiming such a high threshold would also be in line, 
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mutatis mutandis, with Article 35 of the VCLT whereby ‘[a]n 
obligation arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the 
parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means of 
establishing the obligation and the third State expressly accepts that 
obligation in writing.’830 Enhanced legal certainty on the rights of 
removed asylum seekers can thus be obtained if the requested country 
expressly consent in writing to the provision of international protection 
for the readmitted asylum seeker. ‘Informal arrangements, in so far as 
they are incapable of guaranteeing de jure the fulfilment of obligations 
should be deemed inappropriate.’831 For instance, in MSS v Belgium 
and Greece, the ECtHR was of the opinion that: 
 
The diplomatic assurances given by Greece to the Belgian authorities did not 
amount to a sufficient guarantee. It notes first of all that the agreement to take 
responsibility in application of the Dublin Regulation was sent by the Greek 
authorities after the order to leave the country had been issued, and that the 
expulsion order had therefore been issued solely on the basis of a tacit agreement by 
the Greek authorities. Secondly, it notes that the agreement document is worded in 
stereotyped terms and contains no guarantee concerning the applicant in person. No 
more did the information document [...], provided by the Greek authorities, contain 
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any individual guarantee; it merely referred to the applicable legislation, with no 
relevant information about the situation in practice.
832
 
 
If access to asylum procedures is denied in the third country, a 
readmission agreement could be a suitable instrument for imposing 
upon the sending State the duty of re-admitting the applicant and to 
granting her access to asylum procedures. Respecting the sovereignty 
of the third country, a monitoring system should be created to 
supervise the human rights situation in the readmitting State and 
certify whether returned asylum seekers have been effectively 
channelled into mechanisms of protection claims’ determination.833 
However, it is not clear what composition such a supervisory 
committee could have. Suggestions may range from diplomatic 
officers working at the embassies to NGOs and parliamentary 
delegations from international organizations.
834
 Therefore, 
summarizing the points above, the third proposed clause can be 
formulated as follows: 
 
3) If the person who is the subject of readmission is an asylum 
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seeker whose protection claim has not been examined on its merits 
before removal, the following conditions shall apply:  
a) The reply to the request for readmission provided by the 
Competent Authorities of the Requested Contracting Party shall 
contain a confirmation in writing that the individual concerned is an 
asylum seeker, and that the substance of his/her protection claim will 
be thoroughly examined.  
b) The Competent Authorities of the Requesting Contracting Party 
shall ensure that the Requested Contracting Party guarantees access to 
asylum procedures. If such an access is denied, the persons taken in 
charge shall be readmitted by the Requesting Contracting Party 
without formality and sent through the normal asylum channels. A 
monitoring Committee shall be created for this purpose. 
 
Finally, a ‘suspension clause’ with reciprocal effects could be 
activated where there are persistent human rights violations and risks 
for the readmitted persons in the third country concerned.
835
 While the 
Italy-Albania readmission agreement does not have a suspension 
provision, Article 25(2)(3) of the UK agreement with Albania affirms 
in sweeping terms that each Contracting Party shall terminate or 
suspend the agreement by giving notification in writing to the other 
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party on important grounds. Whether infringement of human rights in 
the readmitting country is to be conceived of as a possible pre-
condition for treaty suspension is not clear, but such a possibility is 
not excluded. Therefore, in light of the foregoing, the fourth proposed 
clause, drafted in more specific terms, could be the following:  
 
4) Each Contracting Party may either suspend or terminate the 
Agreement on important grounds, which include the deterioration of 
human rights in the territory of the Requested Contracting Party. 
 
5.10.2. Non-affection clauses and procedural human rights 
clauses: added value or mere reiteration of internationally 
recognized standards? 
EU Member States are embedded in a thick web of human rights 
norms binding them at universal and regional level. This might 
seemingly induce scholars and practitioners dealing with readmission 
agreements to consider any further insertion of non-affection clauses 
or extra legal safeguards for asylum seekers a superfluous duplication.  
To address these arguments, it can first be pointed out that 
procedural human rights clauses and non-affection provisions create 
positive obligations upon both EU Member States and third countries 
towards individuals subjected to a removal decision, including asylum 
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seekers. The imposition of such safeguards for readmitted asylum 
seekers upon the readmitting country could arguably be inducing EU 
Member States to further transfer their refugee responsibilities to a 
‘safe third country’ well beyond borders. However, this would 
overlook the fact that EU Member States are already entitled to 
declare an asylum application inadmissible upon a ‘safe third country’ 
exception by virtue of the Recast Procedures Directive.
836
 For so 
doing, they have to verify the human rights situation in the 
readmitting country and abide to a number of safeguards when 
removing an asylum seeker.
837
 Therefore, an increase of transfers is 
not the most likely outcome of new procedural safeguards, especially 
if considering that individuals might eventually be re-admitted by the 
sending State if the receiving country de facto denies access to asylum 
procedures. 
Previously contracted refugee and human rights law obligations are 
a key benchmark for States cooperating in the readmission of asylum 
seekers. As such, States shall abide by them even when implementing 
a joint migration control arrangement, which somehow restricts the 
liberty of the individual concerned. Nonetheless, it is crucially 
important to highlight that both EU Member States and non-EU third 
countries are not always bound by the same human rights instruments, 
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particularly with regard to the EU acquis communautaire. As practice 
shows, third countries do not always offer the same legal safeguards 
granted by EU Member States. Moreover, the jurisdictional reach of 
EU supranational judges will be limited in cases involving violations 
of fundamental rights that are committed far away from the EU 
borders. In this view, readmission agreements should instead contain a 
clause whereby parties commit themselves to treat third country 
nationals in compliance with international human rights and refugee 
law. If, then, the readmitting country has not ratified the key 
international human rights instruments, the inclusion of precise 
obligations for the two Contracting Parties with regard to the rights of 
refugees and third-country nationals is recommended. Whereas these 
clauses could be a replication for EU Member States (but it is not 
necessarily so), they might also constitute a fundamental benchmark 
for third countries, especially when they readmit asylum seekers who 
have only been transferred on a ‘safe third country’ ground.  
Asylum seekers who are scheduled to be transferred pursuant to a 
‘safe third country’ exception (therefore not on substantive grounds) 
remain ‘presumptive’ refugees. However, while non-refoulement 
obligations continue to apply to them, they are also treated as 
unauthorized residents with no right to freely circulate in the territory 
of the EU. Shifting de facto ‘from the status of victim (the basis of 
humanitarian action) to that of illegal immigrant (the basis of police 
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action)’,838 they are returned, like fully-fledged irregular migrants, to 
a third-transit country under the terms of a readmission agreement. 
The proposed obligation for the requesting State to ascertain that the 
readmitting country effectively ensures access to asylum procedures is 
thus hailed as an additional safeguard. 
Elaboration (or reiteration) of State obligations regarding asylum 
seekers could be instructive for a host of other reasons. First, it 
increases legal certainty for both applicants and governments involved 
in the return of irregular migrants, and permits frontier authorities to 
be confronted with well-defined international obligations and 
enforcement procedures, mostly when return decisions are taken at the 
border and in transit zones. Since transfer treaties always involve a 
limitation of rights, the agreement itself should be ‘in law.’839 A 
formal and transparent treaty is the necessary platform for two States 
that reciprocally decide to limit rights in compliance with the 
international standards they have accepted. 
As a second motive, reiterating procedural human rights 
obligations is relevant mostly for those norms that do not have a 
customary status or that cannot expressly be derived from the text of 
international human rights and refugee law treaties. For instance, 
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 Michel Agier, ‘Forced Migration and Asylum: Stateless Citizens Today’ in 
Cedric Audebert and Mohamed Kamel Doraï (eds), Migration in a Globalized 
World: New Research Issues and Prospects (Amsterdam University Press 2010) 
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 Thomas Clark and François Crépeau, ‘Human Rights in Asylum Sharing and 
Other Human Transfer Agreements’ (2004) 22(2) NQHR 232. 
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access to asylum procedures does not amount to widely accepted right 
under positive law,
840
 and its normative content is partly construed by 
judges. If the 1951 Geneva Convention does not explicitly require 
States to guarantee fair access to refugee status determination 
procedures, it is also true that depriving asylum seekers of an 
individual examination of their personal condition would expose them 
to the risk of refoulement, thereby undermining the object and purpose 
of the Convention.
841
 The jurisprudence of human rights bodies has 
thus recognized the existence of an implicit right to access fair and 
effective asylum procedures.
842
 The content of readmission 
agreements and other transfer arrangements would therefore not only 
be in line with international human rights and refugee law, but also 
with the relevant corresponding standards developed by the case law 
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 A different and wider regime of protection is offered by the EU CFR, which 
expressly confers a right to asylum (Article 18). See Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo, ‘The 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Right to be Granted 
Asylum in the Union’s Law’ (2008) 27 RSQ 33. 
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of human rights bodies and courts.
843
 
Human rights procedural clauses will not be the panacea because 
of the remaining flaws associated with any return process, especially 
when asylum seekers are involved. Readmission agreements are 
flexible instruments giving a high level of discretion to governments 
in determining whether and how to implement removals. However, 
the fact that they do not reflect specific obligations on refugee rights 
risks either maintaining procedural national differences or lowering 
current protection levels below international human rights law 
standards. Non-affection provisions and procedural human rights 
clauses – setting uniform standards – might therefore be an added 
value. 
 
5.11. Readmission agreements and access to protection: 
concluding remarks 
This Chapter carried out a broad examination of standard 
readmission agreements depicted as administrative instruments 
aiming to create a legal framework for forced return. A first finding is 
that general international law only provides the legal basis for a 
State’s obligation to readmit its own nationals. Instead, treaty law, and 
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more specifically, readmission agreements, are the instruments that 
establish an obligation to readmit third country nationals.  
Placing interstate readmission agreements under the umbrella of 
the EU readmission policy, it is important to observe that the Lisbon 
Treaty does not bestow upon the Union the exclusive power of 
negotiating readmission agreements, since the ‘Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice’ pertains to the field of shared competence 
grounded on the principle of ‘sincere cooperation.’844 A Member State 
can carry on with the negotiation of a bilateral readmission 
arrangement only if the EU has not already stipulated a treaty with the 
concerned third State or has not concluded a mandate for negotiating 
such an agreement. Exceptions include cases in which Member States 
require more detailed arrangements to compensate a EU agreement or 
a negotiating mandate containing only general statements. 
Human rights concerns have been expressed in respect to the 
connection of interstate readmission agreements with both ‘safe third 
country’ practices and the usage of accelerated procedures for 
returning unauthorized migrants apprehended at the EU borders. 
Nonetheless, this Chapter convened with Coleman that the text of 
readmission agreements is not per se incompatible with refugee 
rights. The legal status of asylum seekers is indeed regulated in an 
initial phase following their arrival in the territory of one of the EU 
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Member States. Bilateral readmission agreements hold only a 
subsidiary function aimed at enabling return to the country of origin 
or transit of all those people whose protection claims have already 
been rejected in accordance with the EU Recast Procedures and 
Qualification Directives.  
Nonetheless, in situations of informal border controls and massive 
arrivals of migrants and refugees where monitoring is generally 
lacking, the implementation of a readmission agreement may 
contribute to hamper access of asylum seekers to protection. 
Refoulement can thus occur as a consequence of accelerated return 
mechanisms jeopardizing the right to access both asylum procedures 
and effective remedies. Moreover, there is a risk for asylum seekers 
who have transited through ‘safe third countries’ to be removed by 
means of a readmission agreement. This warrants the inclusion of 
saving clauses and reciprocal procedural obligations that add 
additional safeguards for refugees without altering the scope and 
objective of the accords, which are clearly aimed at expediting the 
return of irregular migrants to countries of origin or transit. Thus, 
without any aim to provide an exhaustive response to the refugee 
rights-related problems arising from the implementation of 
readmission agreements, some proposals of draft provisions are 
brought forward as a springboard for further debate among legal 
scholars and policy-makers. 
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Despite recognizing the costs, especially for the requesting State, 
deriving from a new drafting process that gives centrality to human 
rights, the alternative of incurring in international responsibility for 
violating the non-refoulement obligation following the 
implementation of a readmission agreement would definitively be 
more troubling. On the whole, the development and improvement of 
non-affection clauses and itemized procedural human rights clauses 
within the text of bilateral readmission agreements should be 
positively considered if we want to see them acting as effective 
conditionality tools.  
In view of a coherent and solid regime of readmission, foremost 
importance is attached to States’ compliance with existing norms of 
international refugee and European human rights law as well as EU 
law asylum procedures. Nonetheless, when States fail to act within 
such a well-established legal framework, the procedural safeguards of 
readmission agreements might offer a residual and complementary 
protection to removed asylum seekers. Beyond enhancing legal 
certainty for governments and frontier authorities, they would 
moreover present the advantage of making fundamental rights part of 
ordinary business and bilateral cooperation, rather than principles 
merely subject to specialized human rights instruments,
845
 thereby 
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emphasising the implicit acceptance by both parties, during return 
operations, of a ‘human rights acquis.’ 
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Chapter 6. Negotiating Rights and Diplomatic 
Assurances under Memoranda of Understanding  
 
6.1.   Introduction  
Over the last decade, EU Member States have repatriated a notable 
number of individuals, considered threats to the public safety of the 
host country, after receiving diplomatic assurances by the country of 
origin concerning the treatment of the returnees.
846
 Particularly 
interesting for the purpose of this thesis is the case of the UK. Indeed, 
the idiosyncratic response of the UK to terrorism has resulted in the 
negotiation with third countries of Memoranda of Understanding 
(MoUs), written accords that enumerate a long list of assurances 
dictating standards of fair and humane treatment to be afforded to the 
returnees. MoUs stand, therefore, as framework agreements reflecting 
a mutual understanding on respect of human rights in every case of 
removal.  
Some terminological clarifications are needed to avoid overlaps 
among concepts that are very similar and often interchangeably used 
in the literature. Diplomatic Assurancescan can take a variety of 
forms. In the context of the transfer of a person from one State to 
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another, this shorthand term: 
 
Refers to an undertaking by the receiving State to the effect that the person 
concerned will be treated in accordance with conditions set by the sending State or, 
more generally, in keeping with its human rights obligations under international 
law.
847
 
 
Diplomatic assurances are generally exchanged between the 
sending and the readmitting States in the field of extradition or 
migration control, and may include, inter alia, MoUs, Exchanges of 
Letters, Notes Verbales, or Aides-Mémoire. Assurances are usually 
issued by the Embassy or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
requested State and addressed to the requesting country in charge of 
sending the individual back to her country of origin. In extradition 
cases, judicial bodies also provide additional guarantees. 
Diplomatic assurances are herein considered the overarching 
category within which MoUs and individualized diplomatic 
assurances form sub-categories. MoUs are blanket agreements on the 
treatment of the deportees signed with some countries before an 
emergency arises. Individualized diplomatic assurances, instead, are 
case-by-case accords negotiated either independently, in relation to a 
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certain person to be removed, or under a MoU with regard to specific 
individuals after an emergency arises. In the following sections, the 
terms assurances and individualized assurances are at times used 
interchangeably. 
After the September 11
th
 attacks, MoUs have been utilized to frame 
migration control as a national security objective, thus stressing the 
commitment of governments to protect their citizens’ safety from 
foreigners often suspected of exploiting the Geneva Convention to 
obtain residence abroad.
848
 Diplomatic assurances have thus been 
applied to refugees who are considered a threat to the security of the 
host country and removed under Article 33(2) of the Geneva 
Convention, according to which the benefits of non-refoulement: 
 
May not […] be claimed by a refugee for whom there are reasonable grounds for 
regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having 
been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a 
danger to the community of that country. 
 
Another category of individuals subject to deportation with 
assurances includes those individuals who are suspected of being 
involved in terrorist activities and ab initio excluded from the 
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protection of the Geneva Convention under Article 1(f).
849
 Failing to 
qualify for refugee status, but sheltered from removal under 
international human rights law due to the risk of undergoing inhuman 
treatment in their country of origin,
850
 they end up to be trapped in a 
legal and ‘status’ limbo. Diplomatic assurances have, thus, been used 
to facilitate their transfer to third countries in a legally sustainable 
fashion. 
This leads to an urgency to accommodate diplomatic assurances 
within the broader plastic body of a thesis aimed at painting as 
complete a picture as possible of the diverse typologies of written 
bilateral agreements linked to the readmission of undocumented 
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migrants. In particular, the goal of this Chapter is to investigate 
whether the implementation of diplomatic assurances – whether 
negotiated independently or in the framework of a MoU - may hamper 
refugees’ access to protection: the combination of non-refoulement, 
and the individual’s right to access asylum procedures and effective 
remedies before removal.  
In a climate in which migrants are perceived as external threats to 
national stability, the real danger is that States unduly emphasize 
uncertain and flexible national security interests to the detriment of 
the protection of individuals’ fundamental rights.851 The risks are even 
higher for refugees and asylum seekers. For example, adopting a 
migration law rather than a criminal law regime, an asylum seeker 
may be excluded from protection when there are ‘serious reasons for 
considering’ her as a terrorist.852 Contrarily, in criminal proceedings, 
the burden of proof is much higher than that required by the Geneva 
Convention, as a final conviction for terrorism can be obtained only 
when the burden of proof is ‘beyond any reasonable doubt.’853 
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Additionally, beside evidentiary issues, criminal proceedings 
traditionally offer more substantive and procedural guarantees, since 
they deal with a limitation of individuals’ fundamental rights.854 
MoUs, as adopted in the UK, are flexible instruments to deal with 
such security sensitive deportations. Indeed, since only a ‘reasonable 
belief’ is sufficient,855 the threshold for removal required in migration 
proceedings is undoubtedly lower. 
Although diplomatic assurances have mainly been used in the field 
of extradition, their potential application is broader.
856
 They may be 
utilized also in the context of deportation/expulsion and 
‘extraordinary rendition’ to undergo interrogation elsewhere.857 
                                                                                                                                                   
Fight against its Financing 14(2) European Journal of International Law; UD 
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 See, e.g., Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/23/section/3/enacted> accessed 3 April 
2013. 
856Pursuant to Article 1 of the European Convention on Extradition, ‘The 
Contracting Parties undertake to surrender to each other, subject to the provisions 
and conditions laid down in this Convention, all persons against whom the 
competent authorities of the requesting Party are proceeding for an offence or who 
are wanted by the said authorities for the carrying out of a sentence or detention 
order.’ Often regulated through bilateral agreements, extradition can also be defined 
as ‘the surrender by one nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of 
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other, which being competent to try and to punish him, demands the surrender.’ See, 
Terlindem v Adams, 184 US 270 (1902) 289. 
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Expulsion concerns an ‘administrative or judicial act, which terminates the 
legality of a previous lawful residence.’ See, COM(2002) 175 final, Annex I 
‘Proposed Definitions’ <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2002/com2002_0175en01.pdf> accessed 22 
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Unlike extradition, which requires formal acts of two States, 
expulsion or deportation occur on the basis of unilateral decisions of 
the sending State, in principle consistently with international human 
rights and refugee law.
858
 However, as Jones posits, in many cases, 
‘asylum, immigration, and extradition removal proceedings 
overlap.’859 For example, in a number of cases, persons whose 
extradition is requested by the country of origin are asylum seekers or 
individuals excluded from refugee status on grounds of terrorism. In 
these circumstances, the existence of diplomatic assurances is seen as 
part of the factual evidence in determining the non-refoulement test.
860
 
It is to be clarified that the type of removal of primary interest in this 
Chapter is removal through immigration proceedings employed to 
remove unwanted and undocumented aliens.  
The use of bilateral diplomatic assurances raises numerous and 
diverse issues ranging from their legal status to their relationship with 
international human rights obligations and their reliability in 
                                                                                                                                                   
<http://emn.intrasoft-intl.com/Glossary/viewTerm.do?startingWith=D&id=66> 
accessed 22 June 2013. According to the ECtHR, the term ‘extraordinary rendition’ 
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another, for the purposes of detention and interrogation outside the normal legal 
system, where there was a real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.’ See, El-Masri v Former Republic of Macedonia App no 39630/69 
(ECtHR, 13 December 2012) (El-Masri) para 221. 
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eliminating the risk of ill-treatment upon return. However, by 
conceptualizing diplomatic assurances as falling within the broader 
category of agreements linked to the readmission of 
unwanted/unauthorized migrants from EU Member States to countries 
of origin or transit,
861
 this Chapter’s focus is to investigate whether 
their implementation can undermine core refugee rights. 
A number of Western countries, in primis the United States, 
Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Austria, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, the Netherlands, and Russia have resorted to diplomatic 
assurances to transfer alleged terrorists to unsafe countries to undergo 
interrogations and trials.
862
 For the purpose of this Chapter, a 
receiving country is considered ‘unsafe’ when it does not offer 
adequate guarantees that the deportee - often a suspected terrorist or a 
person deemed inconducive to the public good - will be treated in 
accordance with the conditions set by the sending State, in particular 
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with regard to the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment and the right to a fair trial — as enshrined 
within the international human rights treaties ratified by the sending 
State.  
The UK is the only EU Member State that has formalized bilateral 
diplomatic assurances for security-related deportations in the form of 
written MoUs. These instruments include general clauses concerning 
the lawful treatment of deportees. At the same time, they also ‘[allow] 
the government to seek more specific personal assurances depending 
on individual circumstances.’863 
 
6.1.1. Structure of the chapter 
Section 6.2 introduces the Abu Qatada saga as a key case study, 
which epitomizes the endeavour of the UK to legitimize the removal 
of suspected terrorists to undergo interrogations and trials abroad.
864
 
Abu Qatada is, indeed, the first person to challenge, before the 
ECtHR, a deportation order to Jordan issued on the basis of a MoU 
enumerating a series of guarantees for the fair and human treatment of 
the deportee. The content of the MoUs signed by the UK with 
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 Ninth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee (House of Commons), 9 July 
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tm> accessed  15 June 2013 (Ninth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee). 
864
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examined more thoroughly hereunder. 
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Ethiopia, Jordan, Lebanon, and Libya - taken as illustrative examples 
and units of analysis - is therefore examined.
865
 
Section 6.3 engages in a doctrinal debate on the legal status of 
diplomatic assurances under international law. It first explores 
whether diplomatic assurances are considered treaties, political 
agreements, or something in between. Section 6.3.5 investigates if and 
when diplomatic assurances - regardless of their legal status - can be 
deemed reliable instruments to eliminate the risk of torture and 
inhuman treatment. This entails an assessment of whether: first, the 
State giving the assurance can be expected to comply with the 
agreement; and second, how reliability can be strengthened.
866
 A 
review is then conducted of the criteria under which diplomatic 
assurances might be considered sufficiently reliable tools in the 
implementation of a safe transfer to a third country. These criteria, 
however, are not exhaustive, and constitute only a preliminary 
discussion to any broader analysis on reliability. Section 6.3.6 sheds 
light on the nascent trend toward a ‘repoliticization of human 
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rights’867 and questions the utility and appropriateness of a binary 
system of human rights protection, which devolves upon the sphere of 
politics what States have already reserved to the sphere of law. 
Section 6.4 is the core of this Chapter. It asks if the implementation 
of diplomatic assurances – whether negotiated either independently or 
in the framework of MoUs - can undermine refugees’ access to 
protection.  It does so through the lens of international refugee and 
human rights law. It is here worth recalling that this thesis describes 
the wording ‘access to protection’ as the combination of non-
refoulement as well as access to asylum procedures and effective 
remedies. As there is a dearth of jurisprudence of international human 
rights bodies involving the enforcement of MoUs, cases on the use of 
single diplomatic assurances under migration law proceedings are the 
focus of analysis. However, examples are also drawn from the 
numerous cases of diplomatic assurances exchanged in the framework 
of extradition.  
It is clear that an extensive review of the legal issues relevant to the 
links between exclusion (mainly on grounds of terrorism) and refugee 
rights is worthy of a book of its own. However, the present focus is 
only on one of the strategies States are developing to combat the 
terrorist threat by removing suspected people back to their countries 
of origin. Indeed, this Chapter nourishes itself within the broader body 
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of a thesis tackling diverse categories of agreements linked to 
readmission. Whilst diplomatic assurances are generally negotiated to 
facilitate the transfer of individuals considered a threat to the public 
safety of the host country, they have also been used to remove asylum 
seekers whose claims had been rejected or who had been excluded 
from refugee status on national security grounds. However, as Section 
6.5 illustrates, States have relied upon diplomatic assurances also to 
return asylum seekers whose claims had not been assessed yet. This 
Chapter captures this anomaly in the system and critically discusses it 
in view of highlighting the potential risks stemming from the 
extension of the use of diplomatic assurances to people whose asylum 
applications have not been examined in their merits before removal.   
Finally, Section 6.6 summarizes the main findings and engages in a 
general critique of diplomatic assurances after an assessment of law 
(the content of the bilateral agreements at issue) and practice (the 
actual implementation of the agreements). It finds that the decision to 
return a person to an unsafe country, deny her access to effective 
remedies, refuse her asylum, or exclude her from refugee status and 
subsidiary protection are not taken on the basis of diplomatic 
assurances – whether formalized in MoUs or not. Nevertheless, their 
negotiation in individualized circumstances can influence, to a certain 
extent, these decisions, thereby hampering refugees’ access to 
protection.  
 411 
 
Part I 
6.2. Deportation at all costs? The case of the UK and 
diplomatic assurances  
After 10 years of repeated failed attempts by UK governments to 
deport Mr. Omar Othman (Abu Qatada) to Jordan, on 17 January 
2012, the ECtHR determined that the removal of the applicant to his 
country of origin would constitute a violation of his right to a fair trial 
under Article 6 of the Convention.
868
 Abu Qatada is a radical Muslim 
cleric who was recognized as refugee in 1994, and then stripped of 
such status under Article 1(f)(c) of the Geneva Convention because 
‘reasonable grounds’ existed for regarding him as a danger to the 
security of the UK. The ECtHR was thus asked, for the first time, to 
appraise the reliability of diplomatic assurances, negotiated under a 
standardized MoU, in the assessment of the risk for the applicant upon 
removal to Jordan. 
In its November 2012 decision, the British Special Immigration 
Appeal Commission (SIAC) was ultimately not satisfied that there 
was no risk that the impugned statements extracted with torture could 
still be admitted probatively against the appellant in Jordan. This 
provoked the furious and resentful reaction of both the British 
Government and the press, which principally attacked the fact that 
Abu Qatada’s deportation - despite the renewed efforts to obtain 
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further guarantees after the decision of the ECtHR - once again failed 
the test of unfairness, ‘a question of fact which ordinarily would not 
be amenable to appeal.’869 Finally, on 27 March 2013, the British 
Court of Appeal rejected the Home Secretary’s latest legal attempt to 
overturn SIAC’s decision to block Abu Qatada’s deportation to 
Jordan.
870
 
The hysteria provoked by the judgments of the Strasbourg Court, 
SIAC, and the Court of Appeal has to be read in light of the attempts 
of British governments to combat terrorism at all costs, even 
cooperating on deportation with countries that notoriously violate 
human rights. What is certain is that this judgment has spawned such 
an intense debate among legal scholars, human rights practitioners, 
State officials, and civil society that it is unlikely to wane anytime 
soon. What is, for example, the legal value of diplomatic assurances? 
Would diplomatic assurances eradicate the risk of refoulement to 
torture and ill-treatment? Would friendly bilateral relations be 
sufficient elements for a national or international court to consider 
assurances on fundamental rights reliable? What is the impact that the 
ECtHR’s ruling might have on the future use of diplomatic assurances 
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870
Othman (Abu Qatada) v SSHD [2013] EWCA Civ 277, 27 March 2013 (Abu 
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to remove people deemed inconducive to the public good on national 
security grounds? 
The UK government has been labelled as ‘the most influential and 
aggressive promoter in Europe of the use of diplomatic assurances’ to 
forcibly repatriate people considered threats to national security to 
countries where they would suffer human rights violations, including 
inhuman treatment and torture.
871
 Describing how the UK has acted 
with respect to issues of immigration and terrorism before and after 
9/11 is not in the ambit of this Chapter. However, few words need to 
be spent in order to illustrate why the UK has been chosen as item of 
study for this thesis.  
The securitization of migration policy predates September 11, 
2001, and originates in the long history of terrorism in the UK, 
especially against the Irish Republic Army. Perceiving the creation of 
a European geographic area without border controls as a threat to 
security, the UK refused to join the Schengen Border Code.
872
 At the 
same time, it agreed to have access to the Schengen Information 
System (SIS) and the EU database collecting information and 
fingerprints of asylum seekers.  
                                                 
871
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872
 Elspeth Guild, ‘International Terrorism and EU Immigration, Asylum and 
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Foreign Affairs Review  341. 
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With the enactment of the Immigration Act in 1971, immigration 
officials were granted the power to detain migrants, while the Home 
Secretary was entrusted with the deportation of non-nationals 
considered a threat to the public good.
873
 Moreover, the Home Office, 
and not the judiciary, became responsible for determining, after an 
assessment of individual motivations, whether a migrant was entitled 
to stay in the territory.  
The process of securitization of migration was accelerated after 
September 11 when the Parliament passed the Anti-Terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA), an emergency legislation which 
frames terrorism as a pure migration issue - rather than a criminal law 
issue - since it applies only to foreigners suspected of being involved 
in terrorist activities. Moreover, an expulsion decision can only be 
challenged before SIAC, created in 1997 to review decisions taken by 
the Home Office on suspected terrorists. SIAC has thus been placed in 
a position of assessing the reliability of diplomatic assurances, which, 
on its instruction, must be made public in the proceedings.
874
 The 
cases dismissed by SIAC may then be appealed on points of law to the 
Appeal Court and ultimately to the House of Lords.  
                                                 
873
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874
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15 June 2013. 
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Terrorist crimes are generally very hard to prove, and evidence 
dealing with matters of public security contains classified information. 
The use of such evidence in criminal proceedings would necessarily 
imply their disclosure to the public, which is something States have 
difficulty doing.. In this regard, what has raised more concerns, from a 
human rights law perspective, is that the evidence used by SIAC and 
the Appeal Court is based on secret material that cannot be challenged 
and that is too sensitive to be considered in full by an open court for 
such national security reasons.
875
 Thus, migrants suspected of 
terrorism - who are excluded by the scope of Article 1(f) of the 
Geneva Convention, but who cannot be removed, under international 
human rights law, because of the peril of refoulement - risk being 
detained for indefinite periods of time without any formal charge, as 
the security-sensitive evidence incriminating them cannot be 
disclosed.
876
 Since lesser measures, such as surveillance and control 
orders do not remove the threat of terrorism, the UK, flanked by many 
other governments, casts deportation as the only solution. 
In December 2004, the House of Lords held indefinite detention of 
foreign national terrorist suspects under Part 4 of the ATCSA 2001 to 
                                                 
875
 Rebekah Braswell, ‘Protection against Torture in Western Security Frameworks: 
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876
 See, ATCSA, Part 4, Section 23. 
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be incompatible with the ECHR.
877
 This decision forced the UK to 
increasingly rely on diplomatic assurances in order to allow British 
courts to authorize smooth deportation of unwanted foreigners in 
compliance with international human rights standards. MoUs were 
perceived as the suitable instrument to create a stable and 
standardized formal basis for deportation. It was thus presumed that, 
by obtaining international legitimacy, the UK’s deportation with 
assurances policy would have been less exposed to the attacks of 
human rights circles, which have always been reproachful of any 
stratagem designed to displace the risk abroad through cooperation 
with third countries. 
Even if international human rights law does not prohibit per se 
deportation on national security grounds, the UK Privy Council 
Review Committee in 2004 held that 
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Y v SSHD [2006] UKSIAC 36/2004_2, para 222. See also, A and Others v UK 
where the ECtHR found a violation of Article 5(1) of the Convention in respect of 
nine of the eleven applicants who were detained as suspect international terrorists 
and whose presence at liberty in the UK gave rise to a threat to national security 
(para 171). It also held that ‘one of the principal assumptions underlying the 
derogation notice, the 2001 Act and the decision to detain the applicants had been 
that they could not be removed or deported “for the time being”’ (para 167). 
Therefore, as none of the nine applicants were persons ‘against whom action [was] 
being taken with a view to deportation or extradition’, their detention did not fall 
within the exception to the right to liberty set out in paragraph 5(1)(f) of the 
Convention (para 170). The Court also added that it ‘does not accept the 
Government's argument that Article 5(1) permits a balance to be struck between the 
individual's right to liberty and the State's interest in protecting its population from 
terrorist threat. This argument is inconsistent not only with the Court's jurisprudence 
under sub-paragraph (f) but also with the principle that paragraphs (a) to (f) amount 
to an exhaustive list of exceptions and that only a narrow interpretation of these 
exceptions is compatible with the aims of Article 5’ (para 171). See, A and Others v 
UK App no 3455/05 (ECtHR, 19 February 2009). 
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Seeking to deport terrorist suspects does not seem to us to be a satisfactory 
response, given the risk of exporting terrorism. If people in the UK are contributing 
to the terrorist effort here or abroad, they should be dealt with here. While deporting 
such people might free up British Police, intelligence, security and prison service 
resources, it would not necessarily reduce the threat to British interests abroad, or 
make the world a safer place more generally. Indeed, there is a risk that the suspects 
might even return without the authorities being aware of it.
878
 
 
Placing these bilateral accords within international human rights 
legal framework, this Chapter will explore whether deportation 
policies aimed at preserving national security have been or could be 
executed at the expense of the rights of asylum seekers whose refugee 
status has either been rejected, excluded from protection on national 
security grounds, or removed before examination of asylum claims.  
 
6.2.1 Outlining the content of UK’s MoUs 
The UK has provided quite a unique answer to the security 
dilemma by formalizing diplomatic assurances for deported 
individuals. It is for that reason that the MoUs agreed so far with 
Ethiopia, Jordan, Lebanon, and Libya deserve particular attention 
within the three-dimensional systematization of bilateral agreements 
linked to readmission. Despite the content of the UK’s MoUs slightly 
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varies from case to case, a cluster of common traits can be identified. 
Whilst sometimes they reiterate international human rights 
commitments, other times they are more detailed by providing for 
specific post-return monitoring through prompt and regular visits 
from the representative of an independent body, who will conduct 
private interviews with the returned person.
879
 Agreements concerning 
further details on the monitoring have also been added to the MoUs.  
Although MoUs contain diverse typologies of assurances, States 
still have ample discretion in their implementation and acceptance. 
The arrangements will apply to citizens of the requested country
880
 - 
or in the case of Libya and Lebanon also to stateless persons and any 
third country nationals the receiving State is prepared to admit
881
 - 
following a written request made under the terms of the agreement. 
Thus, despite lacking an obligation to pursue the assurances, it will be 
for the receiving State to decide whether to give further assurances, if 
appropriate in an individual case, as a response to the requests made, 
under the Memorandum, by the sending country.
882
 This means that it 
is possible to shift from MoUs to individualized assurances to push 
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the protection of the person in question to a higher level of 
commitment. 
Moreover, MoUs provide for a retrial for those convicted in 
absentia. It is also to be noted that only the agreement with Libya 
explicitly contains an assurance that the death penalty will not be 
carried out ‘if its laws allow’, and requires Libyan authorities to use 
‘all the powers available to them’ […] to ensure that, if the death 
penalty is imposed, it would not be executed.
883
 
With regard to Jordan, on 10 August 2005, the UK Chargé 
d’Affaires in Amman and the Jordanian Ministry of the Interior 
signed a side letter on death penalty, due to the fact that, ‘for 
constitutional reasons’, Jordan was unable to make a formal 
declaration in the MOU itself. The side letter recorded that, if 
someone returned under the agreement was sentenced to death, ‘the 
British Government would consider asking the Jordanian Government 
to commute the sentence’884 and the Jordanian Government would 
commit itself not to impose the death penalty.
885
 
 Another point to notice in the description of the content of MoUs 
is that they do not use the terms ‘torture’ or ‘inhuman and degrading 
treatment’ explicitly.886 Rather, deported persons are entitled to 
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 UK-Libya MoU, Assurances, para 2.  
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 See, Abu Qatada v SSHD, [2007] UKSIAC 15/2005, para 352. 
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 See, Abu Qatada v UK, para 23. 
886
 Justice, ‘Home Office Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers’, 
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‘adequate accommodation, nourishment, and medical treatment, and 
[to] be treated in a humane and proper manner, in accordance with 
internationally accepted standards.’887 Additional safeguards include 
that the deportee: will be entitled to promptly consult a lawyer; will be 
informed of the reasons of the arrest and of any charge against her; 
and will receive regular visits from a representative of the monitoring 
body. The individual must be brought without undue delay before a 
civilian judge for the determination of the lawfulness of her detention 
and will receive a fair and public hearing before an independent and 
impartial civilian court. She will be allowed adequate time and 
facilities to prepare her defence, and to call and examine witnesses. 
The deportee will be allowed to defend herself in person or through 
legal assistance, and to freely observe her religion.. Every judgment 
will be then pronounced publicly. However, in specified 
circumstances, the press and public may be excluded.
888
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Part II 
6.3. Legal status of diplomatic assurances: an open-ended 
doctrinal debate 
The main purpose of diplomatic assurances is to provide 
guarantees against torture and ill-treatment. Scholarship and human 
rights circles have so far mostly associated the insufficiency of 
diplomatic assurances in removing the risk of human rights violations 
for the deportee with their alleged non-legally binding character. 
However, by engaging in the scholarly debate on the status of 
diplomatic assurances under international law, Part II of this Chapter 
concludes that the ‘binding or not binding’ question is not, de facto, 
the determining factor in grasping the impact these bilateral 
agreements (both in the form of MoUs and individualized assurances) 
have on refugee rights. 
At times, assurances are embodied within documents called 
‘MoUs’, which can be either treaties or soft-law instruments. 
However, this classification does not depend on their registration with 
the UN Secretariat as a treaty under Article 102 of the UN Charter.
889
 
Whilst failure of registration does not affect the legal status of an 
agreement, it may hamper the possibility to use it before a dispute 
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settlement body.
890
 It has been argued that the title of a bilateral 
agreement as a Memorandum is not indicative of its legal status. 
Rather it is only one indicator to construct - together with the 
language of the agreement, its object and purpose, and the preparatory 
works - the intention of the parties.
891
 
Despite the enduring debate on the normative status of diplomatic 
assurances, no clear and uniform answer has been elaborated.
892
 
Taking a definitive stance on the legal value of diplomatic assurances 
is not in the remit of this thesis. However, the main arguments on 
either side are herein illustrated with the purpose of scrutinizing 
whether their normative quality plays any role in refugees’ access to 
protection and in the human treatment of the deportee. 
 
6.3.1. Diplomatic assurances as treaties? 
Under Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT), treaties may be defined as: 
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International agreement[s] concluded between States in written form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or 
more related instruments and whatever its particular designation. 
 
As legally binding instruments - where the parties communicate to 
each other the promise of certain behaviour - they are enforceable 
through the legal system adopting them. States and individuals can, 
therefore, lodge complaints concerning transgression of the agreement 
itself. Contrarily, if diplomatic assurances are conceived as non-
treaties, the sending State may not rely on the UN dispute settlement 
in case of breach of the agreement.  
An increasing number of governments resort to diplomatic 
assurances not to torture and to the fair treatment of the deportees as a 
pre-condition to the removal of unwanted foreigners. This raises two 
interrelated questions: first, whether diplomatic assurances are mere 
political commitments to act toward certain agreed ends, without any 
legally binding effect; second, whether such a reliance on bilateral 
assurances can defy the protection of fundamental rights, in primis the 
prohibition of torture, as enshrined within international human rights 
treaties. 
The first issue will be object of closer examination. With regard to 
the second point, it is here sufficient to argue - as we also do in 
Chapter 5 - that changes to multilateral refugee and human rights law 
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instruments cannot be caused by a new treaty binding only few States 
within the international community. Indeed, pursuant to Article 34 of 
the VCLT, ‘a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a 
third State without its consent.’ Therefore, the erga omnes obligations 
found in all international refugee and human rights instruments - for 
example the obligation not to ‘expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a 
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture’893 – 
that are applicable to States, remain unaltered after the exchange of 
bilateral diplomatic assurances on security related deportation (either 
in the form of MoUs or not, regardless of their legal status). Under 
Article 41 of the VCLT: 
 
 Two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude an agreement 
to modify the treaty as between themselves alone if the [modification in question] is 
not prohibited by the treaty and does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of 
their rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations. 
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The VCLT recognizes that various international agreements exist 
that do not fall into the scope of the Convention.
894
 Yet, it does not 
make any explicit reference to the status of diplomatic assurances 
under international law. Therefore, the scholarly debate is still open 
with regard to the legally binding nature of such arrangements.
895
 
Klabbers believes that the very idea that some agreements are not 
binding is in essentially impracticable, as it does not explain what 
other purpose an international agreement can have.
896
 Thus, even if 
the intention of the involved States is solely to create commitments, 
‘gentlemen agreements’897 aim to produce a normative effect 
intending to influence future behaviour. However, Klabbers criticizes 
that, according to some scholars, the parties to a gentleman agreement 
desire ‘to become bound in a normative order other than law, the 
orders most often mentioned being “politics” and “morality”.’898 
Similarly, Noll perceives as ‘quite meaningless’ the existence of non-
binding agreements that do not play any role in altering the risk 
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assessment undertaken by the sending State.
899
 The cardinal factor is 
whether the risk of torture and ill-treatment is in fact eliminated by the 
mutual understanding of the parties with regard to the removed 
individual. 
Some suggest that when diplomatic assurances contain an 
undertaking intended to create new legal obligations beyond mere 
restatements of pre-existing obligations of international law (for 
example, the establishment of a monitoring mechanism), a new 
agreement has been reached.
900
 And it is this new undertaking that 
might constitute a fact in overcoming a risk of ill-treatment.
901
 
In criticizing the Austian distinction between the legally and non-
legally binding nature of international agreements, Klabbers observes 
that ‘in the former case, [States] become intentionally legally bound; 
in the latter, they become so bound without having intended as much, 
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by virtue of good faith, estoppel, or reliance. But if that is the case, 
what can be said to justify the distinction?’902 
 
6.3.2. Diplomatic assurances as binding unilateral statements? 
Diplomatic assurances can also be conceived of as legal 
obligations insofar as binding unilateral statements.
903
 As formulated 
by the ICJ in the Nuclear Test case: 
 
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning 
legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. 
Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific […]. An undertaking 
of this kind, if given publicly, and with intent to be bound, even though not made 
within the context of international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, 
nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo or any subsequent acceptance of the 
declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the 
declaration to take effect […].
904
 
 
According to the ICJ, the intention of the parties to be bound must 
be obtained by interpretation of the act. Likewise, the ECtHR has 
acknowledged that every time a State entertains diplomatic 
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communication by taking a commitment in good faith and limiting its 
freedom of action, it expresses an intention to follow the statement 
and to be bound.
905
 Only after the intent to be bound is uttered, then 
the obligation becomes legal: 
 
When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should become 
bound according to its terms, the intention confers on the declaration the character 
of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a 
course of conduct consistent with the declaration.
906
 
 
In the Einhorn v France case, the ECtHR defined diplomatic 
assurances as treaties despite conceding that they could alternatively 
amount to binding unilateral statements: 
 
The diplomatic notes could also be regarded in public international law as a 
unilateral international undertaking requiring the United States to fulfil the 
obligations it had entered into, failing which its international responsibility would be 
engaged […].
907
 
 
I would add, however, that in the Einhorn case, extradition was 
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sought by the US, which, consequently, had all the interest in 
complying with the given assurances. What is different is a case of 
expulsion and removal ordered for the purpose of returning an asylum 
seeker whose refugee status has still to be determined, or whose status 
has already been refused or revoked. The receiving State simply 
replies to a request by the sending country without having any 
primary interest in readmitting the individual at issue and gives, to 
this end, specific assurances that she will be treating fairly. 
 
6.3.3. Diplomatic assurances as non-legally binding agreements? 
The legal status of diplomatic assurances hardly concedes a 
conclusive response. What cannot be neglected is that States 
intentionally commit themselves at different levels. The presumption 
of a lack of legal bounds constitutes, at times, the main reason for 
States to enter into more informal accords generally negotiated and 
signed by diplomats without parliamentary scrutiny and 
implementation in national legislation. The elements explaining the 
gradual proliferation of informal patterns of cooperation on 
readmission are invisibility and confidentiality, higher flexibility in 
changing circumstances thanks to the ease in amending their text, 
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adaptability to short-term security concerns, and limited costs of 
defection as disputes can be resolved during negotiations.
908
 
Although the doctrine continues to be divided, one of the views is 
that diplomatic assurances are international commitments - political 
promises meant to be kept - but not necessarily legally binding.
909
 
Indeed, it is absolutely possible that non-legally binding instruments 
may nonetheless bring about legal consequences.
910
 In this view, 
whilst a diplomatic assurance is not legally binding, it may evoke 
legal consequences as a matter of fairness and estoppel. It means that 
although the leverage added by the assurance is mainly political, if an 
agreement is made in good faith, States are estopped from defecting 
from their original commitment.
911
 However, if, by virtue of the 
doctrine of estoppel, a State should abstain from acting to the 
detriment of an agreement that has been concluded in good faith, it is 
also true that the pacta sunt servanda rule applies only to treaties. 
Indeed, Article 2(1)(a) of the VCLT only applies to international 
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agreements ‘governed by international law’, which thus excludes 
instruments that do not intend to create mutually binding obligations. 
 
6.3.4. What is the legal value of the UK’s MoUs? 
Shifting attention to the formalized assurances taken as units of 
analysis of this thesis, the Vienna Convention Official Record reports 
that the UK delegation considered that Memoranda were not 
international agreements subject to the law of treaties because the 
parties had not intended to create legal rights and obligations, or a 
legal relationship, between themselves.’912 The heated debate that 
animated the delegates to the Vienna Conference on the introduction 
of the ‘intent’ element as part of the treaty definition ended with the 
exclusion of intent from the VCLT. However, two points can be 
noted. First, titling an agreement as a MoU does not automatically 
exclude it from the sphere of treaties. Second, some authors suggest 
that the kind of intent to take into consideration when assessing the 
normative status of an agreement would be the ‘objective intent’, 
consensus ad idem, as stated in the text of the accord. Such an 
‘objective intent’ differs from the ‘subjective intent’ of the parties, 
which is an aspect of the ‘agreement’ element with the designation 
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traced by Article 2(1) and extremely difficult to prove.
913
 Whilst a 
State is free to decide if it wishes to enter into a treaty or not, it cannot 
use sovereignty as an excuse once it has objectively concluded an 
agreement.
914
 Indeed, ‘if a State concludes an agreement that is 
expressly legally binding, then the State could never succeed in 
arguing that it did not intend for that result. The document speaks for 
itself.’915 
In Worster’s words, an international accord could be, in its 
substance, either a treaty or not, regardless of its title as a MoU.
916
 As 
States are entitled to exercise or not exercise their treaty-making 
power, if they decide to enter into binding agreements, they generally 
do so through clear and explicit language. Although a thorough 
discussion on the legal status of diplomatic assurances (and, in casu, 
the UK’s MoUs) is beyond the scope of this Chapter, it is to be noted 
that, according to some, the diplomatic assurances negotiated under 
the MoUs in question are considered legally binding, while for others 
they are not. 
On the one hand, Worster believes that phrasings such as ‘[the 
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 For a detailed discussion on the intent element, see, Worster 2012, 273-5. See 
also, Kelvin Widdow, ‘What is an Agreement in International Law?’ (1979) BYIL 
117, 121. 
914
 Worster 2012, 301. 
915
 ibid 304. 
916
 ibid.  
 433 
 
deportee] will be brought promptly before a judge’,917 ‘will be 
informed promptly of any charge against him’,918 ‘will receive a fair 
and public hearing’919 cannot be interpreted as mere political 
arrangements, but rather as assertions of State obligations under 
international law with application in the single case of removal.
920
 For 
example, the MoU between the UK and Jordan states that ‘it is 
understood that the authorities of the UK and Jordan will comply with 
their human rights obligations under international law regarding a 
person returned under this arrangement.’921 Similarly, under the 
MoUs with Libya and Lebanon, the two parties ‘will comply with 
their human rights obligations.’922 According to Worster, these 
agreements use mandatory language by referring to assurances as 
‘conditions’923 or stating that they ‘will apply to such a person 
[…].’924 In his view, the monitoring mechanisms created under the 
MoUs with Lebanon, Libya, and Ethiopia create an additional 
obligation - therefore a new agreement - to those already binding 
those States under international human rights law.
925
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On the other hand, the British government has clearly affirmed that 
MoUs are used as a means for the State - in the exercise of its free 
treaty-making power - to preserve a high degree of autonomy under a 
non-legally binding bilateral arrangement. Although the intention of 
the British government is a particularly important element, its 
statements are only an indicator of the normative quality of the 
assurances. Indeed, attention should be paid also to the language of 
the agreements. And in this regard, someone could argue that the text 
of the MoUs signed by the UK with Ethiopia, Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Libya - through the use of terms, such as ‘will’, ‘arrangement’, or 
‘understanding’ - confirms the willingness of the parties not to be 
legally bound. This terminology, beyond the explicit statements of the 
State, would denote the lack of a clear recognition of the intention of 
States to enter into a legally binding agreement and to be held 
accountable for any breach of the accord.  
States have generally embraced the ICJ finding in the Qatar v 
Bahrain case that terminology cannot alone be sufficient to determine 
the normative status of an agreement as a treaty or not.
926
 However, 
the fact that the parties explicitly relied on a diplomatic terminology 
that expresses the intention not to be legally bound cannot be 
neglected. In rejoining to the most common criticism to diplomatic 
assurances used in national security deportation cases, the British 
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government with all necessary clarity declared that ‘while the MoUs 
reflect the express political commitment of the States concerned, they 
are not legally binding.’927 More specifically, in the landmark Abu 
Qatada case, the ECtHR held that it may well be that the MoU with 
Jordan is not legally binding.
928
 Nevertheless, it stressed that 
‘whatever the status of the MoU in Jordanian law, the assurances have 
been given by officials who are capable of binding the Jordanian 
State.’929 
Despite the new cluster of diplomatic assurances, SIAC and the 
Court of Appeal continued to hold that Abu Qatada would face ‘a 
flagrant denial of justice’ if he were sent back to face terror charges 
based on evidence obtained by torture.
930
 Whilst Abu Qatada has 
always challenged the reliability of diplomatic assurances negotiated 
under the MoU, he was prepared to leave the UK for Jordan once the 
two countries ‘enshrined in law’ their bilateral agreement through the 
ratification of a fair trial treaty.
931
 Therefore, to overcome the 
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objections of the British Courts, the Home Secretary decided to 
conclude a new ‘mutual legal assistance agreement’, which entered 
into force in June 2013. This Treaty comprises a number of fair trial 
guarantees for deportees and a stringent ban on the use of torture-
obtained evidence. It places the onus on the prosecution to prove 
beyond any doubt that the statement has been obtained out of free will 
and choice and has not been acquired through torture or ill-
treatment.
932
  The SIAC Judge, Mr. Justice Irwin said ratification of 
the mutual legal assistance agreement by Jordan was not enough. 
Only its entry into force would have let the treaty override any of the 
rulings by the Jordanian courts.
933
 Thus, on 7 July 2013, Abu Qatada 
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finally agreed to return to Jordan following a formal approval of the 
Treaty by Jordan's King Abdullah. 
In light of the foregoing, the doctrine continues to be divided. 
Whilst for some, the UK’s MoUs with Ethiopia, Lebanon, Libya, and 
Jordan are legally-binding, others believe that they cannot 
automatically be regarded as treaties on the ground of being 
instruments embodying an agreement.
934
 Nevertheless, this Chapter 
only aims to map out all these different positions to show how the 
question on the legal value of diplomatic assurances remains unsettled 
as scholarship is unable to agree on a uniform answer. Despite the fact 
that the UK’s MoUs refer to the duty of States to comply with human 
rights under international law, there is room to question why States 
need to duplicate their human rights commitments within the frame of 
a diplomatic accord, which does not contain all those mechanisms of 
enforcement and monitoring provided by international human rights 
treaties—especially with regard to bodies for individual complaints.  
 
6.3.5. Is ‘to bind or not to bind’ the right question? 
Despite the heated debate on the legal status of assurances, in 
practice States consider this appraisal an important, but not a decisive 
element in the assessment of the risk for the deportee. De facto, since 
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governments can keep faith also with their international political 
commitments to avoid undesirable consequences, such as disruption 
of their bilateral relations and (possibly) their international image, 
they argue that the risk of torture or inhuman treatment is not 
necessarily reduced or eliminated by means of a legally binding 
diplomatic assurance. It is to be stressed that any analysis of theories 
of international relations would be outside the scope of this thesis. 
However, it is worth noting that a neoliberal institutionalist such as 
Keohane, by considering the long-term reputational consequences of 
non-compliance, has observed that: 
 
For reasons of reputation, as well as fear of retaliation and concerns about the 
effects of precedents, egoistic governments may follow the rules and principles of 
international regimes even when myopic self-interest counsels them not to.
935
 
 
Legal scholarship remains highly divided on the normative quality 
of diplomatic assurances, and the different stances seem difficult to 
reconcile through a minimum common denominator. Likewise, the 
judiciary does not provide a uniform answer. Thus, I believe that, in 
determining the status of these highly disputed arrangements in 
international law, a case-by-case approach should be adopted by 
giving greater weight to the intention of the parties as inferred from 
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both the phrasing of the agreement, and the positions taken by the two 
governments during the negotiation process.  
That said, I also believe that the key question, for the purpose of 
assessing the impact of diplomatic assurances on refugee rights is not 
whether they are binding, but whether they are reliable,
936
 or, in other 
words, they are meant to be kept. If this is the case, even a political 
commitment might affect the assessment of the risk for the 
removed.
937
 In this respect, I believe that what counts most in the 
assessment of reliability is the human rights track record of the 
receiving country and its extraneousness to practice of torture and 
violent interrogation. 
 
6.3.5.1. Strengthening reliability: what incentives and threats? 
The question of whether an individual (for the purpose of this 
Chapter an asylum seeker, or a person either excluded from refugee 
status or whose status has been rejected or revoked) has a real and 
personalized risk of being subject to ill-treatment upon return requires 
a determination of whether or not assurances are reliable. This entails 
an assessment, from a State perspective, of whether: first, the 
government giving the assurance can be expected to comply with the 
                                                 
936
 It is here worth clarifying that the two concepts are not disconnected. As we will 
see below, a legally binding assurance can also add value to the reliability of 
assurances. 
937
 Skoglund 2008, 337. 
 440 
 
agreement; and second, how reliability may be strengthened. If the 
prospects of compliance are overly remote, any removal would be 
unlawful as the risk for the deportee cannot be eliminated.  
Nonetheless, international human rights treaties’ supervisory 
bodies have generally been more cautious in endorsing the reliability 
of assurances in the eradication of the risk for the deportee. The Agiza 
v Sweden case,
938
 for example, demonstrates how the Committee 
against Torture did not consider the discourse on trust compelling. 
Indeed, despite the fact that Sweden ensured Egypt’s compliance with 
the bilateral commitments by holding that ‘failure to honour the 
guarantees would impact strongly on other similar European cases in 
the future’,939 allegations of torture started to circulate quite soon after 
deportation.  
Governments generally assume that compliance depends less on 
the legal status of the agreement and more on the incentives the two 
involved States have to keep the promise. Although it is often 
maintained that a State flouting binding international human rights 
obligations cannot be trusted to respect a non-legally binding promise 
in a specific case, the same reasoning can be applied - in their view - 
also with regard to legally binding assurances. Since assurances have 
been supplied at the highest level of government, and lack of 
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compliance is likely to do serious damage to diplomatic relations and 
international reputation, the effects of infringement would be more 
detrimental than those deriving from flouting a multilateral obligation 
owed to several States at once. The more individualized assurances 
are, the more incentives a State has to comply with the exchanged 
guarantees. However, if negotiated during the asylum determination 
process, individualized assurances can undermine the principle of 
confidentiality, which is an essential requirement of fair asylum 
procedures.
940
 
It has been argued how ‘the de facto function of a diplomatic 
assurance is to elevate the circumstances of a single person to a case 
of “diplomatic significance” or “personal trust” between senior State 
officials.’941 By means of a bilateral agreement - more than through a 
multilateral arrangement where States seldom rely on State complaint 
mechanisms - the sending State should be more inclined to monitor 
whether the other party follows through on the accord.  
The representative of the British government in the Abu Qatada 
case dwells on how MoUs work in practice, and explains what a 
political commitment can add, beyond a legally binding human rights 
obligation, as follows: 
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States look not only to the legal status of international documents when deciding 
their behaviour but to the whole political context. […] This MoU, while imposing 
less than a legal obligation, was made with respect to one State only, with an 
exceptionally strong political commitment on the part of both governments. 
 
The same approach has been adopted at the level of the national 
judiciary also by SIAC: 
 
The answer here is precisely that [the assurance] is bilateral, and is the result of a 
longstanding and friendly relationship in which there are incentives on both sides to 
comply once the agreement was signed. The failure of those who regard these 
arrangements as unenforceable […] is a failure to see them in their specific political 
and diplomatic context, a context which will vary from country to country.
942
 
 
This approach seems to assume that, regardless of the informal 
format of Memoranda, the receiving country would be more 
committed to respecting standards mutually agreed on a bilateral level 
than at the multilateral level because of the ‘serious bilateral 
consequences if things went wrong.’943 Beside the immediate interest 
of a State in readmitting a national, a government might also decide to 
regulate, in agreement with another country, the treatment of a 
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deportee for the sake of enhancing its international standing. Indeed, 
the long-term costs for defecting States would include attracting 
negative publicity, worsening their reputation, and diminishing 
credibility as actors able to keep faith with their commitments.
944
 
 The decision to sign the agreement is detached from the actual 
compliance with the accord itself. Compliance may also depend on 
different political calculations concerning possible benefits or 
sanctions in other related areas, such as trade or development aid. In 
the major part of security-related deportations, the receiving State has 
a minor interest in negotiating an assurance, which is the outcome of a 
request made by the sending State in view of conferring legitimacy to 
the removal of a person deemed not conducive to the public good. As 
a consequence, the receiving State needs particular motivations to 
meet the demands of the sending State. The lack of incentives was 
probably the reason leading to the failure of diplomatic assurances 
between the British government and Egypt in 1999 concerning the 
deportation of Mr Youssef.
945
 
Generally speaking, assessing the reliability of diplomatic 
assurances is perhaps relatively easier when they are intended to 
prevent receiving States from sentencing to death a certain person.
946
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In these circumstances, the authorities of the sending State can 
seemingly better monitor whether the deportee is effectively 
channelled into a formal process that envisages capital punishment as 
the sanctioning solution. However, supervising compliance with 
assurances against torture or other inhuman and degrading treatment 
turns out to be very complicated, as it requires a constant vigilance by 
competent and independent personnel in relation to abuses committed 
by security forces in detention centres.
947
 
For instance, the British SIAC, although accepting that Libyan 
authorities had entered the MOU with the UK in good faith, did not 
find diplomatic assurances reliable in the specific case of two 
individuals ordered to be deported to Libya on security grounds. 
Given that Libyan authorities had in the past unexpectedly changed 
course, there was a real risk that their position could vary again after 
the delivery of the assurances.
948
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6.3.5.2. Monitoring mechanisms  
A viable manner to supervise whether diplomatic assurances are 
respected seems to be through the instalment of independent 
monitoring bodies. Taking again the UK as unit of analysis, it has 
identified local or national organizations to conduct post-return 
monitoring visits, such as the Ethiopian National Human Rights 
Commission, or the Adaleh Centre for Human Rights appointed by 
the Jordanian governments to monitor the treatments of individuals 
repatriated on the basis of the Memorandum agreed with the UK. The 
MoU with Ethiopia, signed on 12 December 2008, provides that each 
country will nominate an independent monitoring body, which will be 
in charge of overseeing the return, the detention, and trial of any 
deportee. The individual is entitled to contact the monitoring body 
within three years after her date of return, and to receive visits by a 
representative of the committee within 48 hours after the arrest, 
detention, or imprisonment.
949
 
The MoU with Libya provides that: 
 
 The deported person will have unimpeded access to the monitoring body unless 
they are arrested, detained or imprisoned. If the person is arrested, detained or 
imprisoned, he will be entitled to contact promptly a representative of the 
monitoring body and to meet a representative of the monitoring body within one 
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week of his arrest, detention or imprisonment. Thereafter he will be entitled to 
regular visits from a representative of the monitoring body in co-ordination with the 
competent legal authorities. Such visits will include the opportunity for private 
interviews with the person and, during any period before trial, will be permitted at 
least once every three weeks.
950
 
 
The monitoring body can also authorize medical examinations. 
Since the MoU does not specify who the members of the committee 
would be, the UK asked the Gaddafi International Foundation for 
Charity to take on these functions. But the fact that the son of the then 
Head of State, Colonel Gaddafi, was the leader of the organization 
inescapably questioned its independence from the government. It is 
hard to image, indeed, that torture would have been denounced, and, 
even if this were the case, that legal redress would have been provided 
to the victims of such treatment.
951
 
Similarly, in the Arar’s case - concerning a Canadian national 
suspected of terrorism and rendered by the US to Syria - the Canadian 
consul visiting the captive, once confronted with diverging 
information on the detention conditions, preferred to believe the Head 
of the Syrian Intelligence Service rather than Mr. Arar. As Canada 
had an interest in the outcome of Mr. Arar’s interrogation, he was not 
                                                 
950
 UK-Libya MoU, Application and Scope, Assurance 6. 
951
 An analysis of the Libyan monitoring framework is traced in the SIAC case A 
and DD v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKSIAC 
42/2005. 
 447 
 
considered a reliable source of information, thus demoting the 
protection owed to a national and his fundamental rights.
952
 Therefore, 
the Commission of Inquiry called to decide about Mr. Arar’s removal 
to Syria, found that the applicant was tortured despite assurances, and 
concluded that this finding is a concrete example that assurances from 
totalitarian regimes which practice torture in a systematic fashion, are 
of no value and cannot be accepted as reliable sources for a safe 
transfer.
953
 
Many other reasons can contribute to render the supervisory 
system ineffective. Because of the fear of retributive torture, the 
captive might be unable to admit to torture or violent interrogation 
methods when she receives visits from diplomats and members of the 
monitoring committee. Many detainees have expressed similar 
frustrations.. For instance, after two weeks of interrogation and 
torture, Mr. Arar started receiving diplomatic visits, which took place 
in the presence of the Colonel, an interpreter, and three other Syrian 
officials. Although those visits were his lifeline, Mr. Arar found them 
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unbearably frustrating, since he was unable to denounce torture for the 
fear of being beaten again.
954
 
Additionally, if the deportee is an alleged terrorist, an enemy of, or 
a threat for the sending country, diplomats might have no interest in a 
genuine disclosure of truth through an investigation of the reasons 
behind the accusations of torture. First, the two governments may 
share the common interest of acquiring intelligence information. 
Second, admission of ill-treatment would confirm previous criticism 
on the risks of deportation, and would potentially endanger good 
relations with the partner in other areas, such as control and 
prevention of irregular migration.
955
 Third, it is not difficult to 
imagine that the readmitting State might decide to withdraw 
cooperation on counterterrorism matters in the event that a breach was 
discovered.
956
 Fourth, any finding of violation of the assurances 
would result in the embarrassing acknowledgment that an unlawful 
removal in breach of the international obligation against torture has 
been carried out, thus tarnishing the international image of the two 
involved States and undermining their bilateral relationship. Indeed, 
the receiving State would not have any interest in denouncing lack of 
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compliance, thereby depicting itself as an unreliable actor.
957
 Such a 
silencing effect of the diplomats and the captives is the inner virus of 
any assurances; a virus that makes them unreliable instruments as 
long as they are negotiated with notoriously unsafe countries. 
  
6.3.5.3. Enforcement mechanisms  
Since diplomatic assurances are mainly grounded on an ex ante 
trust in a foreign country, a careful assessment of their role in 
eliminating the risk of refoulement should be carried out. To my 
knowledge, each time an individual has been removed in the 
framework of a bilateral exchange of diplomatic assurances on 
national security grounds, she has been excluded from the effective 
control of the judiciary, because of the inability of the sending State to 
exercise jurisdiction to act upon a finding of transgression.
958
 A victim 
of torture is generally entitled to seek civil, criminal, and international 
legal remedies against both the sending and readmitting country. 
Successful civil or criminal  actions can also give rise to 
compensatory or punitive redress, which has a more symbolic value, 
if compared to the irremediable physical and mental damage suffered 
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by the torture victim.
959
 The question, therefore, is what guarantees, if 
any, are available as a consequence of violations of diplomatic 
assurances?
960
 
Traditional political responses in the event of infringement of 
assurances include diplomatic protest as well as threat of economic 
and political sanctions. It should also be added that non-legally 
binding arrangements do not necessarily contain a mechanism for 
arbitration if a conflict arises between the two parties.  
When the return of a person to the country of origin is susceptible 
of provoking irremediable violations of her fundamental rights, no 
sufficient reliance can be made on discretional principles of estoppel 
and good faith, which might be detrimental of legal certainty. Those 
supporting diplomatic assurances as non-legally binding agreements 
would argue that, if a transgression occurs, it would not be possible to 
resort to a legal enforcement action, but conflicts might be solved 
only through diplomatic processes.
961
 From an inter-state perspective, 
where no countermeasures can be invoked if a violation of a non-
legally binding treaty occurs, other unfriendly actions can be 
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undertaken by the parties to an international agreement, such as 
diplomatic protest and retorsion.
962
 
It should also be highlighted that no special forum exists – under a 
bilateral political agreement - to pursue an action alleging violations 
of diplomatic assurances. In addition, domestic courts have been quite 
reluctant to attribute a legal personality to foreign States in domestic 
legal proceedings. Individuals are generally not able to enforce 
diplomatic assurances. Since they are not a party to the agreement and 
no mechanism of individual complaints exists, diplomatic assurances 
do not guarantee an individual standing to allege a breach of the 
accord. The MOUs agreed by the UK do not contain any provision for 
adjudication, enforcement, or sanction for breach of any kind. The 
only noteworthy provision is that either State may withdraw from the 
arrangement by giving six months’ notice. However, the terms of the 
agreement will continue to apply to any person returned under the 
arrangement. No provision regulates the consequences in case of 
breach of this requirement, or in case a detainee is discovered to be a 
victim of torture. Since there is little prospect of detainees gaining 
redress from the domestic legal systems of the receiving countries, 
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‘one would think that this lack of any provision for enforcement went 
directly to the question of the reliability of assurances.’963 
However, international bodies stand as the most suitable arenas for 
seeking legal redress against serious human rights violations. In 
particular, universal and regional human rights bodies are the most 
appropriate venues through which States and individuals may seek to 
adjudicate breaches of fundamental rights, even if they derive from 
breaches of diplomatic assurances. It should be observed, in this 
respect, that UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies, such as the 
Committee against Torture or the HRC, can accept individual 
complaints for violations of the prohibition of torture, as a 
consequence of the failure of the receiving State to enforce diplomatic 
assurances, only if the receiving State has itself accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Committee.
964
 
In the process of both finding out breaches of assurances and 
providing the individual with effective remedies, two elements need 
to be borne in mind. First, the sending State is understandably very 
reluctant to publicly admit that an accord to prevent the future risk of 
mistreatments resulted – despite assurances - in the actual commission 
of those same mistreatments at the hand of a State overtly described 
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as reliable and safe by virtue of the strong political relations linking 
the two governments.  
Second, in its prognostic assessment of the risk, the sending State 
should be persuaded in good faith that there is no peril of proscribed 
treatments upon removal. Accordingly, the role of an international 
human rights body - such as the ECtHR - would be limited to 
ascertaining that the sending State has lived up to the obligation of 
non-refoulement in good faith by receiving a number of safeguards 
from the readmitting country. Non-refoulement - as implicitly 
enshrined, for example, in Article 3 of the ECHR - is a duty of 
prevention, and not a duty of result. The obligation is exhausted when 
the Court is satisfied that a State has made its best efforts to 
reconstruct what might happen sometime in the future, rather than 
when it has achieved a specific result. The appraisal of the risk is, 
indeed, a speculative exercise where the Court is asked to examine the 
foreseeable consequences of sending the applicant to the receiving 
country, bearing in mind all available information.
965
 Therefore, 
regardless of the legal status of the assurances, it would be 
meaningless if a deportee, tortured upon removal, would lodge a new 
complaint before the same Court that had already previously given the 
                                                 
965
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green light to deportation following the satisfactory ex ante 
assessment of the risk made by the sending State.   
 
6.3.5.4. When assurances are reliable and when they are not.  
In light of the foregoing, this Section asks under what 
circumstances diplomatic assurances can be considered sufficiently 
reliable instruments to eliminate the risk of torture or other inhuman 
treatment. As we will better observe in Part III of this Chapter, 
international human rights bodies have generally rejected ipso facto 
assurances as a reliable basis for a safe transfer. In the Ben Khemais v 
Italy case, for example, the ECtHR held that the fact the complainant 
had not suffered immediate ill-treatment upon his return to Tunisia, as 
ensured by the authorities of this State, would not amount to a reliable 
prediction of the fate of that person in the future.
966
 
The implicit importance of the Court’s reasoning lies in the 
consideration that an assessment of the safety of the receiving country 
for the individual must be done also in the long run and in light of the 
general human rights situation in the receiving country. Although a 
court or any other supervisory body should consider the subsistence of 
stable relations between the two involved States, and gauge the 
personalized risk existing at the material time of the expulsion, these 
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bodies cannot neglect the possible irremediable consequences for the 
deportee if torture is practiced once the spotlights are off on a certain 
particular case and the visits from diplomats monitoring the detainee 
become even more rare.  
Whilst assurances concerning death penalty can be more easily 
supervised, it has been suggested that diplomatic assurances on 
human treatment might suffice only in three cases: i) where 
exchanged with countries that do not possess patterns of torture 
toward prisoners and suspect terrorists; ii) where ‘a previous systemic 
pattern of torture has been brought under control’; iii) when ‘although 
isolated, non systemic acts continued, there was independent 
monitoring by a body with a track record of effectiveness, and 
criminal sanctions against transgressors.’967 
More specifically, the ECtHR crafted a series of further criteria, 
which, in my view, are only the starting point of any discussion on 
reliability. If satisfied, they might create a presumption of sufficiency, 
but in any manner whatsoever can be considered exhaustive. These 
criteria include: i) whether the terms of the assurances have been 
disclosed to the Court; ii) whether they are specific or rather general 
and vague; iii) whether the agent giving the assurances is able to bind 
the receiving State and, additionally, local authorities; iv) whether the 
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assurances concern treatments that are legal or illegal in the 
readmitting State; v) whether the two States have strong and durable 
relations; vi) whether the readmitting State has traditionally respected 
previous assurances of similar sort; vii) whether monitoring 
mechanisms exist to supervise compliance; viii) whether an effective 
system of protection against torture is in force in the receiving 
country, in terms of investigation, prosecution of torture-related 
crimes, and cooperation with international monitoring bodies; ix) 
whether the applicant has previously been ill-treated; and x) whether 
the reliability of assurances has already been examined by national 
courts of the sending State.
968
 
Delegating monitoring responsibilities to an independent and 
authoritative third party, composed not necessarily of diplomats, but 
preferably of members of NGOs and human rights organizations, 
would play a crucial role on the assessment of the risk for the 
individual in question. Contacts with detainees should take place over 
time and be carried out by individuals with the necessary expertise. 
As the HRC suggests, a video recording of all interrogations can also 
be kept.
969
 A monitoring body could exercise external pressure on the 
sending State not to conceal any information about human rights 
transgressions. It can also stand as a deterrent for the receiving 
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country by means, for example, of publication of monitoring reports 
of violations and the institutionalization of automatic enforcement 
mechanisms and venues of legal redress when illegal practices are 
detected. However, even if diplomats phrase assurances in very 
specific terms, with the activation of monitoring mechanisms coupled 
with a system of public reports of abuses, I believe they cannot be 
considered reliable in those contexts where torture is pervasive.  
While most literature has delved into the legal status of diplomatic 
assurances, this issue does not seem to be decisive in determining 
whether the risk faced by the individual in the readmitting country is 
in fact displaced, and whether refugees’ access to protection may be 
hampered. As governments tend to violate human rights obligations 
taken at a multilateral level, States are prone to justify diplomatic 
assurances against ill-treatment on the basis of the reliability of their 
partners, regardless both their human rights track record and the 
legally binding nature of the undertakings.  
 
6.3.6. Diplomatic assurances: toward a ‘repoliticization’ of 
rights? 
Although the UN human rights committees and the ECtHR have 
acknowledged the reliability of diplomatic assurances when 
mechanisms of control are in place, it is not an automatic equation 
that more accountable and enforceable security-driven agreements 
 458 
 
eliminate per se the risk of ill-treatment within the borders of a 
country that makes of torture a systematic practice—a practice that, 
inter alia, is often justified in the name of cooperation with Western 
governments in the ‘war on terror.’ Through the analysis of 
international human rights case law, the following sections will show 
how refoulement occurred also when diplomatic assurances had been 
sought.  
The fact that the sending and receiving governments do not want 
their international reputation and diplomatic relationship damaged by 
lack of adherence to the accord still provides no guarantee against the 
perpetration of a wrongful act. Therefore, despite the existence of a 
friendly diplomatic relationship, a State partner with a dismal long-
standing attitude to human rights obligations, which have been 
undertaken at a multilateral level should be considered unreliable. 
With regard to the legal status of assurances, the use of the term 
‘diplomatic’ does not ipso facto exclude their legally binding nature. 
Attention should be drawn on the intention of the parties, the actual 
object of the agreements, and the organs that have negotiated them, in 
order to ensure that they are able to bind the State in accordance with 
Article 46 of the VCLT. A case-by-case approach would, therefore, be 
fitting.
970
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I also believe the existence of legally binding agreements does not 
prevent the commission of the wrongful act, but has an impact only on 
the ex post enforcement mechanisms in case of human rights abuses. 
Enforcement is an element courts (and possibly States) should take 
into consideration in the ex ante assessment of the risk of torture. It 
would indicate to what extent the two States would be able to commit 
themselves by accepting to be subjected to mechanisms to determine 
their responsibility in case of departure from the assurances. In this 
sense, it could also have a deterrent effect.  
However, in practice, States do not deem the legal status of 
diplomatic assurances - which is related to the existence of 
enforcement procedures - particularly relevant to the assessment of 
their reliability. Indeed, political motivations and friendly diplomatic 
relations play de facto a greater role in the decision of States to 
cooperate for a safe removal. Ex post enforcement is perceived as an 
essential component of an effective system of human rights 
protection, but it pursues the purpose of supplying the individual with 
the instruments to seek and obtain justice only after a violation of her 
rights has occurred. The combination of all these elements explains 
why, de facto, the normative quality of diplomatic assurances is not 
deemed by political and judicial authorities as a decisive asset to the 
assessment of the impact assurances have on refugee rights.  
 460 
 
These considerations also raise two further questions, which 
however cannot be answered in the course of this chapter: i) why 
States need to frame their human rights commitments within bilateral 
political agreements, which replicate standards that have already been 
enshrined within international human rights treaties; ii) whether the 
proliferation of bilateral instruments precluding torture in a specific 
case undermine the object and purpose of multilateral human rights 
treaties aimed at granting protection against torture in a general 
manner.
971
 
It is only worth pointing out here that a legally binding assurance 
can legitimately restate pre-existing obligations, but apply them 
specifically to the case of removal of a person under the bilateral 
agreement. Indeed, ‘an obligation might be doubly owed, due to 
having been made obligatory by two different sources.’972 However, 
this does not clarify what would be the added value of repeating in 
generic form commitments, which States have already entered into in 
human rights treaties.
973
 
Diplomatic assurances are generally sought when the sending 
country bears a reasonable suspicion that the receiving State is 
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abusive. The two detrimental, but still inevitable consequences are: on 
the one hand, the implicit recognition of the existence and 
perpetuation of systematic violations of torture in the readmitting 
country; and, on the other hand, the creation of a two-tier system that 
differentiates between the individual shielded by the assurances and 
all other detainees who continue to be subjected to inhuman and 
degrading treatment or torture. 
Moreover, Article 41(2) of the International Law Commission 
(ILC) Articles on State Responsibility (ILC Articles) provides that ‘no 
State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach 
within the meaning of Article 40, nor render aid or assistance in 
maintaining that situation.’ Pursuant to Article 40, a breach of a norm, 
such as the prohibition of torture, ‘is serious if it involves a gross or 
systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation.’ 
Article 41(2) does not only refer to the formal recognition of an 
unlawful situation, but also prohibits acts that would imply such 
recognition.
974
 Article 41(2) ‘extends beyond the commission of the 
serious breach itself to the maintenance of the situation created by that 
breach, and it applies whether or not the breach itself is a continuing 
one.’975 As to the elements of ‘aid or assistance’, it is implicit that the 
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State has ‘knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally 
wrongful act’, as provided for in Article 16 of the ILC Articles.976 
For the purpose of this Chapter, the typical scenario is one of 
bilateral cooperation for the removal of suspected terrorists to a 
country with questionable and violent techniques of interrogation in 
order to extract information that can be helpful to both the sending 
and receiving State. The issue of State responsibility under general 
international law will not be discussed here in further detail. However, 
it can be noted that, if it is proved that the sending country transfers 
unwanted aliens to a third country with knowledge of the 
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act (in casu, the use of 
torture), it might be engaging in a violation of Article 41 for aiding 
and abetting the responsible State in maintaining that situation. 
Although diplomatic assurances (either in the form of an MoU or 
as individualized assurances) have often been considered by national 
authorities as trustworthy tools for removing the risk of mistreatments 
for the deportee, academics, human rights organizations, and 
international human rights bodies have repeatedly questioned their 
reliability. Goodwin-Gill, for example, indicates at least four reasons 
why diplomatic assurances lack efficacy: i) they are based on trust; ii) 
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post-return monitoring mechanisms are insufficient to prevent 
mistreatments, on account of the fact that torture is secretly 
administered and the detainees have no interest in occasionally 
reporting abuses that could cause reprisals; iii) non-state actors can be 
the potential perpetrators of torture; and iv) it is unlikely that States 
are held accountable in case of violations.
977
 
According to Theo Van Boven, the former UN Special Rapporteur 
on Torture, even when there is not a consistent pattern of gross and 
flagrant human rights violations in the receiving country, the potential 
risk of torture or other forms of inhuman treatment in the individual 
case is sufficient to exclude a priori the usage of diplomatic 
assurances.
978
 Post-return monitoring mechanisms have so far proven 
ineffective in both relieving individuals from the risk of torture, and 
as an instrument of accountability.
979
 They neither have a statutory 
mandate allowing unimpeded and unannounced visits, nor possess 
that authority nor influence to ensure that an independent 
investigation of the allegations of torture is carried out.
980
 The 
existence of such a fragile backdrop for human rights protection in 
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security-related transfers ‘leads us to question whether security and 
migration control constitute legitimate enough interests to undermine 
the application of the principles of legal certainty, transparency, and 
democratic control to State action abroad.’981 
In extradition proceedings, negotiation regarding the treatment of 
the person in question is carried out by the criminal justice systems of 
the two involved countries. Instead, when the subject matter involves 
deportations with assurances on security grounds, the same dialogue 
occurs between the countries’ respective political authorities. Such 
deference to bilateral diplomacy might end up being particularly 
dangerous when the fundamental rights of vulnerable individuals are 
at stake. Diplomatic assurances are predominantly negotiated with 
countries where torture is widespread and routine and where, 
consequently, the damage for the applicant would be irremediable if 
torture occurred in concreto. Moreover, if the protection of the rights 
of the deportees can be ensured by the pre-existent set of human rights 
treaties concluded at universal and regional level, I question the utility 
and appropriateness of a binary system of human rights protection, 
which devolves upon the sphere of politics what States have already 
reserved to the sphere of law.
982
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The emerging anomaly is a progressive ‘repoliticization of human 
rights by way of moving their protection and shifting power from the 
legal or judicial sphere to that of diplomacy and transnational security 
networking.’983 An individual identified as an ‘object of “diplomatic 
significance” and “personal trust” between senior State officials’, 
while possibly more protected, would also run the risk of being placed 
at the mercy of the fluctuating exigencies of foreign relations.
984
 
Although this does not sound like the most comforting scenario, it is 
also true that, in many cases, the activism of the judiciary has 
countered the choices made by the executive branch, generally more 
concerned in securing migration at the expenses of the human rights 
of foreigners. Indeed, despite terrorism can drive the ECtHR to grant 
States a wider margin of appreciation in case of ‘war or other public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation’,985 State security 
concerns cannot defer judicial review and trump fundamental human 
rights obligations.
986
 
As Vedsted-Hansen observes, although assurances can be 
perceived as an attempt to translate human rights protection into an 
essentially political issue, they should be subjected to the judicial 
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control of independent bodies.
987
 Nevertheless, the fact that they can 
be disobeyed – as several cases have demonstrated - reveals how ‘the 
dilemmatic relationship between law and policy persists, and the 
shifting of power to the executive and security sphere invites for 
continued legal and academic attention.’988 
 
Part III 
6.4. Access to protection: the relationship between refugee 
rights and diplomatic assurances, in principle and in practice 
Before delving into the intertwining between diplomatic assurances 
and refugee rights, the reader might benefit of brief summary of the 
main points made thus far. Part II of this Chapter pointed out how 
doctrine continues to be divided on the legal status of diplomatic 
assurances. This status can be an element in assessing the existence of 
enforcement mechanisms and the extent to which a State would 
commit itself by agreeing to be subjected to mechanisms of 
determination of responsibility in case of infringement of the 
assurances. However, in practice, the legal status of assurances is not 
deemed as a primary asset by the sending State in its prognostic 
assessment of the risk. States tend, indeed, to pose greater reliance on 
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friendly political relations and the relocation of the deportee to the 
sphere of ‘high diplomacy.’ 
This Chapter takes as units of analysis diplomatic assurances 
formalized within MoUs, written bilateral agreements that lay out the 
mutual understanding on the treatment of the deportees in a general 
fashion. Ample latitude is then given to States in deciding the 
modalities of enforcement of the assurances negotiated under the 
general framework of a MoU. However, because of the dearth of 
jurisprudence on MoUs, cases on the use of single diplomatic 
assurances are brought into the analysis. 
International courts have repeatedly highlighted how diplomatic 
assurances alone are insufficient,
989
 and how the government should 
conduct an independent risk-analysis to assess whether, at the 
practical level, the specific assurances delivered in an individual case 
alter the risk assessment. The next subsections combine both the study 
of law and implementation of the law. They examine whether the use 
of diplomatic assurances, in principle and in practice, can hamper 
refugees’ access to protection, that is to say, non-refoulement, as well 
as access to fair asylum procedures, and effective remedies before 
removal.
990
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6.4.1. Access to asylum procedures, in principle 
Diplomatic assurances assume relevance for supervisory bodies, 
including refugee status determination commissions, national courts, 
or international human rights bodies invested with the task of 
determining whether a particular asylum seeker is entitled to 
protection, and whether assurances eliminate the risk of prohibited 
treatments faced by an individual scheduled to be deported to her 
country of origin.
991
 Although diplomatic assurances do not affect the 
right to access asylum procedures, they can impact the eligibility to 
asylum. To put it more clearly, in principle they cannot be sought 
from the country of origin or the country of former habitual residence 
(in the case of stateless asylum seekers) of an asylum seeker whose 
application is in course of examination. However, assurances might be 
given unilaterally by the country of origin or the country of former 
habitual residence when it is known or suspected that a national or a 
certain individual has sought asylum in another State. Additionally, a 
person may apply for asylum after the request for diplomatic 
assurances has been submitted in view of facilitating the return of a 
person whose presence is considered inconducive to the public good. 
What is important to stress is that, in all these different scenarios, 
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the principle of confidentiality and the right to privacy categorically 
bar the host State from sharing information with the applicant’s home 
country pending a determination of the asylum claim in order to avoid 
that she or her family members are exposed to a risk of persecution, 
and that such information is used for purposes contrary to human 
rights law. Pursuant to Article 12 of the UDHR and Article 17 of the 
ICCPR, ‘no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his 
privacy, family, home, or correspondence. Everyone has the right to 
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.’992 
Likewise, Article 8 of the ECHR provides that ‘Everyone has the right 
to respect for his private and family life, his home, and his 
correspondence’ and restrictions are allowed only in accordance with 
the law. As the HRC explains in its General Comment 16 on Article 
17, ‘the principle of confidentiality requires that effective measures 
have to be taken by States to ensure that information concerning a 
person’s private life does not reach the hands of persons who are not 
authorized by law to receive, process, and use it.’993 
At the EU level, the principle of confidentiality is explicitly 
recognized by Article 30 of the Recast Procedures Directive whereby: 
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For the purposes of examining individual cases, Member States shall not: (a) 
disclose information regarding individual applications for international protection, 
or the fact that an application has been made, to the alleged actor(s) of persecution 
or serious harm; (b) obtain any information from the alleged actor(s) of persecution 
or serious harm in a manner that would result in such actor(s) being directly 
informed of the fact that an application has been made by the applicant in question, 
and would jeopardise the physical integrity of the applicant or his or her dependants, 
or the liberty and security of his or her family members still living in the country of 
origin.
994
 
 
Likewise, Article 45(2)(b) of the Recast Procedures Directive
995
 
requires Member States to ensure that, in considering withdrawing the 
international protection status of a third country national in 
accordance with Article 14 and 19 of the Recast Qualification 
Directive, they adhere to the same procedural guarantees on 
confidentiality.
996
 
In line with the above-mentioned provisions, the UNHCR ‘Note on 
Procedural Standards for refugee status determination under the 
UNHCR’s Mandate’ points out that every official who provides 
                                                 
994
 Article 30 of the Recast Procedures Directive replaces Article 22 of the 2005 
Procedures Directive. 
995
 Article 45(2)(b) of the Recast Procedures Directive replaces Article 38(1)(d) of 
the 2005 Procedures Directive. 
996
 Under Article 14 of the Qualification Directive, Member States shall revoke, end, 
or refuse to renew the refugee status of a third-country national or a stateless person 
if, inter alia, he or she has ceased to be a refugee (Article 14(1)); if after he or she 
has been granted refugee status, it is established by the Member State concerned that 
‘he or she should have been or is excluded from being a refugee in accordance with 
Article 12’ (para 14(3)(a)). 
 471 
 
services to asylum seekers is ‘under a duty to ensure the 
confidentiality of information received from or about asylum seekers 
and refugees.’997 The fact that the applicants have made such a request 
should also be taken into consideration.
998
 Moreover, disclosure of 
information without the consent of the individual concerned shall be 
subjected to the approval of a Protection Staff member, and, in 
appropriate cases, the Department of International Protection (DIP).
999
 
Asylum seekers must always be informed of their right to 
confidentiality and should also be assured that the UNHCR would not 
contact or share information with the country of origin about their 
condition or refugee status, unless they have expressly authorized the 
host country’s authorities to do so.1000 
Therefore, a status determination authority shall not provide the 
State of origin or other entities within the State with any information 
that a certain individual is seeking protection or has already obtained 
asylum, even if the situation in the home country has changed. Such 
an obligation is valid also in those cases in which a person has been 
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denied asylum.
1001
 States shall abide by the confidentiality rule not 
only during the assessment of protection needs, but also during the 
examination of exclusion grounds. In this phase, it might be possible 
to share data about a particular asylum seeker for the sake of 
gathering intelligence information on an individual’s suspected 
terrorist activities. Although the exclusion procedure is not the core of 
this study, it is important to remember that ‘even in such situations, 
the existence of the asylum application should still remain 
confidential.’1002 
States cannot avail themselves of diplomatic assurances in denying 
access to asylum procedures, but can only rely on them as part of the 
factual elements necessary for assessing the risk for the asylum seeker 
and how well-founded her fear of persecution may be if she is 
returned to her home country. Therefore, diplomatic assurances 
cannot give rise to a declaration of inadmissibility of an asylum claim 
or to restrictions of essential procedural safeguards, but can only be 
used to determine the eligibility criteria for the recognition of an 
individual as a refugee or as a person in need of complementary 
protection.
1003
 If exchanged during the phase of assessment of her 
                                                 
1001
 See, UNHCR Submission, Inquiry into Asylum and Protection Visas for 
Consular Officials and the Deportation, Search and Discovery of Vivian Solon 
(2005) para 9 (UNHCR Inquiry into Asylum and Protection Visas). 
1002
 UNHCR, Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 
IF of the 1951 Convention  Relating to the Status of Refugees (4 September 2003) 
540. 
1003
 UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances, paras 41-42. 
 473 
 
claim, assurances can involve violation of confidentiality and thus 
undermine the credibility of the entire process.
1004
 
The fact that the host country has received diplomatic assurances 
cannot constitute a basis for rejecting an asylum application - which 
should always be examined in its substance - but might require, 
according to the circumstances, a prioritization of the treatment of 
such claims.
1005
 For example, applications concerning people 
suspected of terrorism or giving rise to possible considerations of 
exclusion under Article 1(f) of the Geneva Convention should not be 
considered manifestly unfounded, but rather better assessed on a 
priority basis by specialized exclusion units with designated 
Eligibility Officers operating within the institution in charge of 
asylum determination.
1006
 
As the UNHCR emphasizes, diplomatic assurances cannot only be 
limited to eradicating a specific threat - such as the risk of torture - but 
must ‘effectively eliminate all reasonably possible manifestations of 
persecution in the individual case (emphasis added).’1007 The 
institution responsible for asylum determination shall ascertain, in 
other words, that the person in question would not be exposed to any 
other particular form of persecution beyond torture, for example, 
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disproportionate punishment or discrimination. In conducting such an 
evaluation, the decision-making authority shall also verify that the 
entity issuing the assurance has effective control over the actions of 
those State or non-State actors the risk of persecution emanates 
from.
1008
 An effective system of monitoring of the internal situation of 
the country at issue is, therefore, an essential requisite, although such 
a solution does not automatically provide the individual with 
mechanisms of enforcement against possible post-return violations of 
the assurances. 
Moreover, the evaluation of diplomatic assurances as a reliable 
criterion for eliminating the risk of persecution in the home country, 
and, therefore, denying asylum, shall be made in accordance also with 
international human rights law, which provides a wider protection, 
especially when the applicant falls within one of the exclusion clauses 
of the Geneva Convention.
1009
 For instance, the ECtHR, the HRC, and 
the Committee against Torture have acknowledged the right of a 
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person, prior to her removal, to have legal recourse to an independent 
reviewing body to challenge the transfer, and gauge the reliability of 
assurances obtained in response to allegations of torture.
1010
 
 
6.4.2 Access to effective remedies 
Asylum seekers, whose refugee status (or subsidiary protection) 
has been refused or who have been excluded from international 
protection on national security grounds, are entitled to an effective 
remedy, meant as the right both to appeal a negative decision within a 
reasonable time, and to remain in the territory waiting the outcome of 
the appeal.
1011
 In addition, independent judicial scrutiny of diplomatic 
assurances at national and international level may prevent an unlawful 
removal to torture.  
In general, the existence of diplomatic assurances is not one of the 
criteria relied upon by human rights bodies to find violations of the 
right to an effective remedy. For instance, in the Abu Qatada case, the 
ECtHR found that there was no violation of Article 13: 
 
The Court does not consider that there is any support in these cases (or 
elsewhere in its case law) for the applicant’s submission that there is an enhanced 
requirement for transparency and procedural fairness where assurances are being 
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1011
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relied upon; as in all Article 3 cases, independent and rigorous scrutiny is what is 
required. Furthermore [...] Article 13 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as 
placing an absolute bar on domestic courts receiving closed evidence, provided that 
the applicant’s interests are protected at all times before those courts.
1012
 
 
In the great majority of cases object of the present review 
concerning deportation with assurances, the ECtHR has recorded no 
breach of Article 13, owing to the fact that the decision to expel an 
individual after rejection of her asylum claim or the application of an 
exclusion order had been reviewed by a domestic court of appeal. 
Therefore, the exchange of diplomatic assurances should not impair 
the right to an effective remedy as long as a person (including an 
asylum seeker who has either been rejected or excluded from refugee 
status/subsidiary protection) has been allowed to both challenge the 
expulsion decision and to remain in the territory waiting the outcome 
of the appeal.
1013
 
In those few cases where the ECtHR found violations of Article 13, 
responsibility was not attributed to the existence of diplomatic 
assurances per se, since deportees were always entitled to challenge 
their return decision. Breaches of rights were rather caused by lack of 
automatic suspensive effect of the appeal to set aside an expulsion 
order that could produce potentially irreversible effects for the 
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removed individual.
1014
 In lieu of a rigorous and effective scrutiny of 
the claim, an extreme urgent procedure can reduce the rights of the 
defence and the examination of the complaint to a minimum.
1015
 
 
6.4.3. Access to fair asylum procedures and effective remedies, 
in practice 
This Section intends to illustrate how seeking diplomatic 
assurances during the asylum determination process can contribute to 
a violation of the procedural safeguards of asylum mechanisms, such 
as the principle of confidentiality, thus affecting the final outcome of 
the proceedings.
1016
 Although a detailed analysis of the procedural 
and substantive aspects of asylum determination is not at issue here, it 
is worth noting that diplomatic assurances have been progressively 
entering into the evidentiary assessment process. Many cases 
addressed by national courts have raised the criticism of human rights 
circles because of the fact that assurances against torture were sought 
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prior to completion of asylum procedures, thus violating the principle 
of confidentiality.
1017
 A review of practice is thus herein carried out. 
The first case examined in this Section concerns the expulsion of 
Mr. Sihali from the UK to Algeria.
1018
 In contesting the transfer of his 
client, the counsel of the applicant during the appeal before SIAC 
attacked the decision to seek and rely on diplomatic assurances. They 
were deemed, indeed, an integral part of the immigration decision to 
refuse asylum to Mr. Sihali, as witnessed by the refusal letter of 16 
January 2009, which makes express reference to the Note Verbale 
08/08 between the UK and Algeria.
1019
 
Because assurances shall not be sought in the case of an ordinary 
asylum seeker who is not a national security suspect, ‘the Secretary of 
State has deviated from the publicly understood position he previously 
held, not to seek assurances in asylum cases in the absence of a threat 
to national security “or other major public interest.”’1020 However, as 
the UNHCR recognizes, even if ‘in exceptional circumstances, 
contact with the country of origin may be justified on national security 
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grounds […] the existence of the asylum application should not be 
disclosed.'
1021
 
Between 2005 and 2006, the then Dutch Minister for Alien Affairs 
and Integration, Rita Verdonk came under pressure in parliament 
following a report by a current affairs programme (Netwerk) in June 
2005. According to the programme, the Congolese Secret Service 
(DGM, which was also in charge of border control) had been given 
confidential information about its own nationals whose asylum 
applications in the Netherlands were unsuccessful. The fact that 
Minister Verdonk let Congolese authorities know that these people 
had applied for asylum exposed the returnees to the risk of 
persecution. A special commission (Commission Havermans), in 
charge of investigating in more detail the issue, confirmed in 
December 2005 that sufficient information likely to identify the 
persons as asylum seekers had been provided to the Congolese 
government.
1022
 A string of other examples, drawn from international 
human rights case law and circumscribed to the phase of access and 
assessment of protection claims, can be of additional illustrative 
guidance, as the following sub-sections will demonstrate.  
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6.4.3.1 The Committee against Torture and the HRC 
The destiny of Mr. Agiza and Mr. Alzery crossed when these two 
Egyptian nationals arrived in Sweden and applied for asylum. Mr. 
Agiza alleged he was persecuted and tortured in Egypt on account of 
his activities in the Islamic movement. In 1999, when he fled to Iran, 
the Egyptian Superior Court Martial convicted him of terrorism in 
absentia. Fearing a possible readmission to Egypt, he abandoned Iran, 
and on 23 September 2001, during a transit stop through Stockholm, 
he applied for asylum together with his family. Similarly, Mr. Alzery 
was subjected to harassment and arrest in Egypt for his involvement 
in an Islamic movement opposing the Egyptian government. After 
fleeing to Saudi Arabia and Syria, he eventually landed in Sweden in 
1999. 
The Swedish Migration Board determined that Mr. Agiza and Mr. 
Alzery could have a well-founded fear of persecution if they were 
forced to return to Egypt. Nevertheless, the case was turned over to 
the government based upon secret evidence provided to the Migration 
Board by the Swedish Security Police according to which Mr. Agiza 
had a leading role in the terroristic activities of an organization, while 
Mr. Alzery represented a threat for the security of the nation. They 
were excluded from refugee protection and the enforcement of the 
return procedures was so swift that no possibility to challenge both 
exclusion and the expulsion decision was in fact available for the two 
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asylum seekers. They were, therefore, deprived of their right to an 
effective remedy before removal, also on account of the fact that no 
possibility was given to an international court to assess the sufficiency 
of the diplomatic assurances obtained by Egyptian authorities. 
Although the decision of exclusion from refugee status regarding 
Mr. Agiza and Mr. Alzery was issued on 18 December 2001, the 
Swedish government entered into bilateral negotiations with the 
Egyptian government in early December by obtaining from it 
assurances of ‘full respect to their personal and human rights.’1023 By 
seeking diplomatic assurances on the treatment of the two men while 
their asylum applications were still under way, Swedish authorities 
breached the principle of confidentiality whereby no information can 
be given to the government of the country of origin—the source of 
fear for the applicant. The assurances sought from the Egyptian 
government were, thus, deemed sufficiently credible to secure 
compliance with Sweden’s human rights obligations.  
In the cases of Mr. Agiza and Mr. Alzery, exclusion from refugee 
status, which resulted in refoulement, came about without a 
sufficiently reasoned determination of the asylum claims and without 
any information about the security grounds leading to rejection. On 
the same day, the two men were repatriated to Egypt where they 
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alleged to have undergone torture and inhuman treatment. Swedish, 
USA, and Egyptian security agents were all present at the Bromma 
airport during the apprehension of the two men, whose bodies were 
searched in a very intrusive way.
1024
 
Moreover, the Security Police file reports the following 
information: first, the date for the decision on the asylum application 
was settled for 18 December while the plane supplied by the 
American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to expel the two men 
was booked for 19 December; second, these decisions were taken at 
the highest level in the Swedish Foreign Affairs Ministry after 
consultation with the Security Police and Migration Board.
1025
 In 
2003 and 2005, the Committee against Torture and the HRC found 
that Sweden had violated the CAT and the ICCPR for both subjecting 
the two applicants to inhuman and degrading treatment, and for 
transferring them to a country where they were allegedly 
mistreated.
1026
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Moreover, Mr. Agiza was deprived of his right to an effective 
remedy, since misleading information surrounding the denial of the 
asylum application was provided by Swedish authorities to his legal 
advisers. The reason for such a subtle manoeuvre was to prevent 
international human rights bodies, such as the Committee against 
Torture or the ECtHR from issuing a staying order before 
enforcement of the expulsion decision could take place.
1027
 
According to the Committee against Torture, Article 3 of the CAT 
implies the right to an effective, independent, and impartial review of 
the decision to expel or remove. The Committee found, therefore, 
that: 
 
 The absence of any avenue of judicial or independent administrative review of 
the Government’s decision to expel the complainant does not meet the procedural 
obligation to provide for effective, independent and impartial review required by 
Article 3 of the Convention.
1028
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Mr. Agiza was not given sufficient time to file a complaint before a 
Swedish Court or an international body prior to removal. Therefore, 
the Committee held that there was an express breach of Article 22, 
highlighting   that all remedies (against the exclusion from refugee 
status and the expulsion decision) should have been exhausted before 
removal. Likewise, the HRC has interpreted Article 2(3) of the 
ICCPR as requiring States parties to provide administrative and 
judicial review of deportation orders to avoid violations of the 
principle of non-refoulement enshrined in Article 7 of the ICCPR.
1029
 
Under Article 2(3) of the ICCPR,  
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) to ensure that any 
person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an 
effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons 
acting in an official capacity; (b) to ensure that any person claiming such a remedy 
shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or 
legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal 
system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) to ensure 
that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. 
 
6.4.3.2. The ECtHR 
In this analysis of State practice, the ECtHR offers a host of 
instructive cases. In Khaydarov v Russia, for example, the ECtHR 
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held that, if the order to extradite the applicant to Tajikistan was to be 
enforced, there would be a violation of Article 3 of the 
Convention.
1030
 The applicant was an ethnic Uzbek who fled 
Tajikistan to move to Russia where, on 17 June 2008, he applied for 
asylum claiming that the Tajik authorities had persecuted him on 
ground of his ethnic origin. However, his asylum request was denied, 
a decision that was confirmed on appeal. On several occasions, on 4 
and 26 February 2009 and on 12 March 2009, the Moscow City Court 
sent requests for information to the Russian and Tajik Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs concerning the applicant's allegations of a risk of ill-
treatment, and postponed a hearing on the appeal against the 
extradition order pending the examination of the asylum claim.
1031
 As 
we can read in the text of the ECtHR’s decision,  
 
On 24 March 2009 the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the 
Moscow City Court that it had no information concerning any political motives for 
the applicant's prosecution and noted that Tajikistan had ratified nearly every major 
international human-rights instrument, including the ICCPR and the UN Convention 
against Torture. 
 
Only two days after, the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment 
on appeal concerning the refusal of refugee status. On 10 April and on 
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26 May 2009, the Tajik Prosecutor General provided assurances that 
the applicant would not be persecuted on political or religious 
grounds, and that Tajikistan had ratified the main international human 
rights instruments. Called to re-examine the extradition order, the 
Moscow City Court upheld the previous judgement affirming that the 
applicant was a Tajikistani national with no refugee status and that he 
was not persecuted for political or religious reasons.
1032
 It also argued 
the assurances given by the Tajik Prosecutor General's Office sufficed 
to exclude the risk that the applicant would suffer ill-treatment. On 30 
July 2009, the Supreme Court upheld the decision and the extradition 
order became final.
1033
 
Despite the fact that in cases of extradition, the requesting State is 
the home country of the individual in question, and it is privy to the 
person whereabouts, confidentiality should however be respected 
when commencing asylum proceedings. Despite the fact that 
information related to extradition may have a bearing on the eligibility 
of the person to asylum, the decision on asylum and the decision on 
the extradition request should always be conducted in parallel and 
constitute two separate procedures. 
Whether diplomatic assurances were one of the major elements the 
Russian deciding authority relied upon to determine the refusal of the 
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asylum request is a matter of speculation. But what is certain is that 
diplomatic assurances were sought during the asylum determination 
process of Mr Khaydarov, thus violating basic rules of fairness 
requiring that no information on the applicant is shared with the 
country of origin. The outcome of the extradition proceedings was 
affected accordingly.  
 
6.4.4. Non-refoulement, in principle  
In order to avoid refoulement, asylum seekers are entitled not to be 
expelled pending a final determination of their status.
1034
 Under 
Article 33(1) of the Geneva Convention, States cannot transfer a 
person to a territory where she may face persecution on grounds of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or 
political opinion, or where she may be onward removed to another 
State where there exists a risk of persecution for one of the five 
aforementioned reasons.
1035
 
The standard of scrutiny is slightly different depending on the 
instrument. For example, according to the Committee against Torture, 
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the complainant must prove that ‘there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he [or she] would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture.’1036 The HRC affirms, instead, that a person cannot be 
deported to a country where she might face a real risk of being subject 
to torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.
1037
  ‘Substantial 
grounds’ shall exist that demonstrate that the risk of torture is a 
necessary and foreseeable consequence of the individual’s 
removal.
1038
 
When dealing with a case of expulsion/removal, the ECtHR has to 
decide if ‘there are substantial grounds for believing that the person in 
question, if expelled, would face a real risk of being subjected to 
torture or to inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in the 
receiving country (emphasis added).’1039 On account of the difficulty 
expressed by Judge Zupancic, of proving ‘a future event to any degree 
of probability because the law of evidence is a logical rather than a 
prophetic exercise’,1040 the applicant is not required to substantiate 
‘beyond any reasonable doubt’ that she would suffer ill-treatment. If, 
in this context, diplomatic assurances have been provided, they could 
be relied upon only as factual elements for conducting such a 
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determination on the safety of the receiving country in the individual 
case. If assurances cannot mitigate the risk of persecution and ill-
treatment, the non-refoulement obligation must be fully adhered to by 
the host State.  
However, under Article 33(2) of the Geneva Convention, a person 
may be returned to her country of origin if an individualized finding is 
made that she constitutes a present or future serious threat to the 
security of, or to the community of, the host State as a consequence of 
her conviction of a crime of a particularly grave nature.
1041
 In any 
case, refoulement must be necessary and proportionate, and must 
represent the last possible resort when the risk for the host country far 
outweighs the risk of harm for the returned person.
1042
 Moreover, the 
decision to apply Article 33(2) shall always be taken on the basis of a 
set of procedural safeguards, such as the right to be heard and to 
appeal, as well as the right to be granted sufficient time to seek 
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admission to another State, thus avoiding being sent back to the same 
country where persecution is feared.
1043
 
The protection afforded by human rights law is undoubtedly 
broader than that provided by refugee law since non-refoulement 
applies to any persons whose life and liberty can be threatened in the 
receiving country, beyond the five grounds of persecution set in the 
Geneva Convention. Diplomatic assurances may thus be accepted 
only if they offset the risk to the returned person, and if the sending 
State, in all good faith, assumes that the element of trust sufficed to 
consider assurances as reliable instruments. In order to be effective, 
the authorities of the receiving country must be in the position to 
ensure de facto compliance with the assurance itself. For example, 
this criterion cannot be satisfied if State authorities are not able to 
supervise the activity of the security forces of a prison where the 
deportee is kept in custody, and to ensure compliance with the given 
assurance.
1044
 
 
6.4.5. Non-refoulement, in practice 
Diplomatic assurances are not explicitly mentioned in international 
human rights treaties. However, States regularly use them as a means 
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to demonstrate compliance with their non-refoulement obligations, 
and as a consequence, relevant human rights treaty monitoring bodies 
rely on assurances in the pre-removal risk assessment. MoUs and 
individualized diplomatic assurances do not provide the legal basis for 
the return of a person to her country of origin. Nonetheless, in 
numerous cases, national and (mostly) international courts have found 
that, despite assurances, a violation of the principle of non-
refoulement occurred or would occur upon removal to a third country. 
While the present review revolves around the case law of international 
human rights bodies, some domestic decisions regarding transfer by 
means of MoUs are also brought into the analysis.  
In the DD and AS v The Secretary of State for the Home 
Department,
1045
 SIAC blocked the removal of two individuals from 
the UK to Libya by stating that, although it was unlikely that the 
assurances would not be transgressed, the risk that they would be ill-
treated was not ‘well-nigh unthinkable.’1046 Detained under 
immigration powers, the appellants were deemed a threat to the 
national security of the host State. While Mr. DD was alleged to be a 
member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group engaging in terrorist 
activities,
1047
 Mr. AS claimed asylum ‘on the basis that he and his 
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family had been persecuted and tortured by the Gaddafi regime 
because of their true Islamic views.’1048 
Formally, Libyan domestic law prohibited torture and subjected 
perpetrators to criminal sanctions. Nevertheless, torture was de facto 
practiced as NGOs documented only few months before the signature 
of the UK-Libya MoU.
1049
 Therefore, in reviewing the case, SIAC 
noted that individual diplomatic assurances negotiated under the 
MOU between Libya and the UK lacked efficacy in the Libyan 
context and, as such, could not be considered a reliable accord.
1050
 
SIAC found flawed the argument that Libya would honour the 
assurances in the interest of preserving amicable political relations. 
Moreover, the possibility to leave a violation undetected as a 
consequence of weak monitoring mechanisms brought contingency to 
the view that ‘there [was] too much scope for something to go wrong, 
and too little in place to deter ill-treatment or to bring breaches of the 
MoU to the UK’s attention.’1051 
In the Youssef v The Home Office case,
1052
 assurances were sought 
because of ‘evidence that detainees were routinely tortured by the 
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Egyptian Security Service.’1053 However, the British request for an 
assurance concerning prison visits was declined by the Egyptian 
government ‘on the ground that they would constitute interference in 
the scope of the Egyptian judicial system and an infringement of 
national sovereignty.’1054  Mere suspicion of, or a conviction for a 
particular crime cannot as such justify exclusion from protection.
1055
 
The seriousness of the security threat must be individually assessed 
and be proportional to the risk for the person intended to be 
removed.
1056
 
 
6.4.5.1. The Committee against Torture and the HRC 
The decisive issue is not whether assurances have been given, but 
whether they can be used as an instrument to lower the risk the 
individual would face, at the material time of removal.
1057
 
International bodies have often found assurances inadequate in 
trimming down the personalized risk to a level where there is no real 
risk or ‘substantial grounds’, especially where no effective monitoring 
mechanism has been set out, when they have been phrased in a very 
indeterminate and inaccurate manner, or when their strength has been 
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grounded only on the ratification of main international human rights 
instruments by the receiving country.
1058
 At the same time, however, 
international human rights bodies have not banned the use of 
diplomatic assurances as a tool to enhance overall protection by either 
eliminating the risk of torture altogether or reducing such a risk below 
the threshold required to avoid refoulement. 
In the Agiza v Sweden case, the Committee against Torture held 
that the deportation with assurances did not reduce the manifest risk 
of torture and ill-treatment, thus amounting to a violation of Article 3. 
Despite the assurances that the individual would not be ill-treated and 
would be granted a fair trial upon return, the Committee determined 
that: 
 
It was known, or should have been known, to the [Swedish] authorities […] that 
Egypt resorted to consistent and widespread use of torture against detainees, and 
that the risk of such treatment was particularly high in the case of detainees held for 
political and security reasons.
1059
 
 
Even without a finding on the treatment of Mr. Agiza in his home 
country, where torture was widespread, the Committee against 
Torture argued that a violation of non-refoulement could be foreseen 
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on account of his treatment on Swedish soil where also American and 
Egyptian authorities participated to the apprehension, intimate body 
search, and forced deportation of the applicant at Bromma airport. By 
the same token, the HRC held that the efforts placed by Sweden to 
obtain diplomatic assurances from Egypt were sufficient to have 
warned the sending government of the risk of torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment if Mr. Alzery were returned there. Violation of 
Article 7 was indeed recorded.  
In Alzery and Agiza, the view of the Committee against Torture and 
the HRC that assurances were not sufficient to reduce the risk of 
torture upon removal,
1060
 seemed to concede that international human 
rights treaty monitoring bodies would be prepared to accept 
assurances if differently modelled through supervision and 
enforcement mechanisms. For example, in the Pelit v Azerbaijan case 
concerning the issuance of diplomatic assurances by Turkey to 
Azerbaijan, the Committee against Torture argued that:  
 
While a certain degree of post-expulsion monitoring of the complaint’s situation 
took place, the State party has not supplied the assurances to the Committee in order 
for the Committee to perform its own independent assessment of their 
satisfactoriness or otherwise […] nor did the State party detail with sufficient 
specificity the monitoring undertaken and the steps taken to ensure that it both was, 
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in fact and in the complainant’s perception, objective, impartial and sufficiently 
trustworthy.
1061
 
 
In my view, recalcitrant countries, which notoriously practice 
torture, especially in respect of detained suspected terrorists, cannot, 
in any manner whatsoever, be trusted as safe havens, even when 
detailed and apparently convincing diplomatic assurances are 
supplied. 
Another noteworthy case is Zhakhongir Maksudov and Adil 
Rakhimov, Yakub Tashbaev and Rasuldzhon Pirmatov v Kyrgyzstan 
concerning the extradition to Uzbekistan of four rejected refugees 
charged in absentia of terrorism. In the Committee’s view, the 
applicants’ extradition amounted, inter alia, to a violation of Article 7 
of the Covenant. Indeed, 
 
The procurement of assurances from the Uzbek General Prosecutor's Office, 
which, moreover, contained no concrete mechanism for their enforcement, was 
insufficient to protect against such risk. The Committee reiterates that at the very 
minimum, the assurances procured should contain such a monitoring mechanism 
and be safeguarded by arrangements made outside the text of the assurances 
themselves, which would provide for their effective implementation (emphasis 
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added).
1062
 
 
The Committee noted that the assessment of the risk of refoulement 
prohibited by Article 7 of the ICCPR should be conducted in light of 
the information that was known or ought to have been known at the 
time of extradition, and ‘[did] not require proof of actual torture 
having subsequently occurred, although information as to subsequent 
events is relevant to the assessment of initial risk.’1063 The existence 
of assurances is one of the elements relevant to the overall 
determination of the risk.  Since public reports had widely described 
the inhuman treatment meted out to detainees, especially those held 
for political and security reasons, a real risk of torture could be 
envisaged. 
 
6.4.5.2. The ECtHR 
The ECtHR has always attached greatest importance to the human 
rights record of the receiving country in order to assess the safety of 
removals, especially when carried out in the framework of national 
security decisions. Although it has reviewed cases involving 
diplomatic assurances against torture and ill-treatment prior to 
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2008,
1064
 in the well-known Saadiv Italy case, the Court laid out some 
key criteria for gauging reliability of diplomatic assurances on a case-
by-case basis. The respondent government justified expulsion of Mr 
Saadi to Tunisia on the basis of diplomatic assurances according to 
which the requested State had given ‘an undertaking to apply in the 
present case the relevant Tunisian law […] which provided for severe 
punishment of acts of torture or ill-treatment and extensive visiting 
rights for a prisoner’s lawyer and family.’1065 The assurance was 
provided in the form of a Note Verbale by the Tunisian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs the day before the Grand Chamber hearing. The 
ECtHR pointed out that the individual ‘real risk’ of ill-treatment for 
the deportee could not be obliterated by such a generic note, which 
was limited to observing that Tunisian laws respected the rights of 
prisoners, and that Tunisia had acceded to the relevant international 
treaties and conventions.
1066
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The Court held that if the decision to deport the applicant to 
Tunisia was to be enforced, there would be a violation of Article 3 of 
the Convention. It also insisted on the importance of looking beyond 
the oath of the receiving State and examining its actions and human 
rights track record. In this regard,  
 
The existence of domestic laws and accession to international treaties 
guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights in principle are not in themselves 
sufficient to ensure adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment where [...] 
reliable sources have reported practices resorted to or tolerated by the authorities 
which are manifestly contrary to the principles of the Convention.
1067
 
 
The Court also added that the fact that Tunisian authorities had 
given the diplomatic assurances requested by Italy,  
 
Would have not absolved the Court from the obligation to examine whether such 
assurances provided, in their practical application, a sufficient guarantee that the 
applicant would be protected against the risk of treatments prohibited by the 
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Convention […].The weight to be given to the assurances from the receiving State 
depends, in each case, on the circumstances prevailing at the material time.
1068
 
 
In the Ben Khemais v Italy case, the ECtHR reached the same 
conclusion, affirming that it is up to the Court to determine, on a case-
by-case basis, whether it can be firmly established that diplomatic 
assurances provide effective protection against ill-treatment.
1069
 
Despite Tunisian authorities issued a Note Verbale more detailed than 
in Saadi, Mr Ben Khemais was not allowed to receive visits from 
Italian diplomatic authorities or the foreign lawyer representing him 
before the ECtHR.
1070
 
A crucial requirement for the effective implementation of 
diplomatic assurances rests on the capacity of the receiving State to 
exercise effective control over the whereabouts of the individual. 
Considering the way in which torture is secretly administered and the 
difficulty of obtaining information by the captive, national and 
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international courts have at times halted extradition and deportation 
when they believed it to be highly unlikely that the government giving 
assurances, despite its good faith, was de facto able to enforce its 
undertakings. In the Chahal case, the ECtHR stated it was ‘not 
persuaded that the […] assurance would provide Mr Chahal with an 
adequate guarantee of safety.’ This lack of confidence about the 
condition for removal was mainly due to the lack of sufficient control 
over the security forces of a certain prison.
1071
 
Instead, in Soering v UK, the key factor against extradition was the 
independence of the executive and the judiciary in the receiving State. 
Despite the friendly relations between the UK and the US, because of 
the independence of the judiciary, the Court considered the assurances 
issued by the Federal Government absolutely insignificant. Since Mr. 
Soering was charged with an offence falling under the jurisdiction of 
the Commonwealth of Virginia, the Federal State was not competent 
to issue a binding diplomatic assurance. Additionally, even informing 
the judges of the wishes of the UK, at the stage of sentencing, could 
not prevent them from imposing the death penalty.
1072
 Since Virginia 
courts could not bind themselves in advance to a certain result for a 
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future decision, the risk of the death penalty being imposed could not 
be eliminated. 
Therefore, of essence is whether the government issuing the 
assurances is able to control the territory and any public official 
operating within its territory. Only if the responsible entity has the 
power to enforce the agreements and can be trusted in this role, can 
the assurances be used to assess the likelihood of a State’s compliance 
with a certain agreement. The diverse elements considered by the 
Court to assess the suitability of an assurance also demonstrate how 
the ratification of human rights instruments by the requested State or 
relevant domestic law is not sufficient to consider the receiving 
country safe for the individual in question.  
For instance, in the MSS v Belgium and Greece case concerning the 
intra-EU transfer of an asylum seeker under the Dublin system, the 
ECtHR establishes the refutability of the ‘presumption of safety’ and 
of the semi-automatic application of mutual trust:  
 
The Belgian government argued that in any event [the Belgian authorities] had 
sought sufficient assurances from the Greek authorities that the applicant faced no 
risk of treatment contrary to the Convention in Greece. In that connection, the Court 
observes that the existence of domestic laws and accession to international treaties 
guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights in principle are not in themselves 
sufficient to ensure adequate protection where […] reliable sources have reported 
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practices resorted to or tolerated by the authorities which are manifestly contrary to 
the principles of the Convention.
1073
 
 
To my knowledge, after Saadi, the Court ruled on thirteen cases 
concerning individuals (generally alleged terrorists and suspects of 
criminal conspiracy linked to fundamentalist Islamist groups) who 
faced deportation or who had already been transferred by Italy to 
Tunisia under the auspices of diplomatic assurances. It determined in 
all but one case that removal of the applicants did or would violate 
Article 3.
1074
 The Court declared that no trust could be placed in a 
country with a dismal human rights record of monitoring and 
protection of detained against torture and mistreatments, especially 
when sources have reported unlawful practices resorted to or tolerated 
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by the authorities of that State.
1075
  A further crucial hurdle the Court 
noticed was down to the existence of the same formulaic assurances 
within a standardized document indicating the data of each single 
applicant, who had not yet been deported.
1076
 Despite the fact that 
assurances for the two applicants who had already been removed were 
more specific, the Court found a violation of the principle of non-
refoulement embodied in Article 3.
1077
 
The El-Masri v FYRM case offers a clear illustration of what an 
‘extraordinary rendition’ means in practice.1078 Unlike the cases 
discussed above, no assurances against the risk of ill-treatment were 
sought before removal.
1079
 However, the Court found a violation of 
Article 3 and held the respondent State responsible for having 
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transferred the applicant into the custody of the US authorities
1080
 
without 'a legitimate request for his extradition or any other legal 
procedure recognized in international law for the transfer of a prisoner 
to foreign authorities [...]. Furthermore, no arrest warrant had been 
shown to have existed at the time authorizing the delivery of the 
applicant into the hands of US agents.'
1081
 The Court also maintained 
that Macedonian authorities: i) had knowledge of the place where the 
applicant  would be flown from the Skopje Airport; ii) knew or ought 
to have known that there was a serious risk for the applicant to be 
exposed to treatments contrary to Article 3. Indeed, several reports in 
the public domain before Mr. El-Masri’s transfer described the 
worrying condition of detention under the 'rendition' program, and the 
violent interrogation methods used by the US authorities on person 
suspected of involvement in international terrorism.
1082
 
As a general consideration, whilst national courts are more inclined 
to recognize assurances as a ground for a safe expulsion on security 
grounds, international human rights bodies have unquestionably 
struck the balance in favor of the protection of the fundamental rights 
of the deportees, especially with regard to the prohibition of torture. 
Nonetheless, diplomatic assurances have not being categorically 
outlawed, but rather weighed in the balance, as one factor out of 
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many, when they offer sufficient protection and guarantees to 
eliminate the risk for the deportee.  
The salience of individualized and detailed assurances is reasserted 
with emphasis in the long-expected 2012 Abu Qatada v UK case, 
which represents a first opportunity for the Strasbourg judges to 
consider the UK’s practice of negotiation of MoUs for returning 
suspect terrorists to countries of origin. By contending that Abu 
Qatada could not be safely deported to Jordan, the ECtHR moved 
away from its previous jurisprudence and expanded the scope of non-
refoulement. It argued, indeed, that deportation with assurances would 
not be in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. Removal would 
rather result in a breach of Article 6 because of the real risk that 
evidence obtained through torture would be admitted at his retrial in 
Jordan, thus amounting to a ‘flagrant denial of justice.’ Moreover, 
transgression of the right to counsel, the right against arbitrary arrest 
and detention, or to a fair trial may aggravate the risk of torture 
itself.
1083
 
In order to determine the quality of the assurances given and their 
reliability in light of the receiving State’s practice, the Court 
concluded that: i) torture in Jordan remains ‘widespread and routine’; 
ii) it continues to be practiced with impunity within a criminal justice 
system that ‘lacks many of the standard, internationally recognized 
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safeguards to prevent torture and punish its perpetrators;’ iii) Jordan 
lacks a genuinely independent complaint mechanisms; iv) it denies 
‘prompt access to lawyers and independent medical examinations.’1084 
Nevertheless, by relying on the strong political relations between 
the UK and Jordan, the ECtHR reckoned diplomatic assurances 
negotiated in the framework of the 2005 MoU specific and 
comprehensive enough to remove any real risk of ill-treatment of Abu 
Qatada.
1085
 It also added that the extent to which States fail to comply 
with international human rights obligations against torture is, at most, 
only one factor to be weighed in the assessment of diplomatic 
assurances’ reliability. States should not refrain from seeking 
assurances from countries that systematically violate human rights; 
otherwise ‘it would be paradoxical if the very fact of having to seek 
assurances meant one could not rely on them.’1086 
Already in 1996, in the Chahal case, seven of the nineteen judges 
submitted a partly dissenting opinion upholding the position of the 
UK that in terrorism cases, where people are deported outside the 
territorial jurisdiction of the Council of Europe’s Member States, a 
balancing approach, between national security interests and the extent 
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of the potential risk of the deportee in the State of destination, should 
be applied.
1087
 
Both the ECtHR and SIAC had to conclude that the Jordanian 
prosecutors refused to give an undertaking in advance that they would 
not use confessions obtained by torture. Consequently, the UK 
government did not receive minimum assurances on torture evidence, 
even though for more than 10 years Jordan had been under the 
pressure and spotlight of the international community. Considering, in 
addition, that transgression of the right to counsel, the right against 
arbitrary arrest and detention, and to a fair trial, more generally, may 
aggravate the risk of torture itself,
1088
I wonder how the ECtHR, which 
unconditionally assumed that a government ‘incapable of properly 
investigating allegations of torture and excluding torture evidence’1089 
was able to assure that a suspected terrorist would not be mistreated to 
extract a confession. 
To conclude, it is encouraging that, in November 2012, SIAC did 
not open the backdoor to refoulement by means of new assurances 
from Jordan—a country where torture is ‘systematic and routine.’ 
Nevertheless, the general image of the ECtHR, one year after Abu 
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Qatada, ends up to be that one of a tightrope walker. It is the image of 
a Court that nimbly (yet not always convincingly) keeps the 
equilibrium between, on one hand, the effort to protect human rights 
within and beyond borders, and on the other hand, the exigency to 
uphold States’ concern to face terrorist violence by displacing as far 
as possible the ‘foreign-born threat’ and, as a consequence, any 
responsibility for human rights violations. 
 
6.5. Diplomatic assurances on asylum seekers removable to 
‘safe third countries’? 
Section 6.4 is the core of this Chapter and it provided the answer to 
the main research question. It showed how no individual should, in 
principle, encounter a violation of her right to access fair asylum 
procedures and effective remedies, and a breach of her right to non-
refoulement, if basic procedural rules are respected. The principle of 
confidentiality, embodied in soft and hard law instruments, prevents 
the host State from sharing information (through, for example 
diplomatic assurances) with the applicant’s home country pending a 
determination of the asylum claim. Moreover, as long as a rejected or 
excluded asylum seeker is entitled to challenge the decision on her 
status as well as the expulsion order - thus questioning the reliability 
of assurances - no violation of the right to an effective remedy and to 
non-refoulement would take place. 
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Nevertheless, Section 6.4 also revealed how the negotiation of 
diplomatic assurances can de facto hamper refugees’ access to 
protection. In shifting from the study of the agreements per se to the 
their actual implementation, a string of cases show that seeking 
diplomatic assurances during the asylum determination phase 
contributes to defying the procedural safeguards of asylum 
mechanisms, such as the principle of confidentiality, thus affecting the 
final upshot of the proceedings and the fairness of the entire process. 
In some circumstances, asylum seekers have been rejected or 
excluded from refugee status/subsidiary protection after requesting 
diplomatic assurances from the home country. Deprived of their right 
to access administrative and judicial review of their 
exclusion/rejection decision and of the deportation order, they 
incurred violations of the right to an effective remedy. Finally, 
substantive international human rights case law, especially from the 
ECtHR, testifies to the risk of refoulement for people removed, 
generally on national security grounds, to countries of origin on the 
basis of diplomatic assurances against torture and ill-treatment. 
The above-examined judgments primarily concern people whose 
protection claims had been rejected or who were transferred on 
security grounds after exclusion from refugee status/subsidiary 
protection. However, in a few cases, the ECtHR has assessed 
diplomatic assurances as one of the elements to eradicate the risk of 
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ill-treatment toward asylum seekers before asylum procedures were 
completed. It is important to note that removal is not to the country of 
origin but to a ‘safe third country’ of transit. This Section intends to 
separately seize and examine this dangerous and unexplored anomaly 
in the system of protection, thereby questioning consequences for 
refugee rights. Generally, the Court reserves particular attention to the 
plight of asylum seekers as they belong to a particular vulnerable 
group.
1090
 Thus, whilst assessing the opportunity of removal with 
assurances, it underlines how most regard should be had 'to the fact 
that the measure is applicable not to those who have committed 
criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have 
fled from their own country.'
1091
 
The ECtHR heretofore has rejected the use of diplomatic 
assurances for refugees and asylum seekers, but it has to a certain 
extent endorsed them with regard to people whose protection claims 
had been denied or subjected to exclusion. Only time will tell whether 
the Court’s attitude toward asylum seekers will not be contaminated 
by the approach adopted with regard to people who, for different 
reasons, are not entitled to refugee protection. By now, it is worth 
observing how the ECtHR in few cases – which, therefore, do not 
amount to a trend in status nascendi - seems to have suggested to 
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contracting parties to negotiate assurances rather than taking 
responsibility for asylum seekers who are about to be removed or 
have already been removed.
1092
 In the Hirsi v Italy judgment, for 
example, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque proposed 'to provide the 
applicants with practical and effective access to an asylum procedure 
in Italy.'
1093
 By contrast, in its final recommendations, the Court 
unexpectedly urged the respondent State to take 'all possible steps to 
obtain assurances from the Libyan authorities that the applicants will 
not be subjected to treatments incompatible with Article 3 of the 
Convention or arbitrarily repatriated.'
1094
 
In the MSS v Belgium and Greece case, the Court affirmed that 
diplomatic assurances by Greece did not amount to a sufficient 
guarantee because they were worded in stereotyped terms and did not 
address the specific situation of the asylum seeker in question.
1095
 
However, the Court appears to foreshadow that accepting well 
detailed and individualized assurances would by all means be 
plausible if they were able to counteract any risk of ill-treatment. 
Without outlawing diplomatic assurances per se, the ECtHR proposes 
a case-by-case approach, with a special focus on the human rights 
situation of the readmitting country. Even countries where torture and 
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ill-treatment of detainees is known to be widespread and systematic 
have been considered safe, if adequate assurances are given. 
Moreover, as international human rights bodies and national courts 
have substantively recognized, in many cases, refoulement occurred 
as a consequence of expulsion of suspected terrorists under the 
auspices of assurances.
1096
 
In the Saadi v Italy case, the ECtHR rejected the UK’s argument 
that, in case of a threat to national security, stronger evidence has to 
be adduced to prove that the applicant would be at risk of torture or 
ill-treatment in the receiving country. In this view, the individual is 
not required to prove that a ‘real risk’ exists, but rather that such a risk 
is ‘more likely than not.’1097 Accordingly, the threshold for 
determining the safety and reliability of the readmitting country 
giving assurances is seemingly lower when dealing with people 
expelled on national security grounds, regardless of whether they are 
the object of an exclusion provision. Are we ready to exclude that this 
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threshold could one day not be applied also to asylum seekers 
transferred to a ‘safe third country’ or repatriated after diplomatic 
assurances have been used in the asylum proceedings? That would 
certainly amount to a procedural race to the bottom—someone could 
argue. States seem nevertheless eager and well-equipped to run such a 
race. 
 
6.6. Access to protection, diplomatic assurances, and 
MoUs: a concluding critique  
Considering diplomatic assurances as one typology of the 
cooperative arrangements EU Member States have set out to facilitate 
the removal of unauthorized migrants to third countries, they can 
smoothly be encompassed within the broad category of ‘agreements 
linked to readmission.’ However, to grasp the actual impact of 
assurances on refugees’ access to protection, both their content – 
whether framed or not within an MoU - and their actual negotiation 
and implementation by State authorities in single circumstances had to 
be examined. 
MoUs are written umbrella agreements, which set out the general 
framework of cooperation without specifying each and every right in 
detail. They lay out the mutual understanding on the treatment of the 
deportees in a general fashion, and inaugurate the diplomatic relations 
between the two involved States before an emergency arises in a 
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concrete case. They might stabilize relations pushing the readmitting 
State to improve its human rights condition in view of the agreement’s 
application. Individualized assurances, negotiated under a certain 
MoU when a particular need arises, instead contain the accord that the 
individual in question will not in fact be subjected to prohibited 
treatments.
1098
 Despite detailed assurances within MoUs can only give 
an initial overview of the intentions of the parties without ensuring the 
safety of the deportee, their further specificity in individual cases 
make them less likely to be mere pro forma commitments.
1099
 
In light of the above analysis, I argue that whilst the content of 
diplomatic assurances – whether or not inscribed within MoUs - does 
not seem to raise per se issues of incompatibility with refugee rights, 
the implementation of these bilateral agreements in concrete cases 
through individualized assurances may be questionable. MoUs are 
drafted with the intent to normalize diplomatic assurances, establish a 
common plan of action, and make human rights authoritative sources 
of reciprocal commitments. Pursuing the intent of progressively 
stabilizing bilateral relations, MoUs can be part of international 
cooperation, and have the effect of exercising pressure on the 
readmitting State to enhance the general human rights situation within 
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1099
 See, in this regard, also Jones 2006, 34. 
 516 
 
its territory for the sake of the construction of a safe and credible 
deportation policy with the sending country.  
Moreover, in the absence of clear guidelines on the role and use of 
diplomatic assurances, MoUs could serve the purpose of crafting a set 
of public minimum standards, which could guide States while 
negotiating more detailed assurances in specific cases. Indeed, no 
regulation of this practice exists, and international human rights 
organizations, as well as the Council of Europe and the Committee 
against Torture have opposed any proposals for the creation of 
guidelines pointing to best practices or setting minimum standards for 
the use of assurances.
1100
 Also the criteria crafted by the ECtHR to 
assess the reliability of a readmitting State can only be considered as 
preliminary benchmarks.
1101
 
The fact that an MoU enunciates clear-cut commitments does not 
bar the requesting State from seeking further specific assurances,
1102
 
and the individual in question from explaining why in that particular 
case, the assurances envisaged by the MoU are not enough. However, 
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even if MoUs are blanket agreements whose content is fulfilled in 
concreto through a case-by-case negotiation of human rights 
safeguards for a specific person, such individualized assurances might 
not be sufficient to consider ipso facto the readmitting State reliable 
with regard to the treatment of the deportee. It is also worth 
underlying that the unique UK’s diplomatic assurances programme, 
formalized within MoUs, which we take as units of analysis for this 
Chapter, could foreseeably act as a blueprint for other countries. 
States do not make return decisions on the basis of diplomatic 
assurances (either in the form of MoUs or individualized assurances). 
Nevertheless, assurances are one of the main elements - at times the 
most important one - States weigh in the balance while deciding on 
the expulsion of a person. The possibility of influencing the risk 
assessment is not a priori problematic, but it can turn out to be 
awkward where the mere existence of diplomatic assurances is 
assumed as both the primary criterion for rejection or exclusion from 
refugee status and complementary protection, or as a pre-condition to 
removal. In the case law of international human rights bodies, 
diplomatic assurances are generally upheld as one factor amongst 
many in the assessment of the risk, rather than trusted at face 
value.
1103
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At this point, it is to be asked what role they play, if any, in 
hampering refugees’ access to protection: that is to say, shelter from 
refoulement, and access to fair asylum procedures and effective 
remedies. In addressing this research question in the frame of Chapter 
6, we can rely on the set of cases reviewed in Section 6.4, some of 
which have had international resonance before human rights bodies.  
The key findings can be summarized as follows. First, even if 
assurances are considered legally permissible and able in principle to 
reduce the risk of refoulement, they are not always effective in 
practice in preventing torture,
1104
 as a result, national courts and, 
primarily, international human rights bodies have frequently held that 
refoulement took place or would take place upon removal. Second, if 
the exchange of assurances does not per se constitute a hurdle to 
asylum seekers’ access to asylum procedures, it might affect the 
fairness of the proceedings and alter the outcome of the decision-
making process. Indeed, most of the reviewed cases on the use of 
diplomatic assurances show how they have being implemented to 
speed up the process at the expenses of pre-return individual 
guarantees, such as the right to fair asylum procedures and effective 
remedies against rejection/exclusion and the decision of expulsion.   
                                                                                                                                                   
the applicants' extradition.’ See,  Shamayev and Others v Georgia and Russia, para 
345. 
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This ex ante crisis of guarantees assumes even more salience in an 
ex post perspective, as no enforcement mechanisms to protect 
deported individuals from the breach of a diplomatic assurance is 
envisaged. Negotiation of assurances must, therefore, be case-specific 
and consider the entire human rights situation in the readmitting 
country, including its torture track record, in order to verify whether 
assurances suffice to protect from such a risk. For example, it is not 
enough that the promisor has ratified international human rights 
instruments to consider it safe, but its compliance with human rights 
in concreto must be gauged. 
I hold the view that, in principle, the content of diplomatic 
assurances does not seem to raise problems of incompatibility with 
refugee rights. However, in practice, access of asylum seekers to 
protection can be hampered, especially if diplomatic assurances are 
assumed as one of the elements to eradicate the risk of ill-treatment 
toward asylum seekers before asylum procedures are completed, or 
even before asylum applications are actually submitted. Section 6.5 
interestingly examines this questionable hint of State practice. I thus 
wonder whether the lower threshold for determining the safety and 
reliability of a country giving assurances on people expelled on 
national security grounds might one day also be applied to asylum 
seekers removed before an examination of their claims or after 
diplomatic assurances have been used in their asylum proceedings. 
 520 
 
A dangerous employment of assurances may occur in at least five 
circumstances: i) when the assessment of the risk excessively relies on 
the assurances given by the readmitting government, primary source 
of the fear, without bringing into the picture the general human rights 
situation and the pervasiveness of torture in the receiving country; ii) 
when the receiving country has a history of failing both to comply 
with assurances and investigate the allegations of prohibited 
treatments against other detainees; iii) when the assurances are 
negotiated during the examination of the asylum claim, thus violating 
the principle of confidentiality and the right of an asylum seeker to 
access and enjoy fair asylum procedures; iv) when the existence of 
diplomatic assurances accelerates the rejection of the protection claim 
and the enforcement of the return procedures, thus preventing the 
individual from both challenging the decisions and having access to 
an effective remedy; v) when an efficient system of monitoring is 
lacking, and the government issuing the assurances is not able to 
enforce the agreement because of the lack of control of the territory or 
the security forces of the prison where the individual in question is 
detained. 
If obligations regarding the treatment of the deportees are 
altogether a priori considered non-legal, in the meaning of creating no 
new obligation to protect or monitor compliance with fundamental 
rights of the deportee, diplomatic assurances would amount to mere 
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‘pieces of paper.’1105 Therefore, by relying on what the parties 
objectively intended to agree on while negotiating and drafting the 
accord in a certain way, I believe that: i) rather than being wrapped in 
the debate on the formal classification of diplomatic assurances, a 
case-by-case approach on their legal status needs to be prioritized; ii) 
the ‘legally or not legally binding’ question is not, however, decisive 
for the purpose of grasping the impact diplomatic assurances have on 
the rights of refugees and deportees—focus of this study. Key to this 
question is, indeed, whether governments deem diplomatic assurances 
reliable in the assessment of the risk for the deportee. Reliability may 
be strengthened, for example, by means of monitoring mechanisms. 
Prospects of compliance can also depend on the willingness of a State 
to enhance its international standing, or on political calculations 
concerning possible benefits or sanctions in other related areas, such 
as trade or development aid. However, even if offered in good faith, 
an assurance is ‘not of itself a sufficient safeguard where doubts exist 
as to its effective implementation.’1106 
I believe that the fact that MoUs are blanket agreements does not 
mean they are neutral. Rather they constitute the matrix of any other 
contact between requesting and requested State; they formalize within 
a written accord the human rights commitments of a State with a 
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dismal human rights track record. Regardless of their legal status, the 
format of MoUs cannot be used as a ‘legal nicety’ to make ordinary a 
human rendition that common sense would de facto label as 
‘extraordinary.’ Using the law to veil an arrangement designed to 
remove a person to ‘interrogation as opposed to “justice”’1107 within 
the borders of a country notoriously known for its dubious techniques 
of questioning is at the very least objectionable. 
State practice does not stand in a vacuum, but it is the product of a 
normative setting which can be more or less well thought-out. It is this 
normative setting that legal scholars are prone to look at first. 
Nevertheless, it is through the observance of practice that we get 
better clues on the relevant law. Despite letting law and praxis run on 
two parallel lines, we need to continue to keep our eyes on both of 
them. We therefore would realize that, if the negotiation of diplomatic 
assurances in individual cases raises continuous condemnation and 
disapproval, this is also due to flaws in the applicable legislation. 
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Such awareness could induce us to engage in the game of regulation 
building on the fact that MoUs fail, for example, to mention ‘torture’ 
or ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’, or that they lack precision and 
accuracy with regard to monitoring, as well as enforcement and 
redress mechanisms in the event of a breach. While endorsing this 
criticism, I believe that amendments on further human rights 
safeguards in the text of MoUs would do little to sort the problem out. 
Even with new sophisticated monitoring procedures and enforcement 
mechanisms, there will always be limits in detecting torture and 
eliminating the personal risk for the deportee. 
A number of contradictions are inherent in the process of seeking 
assurances given that ‘even as the sending State seeks protection for 
one, so it acquiesces in the torture of others.’1108Moreover, it remains 
unanswered why States need to frame their human rights 
commitments within bilateral political agreements - despite being 
subject to judicial control - which replicate human rights standards 
that have already been enshrined within international human rights 
treaties creating clear binding obligations and mechanisms of 
individual complaints. 
The recent proliferation of diplomatic assurances and security-
related deportations symbolizes the new tendency of governments to 
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consider foreigners as a threat to public safety, thus strengthening the 
link between refugees and terrorists and jumbling the logic of 
protection with the logic of security.
1109
 For instance, the hysteria 
provoked by the decisions of the Strasbourg Court and British courts 
to stay the deportation of Abu Qatada has to be read in light of the 
endeavour of British governments to clear their streets, at all costs, 
from foreign-born suspected terrorists.
1110
 The same considerations 
can be extended to any other countries engaged in the fight against 
terrorism. 
Generally speaking, executives have sought diplomatic assurances 
either in the form of MoUs or individualized assurances, and national 
courts have in the main upheld their use. In some circumstances, 
assurances against the death penalty – if issued by the judiciary - 
might be deemed trustworthy instruments that enhance the regime of 
protection owed to extradited persons. Given that the safety of return 
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is a matter of fact,
1111
 I deem highly problematical, from a human 
rights and refugee law perspective, the possibility of returning a 
person, with the assurance she will not be tortured, to a country where 
torture is a systematic practice. Accordingly, I believe States should 
refrain from relying on diplomatic assurances - whether framed or not 
within standardized MoUs - with countries that persist in the use of 
torture. 
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Chapter 7. Pre-Arrival Interception and Agreements 
for Technical and Police Cooperation  
 
7.1. Introduction 
In the context of the pro-active management of European frontiers, 
diverse bilateral strategies have been devised to keep migrants and 
refugees away from the EU’s territory or rapidly remove them. These 
strategies have been attempted through various types of agreements 
linked to readmission between EU Member States and non-EU third 
countries of origin or provenance of migrants. While both standard 
readmission agreements and diplomatic assurances are being used to 
return foreigners who have already crossed the EU borders, 
agreements for technical and police cooperation are being negotiated 
to set up joint patrols for the pre-emptive containment of unwanted 
arrivals in Europe. 
Drawing a line of demarcation between pre-arrival and post-arrival 
returns, this Chapter focuses on readmission performed before 
individuals enter into the territory of a EU Member State, bearing in 
mind that during interdiction and diversion manoeuvres outside the 
territorial jurisdiction of the EU destination country, the phases of 
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arrival (or non-admission) and return virtually overlap.
1112
 The 
arrangements used for preventing access to the EU territory may be 
deemed as an underlying component of the progressive 
externalization of migration controls – either in the territorial waters 
of a third country or on the high seas,
1113
 with the expectation of 
diluting State responsibilities by letting refugees ‘fall into a gaping 
crack in the human rights system.’1114 Since refugees often travel in 
mixed flows, crossing the sea by boat together with migrants, 
restrictive external migration controls can also end up affecting the 
rights of people genuinely in need of protection.
1115
 
According to available records, in May 2009, Italy embarked on a 
forcible and indiscriminate return policy, deflecting hundreds of 
people to North Africa before they could enter the territorial waters of 
a EU Member State. The Italy-Libya push-back campaign will, 
therefore, be a key case study to explore: i) whether bilateral 
agreements for technical and police cooperation provide the legal 
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framework for the forced return of intercepted refugees to countries of 
embarkation; ii) and whether pre-arrival interceptions and forced 
return can hamper refugees’ access to protection in Europe. 
It is worth noting that any enquiry into State practice is fraught 
with an unavoidable degree of uncertainty due to the inaccessibility of 
relevant information. For instance, in the case of interdictions on the 
high seas resulting in the handover of migrants and refugees to the 
country of embarkation, ambiguity and uncertainty are caused by the 
lack of transparency and absence of monitoring mechanisms, such as 
media, NGOs, and international organizations.
1116
 In order to 
compensate such vagueness and grasp the main functions of 
agreements for technical and police cooperation, this Chapter has 
chosen to pivot the entire analysis around a single case study. The 
arrangements between Italy and Libya are therefore used as a 
reference frame to better comprehend this category of agreements, 
whose content can vary from country to country. 
 The push-back campaign is, arguably, the most controversial 
policy ever adopted by a European government to combat irregular 
immigration by sea. In February 2012, the ECtHR delivered a 
landmark judgment in the Hirsi v Italy case by holding that Italy had 
extraterritorial human rights obligations with regard to twenty-four 
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refugees from Somalia and Eritrea handed over to Libyan authorities 
after being intercepted by Italian warships. Italy exercised, indeed, 
‘effective control and authority’ over intercepted migrants, thus 
creating a ‘jurisdictional link’ between the State and the individuals 
concerned.  
As a consequence of the events of 2011 – both the indiscriminate 
lethal force used by the Gaddafi government to retain power, and the 
Italian involvement in the humanitarian intervention against the 
Libyan government – their bilateral agreements have been suspended. 
Despite the end of the war in Libya and the death of Colonel Gaddafi, 
this study remains relevant for the following reasons. First, there is 
still a need to establish, if any, the legal framework underpinning the 
2009 push-back campaign. Second, southern European States 
continue to face influxes of seaborne migrants and refugees from 
North Africa, and urgently need guidance about clear-cut 
extraterritorial human rights obligations,
1117
 and possible types of 
responsibility they could incur according to general international law. 
Third, in March 2011, the Libyan rebels’ leader promised that the 
post-Gaddafi Libyan Government would respect all agreements 
concluded between Italy and the Gaddafi regime.
1118
 As a 
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consequence, the new governments in place in both Italy and Libya 
are re-establishing cooperation in the field of migration control and 
intend to resume the agreements for technical and police cooperation 
signed in 2007 and 2009. Fourth, sea routes constantly change and, in 
their attempt to reach Europe, people continue to opt for increasingly 
perilous and difficult journeys. Accordingly, new bilateral agreements 
might be negotiated.
1119
 Therefore, the legal analysis of the Italy–
Libya case is pertinent for other situations in which refugees are 
encountered in extraterritorial settings by EU or non-EU third 
countries performing exit border controls in cooperation with EU 
Member States.  
 
7.1.1. Structure of the chapter 
Sections 7.2 and 7.3 provide an initial overview of State practice 
and the content of the agreements for technical and police 
cooperation. This background analysis offers a thorough portrayal of 
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the plethora of bilateral arrangements between Italy and Libya, some 
of which have not been published. Although the content of these 
accords and the practice of push-backs have sparked the interest of 
scholars and human rights practitioners, the subject has often been 
laden with confusion from both a terminological and substantive point 
of view. However, only when the main terms of the accords at issue 
are clarified, including their purpose, and the rules of engagement 
they set up, can the far more complex issues be examined, such as: the 
legal basis underpinning the push-back campaign; the assessment of 
whether access to protection is hampered by the implementation of 
these accords; and responsibility under general international law of a 
EU Member State cooperating with a third country in migration 
control. 
Through the scrutiny of the diverging motivations advanced by 
Italy to justify diversion operations at sea, Section 7.4 investigates 
whether either the 2007 and 2009 Protocols or the 2008 Partnership 
Treaty (individually taken) stand per se as the legal basis for push-
backs. Section 7.5 shows how the legal analysis of the Italy–Libya 
case is pertinent for other situations in which States within or outside 
the EU (in primis the US and Australia) entrust or used to entrust third 
countries of provenance of migrants and refugees with the duty of 
patrolling both their territorial and international waters to deter 
unauthorized immigration. Section 7.5.1 offers an overview of the 
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main tasks of Frontex, the EU Agency involved in both the integrated 
management of the external borders and in the prevention of 
unauthorized entries, especially by sea.  
 Section 7.6 illustrates how refugees’ access to protection – 
understood here as the combination of non-refoulement and access to 
asylum procedures and effective remedies - is undermined by the 
enforcement of maritime pre-arrival interceptions. Section 7.7 argues 
that EU Member States could be held indirectly accountable, under 
Article 16 of the International Law Commission Articles on State 
Responsibility (ILC Articles)
1120
 for an internationally wrongful act 
committed by a third country by means of its ‘aiding and assisting’ 
the third country in illicit operations. By depicting the main elements 
of the Italy–Libya cooperation, a possible reading of the State 
responsibility riddle in the case of violations of the principle of non-
refoulement is offered.  
As a free-standing part, Section 7.7 aims to examine whether State 
responsibility under general international law can be triggered in the 
case of joint operations of migration control. This issue emerges as a 
novelty if compared with previous Chapters, which confined 
themselves to assess whether States comply with primary obligations 
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under international human rights and refugee law treaties by ensuring 
access to protection to refugees and asylum seekers.  
It should be finally observed that one of the main problems in 
pronouncing on the responsibility of EU Member States in cases of 
joint migration controls has been the lack of information about the 
relevant accords and their implementation. For example, whereas the 
engagement rules within the bilateral agreements normally entrust 
Libya with the enforcement of the patrols, the actual execution of the 
accords may give rise to more complex operational scenarios, where 
Italian authorities are also implicated to varying degrees.  
 
7.2. Deflection en route to Libya: a narrative of facts 
According to available records, between 6 May and 6 November 
2009, 834 persons were driven back to Libya and twenty-three to 
Algeria through the autonomous intervention of Italian vessels 
deployed in the course of nine different maritime operations run by 
Italian forces belonging to the Guardia di Finanza (Revenue Police), 
the Marina Militare (Navy) and the Guardia Costiera (Coast Guard) 
and coordinated by the Central Directorate for Immigration and 
Borders Police within the Department of Public Security (Ministry of 
the Interior).
1121
 
                                                 
1121
UNHCR, Submission in the Case of Hirsi, March 2010, para 2.1.3, 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4b97778d2.pdf> accessed 20 August 2013. 
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On two different occasions (6 May and 30 August 2009), the 
people affected by the push-back activities were transported back to 
Libya directly by Italian authorities after being transferred from their 
unseaworthy boats onto Italian vessels. Italy was, thus, unilaterally 
responsible for running the maritime part of the operation. On these 
occasions, migrants and refugees - who had not been informed that 
the Italian ships where directed to return to Libyan ports - were 
compelled by force to disembark and were handed over to Libyan 
officials. During other operations, intercepted people were, instead, 
handed over by Italian authorities to Libyan patrol boats, the latter 
operated by joint Libyan and Italian crews.
1122
 
If 2009 push-backs were preceded by similar cases of deflections 
to Libya in 2004–5, and also, in the late nineties, to Albania, the 
significant difference in the recent Italian interdictions is their 
systematic nature.
1123
 Interdictions and joint push-backs of boat 
migrants continued even in 2010, albeit in different forms. After the 
signature of the 2009 Protocol, Libyan authorities started to show 
their determination by intercepting migrants on the high seas or in 
                                                                                                                                                   
See also, CPT, Report to the Italian Government on the visit to Italy carried out by 
the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 27 to 31 July 2009, 28 April 2010 
<http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/ita/2010-inf-14-eng.pdf> accessed 20 August 
2013 (CPT Report). While these operations were generally conducted by the Coast 
Guard and the Revenue Police, the Italian Navy intervened only twice. The push-
back issue had already been introduced in Section 2.5.3.1 of this thesis. 
1122
UNHCR, Submission in the Case of Hirsi, para 2.1.5. 
1123Alfredo Terrasi, ‘I Respingimenti in Mare di Migranti alla Luce della 
Convenzione Europea dei Diritti Umani’ (2009) 3 DUDI 591. 
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Libyan territorial waters with vessels and technical equipment 
supplied by the Italian government, even entering the Search and 
Rescue (SAR) zone administered by Malta.
1124
 
While Italy and Malta had initially contributed with their officials 
or their own vessels to interdiction operations, in 2010 they attempted 
to withdraw, letting Libya do the job of intercepting migrants near 
Malta or Lampedusa, and returning them to African ports.
1125
 While, 
by 4 April in 2010, only 170 migrants appear to have landed on 
Sicilian shores that year, the number was 4,573 individuals in the 
corresponding period in 2009. If we may assume that a comparable 
number of migrants attempted crossings in 2010 and 2009 
                                                 
1124
After a summit between Italy, Malta, and Libya in early July 2009, the 
representatives of these three countries adhered to a new ‘Strategy for the 
Mediterranean’ aimed at strengthening their collaboration in the control, 
identification, and repatriation of migrants intercepted at sea. This enhanced, 
triangular relationship immediately gave rise to questionable practices, on the basis 
of which refugees started to be interdicted in the Search and Rescue (SAR) zone 
administered by Malta by those Libyan vessels offered by Italy under the framework 
of their bilateral cooperation. As a general note, anyone that attempts to reach Italy 
by sea has to pass through Maltese SAR waters. See, Italia-Malta: Vertice 
Intergovernativo a Roma sui Temi di Strategia Mediterranea, 
<http://www.esteri.it/MAE/AR/Sala_Stampa/ArchivioNotizie/Approfondimenti/201
0/07/20100708_ItaliaMalta.htm?LANG=AR> accessed 20 August 2013. 
1125
For example, on 22 July 2010, twenty-seven Somali asylum seekers out of a 
group of fifty-five people were diverted to Libya, without setting foot in Europe, 
separating members of the same family. See, Sansone Kurt, ‘Somali Migrant 
Separated from Pregnant Wife during Rescue’ Times of Malta (22 July 2010) 
<http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20100722/local/somali-migrant-
separated-from-pregnant-wife-during-rescue> accessed 20 August 2013. Irregular 
inflows of entrants persisted in 2010 and in 2011 through disembarkation of 
thousands of migrants and refugees on Sicilian shores via more perilous and 
difficult routes, in particular via Tunisia. See, Alessandra Ziniti, ‘Immigrati 
Continuano gli Sbarchi: un Flop i Respingimenti in Mare’ Repubblica (8 August 
2010). On the Egyptian route, see, Tobias Zick, ‘Egypt Plays down Reported 
Eritrean Refugee Hostage Crisis in Sinai’ Global Crisis Solution Centre (19 
December 2010) 
<http://www.everyonegroup.com/EveryOne/MainPage/Entries/2010/12/19_Egypt_P
lays_Down_Reported_EritreanRefugeeHostageCrisisIn_Sinai.html> accessed 20 
August 2013. 
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respectively, then the suspected deflection rate is higher than 96 per 
cent.
1126
 By 13 July in 2011, 50,236 migrants had reached Italy by sea 
that year, as a consequence of migratory waves triggered by North 
African revolutions.
1127
 
Since bilateral cooperation on readmission primarily purports to 
confront the ‘humanitarian crisis’ deepened by the flight of thousands 
seeking better living conditions in Europe, regardless of the status of 
the asylum system in readmitting countries, the words of the Frontex 
deputy executive director, Gil Arias Fernández, carry particular 
weight: 
 
 Based on our statistics, we are able to say that the agreements [between Libya 
and Italy] have had a positive impact. On the humanitarian level, fewer lives have 
been put at risk, due to fewer departures. But our agency [Frontex] does not have 
the ability to confirm if the right to request asylum as well as other human rights is 
being respected in Libya.
1128 
 
                                                 
1126
 Fulvio Vassallo Paleologo, ‘Respingimento ed Accordi di Riammissione – Sotto 
Accusa l’Italia che non è un Paese Sicuro per Richiedenti Asilo’ (Meltingpot, 31 
January 2011) <http://www.meltingpot.org/articolo16259.html> accessed 20 August 
2013.. 
1127Migrantes Online, ‘Più di 50mila immigrati sbarcati da gennaio a oggi’ (13 July 
2011) 
<http://www.migrantesonline.it/siti_migrantes/migrantes_online/00005082_Piu_di_
50mila_immigrati_sbarcati_da_gennaio_a_oggi_.html> accessed 20 August 2013. 
1128
 Human Rights Watch, ‘Pushed Back, Pushed Around: Italy’s Forced Return of 
Boat Migrants and Asylum Seekers, Libya’s Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum 
Seekers’ (21 September 2009) 37 <http://www.hrw.org/en/node/85585> accessed 
20 August 2013. 
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It is important to emphasize that neither the denial of entry of a 
vessel into territorial waters, nor the refusal to allow disembarkation, 
amount per se to a breach of the principle of non-refoulement. For 
such a violation to occur, it is necessary that interdiction results in the 
physical return of intercepted refugees to territories (either countries 
of origin or transit) where their life and liberty would be 
threatened.
1129
 The evaluation of a third country’s safety is, therefore, 
a conditio sine qua non for EU Member States to avoid responsibility 
both under human rights treaties and general international law. 
Especially in those instances where migrants and refugees are 
preventively interdicted on the high sea or in the territorial waters of a 
third country, ‘the less one may rely on the ex post control by [EU] 
courts and tribunals (which is the very idea of outsourcing), the more 
we need to engage in an ex ante control.’1130 
At the same time, regardless of whether a State is considered 
generally safe because of the presence of adequate asylum procedures 
and judicial oversight, every individual should be entitled to rebut the 
presumption of safety of that country for him or her in their particular 
case.
1131
 Even when States are faced with mounting pressure of mass 
                                                 
1129
 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, 277–8. 
1130
 Gregor Noll, ‘Law and the Logic of Outsourcing: Offshore Processing and 
Diplomatic Assurances’ (Refugee Protection in International Law, Contemporary 
Challenges Workshop, Oxford, 24 April 2006) 1. 
1131
 Thomas Spijkerboer, ‘Stretching the Limits. European Maritime Border Control 
Policies and International Law’ in MC Foblets (ed), The External Dimension of the 
Immigration & Asylum Policy of the EU (Bruylant 2009). 
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flows of migrants and refugees by sea, their discretion in determining 
how to react is not absolute and a duty exists for contracting 
governments, not only under refugee and human rights law, but also 
under the law of the sea and, more particularly, under the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to cooperate to assist 
ships’ masters in delivering persons rescued at sea to a ‘place of 
safety’,1132 meant, in general terms, as a location where basic human 
needs are met and where ‘rescue operations are considered to 
terminate.’1133 
In the case of the 2009 push-backs, the Italian government branded 
Libya as a safe haven for migrants and asylum seekers: although it 
had not ratified the Geneva Convention, it was party to the 1969 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa, and had accepted, on an informal basis, the presence of the 
UNHCR.
1134
 Also, several agreements had been concluded between 
Italy and Libya that committed them to act in compliance with the UN 
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 
Nevertheless, the inadequacy of Libya’s response to the flow of 
                                                 
1132
 See, amendments to both the International Convention on Maritime Search and 
Rescue (SAR) and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS) (adopted May 2004, entered into force 1 July 2006). Amendment to c V 
of SOLAS and to cc III and IV of the SAR. Resolutions MSC.155 (78) and 
MSC.153 (78), 20 May 2004. 
1133
 IMO Resolution 167 (78), Annex 34, Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons 
Rescued at Sea (adopted 20 May 2004) para 6.12. 
1134
 The OAU Convention commits Libya to guarantee protection to people 
undergoing persecution and fleeing from dangerous geographical zones. 
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migrants and refugees had been well documented. If abuses escalated 
further in early 2011, the Gaddafi regime’s treatment of migrants had 
been known to undermine human rights for a long time. 
 
7.3. Overview of the bilateral agreements linked to readmission 
between Italy and Libya 
States avail themselves of bilateral agreements for technical and 
police cooperation to combat irregular immigration and trans-border 
crimes, such as terrorism, illegal traffic of drugs, trafficking of human 
beings, and organized crime. For the purpose of this thesis, this 
wording is used to indicate arrangements between two States, Italy 
and Libya, which aim to establish a common action against 
unauthorized immigration by means of a program of joint patrols 
resulting in naval interdiction and deflection of intercepted boats to 
the ports of departure. 
Trying to analyze all the informal bilateral agreements, on the basis 
of which Libyan authorities both authorized Italian vessels to cross 
Libyan territorial waters, and accepted readmission of intercepted 
migrants in each single operation, is a painstaking process. Moreover, 
the content of some of these instruments remain unpublished and 
detailed information is often missing. Inevitably, therefore, some 
comments in the following analysis can only be tentative. 
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On 13 December 2000, Italy and Libya initiated their bilateral 
cooperation on irregular migration.
1135
 A Memorandum was signed in 
January 2006 concerning the common engagement in the fight against 
irregular immigration culminating in a Protocol
1136
 and an Additional 
Operating and Technical Protocol on cooperation in the fight against 
irregular immigration (Protocol and Additional Protocol), signed on 
29 December 2007.
1137
 The 2007 accords assume great prominence 
because, for the first time, Italy and Libya concluded arrangements to 
ensure practical operability of the commitments made in the 2000 
Agreement, which was limited to generically recommending the 
parties to exchange information and provide mutual assistance and 
cooperation. 
A Treaty on Friendship, Partnership, and Cooperation (Partnership 
Treaty) was concluded in Tripoli on 30 August 2008.
1138
 This 
                                                 
1135
The Agreement in question concerned collaboration in the fight against 
terrorism, organized crime, illegal traffic of drugs, and irregular immigration, on the 
basis of which the two countries exchanged information on irregular immigration 
and ensured reciprocal assistance to combat this phenomenon. See, Accordo tra la 
Repubblica Italiana e la Gran Giamahiria Araba Libica Popolare Socialista per la 
Collaborazione nella Lotta al Terrorismo, alla Criminalità Organizzata, al Traffico 
Illegale di Stupefacenti e Sostanze  sicotrope e All’Immigrazione Clandestina 
(Rome, 13 December 2000). Another agreement was reached in July 2003 intended 
to define the modalities of cooperation between respective police authorities for the 
purpose of preventing unauthorized flows from Africa, but its content has never 
been published. 
1136
Protocollo tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Gran Giamahiria Araba Libica 
Popolare Socialista (Tripoli, 29 December 2007) (Protocol). 
1137
Protocollo Aggiuntivo Tecnico-Operativo al Protocollo di Cooperazone tra la 
Repubblica Italiana e la Gran Giamahiria Araba Libica Popolare Socialista, per 
fronteggiare il fenomeno dell’immigrazione Clandestina (Tripoli, 29 December 
2007) (Additional Protocol). 
1138
Trattato di Amicizia, Partenariato, e Cooperazione (Bengazi, 30 August 2008) 
ratified by Italy with Law no2009/7 (Partnership Treaty). 
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Partnership Treaty was followed by the negotiation of an Executive 
Protocol to the 2007 agreements, signed on 4 February 2009, which 
still remains unpublished.
1139
 The 2008 Partnership Treaty reshaped 
the system of legal sources by incorporating in Article 19 the 
commitments previously adopted by the parties – especially the 2000 
Agreement and the 2007 Protocols – to intensifying bilateral 
cooperation in the fight against terrorism, organized crime, traffic of 
drugs, and irregular immigration. For the purpose of this Chapter, the 
arrangements under scrutiny are the 2007 and 2009 technical 
Protocols, as well as the 2008 Partnership Treaty.
1140
 
The content of the 2007 arrangements (Protocol and Additional 
Protocol) – which should be jointly examined – was disclosed only in 
2009. Pursuant to Article 1(1) of the Additional Protocol, the parties 
agreed to establish joint missions whereby Libya committed to 
patrolling both its coastline and international waters while Italy agreed 
to supply its Southern-Mediterranean partner with six vessels on a 
temporary basis. Also, under Article 5 of the Protocol, Italy availed 
itself of the EU budget for the construction of a system to control 
Libyan territorial and maritime frontiers to combat the phenomenon of 
                                                 
1139
Protocollo Aggiuntivo Tecnico-Operativo concernente l’aggiunta di un articolo 
al Protocollo firmato a Tripoli il 29/12/2007 tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Gran 
Giamahiria Araba Libica Popolare Socialista, per fronteggiare il fenomeno 
dell’immigrazione clandestina (Tripoli, 4 February 2009) (Executive Protocol). 
1140
 The Italian language is used mainly with regard to those provisions of the 
bilateral agreements that are particularly crucial for reconstructing both the purpose 
of these instruments and the legal basis of push-back operations. The texts of the 
accords, done only in Italian and Arabic, are equally authentic. 
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unauthorized migration to Europe.
1141
 For the first ninety days 
operations were to be conducted by a mixed crew, as a training 
period, after which the Italian personnel on board were to be 
progressively reduced (Article 1(4)).
1142
 A Joint Operations Command 
under the responsibility of a representative appointed by Libya, and a 
vice-commandant appointed by Italy – with advisory tasks – was 
created with the purpose of arranging daily enforcement patrols. 
Libyan authorities were, thus, totally entrusted with the command 
and responsibility for any initiative taken during operational missions, 
as Article 1(5) of the 2007 Additional Protocol reads: 
 
… Il Comando delle unità navali temporaneamente cedute sarà assunto da 
personale individuato dalla Parte Libica, che sarà responsabile della condotta della 
                                                 
1141
 Under Article 5, ‘Italy commits itself to cooperate with the EU in the provision 
of a system of control of territorial and maritime frontiers in order to combat the 
phenomenon of irregular migration. The construction of this system will be entirely 
funded by the EU [...] (my translation). The Italian version reads as follows: 
‘L’Italia si impegna a cooperare con l’Unione Europea per la fornitura, con 
finanziamento a carico del bilancio comunitario, di un sistema di controllo per le 
frontiere terrestri e marittime libiche, al fine di fronteggiare il fenomeno 
dell’immigrazione clandestina [...].’ 
1142
 It is worth observing that the Italian government decided to put a stop to the 
presence of Italian personnel aboard Libyan vessels after an incident occurred on 12 
September 2010. On this date, one of the vessels supplied by Italy to Libya and run 
by a mixed crew fired at a Sicilian trawler. See, Repubblica, ‘I libici mitragliano un 
pescherreccio. Finanzieri italiani sulla nave di Tripoli’ (13 September 2010) 
<http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2010/09/13/news/i_libici_mitragliano_un_pesche
reccio_finanzieri_italiani_sulla_nave_di_tripoli-7043116/> accessed 20 August 
2013.. 
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navigazione e delle inziative assunte sia nel corso delle crociere addestrative che di 
quelle operative (emphasis added).
1143
 
 
Under Article 2 of the 2007 Protocol, Italian officials were 
employed on board vessels only to conduct training activities, to give 
technical assistance, and for maintenance of the vessels.
1144
 When a 
Libyan vessel intercepted a boat, and either escorted or towed it back 
to a North African port, competence attaches to Libya itself, thus 
excluding Italy from the exercise of any kind of legal authority over 
returned migrants and refugees.
1145
 
Neither the Protocols concluded in December 2007 nor the 2009 
Executive Protocol expressly prescribed rules for the interception and 
deflection to Libya of seaborne migrants halted by Italian authorities 
in international waters or closer to the Italian territory.
1146
 Therefore, 
the legality of both the naval interdiction and bilateral readmission 
                                                 
1143
 Article 1(5) can be translated as follows: ‘The command of the temporarily 
given vessels  will be taken by Libyan personnel, who will be responsible for 
navigation and any activities undertaken in the course of both training and operative 
missions.’ 
1144
 Under Article 2, ‘… I mezzi imbarcheranno equipaggi misti con personale 
libico e con personale di polizia italiano per l’attività di addestramento, di 
formazione, di assistenza tecnica all’impiego, e manutenzione dei mezzi […].’ 
1145
 This conclusion is also backed by the words of the Italian Ambassador in 
Tripoli. See, Trupiano, ‘Indagine conoscitiva sulle nuove politiche Europee in 
materia di immigrazione’ (Audition before the Parliamentary Committee monitoring 
the implementation of the Schengen Code, Europol’s activity, and migration-related 
issues, Rome, 13 October 2009) 5 
<http://www.camera.it/470?stenog=/_dati/leg16/lavori/stenbic/30/2009/1013&pagin
a=s020> accessed 3 January 2012. 
1146
See, Terrasi 2009, 1; see also, generally, Seline Trevisanut, ‘Immigrazione 
Clandestina via Mare e Cooperazione fra Italia e Libia dal Punto di Vista del Diritto 
del Mare’ (2009) 3 DUDI 609. 
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programs will be mainly discussed in relation to their modalities of 
execution. Article 19 of the 2008 Partnership Treaty provided an 
‘intensification of the ongoing cooperation in the context of the fight 
against terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and clandestine 
migration.’1147 It also committed the parties to developing bilateral 
and regional initiatives to collaborate to prevent the irregular 
departure of migrants directly in the countries of origin.  
Furthermore, mixed crews patrol Libyan coasts on vessels supplied 
by Italy, while land borders are subjected to a satellite detection 
system jointly financed by Italy and the European Union. Italy and 
Libya strengthened their technical and financial assistance in the 
framework of the Friendship Treaty in 2008 and the Executive 
Protocol in 2009, on the basis of which Italy supplied Libya with six 
vessels on a permanent ground. In light of the new circumstances, a 
different and more collaborative patrolling practice was put in place to 
perform their contractual duties on irregular migration control. It is 
also worth observing that no delimitation ratione personae is made in 
the text of these technical agreements, and no distinction is drawn 
between nationals and third country nationals, or between asylum 
seekers and all other irregular migrants. 
                                                 
1147
 Pursuant to Article 7(2) of the Decree of the Minister of Interior of 14 July 
2003, vessels suspected of being used in the transportation of irregular migrants 
may be stopped, with a view to their possible deflection to the ports of departure. 
See, <http://www.stranieriinitalia.it/briguglio/immigrazione-
easilo/2003/settembre/decreto-mininterno-14-7-03.html#_ftn1> accessed 3 January 
2012. 
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7.4. In search of a legal foundation for push-backs to Libya 
Studying the content of agreements for technical and police 
cooperation and looking for a legal basis in cases of joint migration 
control serves three purposes. First, it helps answer one of this thesis’ 
research questions on the relationship between agreements linked to 
the readmission of unauthorized migrants and the decision to return 
refugees to countries of origin or transit. Second, the diverse legal 
bases put forward by the Italian government to justify its cooperation 
with Libya also show that Italy ought to know about the treatment of 
migrants and refugees in Libya. Sovereign discretion cannot warrant 
displacement of fundamental rights, first and foremost the principle of 
non-refoulement. EU Member States, in casu Italy, have a duty to 
abide by international refugee and human rights law, whether they are 
either engaged in the implementation of search and rescue operations, 
anti-smuggling activities, or the performance of migration controls in 
tandem with another country. 
Third, identifying the framework within which controversial 
practices susceptible of involving State responsibility were executed 
help understand the actual role played by bilateral agreements for 
technical and police cooperation. Gaining knowledge of the rules of 
engagement and the subdivision of responsibilities enables an 
assessment of both the different legal competences of the two States, 
and the degree of assistance provided by Italy to Libya. It also 
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contributes to better assessing which State would have primary 
responsibility in the case of human rights violations, and to what 
extent the other State could be indirectly complicit in the commission 
of an international wrongful act. Moreover, the analysis of a topical 
case, such as the Italy-Libya cooperation, contributes to showing how 
de-territorialized State action can undercut the rights of refugees 
intercepted before entering the territorial jurisdiction of the European 
intercepting country.  
A purposive interpretation of some critical provisions of the 
bilateral accords for technical and police cooperation – an 
interpretation that does not overstretch the literal reading of the text – 
reveals how return to Libyan soil is the inevitable and foreseeable 
outcome of a cooperation policy that expressly pursues the goal of 
preventing and combating unauthorized arrivals to Europe by 
patrolling international waters and the Libyan coasts.
1148
  The 
interception of ships and their diversion to a third country, or the act 
of handing migrants over to the authorities of a third State are not 
powers expressly prescribed in the 2009 Executive Protocol or in the 
2007 agreements for technical and police cooperation. Thus, the 
                                                 
1148
 The return-related purpose of the push-back policy has been confirmed by the 
CPT Report, 11. See also, Article 1(1) and (3) of the Preamble to the 2007 
Additional Protocol. For case law and doctrine on treaty interpretation based on the 
‘ordinary meaning’ of the text and its ‘object and purpose’, refer to Section 1.6.4. of 
this thesis. 
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question where this enforcement jurisdiction can be inferred from 
remains open, and as such deserves further discussion.
1149
 
Nevertheless, a bona fide interpretation of a number of provisions 
implicitly entails recognition of the underlying purpose of these 
accords, namely, the restriction of undocumented migration to Europe 
through a program of technical and police cooperation with Libya.
1150
 
This goal is also corroborated, as outlined below, by the numerous 
statements of representatives of the Italian and Libyan 
governments.
1151
 In the framework of the intensive technical 
cooperation and financial support crafted by these bilateral 
instruments of migration control, Libya undertook to readmit migrants 
and refugees intercepted by either Italian or Libyan authorities after 
transiting through Libya on their way to Europe.  
However, it is likely that further instruments, which are not readily 
available, have played a role in shaping the push-back campaign: for 
instance, ad hoc notes exchanged by competent border authorities, or 
other informal accords, where consent is given by fax or telephone, on 
the basis of which both Italian vessels were authorized to enter Libyan 
territorial waters, and Libya assented to the readmission of third 
                                                 
1149
 See, on this point, Section 7.4.3. 
1150
 The joint commitment to the struggle against illegal immigration is reiterated in 
the preambles of the 2007 Protocols and in Article 19 of the 2008 Partnership 
Treaty. 
1151
 Also the ECtHR in the Hirsi v Italy judgment has affirmed that push-backs in 
May 2009 were carried out with the intention of preventing irregular migrants from 
disembarking on Italian soil. See, Hirsi v Italy, para 181. 
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country nationals. As far as the push-backs of 6 May 2009 are 
concerned, the Italian Ministry of the Interior declared that the 
authorization by the Libyan government for the readmission of 
migrants was issued during the night, after long negotiations.
1152
 My 
hypothesis is that neither the 2007 and 2009 technical Protocols, nor 
the 2008 Partnership Treaty, stand per se as the legal basis of push-
backs, but this series of agreements, taken as a whole, constitutes the 
legal and political framework within which the 2009 push-backs were 
performed.  
In its official response to the Council of Europe Committee on the 
Prevention of Torture (CPT) during its July 2009 mission to Italy, the 
Italian government put forward diverse and incongruous legal 
justifications for its push-back policy.
1153
 As discussed in the 
following subsections, the main explanations advanced by the Italian 
government to validate push-backs are: SAR measures, migration 
control activities in pursuance of the Protocol on the Smuggling of 
Migrants, and police operations carried out by Italy on behalf of Libya 
to return to the country of departure those who had irregularly evaded 
border controls. These arguments are analyzed below, bearing in mind 
the existence of two different legal frames authorizing, on the one 
                                                 
1152
 See, Meltingpot, ‘Migranti riaccompagnati in Libia’ (7 May 2009) 
<http://www.meltingpot.org/articolo14467.html> accessed 20 August 2013. 
1153
 Response of the Italian Government to the CPT Report, app I (Response Italian 
Government) <http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/ita/2010-inf-15-eng.pdf> accessed 
20 August 2013. 
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hand, interception or rescue operations on the high seas, and, on the 
other hand, the return of migrants and refugees to the country of 
embarkation. 
 
7.4.1. Search and rescue? 
First, interventions have been labelled as ‘search and rescue’ 
operations, requiring EU Member States’ vessels to disembark 
rescued people to a ‘place of safety’, broadly defined as ‘a place 
where the rescue operations are considered to have been 
completed.’1154 A ‘place of safety’, however, ‘is not necessarily the 
closest one to the place where people were rescued.’1155 Pursuant to 
Article 98(1) of the UNCLOS, ‘every State shall require the master of 
a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without serious danger 
to the ship, the crew, or the passengers […] to render assistance to any 
person found at sea in danger of being lost’ and ‘to proceed with all 
possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their 
need of assistance.’ Similarly, the SOLAS Convention provides that 
‘[t]he master of a ship at sea which is in a position to be able to 
provide assistance, on receiving a signal from any source that persons 
are in distress at sea, is bound to proceed with all speed to their 
                                                 
1154
 The SAR Convention sets the duty to disembark the shipwrecked in a ‘safe 
place.’ See also, the IMO Resolution MCS 167/78 of 20 May 2004 and the 
amendments to the SAR and SOLAS Conventions. 
1155
 See, Response Italian Government, para c. 
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assistance…’1156 No delimitation ratione personae is made, and ‘any 
person’ in distress at sea can benefit from the SAR obligations falling 
upon States.
1157
 
The State holding primary responsibility for the delivery of the 
intercepted migrants to a ‘place of safety’ is the State responsible for 
the SAR region where assistance is rendered.
1158
 Broadly speaking, 
under maritime law, only the flag State has jurisdiction over a vessel 
on the high seas but in the case of boat refugees, the flag State could 
be the very State from which they are fleeing. Although 
disembarkation in the next port of call is not a rule of customary 
law,
1159
 some scholars, and the UNHCR, maintain that the obligation 
on the coastal State to accept disembarkation may implicitly be 
inferred from the maritime Conventions.
1160
 
The absence of a clear-cut definition of a ‘place of safety’ is not 
per se damaging since it allows for a case-by-case approach, which 
                                                 
1156
 SOLAS, c V, reg 33(1). 
1157
 SAR Annex, cc 2 and 3, para 2.1.10. 
1158
 SAR Annex, para 3.1.9 and SOLAS, c V, reg 33 (1-1). On the latest 
amendments to the SAR Convention and its application in the Mediterranean, see, 
Seline Trevisanut, ‘Search and Rescue Operations in the Mediterranean: Factor of 
Cooperation or Conflict?’ (2010) 25 IJMCL 526-35. 
1159
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under its control […].’ See, Circular FAL.35/Circ.194, ‘Principles relating to 
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takes into account the particular circumstances of each rescue 
situation and the different categories of stowaways.
1161
  In this regard, 
the Guidelines on the treatment of rescued persons of the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) emphasize how: 
 
The need to avoid disembarkation in territories where the lives and freedoms of 
those alleging a well-founded fear of persecution would be threatened is a 
consideration in the case of asylum seekers and refugees recovered at sea.
1162
 
 
However, a number of examples show how coastal States continue 
to bounce responsibilities for disembarkation. And, in some 
circumstances, such an uncertainty has led to episodes of non-rescue, 
or the sinking of overcrowded boats resulting in the death of the 
passengers on board.
1163
 Moreover, if rescue units or other suitable 
ships can temporarily be used to discharge initial succours in cases of 
                                                 
1161
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Human Right’ (National Report – Malta, December 2013) 36 
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distress, survivors must in the end be disembarked in a ‘place of 
safety’, which may only be on dry land.1164 
As stated by the ECtHR - which broadly relied on reports of 
international human rights organizations - Libya could not be 
considered a ‘place of safety’ because of the well-documented 
inadequacy of its response to flows of migrants and asylum 
seekers.
1165
 Moreover, as provided by the IMO Guidelines, a vessel 
cannot be conceived of as a final ‘place of safety.’ The fact that a 
State is legally bound to disembark a person rescued at sea in a safe 
haven implicates the duty to collect thorough information on the 
condition of reception and treatment of rescued migrants and refugees 
in the receiving country. 
In accordance with the UNHCR’s proposed definition, 
‘interception’ embraces all those extraterritorial activities carried out 
by a State to keep undocumented migrants, including refugees, away 
from their territory, thus preventing entry by land, sea, or air.
1166
 At 
                                                 
1164
 ibid para 6.14. 
1165
Hirsi v Italy, paras 123–6. 
1166
UNHCR Executive Committee, Interception of Asylum Seekers and Refugees: 
The International Framework and Recommendations for a Comprehensive 
Approach, UN doc EC/50/SC/CPR.17, 9 June 2000. Interception may encompass 
interdiction of boats (‘active’ or ‘physical’ interception) as well as ‘passive’ 
measures, such as implementation of restrictive visa requirements, carrier sanctions, 
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immigrants to identify those possessing false or inadequate documentation and to 
prevent their departure to the destination country. Nothing prohibits interception 
from also being executed in the territorial waters of a third country if the consent of 
the coastal State is given. On practices deterring asylum seekers, see, Brian Gorlick, 
‘Refugee Protection in Troubled Times: Reflections on Institutional and Legal 
Developments at the Crossroads’, in Niklaus Steiner, Mark Gibney, and Gil 
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face value, ‘rescue’ and ‘interception’ appear to be profoundly 
different, but examination indicates both their similarities and 
ambiguities. As a general rule, ‘when vessels respond to persons in 
distress at sea, they are not engaged in interception.’ ‘Rescue’ can, 
indeed, be described as ‘an operation to retrieve persons in distress, 
provide for their initial medical or other immediate needs, and deliver 
them to a place of safety.’1167 However, problems arise when, for 
example, a State coastguard encounters an unseaworthy boat allegedly 
transporting undocumented migrants.
1168
 
Because of the incongruent responses by the Italian government 
and the lack of a clear legal basis encompassing its activities in 2009, 
it is not straightforward to categorize the push-backs to Libya as either 
rescue measures or external maritime border control operations. It is 
important to note that such a classification is immaterial for the 
purpose of establishing State responsibility under general international 
law and human rights law, as in both cases, what counts is whether 
primary human rights obligations have been violated as a consequence 
of the abovementioned practices.
1169
 Nevertheless, this categorization 
matters for the purpose of EU law. Indeed, assuming that ‘search and 
rescue’ missions do not fall under the Schengen Border Code (SBC), 
                                                                                                                                                   
Loescher (eds) Problems of Protection: the UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights 
(Routledge 2003) 86. 
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 See, e.g., Hirsi v Italy, para 81. See also, Moreno-Lax 2012a, 9. 
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States generally prefer to deem their activities on the high seas as 
‘rescue’ missions rather than ‘interceptions.’1170 
This issue is controversial as demonstrated by the annulment of 
Council Decision 2010/252/EU of 26 April 2010 supplementing the 
SBC in a case concerning the surveillance of the external maritime 
borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by 
Frontex.
1171
 Indeed, Part II (paragraph 1.1) of the Annex to the 
Decision – which continues to maintain its effects until its 
replacement - provides that ‘[t]he obligation to render assistance to 
the persons in distress at sea shall be carried out [by Member States]’ 
and that ‘[p]articipating units shall provide assistance to any vessel or 
person in distress at sea.’1172 
That said, Article 3(b) of the SBC sets forth that it is to be applied 
without prejudice to ‘the rights of refugees and persons requesting 
                                                 
1170
 Pursuant to Article 1, the SBC aims to establish rules governing the border 
control of persons crossing the external borders of the Member States of the 
European Union. As stated in recital 6 of the Code, border control is intended to 
‘help to combat illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings and to prevent 
any threat to the Member States’ internal security, public policy, public health and 
international relations.’ 
1171
 See, Case C-355/10, European Parliament v Council of the European Union, 5 
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Court concluded that ‘the contested decision must be annulled in its entirety because 
it contains essential elements of the surveillance of the sea external borders of the 
Member States which go beyond the scope of the additional measures within the 
meaning of Article 12(5) of the SBC, and only the European Union legislature was 
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More specifically, paragraph 2(1) of Part II of the Annex to the Decision 
provides that, unless otherwise specified in the operational plan, ‘priority should be 
given to disembarkation [of rescued people] in the third country from where the ship 
carrying [them] departed or through the territorial waters or search and rescue 
region of which that ship transited.’ See, also, para 29 of case C/355/10. 
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international protection, in particular as regards non-refoulement’, 
while Article 5(4)(c) allows for derogation from normal entry criteria 
on account of humanitarian grounds or because of international 
obligations. Since the ratione loci of the Code exceeds the perimeter 
of EU Member States,
1173
 
 
Both interdiction and search and rescue measures undertaken by EU Member 
States anywhere at sea with the purpose of border control, or in the course of a 
maritime surveillance operation, shall be considered as coming within the remit of 
the Schengen Border Code and subject to its provision on non-refoulement.1174 
 
Thus, by rejecting a fragmentary approach to maritime obligations, 
States should prioritize a systemic interpretation of their duties at sea, 
thus harmonizing their border control measures with international 
human rights and refugee standards.
1175
 Indeed, as some argue, 
 
                                                 
1173
 SBC, paras 2.1.3 and 2.2.1, Annex VI. While at sea, controls can be performed 
‘in the territory of a third country’ (SBC, para 3.1.1, Annex VI), checks can be 
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1175
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 [States] cannot circumvent refugee law and human rights requirements by 
declaring border control measures – that is, the interception, turning back, 
redirecting, etc. of refugee boats – to be rescue measures. In the case of both rescue 
at sea and border control measures vis à vis  migrants who are not in distress at sea, 
the following procedures are required: transfer of the protection seekers and 
migrants to asafe place on EU territory; conduct of proceedings in order to examine 
the asylum application; legal review of the decision.1176 
 
According to the EU Commission tasked to elaborate on the 
material scope of application of the SBC, Italy’s push-backs to Libya 
amounted to border surveillance operations falling within the purview 
of the SBC by virtue of Article 12, whereby border surveillance 
measures are aimed to prevent unauthorized border crossings.
1177
 
‘Search and rescue’ has often been adduced as the legal basis for 
both interception of shipwrecked flagless boats and the deflection of 
interdicted people to ports of embarkation.
1178
 Nevertheless, 
portraying the 2009 push-backs as ‘rescue activities’ would not reflect 
Italy’s obligation, as a State party to the SAR and SOLAS 
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Conventions, to cooperate to assist shipmasters in delivering persons 
rescued at sea to a ‘place of safety.’ 
 Moreover, even if it is agreed that Italian authorities intervened 
after receiving a distress call for the purpose of rescuing individuals in 
distress in the international waters within Maltese SAR competence, 
the ‘rescue’ operation can only be considered to be fully 
accomplished when survivors finally disembark on safe, dry land, and 
not when they are initially rescued. Therefore, having discarded the 
first explanation, we now shift our attention to the second 
justification.   
 
7.4.2. An anti-smuggling operation? The role of the Palermo 
Protocol 
Under Article 110(1) of the UNCLOS, 
 
Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a 
warship, which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship is not justified in 
boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that: (a) the ship is 
engaged in piracy; (b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade; (c) the ship is engaged 
in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the warship has jurisdiction under 
Article 109; (d) the ship is without nationality; or, (e) though flying a foreign flag or 
refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the 
warship. 
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Therefore, the Italian government appeals, as a second 
justification, to the potential application of the Palermo Protocol on 
Smuggling of Migrants,
1179
 which entrusts States to stop and search 
vessels without nationality (Article 8).
1180
 In particular, paragraph 7 
provides that: 
 
 A State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel is engaged in 
the smuggling of migrants by sea and is without nationality or may be assimilated to 
a vessel without nationality may board and search the vessel. If evidence confirming 
the suspicion is found, that State Party shall take appropriate measures in 
accordance with relevant domestic and international law. 
 
While the Protocol allows a State party to request the assistance of 
other States parties in suppressing the use of a vessel without 
nationality that is suspected of engaging in the smuggling of migrants 
by sea,
1181
 it is also true that nothing in the text of the Protocol 
explicitly entitles Contracting States to divert or escort intercepted 
vessels back to the country of embarkation. The Protocol does not 
expressly prohibit coastal States to grant permission to receive 
                                                 
1179
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 
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1180
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1181
 Article 8(1) of the Protocol against Smuggling. 
 559 
 
intercepted migrants either. Nevertheless, a saving clause plainly 
requires States conducting enforcement operations at sea to respect 
humanitarian law, human rights, and refugee law, in conformity with 
the principles of non-refoulement and non-discrimination (Article 9). 
The obligation to comply with these fundamental international rules 
imposes upon the intercepting State both the responsibility to act in 
the full respect of the principles in question, and the duty to ascertain 
whether these norms are respected de jure and de facto in the third 
cooperating country in order to prevent the commission of an 
international wrongful act. 
The mere fact that the Palermo Protocol does not impede the return 
of migrants to Libya is not sufficient to consider it as the legal 
foundation of the operations.
1182
 Its text only envisages the 
repatriation of migrants to countries of origin or permanent residence 
(Article 18(1)), not to countries of transit such as Libya. Moreover, 
the Protocol provides that its implementation shall not affect the 
obligations entered into under any other applicable bilateral or 
multilateral treaty, or any other applicable operational arrangement 
regulating, in whole or in part, the return of unauthorized persons 
(Article 18(8)). As the Protocol on Smuggling of Migrants is an 
unsound legal basis for push-backs, the question remains open: on 
                                                 
1182
 Tondini 2010, 9. 
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what basis were intercepted migrants, including refugees, diverted to 
Libya? 
 
7.4.3. Italy–Libya agreements: an example of ‘international 
cooperation principles’? 
Although interdiction and deflection activities by Italian authorities 
went beyond the literal meaning of the Italy–Libya agreements, and 
the actual scope of Italy’s maritime operations could not be foreseen, I 
believe the text of the bilateral Protocols is (perhaps purposely) 
somewhat vague. As a consequence, an ample margin of intervention 
is left to Italian authorities. Moreover, the push-back practice - 
involving a consistent sequence of acts and pronouncements - would 
have been impossible without the broader framework of interactions 
between Italy and Libya created by the 2007 and 2009 bilateral 
agreements for technical and police cooperation, and also by the 2008 
Partnership Treaty.  
In this respect, the systematic character of Italy’s return operations 
to Libya should not be overlooked. First, they were repeated 
frequently over a long interval of time, ending only when the case of 
twenty-four returnees from Eritrea and Somalia was brought before 
the ECtHR in November 2009.
1183
 Second, Libya never protested 
                                                 
1183
 The case in question is Hirsi v Italy. 
 561 
 
against the readmission of third country nationals, or the intervention 
of Italian vessels in the patrolling of international waters that resulted 
in the deflection of intercepted migrants and refugees to the ports of 
departure. Third, whereas readmission of own nationals is now 
considered a customary obligation in international law, readmission of 
third country nationals is only possible on the basis of an agreement 
between two States. 
As a final avenue, by invoking generic ‘international cooperation 
principles’, the Italian government has justified redirection of 
intercepted ships as a response to Libya’s request. Indeed, migrants 
and refugees in their attempt to reach Europe had infringed Libyan 
migration law by irregularly fleeing the country after eluding local 
border controls.
1184
 Due to an absence of a precise legal framework 
and a standardized readmission procedure, the agreements for 
technical and police cooperation concluded between Italy and Libya 
in 2007 and 2009 seem to embody these ‘international cooperation 
principles.’ However, it is possible that a more direct expression of 
these principles is contained in other classified and informal accords, 
on the basis of which Libya assented to the readmission of 
undocumented migrants in ad hoc notes during the contingency of the 
2009 maritime interceptions.
1185
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  Response Italian Government, para c. 
1185
As indicated in Section 7.4, the consent to readmission was issued by Libya in 
the night of 6 May after long negotiations. In order to interdict the suspect vessels 
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Article 2(1) of the 2007 Additional Protocol would explain Italy’s 
participation in those activities of control of external maritime 
borders. It provides that the Joint Operations Command may request 
the intervention of Italian units, ordinarily deployed in the Italian 
island of Lampedusa, for conducting ‘anti-immigration (sic) 
activities’, telos of all agreements linked to readmission between Italy 
and Libya.
1186
 Although nothing in the text specifies what exactly 
these ‘anti-immigration activities’ are, it is possible to infer that push-
backs amount to a practice denoting the consensus of both parties to 
the Italian enforcement of police actions on behalf of Libya. 
Push-backs would be, in other words, a procedure falling ‘within 
specific agreements, aimed at “returning to requesting States those 
migrants, being intercepted in international waters, who had escaped 
the controls of the relevant authorities” of the countries from which 
shores they departed.’1187 This interpretation would also be consistent 
with the Preamble to the 2007 Protocol, whereby Italy and Libya 
commit to intensifying their cooperation on irregular migration 
                                                                                                                                                   
and then exert enforcement jurisdiction - especially in the context of counter-drug 
trafficking - States have generally obtained the consent of the flag State or, initially, 
the consent of the Master through the involvement of an administrative Agency of 
the boarding State. This Agency usually requests the permission by the respective 
agency of the flag State through informal means, such as telephone or facsimile. In 
United States v Gonzalez, a conversation by telephone was considered to be an 
‘arrangement’ between governments.  See Judge Kravitch, United States v 
Gonzalez, 776 F.2
nd
 (11 Circuit, 1985) 936 as cited in Papastavridis 2010a, 875 fn 
55. 
1186
  In this regard, pursuant to Article 2(1), ‘… [I]l citato Comando ha la facoltà di 
richiedere l’intervento e o l’ausilio delle unità navali italiane ordinariamente 
rischierate presso l’isola di Lampedusa per le attività antiimmigrazione.’ 
1187
 Response Italian Government. 
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control, taking due account of the difficulty Libya experienced in 
policing its more than 5,000 kilometres of desert and 2,200 kilometres 
of maritime borders. Likewise, the Preamble of the 2009 Executive 
Agreement, by recalling the previous accords, reaffirms the necessity 
to activate systems of maritime control to combat unauthorized 
immigration at technical and operational level. 
In addition, the 2007 Protocols include provisions dealing with the 
common commitment for the restraint of irregular immigration to 
Europe through joint patrols in the Libyan territorial waters and in 
international waters under Libyan command and responsibility.
1188
 
Coping with unauthorized immigration also subsumes the possibility 
of both sighting and halting any crafts with clandestine passengers on 
board, as Article 2(1)(d) of the 2007 Additional Protocol sets forth. 
Article 2 of the 2009 Executive Agreement provides, instead, that ‘the 
two countries undertake to repatriate clandestine immigrants [from 
their territory] and to conclude agreements with the countries of origin 
in order to limit clandestine immigration.’1189 
Since freedom of navigation reigns on the high seas, vessels are 
subject – save in exceptional cases – to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
their flag State (Article 92(1)). As indicated in the previous Section, 
naval interdiction on the high seas is grounded in international 
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agreements between two or more States aimed at exercising the right 
of visit to combat criminal activities not listed in Article 110 
UNCLOS and performed by vessels without nationality or not sailing 
the flag of a State party to the agreement.
1190
 In particular, Article 110 
requires that, ‘[e]xcept where acts of interference derive from powers 
conferred by treaty’, States may exercise a ‘right of visit’ with regard 
to ships of uncertain nationality and flagless ships to verify the 
vessel’s right to fly its flag. If, after document inspection, suspicion 
remains, the interdicting vessel ‘may proceed to a further examination 
on board the ship, which must be carried out with all possible 
consideration.’  
It is fitting to observe how, not only treaties, but also ad hoc 
accords can constitute an international agreement granting a State the 
right to intercept and visit a flagless vessel on the high seas.
1191
 This 
was upheld, for example, by the ECtHR (Grand Chamber) in the 
Medvedyev v France case concerning the interception of a Cambodian 
boat suspected of drug trafficking in international waters off Cape 
Verde after obtaining consent by the flag State through a diplomatic 
note,
1192
 which ‘officialised Cambodia's agreement to the interception 
                                                 
1190
 See, Seline Trevisanut, ‘The Principle of Non-Refoulement at Sea’ (2008) 12 
Max Planck UNYB 205, 240. 
1191
Efthymios (Akis) Papastavridis, ‘European Court of Human Rights: Medvedyev 
et al v France’ (2010) 59 ICLQ 874. For a different view, see, Douglas Guilfoyle, 
Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press 2012). 
1192The Diplomatic Note reads as follows: ‘The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
International Cooperation (. . .) has the honour formally to confirm that the Royal 
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of the Winner [… ].’1193 In addressing the distinction between treaties 
and other international accords, the ICJ has clearly sustained  that 
‘where   […] the law prescribes no particular form, parties are free to 
choose what form they please provided their intention clearly results 
from it.’1194 In this view, it can be argued that the diplomatic note of 7 
June 2002 between France and Cambodia amounts to a binding 
agreement as it ‘enumerates commitments […] and thus create rights 
and obligations in international law.’1195 Indeed, by authorizing the 
French authorities ‘to intercept, inspect and take legal action against 
the ship Winner’, the diplomatic note created a legal basis for the 
boarding operation, conferring a right to visit pursuant to Article 110 
UNCLOS.
1196
 
However, this right of visit on the high seas should not be 
conflated with the assertion of enforcement jurisdiction, which instead 
depends on the prior establishment of legislative jurisdiction and 
                                                                                                                                                   
Government of Cambodia authorises the French authorities to intercept, inspect and 
take legal action against the ship Winner, flying the Cambodian flag [. . .] (emphasis 
added).’ 
1193
Medvedyev and Others v France (2010) 51 EHRR 39, 97. 
1194
See, Temple of Preah Vihear case, (Cambodia v Thailand), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment of 26 May 1961, ICJ Rep (1962) 31. See also, the Aegean 
Continental Shelf Case (Greece v Turkey) ICJ Rep (1978) 38–44. 
1195
See, Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v 
Bahrain), ICJ Rep 1994 120. See also, Klabbers 1996, 215; Papastavridis 2010a, 
874; Klabbers 1996, 215. 
1196
 Papastavridis 2010a, 874. Without going into the details of this case, it should 
however be added that detention of the applicants was prescribed only by 
international law but not by national law as there was no basis in the French Law for 
the establishment of jurisdiction over members of the crew. As a consequence, the 
Court found a violation of Article 5(1) of the Convention. 
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would enable the intercepting State to bring the vessel to the port of 
the boarding State, arrest, try the offenders, confiscate the vessels, 
etc.
1197
 While ‘legislative jurisdiction’ concerns the power to prescribe 
rules, enforcement jurisdiction concerns 'the power to take executive 
action in pursuance of the making of decisions or rules.'
1198
 
Redirection to a third country after interception either on the high 
seas or in the territorial waters of a coastal State is practically and 
legally possible only with the consent of the coastal State itself on the 
basis of either formal or informal accords.
1199
 This is valid in 
particular when the readmitting State is different from the flag State of 
the intercepting vessel. In this case, diversions are executed on 
account of an accord between the State toward which the ship is 
redirected and the flag State of the interdicting vessel, which performs 
police actions on behalf of the former country.  
On the high seas, enforcement jurisdiction can only be exercised 
with the consent of the flag State, which can be granted either by a 
pre-existing bilateral or multilateral treaty or by an ad hoc accord. In 
the context of control of irregular migration by sea, Italian authorities 
were potentially entitled, in keeping with Article 110(1), to exercise a 
right of visit of intercepted flagless boats, even outside any specific 
                                                 
1197
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1198
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bilateral or multilateral agreement. However, the legal framework 
authorizing deflection of migrants and refugees is still not clarified, as 
uncertainty exists over whether a further power of seizure can be 
inferred from the right of visit. Neither general international law nor 
the UNCLOS explicitly confer other rights upon the intercepting State 
and any further assertion of jurisdiction.
1200
 It should be noted that the 
right to visit an intercepted vessel ‘does not ipso facto entail the full 
extension of the jurisdictional power of the boarding States.’1201 If the 
vessel is brought to a port for further investigation, the exercise of 
jurisdiction would be limited to inquiring as to the nationality of the 
vessel and intentions of the persons onboard.
1202
 Therefore, 
 
Such actions as seizing the ship and apprehending the persons on board; 
ordering the ship to modify its course towards a destination outside the territorial 
waters or the contiguous zone; escorting the vessel or steaming nearby until the ship 
is heading on such course; conducting the ship or the persons on board to a third 
country or handing them over to the authorities of a third State, do not readily 
follow from the terms of the [law of the sea] treaties. The fact that the cayucos and 
pateras used for the transport of migrants do not fly the flag of any State does not 
seem to allow for unlimited enforcement jurisdiction in their regard.1203 
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These considerations are also relevant to the interception of 
migrants in the contiguous zone, which extends 24 nautical miles 
from the baselines. In the contiguous zone, freedom of navigation 
applies and coastal States may exercise controls over vessels in transit 
only to avoid violations of their immigration, custom, fiscal, and 
sanitary laws (Article 33(1) UNCLOS).
1204
 Since proportionality is 
always required,
1205
 it cannot be taken for granted that powers of 
detention or forcible return to the country of departure are implicitly 
encompassed in this proviso. Therefore, even if it is accepted that 
interception of migrants and refugees in international waters was 
triggered by Article 110(1) with regard to vessels without nationality, 
the initial aim of a maritime operation might shift to something 
different—for example, in the context of the Italy–Libya push-backs, 
from a SAR operation to a measure of border control and vice 
versa.
1206
 
As explained by the Italian Ambassador in Tripoli, Trupiano, the 
procedure of ‘accompaniment’ to Libya originates in the various 
accords between these two countries concluded from 13 December 
                                                 
1204
 The territorial sea extends up to 12 nautical miles from the coastline. In 
territorial waters State sovereignty is limited only by the right of innocent passage. 
1205
 See, the Award by the Permanent Arbitral Tribunal, Guyana v Suriname, 17 
September 2007, para 445: ‘In international law force may be used in law 
enforcement activities provided that such force is unavoidable, reasonable and 
necessary.’ 
1206
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by Seline Trevisanut, ‘Non-refoulement at Sea’ (Governing Migration by Sea: a 
Legal Perspective Workshop, Oxford, 17–18 November 2011). 
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2000 onwards.
1207
 The 2007 Protocols for the first time established 
maritime joint patrols with six vessels temporarily rendered to Libya. 
Then, through the Bengasi Partnership Treaty in 2008, the two 
Contracting Parties renewed their common commitment in several 
fields of action, including the fight against unauthorized immigration. 
This led to the adoption of the 2009 Executive Protocol, which 
defines the organization of the joint patrolling missions conducted by 
vessels operated by a mixed crew. The Executive Protocol, by 
supplying Libyans with six vessels on a permanent basis (replacing 
the Italian flag with a Libyan one), significantly shifts their control of 
unauthorized migration to Europe in a more pro-active direction. 
Although Italy had repeatedly solicited Libya’s participation in joint 
patrols, Libya had always refrained from taking part in the operations. 
Indeed, until May 2009, Libya remained reluctant to the idea of letting 
a military boat flying the Italian flag across Libyan territorial waters 
to drive migrants back to the North African coast.
1208
 The provision of 
vessels on a permanent basis and the operational definition of 
technical cooperation envisaged by the 2009 Executive Protocol 
changed the context of their collaboration, thus paving the way for the 
push-back practice. 
                                                 
1207
See, Trupiano, 5 
<http://www.camera.it/470?stenog=/_dati/leg16/lavori/stenbic/30/2009/1013&pagin
a=s020> accessed 20 August 2013.  
1208
  ibid. 
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The reasons for a transit country, such as Libya, to accept the 
burden of thousands of returned migrants and refugees must be 
examined. It goes without saying that Italy and Libya, as Contracting 
Parties of the 2007 and 2009 bilateral agreements, did not have the 
same interest in the readmission of migrants, who were not Libya’s 
nationals but foreign nationals passing through its territory on their 
way to Europe. Moreover, Libya did not have legal institutional 
capacity or adequate facilities to manage the massive presence of 
irregular migrants and refugees. Therefore, if it was willing to invest 
resources in patrolling its territorial and maritime borders, it was 
motivated by expected benefits. Technical cooperation and assistance 
in terms of training, consulting, exchange of intelligence information 
and supply of vessels and equipment are the most common incentives 
used by Italy to induce Libya to cooperate on prevention of 
unauthorized immigration under the 2007 and 2009 technical 
Protocols. 
The 2008 Partnership Treaty marks the most significant step 
toward diplomatic normalization and the creation of a favourable 
climate between these two countries.
1209
 By cooperating with Italy 
                                                 
1209
 Italy committed itself to allocate huge resources to Libya, built a highway from 
Tunisia to Egypt, and invested in both the construction and education sectors 
through the provision of scholarships for Libyan citizens willing to study in Italy. 
Pursuant to Article 8(1), Italy agreed a $5 billion compensation package to end 
disputes relating to Italian colonialism, in return for Libya intensifying its efforts to 
curb illegal immigration by sea (Article 19). Not only did Italy express its regret for 
the suffering that Italian colonization caused to the Libyan people, but it had also to 
undertake ‘special initiatives’, such as the grant of scholarships, rehabilitation of 
victims of mine explosions, and the handing over to Libyan authorities of 
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and the EU in the fight against irregular migration, international 
terrorism, and the smuggling of human beings, not only did Libya 
obtain political and economic benefits, such as the lifting of the 
European embargo and the construction of a gas pipeline to Italy, but 
it also improved its international standing.
1210
 It has therefore been 
argued that ‘it is this whole bilateral cooperative framework which 
secures a minimum operability in the cooperation on readmission 
more than the “reciprocal” obligations contained in a standard 
readmission agreement.’1211 Since the accords for technical and police 
cooperation do not constitute standard readmission agreements and 
are quite vague in defining the scope of migration control activities, 
the parties rely on having a wider margin of manoeuvre to respond to 
short-term security concerns and new situations fraught with 
uncertainties.
1212
 
As asserted by the Italian government, in its observations in the 
Hirsi case,
1213
 and iterated by the former Italian Minister of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
archaeological artefacts brought to Italy during its colonial rule. For an overview of 
the Partnership Treaty, see, Natalino Ronzitti, ‘The Treaty on Friendship, 
Partnership, and Cooperation between Italy and Libya: New Prospects for 
Cooperation in the Mediterranean’ (Institute of International Affairs 2009) 
<http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iai0909.pdf> accessed 20 August 2013. 
1210
 See, Jean-Pierre Cassarino, ‘Informalizing Readmission Agreements in the EU 
Neighborhood’ (2007) 42 The International Spectator 183; Emanuela Paoletti, 
‘Relations among Unequals? Readmission between Italy and Libya’ in Cassarino 
2010a, 70. 
1211
 Jean-Pierre Cassarino, ‘Dealing with Unbalanced Reciprocities: Cooperation on 
Readmission and Implications’, in Cassarino 2010a, 8. 
1212
 ibid. 
1213
 See, Italian Government Submissions in Hirsi v Italy, para 65. 
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Interior, Maroni, on several official occasions, the Protocols signed in 
2007 and 2009 with Libya, as well as the 2008 Partnership Treaty, 
may constitute both the legal foundation for push-back missions, and 
crucial tools in the fight against clandestine 
immigration.
1214
Accordingly, the Italian vessels deployed in 
international waters, together with the vessels donated to Libya, are 
part of a wider surveillance and ‘border control system aimed to strike 
migratory flows at the root.’1215 
Although in the complex contingencies of patrol operations, States 
implement readmission through unpublished and informal exchanges 
of notes, they generally prefer to secure operability of bilateral 
cooperation on highly sensitive issues, such as readmission (quite 
unpopular in countries of origin or transit of migrants) through 
flexible but still written documents.
1216
 These accords ensure, at least, 
more credibility and predictability in terms of compliance with the 
commitments of, and responsiveness to, the expectations of the parties 
                                                 
1214
Roberto Maroni, Minister of the Interior, ‘Resoconto. Sommario and 
Stenografico’ 5 (Oral information at Senato della Repubblica, XVI Legislatura, 25 
May 2009) <http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/00424000.pdf> 
accessed 20 August 2013. See also, AdnKronos, ‘Immigrati, Maroni: “L’accordo 
con la Libia funziona. Avanti con i respingimenti.” Bruxelles: chiarimenti da Italia e 
Malta’ (31 August 2009) 
<http://www.adnkronos.com/IGN/News/Politica/?id=3.0.3718416369> accessed 3 
January 2012. 
1215See, Massimo Nesticò, ‘Immigrazione: Consegnate a Libia tre Motovedette GDF 
– D’Arrigo, Equipaggi Libici Addestrati da GDF’ (Associazione Finanzieri Cittadini 
e Solidarietà, 17 May 2009) <http://www.ficiesse.it/home-
page/3065/immigrazione_-consegnate-a-libia-tre-motovedette-gdf---d_arrigo_-
equipaggilibici-addestrati-da-gdf> accessed 20 August 2013. 
1216
 Cassarino 2010a, 8. 
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on a more regular basis. As Nolte pointedly observed, ‘treaties are not 
just dry parchments. They are instruments providing stability to their 
parties and to fulfil the purposes which they embody.’1217 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that Libya’s cooperation on 
patrolling sea and land borders, and readmission of undocumented 
third country nationals intercepted by Italian authorities, builds on a 
solid platform of costs–benefits analysis. Although the only possible 
conclusion is that push-backs do not have a clear legal basis, it can be 
argued that the wide ranging series of accords concluded between 
Italy and Libya, including the 2007 and 2009 agreements for technical 
and police cooperation and the 2008 Partnership Treaty, as well as 
those unpublished notes exchanged between national authorities in the 
contingency of patrol operations, constitute the multifaceted legal and 
political scaffold supporting the practice of interdiction and deflection 
of undocumented migrants and refugees to the port of embarkation. 
Considering the high costs of readmission for Libya – in social, 
political, and economic terms – it is plausible that, beyond unilateral 
acquiescence, ad hoc consent is necessary for each and every 
maritime operation resulting in the actual disembarkation and 
readmission of third country nationals. 
                                                 
1217
 ILC, Report on the Work of its Sixtieth Session, Treaties over time in particular: 
Subsequent Agreements and Practice, A/63/10, Annex A (2008) 365 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2008/2008report.htm> accessed 20 August 2013. 
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The salience of the Italy–Libya agreements can be condensed in 
two principal points. First, the technical Protocols encapsulate those 
‘international cooperation principles’ that aim to curtail irregular 
migration to Europe. Whether forced return to the country of 
departure is deemed either as a police action of Italy on behalf of 
Libya, or as an autonomous Libyan initiative taken with Italy’s 
support and assistance, does not alter the ultimate goal of the bilateral 
arrangements. Second, the 2007 and 2009 agreements for technical 
and police cooperation, as well as the 2008 Partnership Treaty, 
encompass the arsenal of incentives utilized by Italy to persuade 
Libya to more proactively cooperate in both curbing irregular 
migration, and in accepting the readmission of third country nationals 
intercepted in their desperate flight to Europe. As such, I argue the 
aggregation of all these accords constitutes the legal and political 
framework within which Italy-Libya cooperation on migration control 
(including the push-back policy) was put into action. The research 
question on the relationship between agreements for technical and 
police cooperation and the decision to return migrants and refugees to 
transit countries is thus addressed. 
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7.5. Not an isolated case: outlining further agreements for 
technical and police cooperation 
Deflections to Libya - country of embarkation but not of origin of 
undocumented migrants heading to Europe - find a first precedent in 
the Italian interdictions at sea in response to the massive influx of 
migrants from Albania in 1997. Also in that case, operations were 
authorized by a set of agreements concluded between the two 
countries. While on 25 March 1997, an agreement was signed in the 
form of an Exchange of Letters, on 2 April 1997, the two States 
signed a Protocol encompassing all the technical enforcement 
measures Italy could adopt to hold back the masses of irregular 
migrants arriving by sea.
1218
 Finally, in November 1997, a 
readmission agreement was signed that entered into force on 1 August 
1998.  
The cases briefly reviewed in this Section demonstrate that the 
analysis of the Italy–Libya case is pertinent for other situations in 
which countries within or outside the EU entrust or used to entrust 
third countries of provenance of migrants and refugees with the 
patrolling of both their territorial waters and international waters in 
order to prevent unauthorized immigration to Europe. In the late 
1990s, new influxes of migrants from North Africa ‘threatening’ to 
                                                 
1218
 The agreement was adopted through a simplified procedure whereby States 
exchanged the instruments constituting the treaties. 
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transgress the EU border ceased as a consequence of the enhanced 
bilateral cooperation in the field of readmission and police 
cooperation with Southern Mediterranean countries,
1219
  such as 
Tunisia,
1220
 Morocco,
1221
 Algeria,
1222
 and more recently Egypt and 
Libya.
1223
 
Faced with the same challenge, Spain, in its endeavour to contrast 
irregular migration by sea set up joint patrols authorized by a host of 
bilateral agreements with several African countries, including 
Morocco in 2003, Senegal and Mauritania in 2006, Cape Verde in 
2007, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Guinea Conakry in 2008.
1224
 These 
documents would constitute the legal basis for joint sea patrols 
between the Spanish Guardia Civil and African security forces aimed 
to decrease the number of arrivals of migrants and refugees from 
                                                 
1219
 The agreements for technical and police cooperation with these countries 
provided for the transfer of equipment and training courses to assist them in the 
control of irregular immigration. Police officers were also sent to diplomatic and 
consular representations to bring their contribution in the field of migration. See, 
Alessia Di Pascale, ‘Migration Control at Sea: The Italian Case’ in Ryan and 
Mitsilegas 2010, 296. 
1220
On 6 August 1998, an agreement was signed in the form of an Exchange of 
Letters concerning the entry and readmission of people in an irregular position. 
Another agreement on police cooperation was concluded on 13 December 2003. 
1221
Readmission agreement signed on 27 July 1998.  
1222
Agreement on the movement of persons signed on 24 February 2000. 
1223
The details of the Agreements between Italy and Libya have already been 
provided. With regard to Egypt, instead, while an Agreement on police cooperation 
was concluded on 18 June 2000, a Readmission Agreement was signed on 9 January 
2007. 
1224
 For an analysis of all these agreements, see, Paula Garcia-Andrade, 
‘Extraterritorial Strategies to Tackle Irregular Immigration by Sea: a Spanish 
Perspective’ in Ryan and Mitsilegas 2010, 311 ff. 
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African countries of origin or transit.
1225
 For instance, pursuant to the 
MoUs signed by Spain with Mauritania and Senegal, immigration 
officers, nationals of these African countries, were brought onboard to 
carry out interdiction activities in their territorial waters.
1226
 
 Because of the lack of public access to the text of these 
arrangements, it is not possible to inquire as to their exact content, the 
degree of involvement of Spanish authorities in the enforcement of 
maritime operations, and the legal safeguards applied by Spain to the 
passengers of detected vessels.
1227
 All in all, however, the rationale of 
the accords negotiated by Italy and Spain with African countries 
points to conditioning the transfer of technical equipment, vessels, 
funding, and the organization of training courses to a more decisive 
involvement of countries of origin or transit in the prevention of 
irregular migration flows to Europe. 
Without any claim of exhaustiveness, it is also worth observing 
that both the US and Australia have been particularly involved in 
interdiction and extraterritorial processing policies. The US has 
mainly targeted irregular boat arrivals from Haiti and Cuba. As 
provided by a bilateral agreement signed by the US and Haiti in 
                                                 
1225
 See, for instance, the reply of Frontex to the NGO ILPA (Immigration Law 
Practitioners’ Association).  
1226
 Jorrit Rijpma, ‘Building Borders: the Regulatory framework for the 
Management of the External Border of the European Union’ (PhD Thesis European 
University Institute, Florence, 2009) 341-342, as quoted in Gammeltoft-Hansen, 
Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law and the Globalization of Migration 
Control (Cambridge University Press 2011) 133. 
1227
 Garcia-Andrade 2010, 321. 
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September 1981, after intercepting and searching vessels suspected of 
transporting irregular migrants from Haiti, people transferred aboard 
US Coast Guard cutters were subjected to a summary screening.
1228
 
Although from 1981 to 1990 almost 23,000 Haitians were intercepted 
and repatriated, only six persons were provided with a full asylum 
hearing and taken to the US to pursue their claims.
1229
 Since 
September 1991 and the fall of the democratically-elected President 
Aristide, a second massive wave of Haitians began to make their way 
to the US by boat. However, those who had an arguable protection 
claim were no longer transferred to the US, but instead held on 
intercepting ships and transferred then to Guantanamo Bay where a 
US facility was created as a holding and processing centre for asylum 
seekers.
1230
 
In 1994, following a remarkable hike of the number of people 
fleeing Cuba by boat, the US entered into an agreement with this 
country. While the Cuban government committed itself to prevent the 
departure by boat of undocumented migrants, the US would admit 
                                                 
1228
 Migrants Interdiction Agreement (23 September 1981) US-Haiti, 33 UST 3559, 
3560. 
1229
 See, Bill Frelick, 'US Refugee Policy in the Caribbean: No Bridge Over 
Troubled Waters' (1996) 20(2) Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 67; Stephen H. 
Legomsky, 'The USA and the Caribbean Interdiction Program' (2006) 18(3-4) 
IJRL677, 679. 
1230
For an overview of the practice of interdiction on the high seas and 
extraterritorial processing at Guantanamo Bay, see, Daniel Ghezelbash, ‘Shifting 
Sands and Refugee Boats: the Transfer of Migration Control Policies between the 
United States and Australia’, in Gauci, Giuffré and Tsourdi 2014. See also, Azadeh 
Dastyari and Effeney Libbey, 'Immigration Detention in Guantanamo Bay' (2012) 
6(2) Shima: The International Journal of Research into Island Cultures 49. 
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20,000 Cubans per year through orderly procedures.
1231
 With the 
exception of those Cubans transferred to Guantanamo Bay for 
extraterritorial processing after showing credible and genuine 
protection claims to onboard adjudicators, all other arrivals were 
returned to Cuba.
1232
 
As far as Australia is concerned, in September 2001, in the 
aftermath of the Tampa incident,
1233
 the Australian government 
launched the ‘Pacific Solution.’ One of the initiatives - realized by 
means of an MoU between Australia (would-be destination country) 
and Indonesia (transit country) - consisted of intercepting, on the high 
seas, asylum seekers making their way to Australia aboard 
unauthorized vessels.
1234
 If the attempts to tow or escort these boats 
back to Indonesia failed, asylum seekers were transferred to Manus 
                                                 
1231
 Bill Frelick, 'US Refugee Policy in the Caribbean: No Bridge over Troubled 
Waters' (1996) 20(2) Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 67, 71. 
1232
 ibid 72. ‘Both the practices of interdiction and extraterritorial processing on 
Guantanamo Bay continue to this day. In 2012, there were a total of 2,955 
interdictions, with 1,275 Cubans, 977 Haitians, 456 Dominicans, 23 Chinese, 79 
Mexicans, 7 Ecuadorians and 5 migrants with other nationalities. As of February 
2012, there were a total of only 33 migrants (all Cubans) being held at 
Guantanamo.’ See, Ghezelbash 2014. 
1233
 For an analysis of the incident, see, Chantal Marie Jeanne Bostock, 'The 
International Legal Obligations owed to the Asylum Seekers on the MV Tampa' 
(2002) 14(2-3) IJRL 279; Mary Crock and Daniel Ghezelbash, 'Do Loose Lips 
Bring Ships?: The Role of Policy, Politics and Human Rights in Managing 
Unauthorized Boat Arrivals' (2010) 19 Griffith Law Review 238. 
1234
 On the recent Australian plan to ‘tow back boats to Indonesia, see, Maria O’ 
Sullivan, ‘Push backs’ of Boats to Indonesia’, Castan Center for Human Rights 
Law, 18 July 2013 <http://castancentre.com/2013/07/18/push-backs-of-boats-to-
indonesia/> accessed 20 August 2013.  On migration to Australia and refugee rights, 
see also, Penelope Mathew, ‘Anywhere but Here: Australia and “boat people”’ 
(2011) 1 Migration Australia  20; Penelope Mathew, ‘Limiting Good Faith: 
“Bootstrapping” Asylum Seekers and Exclusion from Refugee Protection’ (2010) 
29 Australian Yearbook of International Law 135. 
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Island or Nauru for extraterritorial processing of their protection 
claims.
1235
 
In May 2011, a bilateral agreement was negotiated with Malaysia 
with the aim to deter asylum seekers from travelling by boat to 
Australia.
1236
 Under the terms of the arrangement, 800 asylum 
seekers, arrived in Australia by boat, would be removed to Malaysia 
where they would ‘go to the back of the [asylum] queue.’1237 In 
return, Australia would commit to accept the resettlement of 4000 
UNHCR-recognized refugees from Malaysia over four years. Quite 
soon, however, the Australian High Court struck down the agreement 
on the ground that Malaysia did not provide sufficient safeguards 
regarding transferred asylum seekers.
1238
 
                                                 
1235
Under the Pacific Solution, some territories were 'excised' from Australia's 
migration zone.  A further initiative involved the removal of asylum seekers, who 
entered at a certain excised zone, to a designated country, such as Nauru and Papua 
New Guinea, where offshore detention facilities had been set up. Asylum seekers 
processed in Nauru and Papua New Guinea were not granted access to the same 
refugee status determination procedures applied on the Australian mainland. See, 
Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Cth), amending s 
5(1) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth). See, Mary Crock, 'In the Wake of Tampa: 
Conflicting Visions of International Refugee Law in the Management of Refugee 
Flows' (2003) 12(1) Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 49. 
1236
 Arrangement between the Government of Australia and the Government of 
Malaysia on Transfer and Resettlement (25 July 2011) (Australia–Malaysia 
Arrangement). 
1237
 See, Q&A, ‘Gillard Reaches Asylum Agreement with Malaysia’ (7 May 2011) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2011/05/07/3210503.htm?site=qanda> 
accessed 20 August 2013. 
1238
Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Another; 
Plaintiff M106 (by his litigation guardian, Plaintiff M70/2011) v Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship and Another (2011) 280 ALR 18; For an analysis of 
the case, McAdam and Wood, ‘Australian Asylum Policy All at Sea: an Analysis of 
Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and the Australia-
Malaysia Arrangement’ (2012) 61 ICLQ 274; Sasha Lowes, 'The Legality of 
Extraterritorial Processing of Asylum Claims: The Judgment of the High Court of 
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7.5.1. Encountering Frontex 
The Lisbon Treaty reckons the development of a ‘common 
immigration policy’ and the gradual introduction of an ‘Integrated 
Border Management’1239 as major political objectives.1240 According 
to the Council, Integrated Border Management encompasses, inter 
alia, border control, detection and investigation of cross-border 
crimes, migration control measures in third countries, cooperation 
with neighbouring countries, inter-agency cooperation for border 
management and coordination of the activities of Member States and 
the EU in the abovementioned areas.
1241
 
Operational cooperation between the Member States, including 
cooperation under the aegis of Frontex (the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of 
the Member States of the European Union) is one of the main 
components of this strategy.
1242
 Although this Chapter is not about 
                                                                                                                                                   
Australia in the 'Malaysian Solution' Case' (2012) 12 HRLR 168; Michelle Foster, 
'The Implications of the Failed 'Malaysian Solution': The Australian High Court and 
Refugee Responsibility Sharing at International Iaw' (2012) 13 MJIL 395. 
1239
 The Integrated Border Management concept was first established by the 
European Commission on the basis of the Laeken Conclusions of December 2001. 
See, ‘Towards integrated management of the external borders of the EU member 
states’, COM(2002) 233 final, 7 May 2002. See also, Presidency Conclusions, 
Laeken 14-15 December 2001, Council doc. SN 300/1/01 REV 1, para 42. 
1240
 See, Articles 77(1)(c) and 79(1) of the TFEU. 
1241
 EU Finnish Presidency, Council Conclusions of 4-5 December 2006, Press 
Release 15801/06, 27. 
1242
Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union, [2004] OJ L 349/1 (Frontex 
Regulation), as amended by Regulation (EU) no 1168/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 amending Council Regulation 
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Frontex,
1243
 an overview of its main tasks will, however, assist the 
reader in having a more limpid picture of the different strategies 
pursued by the EU and its Member States to ‘defend’ their external 
borders from unauthorized arrivals.  
Established in 2004, Frontex is mandated to assist EU countries in 
applying the concept of integrated management of the external 
borders and to streamline cooperation between national border 
authorities.
1244
 The Agency has been entrusted with different areas of 
activity catalogued in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011. It 
plans, coordinates, implements, and evaluates joint operations 
                                                                                                                                                   
(EC) no 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union. See also, Regulation (EC) no 863/2007 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007, establishing a mechanism for the 
creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and amending Council Regulation 
(EC) no 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and powers 
of guest officers, [2007] OJ L 199/30 (RABIT Regulation). 
1243
 Burgeoning literature has already been produced on Frontex. See, e.g.; Violeta 
Moreno-Lax, ‘The EU Regime on Interdiction, Search and Rescue, and 
Disembarkation: the Frontex Guidelines for Intervention at Sea’ (2010) 25(4) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law; Efthymios Papastavridis, 
'Fortress Europe' and FRONTEX: Within or Without International Law? (2010) 
79(1) NJIL; Anneliese Baldaccini, ‘Extraterritorial Border Controls in the EU: the 
Role of Frontex in Operations at Sea’ in Ryan and Mitsilegas 2010, 229 ff; Arias 
Fern ndez, Gil, ‘Frontex and Illegal Immigration in the European Union’ in José 
Manuel Sobrino Heredia (ed) S ret  Maritime et  iolence en Mer = Maritime 
Security and Violence at Sea (Bruylant 2011); Moreno-Lax 2011a; Seline 
Trevisanut, Immigrazione Irregolare via Mare: Diritto Internazionale e Diritto 
dell'Unione Europea (Jovene 2012); Anna Liguori and Novella Ricciutti, ‘Frontex 
ed il rispetto dei diritti umani nelle operazioni congiunte alle frontiere esterne 
dell'Unione Europea’ 2012 6(3) DUDI 539; Sarah Léonard, ‘EU Border Security 
and Migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and Securitisation through 
Practices’, in Christian Kaunert and Sarah Léonard (eds), Developing European 
Internal Security Policy: after the Stockholm Summit and the Lisbon Treaty 
(Routledge 2012); Jorrit Rijpma, ‘Hybrid Agencification in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice and its Inherent Tensions: the Case of Frontex’, in M Busuioc, 
M Groenleer and J Trondal (eds), The Agency Phenomenon in the European Union: 
Emergence, Institutionalisation and Everyday Decision-making (Manchester 
University Press 2012).  
1244
 Recital 31 of the Regulation (EU) no 1168/2011. 
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conducted using Member States’ staff and equipment at the external 
maritime, land, and air borders; trains border guards across the Union; 
conducts risk analysis on the ongoing situation at the external border; 
conducts research on technological advancement, which is relevant 
for the control and surveillance of Europe’s external borders; ‘assists 
Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical and 
operational assistance at the external borders, taking into account that 
some situations may involve humanitarian emergencies and rescue at 
sea’;1245 created European Border Guard Teams (EBGT), which are 
meant to intervene in crisis situations at the external border, including 
joint operations, pilot projects or rapid interventions in accordance 
with Regulation (EC) No 863/2007; assists Member States in forcibly 
returning, through joint operations, foreign nationals staying 
irregularly on the territory of the EU; develops and operates 
information systems on the risks and current state of affairs at the 
external borders; cooperates with non-EU/Schengen countries that are 
identified as countries of origin or transit of irregular migrants to 
Europe.  
The 2011 amendment emphasizes that the Agency:  
 
Shall fulfil its tasks in full compliance with the relevant Union law, including the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [...]; the relevant 
                                                 
1245
 ibid Article 2(da). 
 584 
 
international law, including the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees done 
at Geneva on 28 July 1951; obligations related to access to international protection, 
in particular the principle of non-refoulement; and fundamental rights[...].’
1246
 
 
More specifically, Article 2(1a) provides that: 
 
In accordance with Union and international law, no person shall be disembarked 
in, or otherwise handed over to the authorities of, a country in contravention of the 
principle of non-refoulement, or from which there is a risk of expulsion or return to 
another country in contravention of that principle. The special needs of children, 
victims of trafficking, persons in need of medical assistance, persons in need of 
international protection and other vulnerable persons shall be addressed in 
accordance with Union and international law. 
 
With regard to the relationship between Frontex and Member 
States, the latter should report to the Agency on any operational 
matters falling outside the framework of the Agency.
1247
 Frontex can 
also rely on guest officers who are defined as national experts from 
Member States to be seconded to the Agency.
1248
 Pursuant to the 
amended Article 10(2), their executive authority is subject to 
international and EU law and shall comply with fundamental rights 
and the national law of the Member State hosting the operation. 
                                                 
1246
 ibid Article 1(2). 
1247
 ibid Article 2(2). 
1248
 ibid Article 15(a)(5). 
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The Hera and Nautilus maritime operations constitute some of the 
joint missions performed at the external borders of the EU Member 
States. Without going into the details of these missions, it is worth 
observing that Hera was first launched, on 17 July 2006, at the 
request of Spain engaged with the management of irregular flows 
from the Canary Islands. The main purpose of this cooperative 
operation, which resulted in the involvement of different countries at 
various times, was both to deter irregular migration by sea and to 
identify traffickers and smugglers.
1249
 Screening of irregular migrants 
was carried out through the secondment of experts from participating 
States.
1250
 Additionally, Frontex authorities attempted to prevent the 
departure of boats loaded with migrants heading to Europe by 
intercepting them directly in the territorial waters of the countries of 
embarkation and returning them to ports of departure, namely 
Senegal, Mauritania, and Cape Verde.
1251
 
                                                 
1249
 For more information on Hera 2006 and 2007, see, Communication from the 
Commission to the European  Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of Regions. Report on the evaluation and 
future development of the FRONTEX Agency (SEC(2008) 150 final, 13 February 
2008) <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0067:FIN:EN:PDF> 
accessed 20 August 2013. To read more on Hera 2008 and 2009, see, respectively, 
Frontex General Report 2008, 40;  and Frontex General Report 2009. They are both 
available at: 
<http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_re
port/2008/frontex_general_report_2008.pdf> and 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201008/20100805ATT79
751/20100805ATT79751EN.pdf> accessed 20 August 2012.  
1250
 Frontex Press Release, ‘Longest FRONTEX coordinated operation – HERA, the 
Canary Islands’, 19 December 2006.  
1251BBC News, ‘Stemming the immigration wave’, 10 September 2006 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5331896.stm> accessed 20 August 2013. 
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Although a number of Framework Agreements and MoUs exist 
between Spain and the African countries concerned,
1252
 the legal basis 
of Frontex interception and return missions is not clear. In this regard, 
Frontex has stated that: 
 
Persons that were intercepted during Joint Operation HERA 2008 at sea [...] 
have either been convinced to turn back to safety or have been escorted back to the 
closest shore (Senegal or Mauritania). Spain concluded agreements with Mauritania 
and Senegal which allow diverting of would-be immigrants’ boats back to their 
points of departure from a certain distance of the African coastline [...]. A 
Mauritanian or Senegalese law enforcement officer is always present on board of 
deployed Member States’ assets and is always responsible for the diversion.
1253
 
 
No data was collected with regard to possible asylum applications 
made by intercepted migrants.
1254
 
With regard to the Nautilus operation, its main goal is ‘to 
strengthen the control of the Central Mediterranean maritime border 
[…] and also to support Maltese authorities in interviews with the 
immigrants’ who mostly came from Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia, and 
Nigeria.
1255
 First established in June 2007, Nautilus has become 
                                                 
1252
 See, Section 7.5. 
1253
 Frontex Press Release, ‘HERA 2008 and NAUTILUS 2008 Statistics’, 17 
February 2009. 
1254
 Moreno-Lax 2011a, 382. 
1255
 Frontex Press Release, ‘Joint Operation Nautilus 2007 – the end of the first 
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permanent and continues to be deployed with the participation of 
different Member States.
1256
 Nautilus 2008 followed the reach of an 
agreement between participating Member States whereby migrants 
rescued in the Libyan Search and Rescue Area would be returned to 
Libya, or to the closest safe port if readmission to Libya was not 
possible.
1257
 Lacking Libya’s consent, intercepted migrants were all 
disembarked on Italian and Maltese soil.
1258
 
What is uncertain is the degree of interrelatedness between 
Nautilus 2009 and the Italian push-back campaign. What is certain, 
however, is that these two strategies coincided in time.
1259
 According 
to Human Rights Watch, on 18 June 2009, 
 
[a] German Puma helicopter operating as part of the Operation Nautilus IV 
coordinated [the] Italian Coast Guard interception of a boat carrying about 75 
migrants 29 miles south of Lampedusa. The Italian Coast Guard reportedly handed 
the migrants over to a Libyan patrol boat, which took them to Tripoli.
1260
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
phase’, 6 August 2007.  
1256
 To read more on Nautilus 2006 and Nautilus 2007, refer to the European 
Commission, SEC (2008) 150 final; for Nautilus 2008 and Nautilus 2009, see, 
Frontex General Report 2008 and Frontex General Report 2009. 
1257
 Frontex Press Release, ‘Go ahead for Nautilus 2008’, 7 May 2008. 
1258
 Frontex Press Release, ‘HERA 2008 and Nautilus 2008 Statistics’, 17 February 
2009. 
1259
 Nautilus ran, indeed, from April to October 2009, while Italy’s push-backs were 
carried out from May to November 2009. 
1260
 HRW 2009a, 37. 
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Frontex has promptly reacted by categorically excluding any kind 
of involvement in activities aimed at redirecting migrants and 
refugees crossing the Mediterranean by unseaworthy boats to Libya. 
Operation Nautilus 2009 was, indeed, underway on that very same 
day, but in a different operational area.
1261
  All in all, despite the 
secrecy of the operational plan of Nautilus 2009, according to many, 
the complementarity between Frontex operations and the Italian-
Libyan patrols aimed at halting the arrival of unauthorized migrants 
through the Mediterranean seems, yet, quite evident.
1262
 
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the EU has started both to 
earmark considerable sums of humanitarian aid to North African 
countries and to support transfer of foreign nationals from Libya to 
their countries of origin.
1263
 Border control and surveillance policies 
were also reinforced through the mobilization of Frontex. For 
example, on 20 February 2011, after a request from Italy, the EU 
Agency deployed the Joint Operation EPN Hermes aimed at ‘assisting 
                                                 
1261
 Frontex Press Release, ‘Frontex not involved in diversion activities to Libya’, 
21 September 2009. 
1262
 Moreno-Lax 2011a. According to some, the Agency seems to recognize its 
involvement in the push-back campaign. See e.g., Judith Crosbie, ‘Frontex “may be 
helping” Italian migration policy’, European Voice, 24 September 2009 
<http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/frontex-may-be-helping-italian-
migration-policy/65936.aspx > accessed 3 January 2012. 
1263
 See Commission Press Release, ‘The European Commission’s humanitarian 
response to the crisis in Libya’ MEMO/11/143, Brussels, 4 March 2011; 
Commission factsheet, ‘Humanitarian aid and civil protection: Libya crisis’, 25 
October 2011 <http://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/2011/20110823_02_en.htm>  
accessed 20 August 2013. 
 589 
 
Italy in controlling vessels carrying immigrants and refugees’1264 and 
at ‘detecting and preventing illegitimate border crossings to the 
Pelagic Islands, Sicily, and the Italian mainland.’1265 Frontex officials 
also carried out the pre-screening of intercepted migrants, interviewed 
migrants on travel routes, and gathered information on arrival 
numbers for the purpose of developing risk analyses. The Hermes 
operation was led by Italy, which provided naval and aerial 
equipment. It was also supported by France, Germany, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and by experts coming from 11 Member States.  
Started in February 2011, the Hermes mission was then extended 
on several occasions,
1266
 and run until the end of August 2012.
1267
 In 
the effort to primarily thwart unauthorized entries by strengthening 
Europe’s border control response capability in the Central 
Mediterranean, Frontex, and the EU more broadly, have been 
criticized for not doing enough to prevent deaths at sea.
1268
  For 
instance, the uncoordinated responses to migration from North Africa 
                                                 
1264
 EU Commissioner Malmström, Statement announcing the launch of the Frontex 
operation ‘HERMES’ in Italy as of 20 February 2011, MEMO/11/98, Brussels, 20 
February 2011. 
1265
 Frontex Press Release, ‘HERMES 2011 running’, 21 February 2011, 2. 
1266Frontex, ‘Hermes Operation Extended’ 
<http://www.frontex.europa.eu/news/hermes-operation-extended-OWmwti > 
accessed 20 August 2013. 
1267
 For an analysis of the Hermes operation, see, Sergio Carrera, Leonhard den 
Hertog and Joanna Parkin, ‘EU Migration Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring. 
What prospects for EU-Southern Mediterranean Relations?’ MEDPRO Technical 
Report No. 15, August 2012, 4-5. 
1268
 Human Rights Watch, ‘EU: Put Rights at Heart of Migration Policy’, 20 June 
2011 <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/20/eu-put-rights-heart-migration-policy> 
accessed 20 August 2013. 
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and the lack of clear rules in terms of search and rescue 
responsibilities led to the death of 63 sub-Saharan Africans who did 
not receive adequate assistance by military vessels engaged in the 
patrols at sea.
1269
  
As a response to the annulment by the ECJ of the 2010/252/EU 
Council Decision, in April 2013, the European Commission presented 
a proposal for a Regulation establishing rules for the surveillance of 
the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation 
coordinated by Frontex.
1270
 However, the Meijers Committee, in May 
2013, issued a report pointing to the flaws of the new proposal, in 
particular with regard to: i) the lack of guarantees pertaining to the 
presence, in the country of disembarkation, of legal advisors and 
interpreters, as well as the availability of a remedy before an 
                                                 
1269
 See, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Report ‘Lives lost in the 
Mediterranean Sea: Who is responsible?’, Committee on Migration, Refugees and 
Displaced Persons, Rapporteur Ms Tineke Strik. See also, Jack Shenker, ‘Aircraft 
carrier left us to die, say migrants’, The Guardian, 8 May 2011 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/08/nato-ship-libyan-migrants> 
accessed 20 August 2013>. 
1270
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
‘establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of 
operational cooperation coordinated by Frontex’ (COM(2013) 197 final), 12 April 
2013. This Proposal meets some of the criticisms raised by the Council Decision 
2010/252/EU of 26 April 2010 'supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as 
regards the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of operational 
cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union.' Decision 2010/252/EU intended to reinforce the protection of 
fundamental rights and to guarantee respect for the principle of non-refoulement in 
sea operations by informing people on the place of disembarkation, establishing 
clear rules of engagement for joint patrolling and the disembarkation of intercepted 
or rescued persons in order to ensure the safety of those seeking international 
protection, and to prevent loss of life at sea. The decision was, however, annulled by 
the Court of Justice upon request of Parliament. See, CJEU 5 September 2012, Case 
C-355/10, European Parliament v Council of the European Union. 
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independent authority with suspensive effect; ii) the absence of 
provisions indicating that interception measures should be performed 
in conformity with the provisions on entry conditions and refusal of 
entry in the Schengen Border Code.
1271
 
This Section on Frontex, however descriptive, was yet functional 
to a broader understanding of the EU response to unauthorized 
arrivals by sea, land, and air, beyond the specificity of the Italian 
context. To conclude this first Part of the Chapter  - which rests on a 
punctual illustration of facts and collection of empirical material – the 
next Section will provide the reader with further information on 
Italy’s cooperation with North African countries after the 2009 crisis 
and the 2011 Arab Spring. This is to show the continued relevance of 
the legal analysis carried out throughout this Chapter with regard to 
the role of bilateral agreements for technical and police cooperation in 
hampering refugees’ access to protection, and the international 
responsibility of States engaged in joint migration controls. 
 
7.5.2. Bilateral cooperation after the Arab Spring 
Pursuant to the agreement on technical and police cooperation 
signed with Tunisia on 5 April 2011, as a bulwark against mass 
                                                 
1271
 To read the Meijers Committee Note, refer to ‘Note on the Proposal for a 
Regulation establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the 
context of operational cooperation coordinated by Frontex (COM(2013) 197 final), 
23 May 2013 <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/may/meijers-committee-note-
surveillance-external-sea-borders.pdf> accessed 20 August 2013. 
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arrivals from North Africa in 2011, Italy committed itself to supplying 
its South Mediterranean partner with twelve new and refurbished 
patrol boats, hundreds of off-road vehicles,
1272
 and 100 million Euros. 
In turn, Tunisia committed itself to patrolling its coastal waters and to 
accepting the repatriation of migrants arriving in Italy after 6 April 
2011 and removed from the country on the basis of accelerated 
identification procedures. This new cooperation with Tunisia led to a 
revival of the ‘push-back’ policy at sea already tested by Italy in 2009. 
On 21 August 2011, for example, 104 persons were collectively 
pushed back to the ports of departure by means of the classified 
agreement between Italy and Tunisia.
1273
 
As to the interdiction procedure, boats are usually sought by the 
Navy (Marina Militare), which informs the Revenue Police (Guardia 
di Finanza) in charge of controlling irregular migration and defending 
national frontiers. These two bodies coordinate with each other to 
watch over the crafts (so-called ‘targets’), check their route, their 
speed and general navigation conditions. Once a boat is observed to 
be sailing away from Tunisia, it is engaged by Navy or Revenue 
                                                 
1272
 See, Migrants at Sea, ‘Italy-Tunisia Reach Migration Agreement: 6 Months 
Residency Permits for Tunisians Already in Italy; Accelerated Return Procedures 
for Newly Arriving Tunisians’ (6 April 2011) 
<http://migrantsatsea.wordpress.com/2011/04/06/italy-tunisia-reach-migration-
agreement-6-month-residency-permits-for-tunisians-already-in-italy-accelerated-
return-procedures-for-newly-arriving-tunisians/> accessed 20 August 2012. 
1273
 Cosentino 2011. 
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Police vessels, which transfer the unauthorized passengers to Italian 
patrol boats and then to Tunisian guard ships.
1274
 
On 15 December 2011, Italy and the new Benghazi-based Libyan 
National Transitional Council (NTC) reached an agreement on the 
reactivation of the Italy–Libya Friendship Treaty.1275 In June 2011, 
they signed a new agreement to combat unauthorized flows of 
migrants to Italy. If ‘everything must change so that everything can 
stay the same’,1276 this seems to be the case after the signature of a 
Memorandum between the Italian government and the NTC. 
Negotiated in the aftermath of a violent conflict, the Memorandum 
reinstates the same terms of the accords previously concluded with the 
Gaddafi government by confirming the commitment to a shared 
management of migration through the reactivation of preceding 
agreements, including the 2007 and 2009 technical protocols. As part 
thereof,
1277
 the two parties will provide mutual assistance and 
cooperate in the fight against unauthorized migration, including 
repatriation of irregular migrants. 
                                                 
1274
 ibid. 
1275
 See, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Note, ‘Italy-Libya: Reactivation of the Treaty 
of Friendship’, 15 December 2011 
<http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Sala_Stampa/ArchivioNotizie/Approfondimenti/201
1/12/20111215_ItaliaLibiaTrattatoAmicizia.htm> accessed 3 January 2012. 
1276
 This is one of the famous phrases pronounced by the Prince of Salina in the 
1958 Novel The Leopard written by G Tomasi di Lampedusa. 
1277
 See, Migrants at Sea, ‘Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and 
Libyan NTC’ (20 June 2011) 
<http://migrantsatsea.wordpress.com/2011/06/20/memorandum-of-understanding-
between-italy-and-libyan-nct/> accessed 20 August 2013. 
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Italy and Libya have recently reiterated the desire to strengthen 
their friendship and cooperation in the control of irregular migration. 
In the oral agreement of 3 April 2012 (published only in June) 
between the Ministries of the Interior of the two countries,
1278
 
satisfaction has been expressed for the new program launched by Italy 
to train Libyan police officers in security-related fields, including 
frontiers control and leading of vessels.
1279
 The accord also provides 
for exchange of experts to fight irregular migration,
1280
 and the 
construction of the medical centre of Kufra and other reception 
facilities for unauthorized migrants, with the support of the EU 
Commission.
1281
 In Section 3, Libya commits itself to promptly 
inform Italian authorities of any issues regarding the monitoring of 
Libyan territorial and maritime borders ‘for the purpose of contrasting 
the departure of migrants from its territory (emphasis added).’ On the 
other hand, Italy engages in supplying Libya with all technical means 
and equipment to fortify surveillance of Libyan frontiers. The two 
governments also convene on the need for a revival of the activities 
for the monitoring of Southern borders by planning maritime 
                                                 
1278
 Processo Verbale della Riunione tra il Ministro dell’Interno della Repubblica 
Italiana ed il Ministro dell’Interno della Libia (Tripoli, 3 April 2012) (Oral 
Agreement Italy-Libya 2012). 
1279
 ibid Section 1.  
1280
 ibid. 
1281
 ibid Section 2. Human rights organizations have expressed their criticism 
against the Italy-Libya agreement. See, e.g., Amnesty International, ‘L'accordo 
Italia - Libia in materia di immigrazione mette a rischio i diritti umani’ (18 June 
2012) <http://www.amnesty.it/accordo-italia-libia-in-materia-di-immigrazione-
mette-a-rischio-i-diritti-umani> accessed 20 August 2013. 
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operations pursuant to their bilateral agreements and international law 
of the sea. Needless to say, the parties finally ‘commit themselves to 
respect human rights as enshrined in international agreements and 
conventions.’1282 
 
7.6. Hampering access to protection through pre-arrival 
interceptions 
Section 7.4.3 presented the whole spectrum of bilateral agreements 
for technical and police cooperation as the legal basis for interception 
and return activities performed under Libya’s responsibility, 
regardless of Italian officials’ presence on board the interdicting crafts 
placed under Libyan command. Moreover, it showed how these 
bilateral accords, implemented beyond territorial frontiers, represent a 
key component of the legal and political framework within which the 
forced return of refugees to the country of embarkation is made 
possible after interception by EU Member States, such as in the 2009 
push-backs. 
International responsibility for human rights violations may arise 
every time States exercise jurisdiction.
1283
 It is tightly related to the 
existence of a State’s obligation, and is intended to verify whether a 
                                                 
1282
 ibid Section 3. 
1283
 Marko Milanovic, ‘From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of 
State Jurisdiction in Human Rights Treaties’ (2008) 8 HRLR 411, 417. 
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certain State is liable for the violation of the obligation in point. 
Mindful of the vastness of obligations incumbent upon EU Member 
States under both the law of the sea and international human rights 
law, focus is placed here on responsibility triggered by violations of 
the fundamental principle of non-refoulement, which is closely 
correlated to the lack of access to asylum procedures and effective 
remedies for individuals intercepted at sea. 
Although the Geneva Convention is silent about its extraterritorial 
application, scholars and the UNHCR agree that ‘the ordinary 
meaning of refouler is to drive back, repel, or re-conduct, which does 
not presuppose a presence in-country’ thereby encouraging the view 
that Article 33(1) would encompass rejection at the border, in transit 
zones, and on the high seas.
1284
 While specific territorial limitations 
have been set forth in other Articles of the Geneva Convention, no 
such restriction is embodied in paragraph 1 of Article 33.
1285
 
Accordingly, the UNHCR has stressed that Article 33(1) applies also 
                                                 
1284
 See, e.g., Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 2001, 87, 110; Coleman 2009, 253; Walter 
Kälin, Martina Caroni and Lukas Heim, ‘Article 33 para 1 (Prohibition of Expulsion 
and Return (Refoulement)’ in Andreas Zimmermann (ed) The 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford 
University Press 2011) 1361, 1367; UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on the 
Extraterritorial Application of Non-refoulement, 12 para 24. See also, Goodwin-Gill 
and McAdam 2007, 246; Hathaway 2005, 339; Andreas Fischer Lescano and 
Tillman Lohr, Border Control at Sea: Requirements under International Human 
Rights and Refugee Law (European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights 
2007) 14; Moreno-Lax 2011b, 411-20. For a broader analysis on the 
extraterritoriality of the principle of non-refoulement under international refugee law 
and human rights law, see, Section 2.5 of this thesis. 
1285
 See, Roland Bank, ‘Refugees at Sea; Introduction to Art. 11 of the 1951 
Convention’, in Zimmermann 2011, 815, 833, 835. 
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beyond the territorial frontiers of a State party to the Convention.
1286
  
In some circumstances, national jurisprudence has adopted a 
restrictive interpretation of the ratione loci of the principle of non-
refoulement. For example, in a case concerning the push-back of 
Haitians who attempted to flee their country and seek protection in the 
US, the US Supreme Court refused the extraterritorial relevance of 
non-refoulement, as codified in Article 33(1) of the Geneva 
Convention.
1287
 Nevertheless, the Sale case has been harshly criticized 
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which held that 
‘that Article 33 had no geographical limitations.’1288 Likewise, in the 
Prague Airport case, the English Court of Appeal convened that Sale 
was ‘wrongly decided’ as it shall be ‘impermissible to return refugees 
from the high seas to their country of origin.’1289   
                                                 
1286
 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Haitian Centre for Human 
Rights et al. v United States of America, Decision of the Commission as to the 
merits of Case 10.675 United States 13 March 1997, para 157 (Haitian Centre 
Case). See also UNHCR, Gene McNary, Commissioner, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, et al (Petitioners) v Haitian Centres Council, Inc et al 
(Respondents). Brief Amicus Curiae of the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Refugees in Support of Respondents, October 1992, 85-102.  
1287
 See, US Supreme Court, Sale, Acting Commissioner, INS v Haitian Centres 
Council [1993] 113 (USSC) 2549. 
1288
 Haitian Centre Case, para 157. Among scholars, see, e.g., Guy S Goodwin-Gill, 
‘The Haitian Refoulement Case: A Comment’ (1994) 6 IJRL 103; Steven H 
Legomsky, ‘The USA and the Caribbean Interdiction Program’ (2006) 18 IJRL 679; 
JY Carlier, ‘Droit d’asile et des Réfugiés: de la Protection aux Droits’ (2007) 332 
Recueil des Cours de l’Acad mie de  roit International 107. 
1289
 Regina (European Roma Rights Centre) and Others v Immigration Officer at 
Prague Airport [2003] EWCA Civ 666, paras 34-35. 
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Placing our attention on international human rights bodies, it is 
possible to observe that the jurisprudence of the HRC,
1290
 the 
Committee against Torture,
1291
 and the ECtHR
1292
 - as examined in 
Chapter 2 - have increasingly confirmed the extraterritorial 
applicability of the relevant treaties when States deal with individuals 
who risk being subjected to torture or degrading treatment if handed 
over to the authorities of their countries of origin or transit.
1293
 The 
ECtHR has also clearly emphasized States’ duty to prevent 
refoulement from occurring, wherever jurisdiction is exercised.
1294
 
While the applicability of the principle of non-refoulement in cases of 
expulsion and extradition has been recognized on several occasions, 
                                                 
1290
 The HRC recognizes the extraterritorial scope of the relevant Covenant to the 
non-refoulement obligation where individuals are either within or outside the 
territory of a State party, but under the control of the State itself. This also implies a 
prohibition to ‘extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove’ a person where reliable 
grounds exist to believe that she will suffer an irreparable harm either in the 
readmitting country or in any other country to which she could subsequently be 
removed (HRC General Comment no 31, ‘The nature of the general legal obligation 
imposed on States parties’ UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, 26 May 2004, para 
12). See also, the HRC Concluding Observations on the United States of America’ 
UN Doc CCPR/C/USA/CO/3Rev. 1, 18 December 2006, para 16); Mohammad 
Munaf v Romania, 21 August 2009 Comm no CCPR/ C/96/D/1539/2006, para 14.2; 
HRC General Comment no 2, ‘The prohibition of torture and cruel treatment or 
punishment (Article 7)’ UN Doc HRI/HEN/1/rev.1, 28 July 1994, para 9; Kindler v 
Canada, Comm no 470/1991, 11 Nov 1993, para 13.2. 
1291
 According to Article 3 of the CAT, no State party can extradite, return, or expel 
a person to another State where he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 
On the extraterritorial applicability of the Convention to any territory ‘under the de 
facto effective control of the State party’, see, ‘Conclusions and Recommendations 
on the United States of America’, 1–19 May 2006, CAT/C/USA/C/2, para 15; JHA 
v Spain, 21 Nov 2008, CAT/C/41/D/323/2007; see also, General Comment 2 
‘Implementation of Article 2 by States parties’, 24 January 2008, CAT/C/GC/2, para 
6; Sonko v Spain UN Doc CAT/C/47/D/368/2008 (20 February 2012) para 10.3. 
1292
See, e.g., Medvedyev v France; Xhavara v Italy; Women on Waves v Portugal; 
Hirsi v Italy; Al Jedda v UK; Al Skeini v UK; Al Saadoon v UK. 
1293
 See, Chapters 2, 3, and 4 for a description of the relevant case law. 
1294
 See, e.g., Hirsi v Italy; Xhavara v Italy, 5; WM v Denmark App no 17392/90 
(EurComm, 14 October 1992). 
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the applicability of this principle to people intercepted on the high 
seas during offshore migration operations has been less conclusive, 
until the 2012 Hirsi decision.
1295
 In this judgment, the ECtHR held 
that there had been an extraterritorial violation of Article 3 of the 
relevant Convention on account of the fact that the applicants were 
exposed a) to the risk of ill-treatment in Libya, and b) to the risk of 
repatriation to Somalia and Eritrea.
1296
 According to the Court, Italy 
exercised a ‘continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control’ 
over the migrants found at sea,
1297
 thus upholding the same 
jurisdiction threshold applied in Medvedyev, where, however, the 
intercepted vessel was simply escorted from the international waters 
to France. 
As explained in Chapter 2, the Court’s reasoning is not exhaustive 
on this point and the Hirsi case gives room to contend that also a 
minimal control would be sufficient to engage the jurisdiction of the 
State exercising migration controls beyond borders.
1298
 Shifting thus 
emphasis from State action per se to the consequences of that action, 
physical contact does not amount to an essential requisite to engage 
jurisdiction. In this view, jurisdiction (and potentially responsibility) 
                                                 
1295
 For commentary on the Hirsi v Italy case and the application of non-refoulement 
on the high seas, see, Giuffré 2012b; Moreno-Lax 2012a; Maarten Den Heijer, 
‘Reflections on Refoulement and Collective Expulsion in the Hirsi Case’ (2013) 
25(2) IJRL 695. 
1296
 For an extensive analysis of the extraterritorial applicability of the principle of 
non-refoulement and the Hirsi v Italy case, see, Section 2.5 of this thesis. 
1297
 Hirsi v Italy, para 81. 
1298
 ibid para 79. 
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under international human rights law can also be engaged in those 
operations of looser-control at sea where State action falls short of 
arresting or detaining the individuals concerned.
1299
 Thus, actions 
such as intimating a boat to modify its course by screaming or 
steaming nearby until it is heading outside the territorial waters or the 
contiguous zone, as well as conducting or escorting the ship to a third 
country can amount to ‘effective control.’ If preventing entry to 
territorial waters does not automatically amount to refoulement, 
violations of this principle arise if the concerned persons are returned 
to the frontiers of a territory where their life and liberty can be 
seriously threatened.
1300
 Therefore, interdicting authorities shall 
always determine whether a specific third State is ‘safe, accessible, 
and reachable for the boat in question.’1301 
The Hirsi ruling also confirms States’ obligation to inform 
refugees about their rights, ensure access to asylum procedures and 
effective remedies, and assess the safety of the third country. 
Although the Geneva Convention does not expressly bind States to 
grant access to asylum procedures, such an obligation can be 
implicitly derived by the principle of non-refoulement (Article 33(1)) 
whose content and scope needs to be shaped in good faith through the 
                                                 
1299
 Roland Bank, ‘Refugees at Sea; Introduction to Article 11 of the 1951 
Convention’ in Zimmermann 2011, 841. 
1300
 For a thorough review of the case law of international human rights bodies on 
State extraterritorial obligations, see, Section 2.5 of this thesis.  
1301
 Bank 2011, 849. 
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joint reading of international refugee and human rights law 
instruments interpreted on the basis of their ordinary meaning in light 
of their object and purpose.
1302
 Therefore, not only should refugees be 
entitled to substantiate their protection claims before competent 
authorities onshore in order to dispel any risk of ill-treatment upon 
return, but, if intercepted on the high seas, they should also be 
disembarked in a safe place and receive access to fair and effective 
asylum procedures.
1303
 
This Chapter’s main conclusion is that the implementation of 
bilateral agreements on technical and police cooperation can hamper 
refugees’ access to protection—that is to say non-refoulement as well 
as access to asylum procedures and effective remedies. Indeed, as 
explained in Part I of this thesis, the enforcement of non-refoulement, 
under international refugee and human rights law, has two procedural 
consequences: the duty of the State to advise the individual in 
question about her entitlement to obtain international protection, and 
                                                 
1302
 See, in particular, Article 3 and 13 of the ECHR, Article 3 of the CAT, and 
Article 7 of the ICCPR, which have been extensively examined in Chapters 2, 3, 
and 4 of this thesis. On the interplay between refugee law and human rights law, 
see, Tom Clark and Francois Crépeau, ‘Mainstreaming Refugee Rights. The 1951 
Refugee Convention and International Human Rights Law’ (1999) 17(4) NQHR 
389. Also the EXCOM Conclusion no 95 (LIV) on International Protection (10 
October 2003) underlines the ‘complementary nature of international refugee and 
human rights law.’ 
1303
 For an extensive analysis of the extraterritorial applicability of the right to 
access asylum procedures, see, Section 3.4.1. 
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the duty to provide fair asylum procedures and an effective remedy to 
an individual.
1304
  
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR, more than other international 
bodies, has interpreted the prohibition of refoulement as requiring 
access to an effective and rigorous examination of protection 
claims,
1305
 even in extraterritorial contexts. To give an example, in 
Hirsi v Italy, for the first time, the Court recognizes the duty of the 
intercepting State to guarantee access to asylum procedures when 
refugees are intercepted on the high seas. Indeed, preventing people 
from lodging their protection claims would both heighten the risk of 
refoulement and indirectly lead to a violation of Article 3 of the 
Convention.
1306
 Along the same lines, the Court found that the 
summary return of interdicted refugees without access to an 
individualized status determination procedure and without a thorough 
and rigorous assessment of their requests before the removal measure 
was enforced amounted to a violation of Articles 3 and 13 of the 
                                                 
1304
 See, Section 3.2 and in particular, Kälin, Caroni and Heim 2011, 1395 for the 
view that non-refoulement entails an obligation to ensure access to an effective 
remedy that is available in law and in practice. According to the Committee against 
Torture, ‘the prohibition on refoulement contained in Article 3 [of the Convention] 
should be interpreted the same way to encompass a remedy for its breach.’ See, 
Agiza v Sweden, para 13.8. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR is abundant of cases 
where the notion of an effective remedy under Article 13 is interpreted as requiring 
independent and rigorous scrutiny of a claim that there exists a real risk of 
refoulement contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR. See, e.g., Jabari v Turkey, para 50. 
For further case law, refer to Section 4.4 of this thesis.  
1305
 For instance, in the Amuur v France decision, the ECtHR asserted that effective 
access to asylum procedures must be ensured also to asylum seekers retained in the 
international zone of an airport. See, Amuur v France, para 43. 
1306
 Hirsi v Italy, paras 185, 201-5. For a broader analysis on the extraterritorial right 
to access asylum procedures, see, Section 3.4.1 of this thesis. 
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Convention and Article 4 of Protocol 4.
1307
 
To sum up, since States shall fulfil these procedural guarantees 
(non-refoulement, access to asylum procedures, and effective 
remedies) also in respect of migrants and refugees found at sea,
1308
 
joint patrols of international waters carried out with the purpose of 
intercepting migrants and refugees before they are able to enter the 
territorial jurisdiction of a EU Member State, and return them to the 
port of departure, undercut the right of asylum seekers to seek and 
find shelter abroad.  
 
7.7. State responsibility beyond borders: the role of Italy in 
extraterritorial immigration controls 
 
7.7.1. Jurisdiction and responsibility compared 
This Chapter could stop at Section 7.6, which sought to answer the 
key research question this thesis intends to tackle. However, due to 
the sensitivity and complexity of the issue of extraterritorial migration 
controls, the following sections pursue the analysis further by 
exploring the emerging debate on State Responsibility under general 
                                                 
1307
 ibid, paras 205-7. On the extraterritorial applicability of the right to an effective 
remedy under the ECHR, see, Section 4.4.1 of this thesis.  
1308
 Hirsi v Italy, Concurring Opinion 44-45. See also, the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe, ‘Resolution 1821 (2011) on the Interception and Rescue at 
Sea of Asylum Seekers, Refugees, and Irregular Migrants’, paras 9.3–9.6. 
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international law in situations of bilateral cooperation against irregular 
migration. As discussed in the previous Section, the implementation 
of agreements for technical and police cooperation beyond borders 
may de facto hamper the enjoyment of essential refugee rights. 
However, it cannot automatically be inferred that EU Member States, 
which cooperate with third countries in patrolling external maritime 
borders, are internationally responsible under human rights law if 
intercepted migrants and refugees are returned to countries where 
their life is irremediably endangered. 
A prerequisite to engage responsibility under human rights law is 
that States exercise jurisdiction over persons returned to unsafe ports 
of departure as a consequence of joint patrols carried out either on the 
high seas or in the coastal waters of the country of embarkation.
1309
 
But let us assume that it is either difficult to establish whether or not a 
State exercises jurisdiction, or it can be shown that it did not exercise 
such an effective control as demanded by human rights law to 
establish jurisdiction. At this point, it would be interesting to look at 
whether there is a customary norm prohibiting refoulement, whose 
violation is governed by the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. 
Focusing on State Responsibility would enable identification of an 
internationally accountable actor, even if indirectly, whenever States 
                                                 
1309
 This point has already been examined in the course of this thesis. See, as an 
example, the Hirsi v Italy case. 
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engage in human rights violations with regard to people that do not 
fall under their effective control and authority.  
As a preliminary note, it is worth clarifying that in this context the 
study of State Responsibility is not intended to be comprehensive, but 
is limited to an overview of the kinds of liability a EU Member State 
might incur in contexts of cooperative migration control. However, I 
then move more specifically into the subject of indirect responsibility 
under Article 16 of ILC Articles, and take a definite stance on Italy’s 
possible complicity with Libya for violation of the principle of non-
refoulement while performing activities of migration control at sea. It 
would moreover exceed the scope of this Chapter to proceed with a 
comprehensive analysis of concepts such as jurisdiction, attribution, 
the different conditions to assert responsibility, and its legal 
consequences. Nevertheless, a number of specifications are needed.  
 In general international law, ‘jurisdiction’ points to the authority 
of the State to regulate the conduct of natural and legal persons by 
means of its domestic law. Such an authority, which is grounded in, 
and delimited by international law, includes both the power to 
prescribe and the power to enforce legal rules.
1310
 ‘Jurisdiction’ in 
human rights treaties is not a legal competence, but refers to a factual 
                                                 
1310
 For a distinction between prescriptive jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction, 
see, Vaughan Lowe and Christopher Staker, ‘Jurisdiction’ in Malcolm Evans (ed), 
International Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 335–6. See also, Malcolm Shaw, 
International Law (Cambridge University Press 2008) 645. 
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power that a State exercises over persons or territory.
1311
  Every time a 
State exercises this power - meant as effective control and authority 
over a territory or a person - it must protect and ensure the rights of 
the people concerned.
1312
  Moreover, doctrine,
1313
 as well as the 
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
1314
 and 
international human rights bodies, has been interpreting ‘jurisdiction’ 
as operating extraterritorially.
1315
 
                                                 
1311
 Milanovic 2008, 417. 
1312
 See, e.g., the Lopez Burgos v Uruguay case where the deciding factor in 
determining jurisdiction is not ‘the place where the violation occurred, but rather the 
relationship between the individual and the State in relation to a violation of any of 
the rights set forth in the Covenant, wherever they occurred.’ Lopez Burgos v 
Uruguay, 29 July 1981, ICCPR A/36/40 para 12.1. On the application of the 
concept of ‘functional jurisdiction’ to activities taking place beyond territorial 
frontiers, see, Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011, 124. See, Sections 2.5.3 and 2.5.3.1 of this 
thesis for a discussion on jurisdiction in extraterritorial contexts. 
1313
 Guy S Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Extraterritorial Reach of Human Rights Obligations: 
A Brief Perspective on the Link to Jurisdiction’ in L Boisson de Chazournes and M 
C Kohen (eds), International Law and the Quest for its Implementation/Le Droit 
International et la Quête de sa Mise en Oeuvre: Liber Amicorum Vera Gowlland-
Debbas (Brill 2010) 293; Marko Milanovic (ed), Extraterritorial Application of 
Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy (Oxford University Press 
2011). 
1314
 Relevant are the two judgments of the ICJ in the Wall Advisory Opinion and in 
the Congo-Uganda case where the Court held that State responsibility under human 
rights law may be engaged by States carrying out a military occupation of a foreign 
territory. See, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, ICJ Reports (2004), Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, paras 
109–111; see also, Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Democratic 
Republic of Congo v Uganda), ICJ Reports (2005), Judgment, 19 December  2005, 
paras 216, 220. In the absence of a general rule imposing the respect of human 
rights obligations only within State territory, the ILC has affirmed that acts or 
omissions attributable to a State can engage its international responsibility, 
‘regardless of whether they have been perpetrated in national or foreign territory.’ 
See, Report of the ILC on the work of its twenty-seventh session, Yearbook of the 
ILC 1975, vol II, 84. 
1315
 See, e.g., the HRC’s oft-quoted case Lopez-Burgos v Uruguay, paras 12.1–2. On 
a general note, the ECtHR has considered as a decisive element for determining 
State jurisdiction and, therefore, the application of the relevant treaty, whether a 
certain person falls within the effective control and authority of a contracting State, 
regardless of whether it is exercising public powers or not. See, e.g., Loizidou v 
Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (1995) 20 EHRR 99, paras 62–4; Cyprus v Turkey 
 607 
 
Although jurisdiction is a condition for engaging State 
responsibility,
1316
 the two concepts should not be equated. Whilst 
‘State jurisdiction’, in human rights law, is ‘a question of a State’s 
control over the victims of [human rights] violations […] or, more 
generally, control over the territory in which they are located’,1317 
‘responsibility’ refers to the liability of a State for a violation of the 
rights of a person who is within its jurisdiction. However, jurisdiction 
in international law delimits municipal legal systems of States,
1318
 and 
is an emanation of one State’s sovereignty, that is, the claim both to 
regulate its own public order, and exercise power vis-à-vis other 
States.
1319
 Unlike the human rights context - where jurisdiction is ‘a 
question of fact, of actual authority and control’1320 - in general 
international law, this power relies on legal entitlements or 
competences.
1321
 
                                                                                                                                                   
(2002) 35 EHRR 30, paras 76, 80; Ilascu and Others v Moldova and Russia (Merits) 
(2005) 40 EHRR 46, para 384; Ocalan v Turkey (Merits) (2005) 41 EHRR 985, para 
91; Issa and Others v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 27, paras 68–71; Pad and Others v 
Turkey App no 60167/00 (ECtHR, 28 June 2007) paras 53–5; Al-Saadoon and 
Mufdhi v United Kingdom (2010) 51 EHRR 9; Medvedyev v France, para 81; Al 
Skeini v UK, (2011) 53 EHRR 18, para 149; Hirsi v Italy, para 81. See also, WM v 
Denmark concerning extraterritorial non-refoulement from an embassy in the 
territory of a non-Contracting Party to the ECHR. 
1316
 Oliver De Schutter (ed), International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, 
Commentary (Cambridge University Press 2010) 124. 
1317
 Milanovic 2008, 446. 
1318
 ibid 447. 
1319
 ibid, 420; Ian Brownlie (ed), Principles of Public International Law (Clarendon 
Press 2008) 297. 
1320
 Milanovic 2008, 447. 
1321
 Sir Franklin Berman, ‘Jurisdiction: the State’, in P Capps, MD Evans and S 
Konstadinidis (eds), Asserting Jurisdiction (Hart Publishing 2003), xix. 
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The secondary rules of State responsibility concern, instead, ‘the 
general conditions under international law for the State to be 
considered responsible for wrongful actions or omissions, and the 
legal consequences which flow therefrom.’1322 In Ago’s words, ‘it is 
one thing to define a rule and the content of the obligation it imposes 
and another to determine whether that obligation has been violated 
and what should be the consequences of the violation.’1323 For this 
second aspect of responsibility proper, it would be important to verify 
what kind of responsibility could be established, under general 
international law, when States commit an international wrongful act 
while carrying out external migration controls autonomously or in 
conjunction with another actor. 
On a general note, States are responsible for any conduct of their 
organs whether they ‘exercise legislative, executive, judicial, or any 
other functions.’1324 As outlined by Article 2 of the ILC Codification, 
                                                 
1322
 James Crawford,  he International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility: Introduction, Text, and Commentaries (ILC Commentary) 
(Cambridge University Press 2002) 74. 
1323
 Roberto Ago, ‘Second Report on State responsibility, by Special Rapporteur – 
the origin of international responsibility’, Extract from the Yearbook of the ILC 
(1970), vol II, doc A/8010/Rev.l, 178, para 7(c). The dichotomy between primary 
and secondary rules of international law is not defended as correct by part of the 
doctrine. Linderfalk, for instance, criticizes the assumption that State responsibility 
can be described as separate from the ordinary rules of international law. See, Ulf 
Linderfalk, ‘State Responsibility and the Primary-Secondary Rules Terminology – 
The Role of Language for an Understanding of the International Legal System’ 
(2009) 78 NJIL 53, 72. 
1324
 Article 4(1) of the ILC Articles. Additionally, under Article 5, States may 
engage responsibility even for  ‘[t]he conduct of a person or entity which is not an 
organ of the State under Article 4 but which is empowered by the law of that State 
to exercise elements of the governmental authority …’ 
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the requirements for determining an international wrongful act are 
twofold: first, the conduct at issue must be attributable to the State; 
second, the conduct must consist of the infringement of an 
international legal obligation in force at that time for that State. 
As interception and forced return measures can assume various 
forms, identifying the exact scope of both States’ obligations toward 
refugees in the context of controls at sea, and concurrent 
responsibilities in case of infringement of these obligations, could be 
complicated. In particular, the following Sections concentrate on the 
modalities of execution of the 2009 push-backs and, more broadly, on 
the police cooperation set up by the bilateral technical Protocols 
concluded between Italy and Libya in 2007 and 2009. 
The patterns of State cooperation connected to readmission of 
unwanted migrants, who often travel along with refugees, are 
multifarious. EU countries may train the border guards of a third 
State, supply them with patrol boats, exchange police and immigration 
officers, participate with their own officials in mixed crews, intercept 
boat migrants by means of their own vessels and hand them over to 
the authorities of the country of embarkation, or delegate such 
functions directly to the third State itself. 
Since in joint migration controls, EU Member States can attract 
either direct or indirect responsibility if they disregard refugee or 
human rights, responsibility should be tackled on an ad hoc basis 
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following rules on attribution of State conduct. For the purpose of this 
thesis, the conduct that should be attributable to a EU Member State 
to establish the international wrongful act, and therefore, its 
international responsibility, would be the return of intercepted 
refugees ‘to territories where their lives and freedoms would be 
threatened.’1325 State practice, since the adoption of the Geneva 
Convention, has provided persuasive evidence that the principle of 
non-refoulement has achieved the status of customary international 
law.
1326
 As a matter of human rights law, the principle of non-
refoulement is a corollary to the prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment, or punishments, as enshrined in several 
international instruments,
1327
 such as the ICCPR and the CAT, ratified 
by both Italy and Libya.
1328
 
                                                 
1325
 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, 277. 
1326
 The customary status of non-refoulement has also been confirmed by several 
scholars, including: Kay Hailbronner, ‘Non-refoulement and ‘Humanitarian’ 
Refugees: Customary International Law or Wishful Legal Thinking?’ in D Martin 
(ed), The New Asylum Seekers: Refugee Law in the 1980s (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1988) 128–9; William Schabas (ed), Non-refoulement, Human Rights, 
and International Cooperation in Counter-terrorism (Liechtenstein 2006) 7; Geoff 
Gilbert, ‘Is Europe Living Up to its Obligations to Refugees?’ (2004) 15 EJIL 963, 
966; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007; Aoife Duffy, ‘Expulsion to Face Torture? 
Non Refoulement in International Law’ (2008) 20(3) IJRL 373, 389; Trevisanut 
2008, 218. For an opposite view, see, Hathaway 2005, 363-70. For broader 
discussion on the customary status of non-refoulement, refer to Section 2.2 of this 
thesis.  
1327
 In this vein, the jus cogens value of non-refoulement can be derived by the 
absolute prohibition on torture. Under Article 41(2) of the ILC Codification, ‘No 
State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the 
meaning of Article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.’ 
Article 40(1) refers to the international responsibility ‘entailed by a serious breach 
by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international 
law.’ 
1328
 See, Chapter 2 for an analysis of non-refoulement under human rights law. 
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7.7.2. Independent responsibility and attribution of State conduct 
to another State 
Relying on the empirical material deployed in Sections 7.2 and 7.3, 
this Section sketches out two kinds of responsibility that a EU 
Member State may incur where it is involved in a common action 
against irregular migration together with a third country. First, in the 
case of joint border controls - even when patrols have been moved to 
the territorial waters of a non-EU third country - States can be found 
independently responsible. In these circumstances, the ILC Articles 
require the conduct of State organs must be attributable to the two 
States and entail a breach of their international obligations, in casu the 
principle of non-refoulement (independent responsibility).
1329
  
A second possible scenario exists where responsibility is assigned 
to a EU Member State for the actions of the border guards of a third 
country. In this case, foreign border authorities should be conceived 
of as subsidiary organs of the EU country and executors of its 
immigration policies. Pursuant to Article 6 of the ILC Articles, 
 
                                                 
1329
 See Articles 2 and 4 of the ILC Articles. Pursuant to Article 2: ‘There is an 
internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or 
omission: (a) is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes 
a breach of an international obligation of the State.’ Under Article 4: ‘1) The 
conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under 
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any 
other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and 
whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit 
of the State. 2) An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in 
accordance with the internal law of the State.’ See also, Crawford 2002, 145–6. See 
also, Crawford 2002, 145–6. 
 612 
 
 The conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of a State by another State shall 
be considered an act of the former State under international law if the organ is 
acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the State at 
whose disposal it is placed. 
 
Acting on instructions is not sufficient to attribute conduct of a 
State organ to another State and it is necessary that the organs of the 
third country ‘act in conjunction with the machinery of that [EU] State 
and under its exclusive direction and control, rather than on 
instructions from the sending State.’1330 
Let us now try to apply the notion of independent responsibility to 
our case study. Although this kind of responsibility would be in 
principio the best suited to describe the condition of joint maritime 
operations, it is likely that Italy would not be appointed separate 
responsibility for conduct attributable to it when interception is 
conducted by vessels under Libyan command in either Libyan 
territorial waters or on the high seas. In these circumstances, Libya is 
fully competent to decide upon matters related to navigation, 
patrolling, and interception. 
By contrast, on 6 May and 30 August 2009, refugees intercepted 
on the high seas were transferred to Italian vessels, shipped to Libya, 
and handed over to Libyan authorities. Thus, the wrongful act - 
                                                 
1330
 Crawford 2002, 103. 
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consisting of subjecting returned persons to inhuman treatment and 
refoulement to countries of origin – could be separately attributed 
both to Italy and Libya. To be more specific, in the context of the 
push-backs object of the Hirsi v Italy case, no issue of complicity 
arises, as Italy autonomously conducted the operations by means of its 
own vessels and Italian personnel.  
Independent responsibility might also be invoked ex hypothesi to a 
situation in which Libyan ships enter either Italian territorial waters to 
rescue or interdict boat migrants and refugees and drive them back to 
the coast of North Africa. Indeed, the coastal State - which holds 
primary responsibility both for addressing any protection claim and 
for transporting rescued migrants in a reasonable time to a ‘place of 
safety’1331 - by authorizing the third country to intervene, exercises its 
sovereign authority. Since, under Article 33(1) of the UNCLOS, a 
State retains jurisdiction over immigration matters in its contiguous 
zone, Italy would remain primarily responsible if it authorized Libya 
to intercept migrants, including refugees, in this area.
1332
 However, if 
permission were not granted, Libya would not only violate Italian 
                                                 
1331
 Pursuant to Article 2(1) of the UNCLOS, the sovereignty of a coastal State 
extends to the territorial sea. See, generally, Trevisanut 2008; E Turco Bulgherini, 
‘Acque Territoriali e Sicurezza Marittima’ (2010) 3, Online Gnosis Rivista Italiana 
di Intelligence <http://gnosis.aisi.gov.it/Gnosis/Rivista24.nsf/servnavig/57> 
accessed 20 August 2012. See also, UNHCR Executive Committee, ‘Conclusion on 
Protection Safeguards in Interception Measures’, UN doc no 97 (LIV) – 2003, 10 
Oct 2003, para (a)(i) <http://www.unhcr.org/496323740.html> accessed 20 August 
2013. 
1332
 This is, yet, an ex hypothesi reasoning as Italy has not yet proclaimed a clear 
contiguous zone. 
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sovereignty but would also be primarily responsible for the protection 
of interdicted people.
1333
 
The application of Article 6 of the ILC Articles should also be 
excluded. Indeed, according to the 2007 and 2009 agreements 
between Italy and Libya, the latter operates within its own command 
on board of vessels supplied by the Italian government. Therefore, the 
argument that African border guards receive training, funding, 
technical equipment, and assistance cannot be utilized to consider 
African border authorities as subsidiary organs of the Italian 
government.
1334
 It remains, thus, to be seen which alternative avenues 
can satisfactorily be pursued through the institution of State 
responsibility. 
 
7.7.3. Indirect responsibility for aiding and assisting another 
State 
A State could be held indirectly accountable for an internationally 
wrongful act committed by another State by means of its ‘aiding and 
assisting’ the third country itself in performing an illicit operation 
through supportive political statements, the provision of 
                                                 
1333
 Barbara Miltner, ‘Irregular Maritime Obligations: Refugee Protection in Rescue 
and Interception’ (2006–2007) 30 Fordham Int’l LJ 75, 122–3. 
1334
 See, Den Heijer 2010a, 192–3. 
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infrastructures, technical utilities, or financial support. Under Article 
16 of the ILC Codification: 
  
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so 
if: (a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally 
wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that 
State. 
 
This provision does not tackle attribution or questions of joint and 
several liabilities since the abetting State did not itself carry out the 
conduct but assisted the conduct of another State.
1335
 As indicated in 
the chapeau to Article 16, a wrongful conduct refers to violations of 
international obligations by the assisted State, the ‘latter’, ‘which 
distinguishes the situation of aid or assistance from that of co-
perpetrators or co-participants in an internationally wrongful act.’1336 
Therefore, Article 16 ‘establishes a distinct wrong of complicity, 
independent of the wrong committed by the perpetrating State’1337  
                                                 
1335
 Report of the ILC to the General Assembly, Fifty-First Session, A/54/10 (1999) 
para 266. 
1336
 Crawford 2002, 148. For the issue of joint responsibility of several States for the 
same injury, see, Article 47 of the ILC Articles. 
1337
 ibid. For the issue of joint responsibility of several States for the same injury, 
see Article 47 of the ILC Articles. 
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that remains primarily responsible, while the assisting State has a 
purely supporting role.
1338
 
To give an example, a State may be responsible for violation of the 
principle of non-refoulement where it knowingly assists another State 
to return refugees to a place where their life or liberty might be 
threatened.
1339
  Even if the first State does not itself carry out the 
unlawful conduct, but supplies equipment with knowledge of the 
intentions of the assisted State, a strong enough link exists to establish 
complicity. Therefore, this Section, slightly departing from the 
context of the 2009 push-backs, explores whether Article 16 could be 
used to delimit State responsibility within the framework of the 
general cooperation between Italy and Libya established by the 
technical Protocols on migration control. 
It is likely that Italy engaged jurisdiction, under human rights law, 
for sending refugees intercepted on the high sea (on 6 May and 30 
August 2009) back to Libyan ports on its own vessels, in violation of 
the fundamental rights of individuals placed under its control. With 
regard to the push-backs of 6 May, the ECtHR found that Italy had 
jurisdiction and therefore responsibility for violations of the 
fundamental rights of returned persons. Diverse operational missions 
can however be performed. For instance, on the remaining occasions 
                                                 
1338
 ibid. 
1339
 Michelle Foster, ‘Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Implications of Requiring 
Refugees to Seek Protection in Another State’ (2007) 28 MJIL 223, 263. 
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in 2009, migrants and refugees were interdicted by Italian authorities 
and transferred to Libyan vessels in charge of returning them to 
Tripoli. Instead, in many other cases, which obtained less public 
attention, Libyan authorities performed interceptions directly in their 
territorial waters or on the high seas, without the intervention of 
Italian warships.  
Major attention rests on the modalities of collaboration and 
assistance deriving from the terms of the bilateral technical Protocols 
and the Partnership Treaty. For instance, under the terms of the 2007 
and 2009 technical Protocols, Libya is autonomously committed to 
sea patrols, which may result in the diversion of migrants and 
refugees to the country of embarkation under the full command of 
Libyan authorities. Article 16 of   ILC Codification does not tackle 
attribution or questions of joint and several liabilities, since the 
abetting State does not itself commit the internationally wrongful act 
but assists another State, which performs the illicit conduct.
1340
 Thus, 
as Crawford explains, ‘by assisting another State to commit an 
internationally wrongful act, a State should not necessarily be held to 
indemnify the victim for all the consequences of the act, but only for 
those which […] flow from its own conduct.’1341 
                                                 
1340
 ILC Report, para 266. 
1341
  Crawford 2002, 151. 
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Although, according to the text of the 2007 and 2009 technical 
Protocols, only Libyan authorities on board the military vessels are 
entrusted with the responsibility and the legal authority for the 
operational missions at sea, Italy has substantively supported its 
partner by providing funding, training, consultancy, as well as 
surveillance equipment. Therefore, the question is whether a certain 
threshold is reached to establish that Italy was aware that its assistance 
could be used to perform a wrongful conduct. 
Regrettably, there is little jurisprudence of help in defining the 
contours of ‘aiding and assisting’ responsibility.1342 This leaves ample 
room for interpretation. According to the ICJ, for example, it is not 
necessary that the assistance provided by the aiding State be essential 
to the commission of the international wrongful act, but it must at 
least have ‘contributed significantly to that act.’1343  In addition, the 
violation constituting an internationally wrongful conduct must 
concern the infringement of a norm that would amount to wrongful 
conduct in both States.
1344
 
A quite wide category of actions can be encompassed within the 
reach of Article 16, such as training, economic assistance, the 
                                                 
1342
 Although Article 16 of the ILC Articles is not strictly relevant for the Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro case (Genocide Convention Case), the 
ICJ takes the opportunity to make some considerations on the concept of ‘aid or 
assistance’ (ICJ judgment of 26 February 2007, paras 420–4). 
1343
 Crawford 2002, 149. 
1344
 ibid. 
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provision of confidential information,
1345
 as well as political or legal 
aid, even in the form of treaties employed to facilitate the 
performance of the illicit act.
1346
 As the scope ratione materiae of 
Article 16 is so vast, the mental element has been interpreted very 
restrictively.
1347
  If on the one hand, it can be presumed that a State is 
aware of the circumstances making the conduct of the assisted State 
internationally wrongful, it is also true that configuring such a 
responsibility is not an easy task. Indeed, the threshold for 
establishing indirect responsibility is very high, and the process of 
proving that that aid or assistance has been intentionally given ‘with a 
view to facilitate the commission of the wrongful act’ would be 
cumbersome. 
The mental element requirement still remains a hotly debated issue 
because of the problems of representing a State as an entity able to 
formulate conscious decisions.
1348
 Moreover, in order to avoid 
responsibility, a State could intentionally avoid making public 
                                                 
1345
 James Crawford, ‘Second Report on State Responsibility’ (1999) Yearbook of 
the ILC vol II (part I) 50, n 349. 
1346
 Bernahrd Graefrath, ‘Complicity in the Law of International State 
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Helmut P Aust, Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility (Cambridge 
University Press 2011) 192-230. 
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Mixed Messages and International Law’ (2009) 58 ICLQ 1, 10. 
1348
 Maarten Den Heijer, ‘Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum’ (PhD Thesis, 
University of Leiden 2010) 94.  
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pronouncements stating its will.
1349
 Taking into account the difficulty 
in determining the state of mind of a State, such a strict mental 
requirement would also lead to the exclusion of those cases where 
States commit international wrongful acts not from a desire to violate 
human rights, but because they implicitly accept the risk that breaches 
of fundamental rights may occur while pursuing different and less 
harmful objectives.
1350
  Rather than focusing on the mental reasons 
driving State action, greater attention should be drawn on the 
assessment of whether the assisting State was aware that its assistance 
would be put to wrongful use. 
Conversely, the ILC is very keen to emphasize that a high 
threshold must be met, otherwise international responsibility could be 
triggered anytime a State engages in bilateral cooperation with a third 
country.
1351
 It has, thus, stressed that the ‘eventual possibility’ that a 
wrongful act could derive from a State’s assistance is not sufficient to 
establish the link between the facilitating act and the wrongful 
conduct.
1352
  Rather, it is to be proved that an accomplice State aided 
                                                 
1349
 On the difficulty of inferring intention, and therefore complicity, from public 
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1351
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1352
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another country by accepting, with knowledge of the facts, the serious 
risk that wrongful acts would be committed.
1353
 
 
7.7.2.1. Italy’s responsibility for ‘aiding and assisting’ Libya? 
In light of the above, what rests to be explored is whether by 
assisting Libya in patrolling its territorial and international waters to 
intercept and return migrants and refugees to a territory where their 
life could be irremediably endangered, Italy acted with full knowledge 
of the circumstances in which its aid or assistance would be used. 
Providing assistance that facilitates only occasional wrongdoings 
should not be sufficient to raise the threshold of State responsibility to 
a level falling within Article 16 of the ILC Articles.
1354
 
It cannot be argued that this was the case with the Italy–Libya 
cooperation in migration control. Indeed, in 2009, 834 persons were 
returned to the port of departure, within the framework of a well-
organized policy, over the course of nine separate operations, during 
which migrants and refugees were handed over to the Libyan 
authorities after their interception on the high seas by Italian vessels. 
Push-backs, frequently repeated over six months between 6 May and 
6 November, were carried out in a systematic fashion with the 
approval of both governments. On several other occasions, after the 
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entry into force of the 2009 Executive Protocol, Libyan officials 
interdicted irregular migrants and refugees heading to Europe, in their 
territorial waters or on the high seas, without the intervention of 
Italian vessels.
1355
 Unfortunately, keeping track of the number of 
people halted and returned to Libya before they could encounter the 
authorities of a EU Member State is practically impossible. 
Despite the transfer of the maritime operations to Libyan 
authorities, and the attempt to keep the details of ‘anti-immigration 
activities’ classified, a great deal of information on the treatment of 
migrants in Libya, and the form of its cooperation with Italy, is in the 
public domain. As explained in Section 7.2 of this thesis, Italian 
officials were always on board the vessels used to ship migrants and 
refugees back to Libya, or to transfer passengers to Libyan crafts. 
They thus had full knowledge of the circumstances, and were fully 
aware that intercepted refugees were terrified of being returned to 
Libyan guardianship.
1356
  In this respect, there is room to presume not 
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only that Italy was conscious of the ‘eventual possibility’ of the 
harmful use of its aid but, more decisively, that it knew its aid would 
be put to wrongful use. 
The Italian overarching intent to outsource its responsibilities for 
migrants and refugees, by supporting Libya in its role of watchdog of 
Europe’s gateways for the containment of irregular migration by sea, 
has been corroborated by the numerous public and official statements 
from both the Italian and Libyan governments.
1357
  It has also been 
confirmed by factual data and by the conclusion of bilateral 
agreements establishing a detailed framework for mutual cooperation. 
For example, over the last decade, Italy assisted Libya on a regular 
basis with the provision of funding, vessels, satellite devices, 
technical equipment for patrolling land and maritime borders, night-
vision devices, binoculars, all terrain vehicles (ATV), life boats, and 
sacks for the transportation of corpses.
1358
 It also provided training for 
border officials, confidential information, consultancy, money for 
                                                                                                                                                   
<http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2010/09/15/news/finanziere_mazara-7088107/> 
accessed 20 August 2013. 
1357
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both the construction of reception centres
1359
  and charter flights both 
to return irregular migrants from Libya to source countries,
1360
 and to 
transfer police officers stationed at Libyan diplomatic and consular 
offices to work on migration issues.
1361
  
In order to infer that the assistance provided by Italy to Libya falls 
in toto under the scope of Article 16, it should be demonstrated that 
aid and assistance were intentionally given ‘with a view to facilitate 
the commission of the wrongful act’ by Libya, and that the 
accomplice State accepted with full ‘knowledge’ of the facts the 
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serious danger that a wrongful act would be carried out.
1362
 Such 
conduct would include the violation of the customary principle of 
non-refoulement, which also enjoys a peremptory status as corollary 
to the prohibition of torture. 
Is it, therefore, possible to assume that Italy knew or could 
reasonably expect - at that material time - that a real risk existed of 
migrants and refugees being returned to the territory of a country 
where they could suffer torture, or other inhuman and degrading 
treatment? If so, Italy can potentially be held accountable for assisting 
Libya in violating the principle of non-refoulement. Indeed, refugees 
are notoriously victims of torture and inhuman treatment in Libya, and 
are exposed to the risk of onward expulsion to their countries of 
origin.
1363
 
As confirmed by the ECtHR in the Hirsi judgment, not only Italy 
‘could not ignore’ the treatment reserved by Libya to migrants and 
refugees, but it also had an obligation to proactively find out the real 
situation of migrants and refugees before proceeding with their 
expulsion.
1364
 Numerous reports by international organizations and 
NGOs depicted the grievous treatment of irregular immigrants in 
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Libya at the material time in which push-backs took place.
1365
  It 
follows that Italian authorities, in full knowledge of the facts, exposed 
intercepted refugees to inhuman and degrading treatment by removing 
them to Libya, which, inter alia, did not offer any guarantees against 
repatriation to Somalia and Eritrea.
1366
 According to the Court, ‘it was 
for the national authorities, faced with a situation in which human 
rights were being systematically violated […] to find out about the 
treatment to which the applicants would be exposed after their return.’ 
This positive obligation to acquire knowledge before carrying out a 
certain action in tandem with a third State might also influence the 
way in which complicity can be established. 
Immediately after the first push-back operation, both the European 
Commission
1367
 and several human rights organizations raised 
concerns about such practice by both urging the Italian government to 
stop forced return, and by highlighting the disturbing conditions in 
which migrants and refugees are compelled to live once in Libya—a 
country that does not have a national asylum system in place,
1368
 is 
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not party to the Refugee Convention,
1369
 and does not even recognize 
the existence of refugees in Africa.
1370
 Moreover, Italy should have 
known that Libya used to indiscriminately repatriate irregular 
migrants and refugees to countries of origin by means of bilateral 
readmission agreements: indeed, in 2004, the European Commission, 
after a technical mission to Libya, had collected and published 
statistics on returns.
1371
  Additionally, the 2009 Protocol explicitly 
requires Italy to assist Libya in boosting migrants’ repatriation. Thus, 
Italy should also have known the risks migrants and refugees would 
be exposed to, even if the command and direction of the operations 
had been entirely delegated to Libya. 
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In the circumstance of pre-border controls jointly carried out by 
Italy and Libya or by Libya alone, the conditions posed by Article 16 
of the ILC Articles appear to be fully met. They are summarized as 
follows: first, however complicated the process of detecting the 
intention of a State is, the mental element of the Italian government 
seems to have reached a threshold sufficient to trigger its indirect 
responsibility. As required by paragraph a) of Article 16, to be 
internationally responsible, an aiding State should have acted ‘with 
knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act.’ 
Not only does Italy’s intention to return migrants and refugees to an 
unsafe country patently emerges from the pronouncements and 
practice of the Italian government,
1372
 but Italy was also able to base 
its safety appraisal upon an enormous variety of available information 
concerning the human rights situation in Libya. 
Second, an unequivocal link exists between the facilitating act and 
the subsequent wrongful conduct. Although the provision of training, 
technical equipment, and funding does not amount per se to an 
unlawful practice, Italy’s indirect responsibility can, nonetheless, be 
inferred from its assistance to refugees’ return to Libya with full 
knowledge of the systematic human rights violations migrants and 
asylum seekers would suffer in the recipient country. Considering that 
Italy is obliged under international law to abide by the fundamental 
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principle of non-refoulement, cooperating with Libya in returning 
migrants and refugees to a territory where they would suffer inhuman 
and degrading treatment also satisfies paragraph b) of Article 16 
requiring that ‘the act would be internationally wrongful if committed 
by [the assisting] State.’ 
 
7.8. Concluding remarks 
Push-backs to Libya were conducted between May and November 
2009 without serious consideration of both the risk of refoulement and 
the lack of effective asylum legislation in the readmitting country. 
Italy’s independent responsibility under international law could, 
hence, potentially be invoked, especially in those cases where it 
executed interception and accompaniment operations using its own 
vessels. Externalization of migration controls on the part of EU 
Member States may generally entail a hazardous shift of responsibility 
to third countries, which are often mischaracterized as ‘safe’ without 
in fact offering asylum seekers safeguards comparable to those 
available within the EU.  
This Chapter primarily sought to demonstrate that, although 
‘readmission’ of intercepted migrants does not readily follow from the 
text of bilateral agreements for technical and police cooperation 
between Italy and Libya, these instruments are used to entrust a non-
EU third country with the command and responsibility of patrol and 
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return operations, which are generally carried out in international 
waters or in the coastal waters of the third country itself. Since their 
purpose is to avoid evasion of migration controls by transporting 
unauthorized migrants back to the ports of departure, these activities 
of maritime border control tend to prevent ab initio EU Member 
States from exercising jurisdiction. 
The 2009 push-backs of migrants and refugees do not have a clear 
legal basis, as can be seen in the incongruent arguments provided by 
the Italian government. Nonetheless, their content is vague enough to 
open the way to any kind of collaboration between Italy and Libya in 
what they call ‘anti-immigration activity.’ This study has two main 
findings. First, it proves that the wide-ranging series of accords 
between Italy and Libya – including the 2007 and 2009 agreements 
for technical and police cooperation and the 2008 Partnership Treaty – 
constitute the multifaceted legal and political scaffold supporting the 
practice of interdiction and deflection of undocumented migrants and 
refugees to the ports of embarkation.
1373
 Second, the actual 
implementation of these arrangements can hamper refugees’ access to 
protection—the overarching concept, including non-refoulement and 
access to asylum procedures and effective remedies in the EU 
Member State the intercepted refugee strove to reach. 
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Bearing in mind that the customary principle of safety of life at sea 
should always be respected, in the case of the 2009 push-backs, 
migrants and refugees interdicted by Italian authorities on the high 
seas were not granted the right to access onshore asylum procedures, 
or to challenge the refusal of entry, but were taken on board in 
international waters off Sicily in order to be returned directly to 
Libya, where well-founded reasons existed to presume that their life 
and liberty would be threatened.
1374
 When migration controls are 
entirely shifted to a third country, no chance exists for a EU Member 
State to monitor the fate of intercepted migrants and refugees. This 
Chapter shows, therefore, how international human rights law 
complements State obligations under the law of the sea by 
‘[importing] an additional legal meaning to the term “place of safety” 
for the disembarkation of rescued migrants.’1375 
International human rights bodies have made clear that 
extraterritorial jurisdiction does not rely on competence and legal 
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entitlements, but on factual authority and control,
1376
  even in cases 
where bilateral agreements tend to blur jurisdiction and responsibility 
by displacing the theatre of action beyond territorial frontiers. 
However, EU Member States that cooperate with third countries in 
patrolling external maritime borders are not always responsible under 
human rights treaties. When migrants are directly halted by the 
authorities of the country of embarkation in its territorial waters or on 
the high seas and driven back to the ports of departure, refugees are 
prevented from entering the sphere of jurisdiction of a EU Member 
State. 
Considering that very complex operational situations may be put 
into motion, a case-by-case approach is the most suitable strategy to 
determine the degree of involvement of a EU Member State in the 
performance of external migration controls. Core norms under 
international refugee and human rights law shall be applicable in 
every offshore operational context, regardless of whether non-EU 
third countries patrol and divert intercepted migrants and refugees 
autonomously or in conjunction with a EU Member State. Thus, the 
last Section of the Chapter contends that Italy could engage indirect 
responsibility, under Article 16 of the ILC Articles, for its ‘aiding and 
assisting’ Libya in infringing a primary human rights obligation (non-
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refoulement) through the unlawful containment of irregular migration 
by sea. 
In this respect, the multifaceted framework of economical and 
technical support delivered to Libya by the Italian government, its 
innumerable pronouncements in favor of the return praxis, its positive 
obligation to assess Libya’s safety before enforcing expulsion, as well 
as its failure to heed the recommendations of human rights 
organizations to stop removals to Libya, despite the wide availability 
of reliable information describing the miserable human rights 
situation of migrants and refugees in that country, corroborate the 
view that the mental element of the Italian government reached a 
threshold sufficient to potentially trigger its liability. 
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Chapter 8.  Conclusion 
 
8.1. On the intertwining between agreements linked to 
readmission and refugee rights 
The central concern of this thesis was to develop the concept of 
agreements linked to readmission and thereby examining whether the 
implementation of these agreements may hamper refugees’ access to 
protection in Europe. The wording ‘agreements linked to readmission’ 
has therefore been used to grasp the plethora of bilateral accords 
concluded by EU Member States with third countries both for 
smoothing the forced return of irregular migrants with no title to stay 
any longer within their territory, and for preventing arrivals by 
outsourcing or off-shoring migration controls.  
As knots on a thread, readmission agreements, diplomatic 
assurances, and agreements for technical and police cooperation have 
been hitherto analysed in sequence both to shed light on their main 
features and tease out a number of situations in which their actual 
implementation undermines core refugee rights. This study has been 
triggered by the assumption that States increasingly tend to connect 
asylum with the fight against irregular immigration, thus often 
myopically adopting asylum measures driven by strict border control 
considerations.  
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These final pages will draw together all the main findings and 
suggestions proposed, and thus summarize the concluding remarks. 
The key question this thesis aimed to address was whether the 
implementation of bilateral agreements linked to readmission can 
undermine refugees’ access to protection. ‘Protection’ is here 
understood as the combination of the right to non-refoulement, 
foundational principle of refugee law, and two correlated procedural 
entitlements, namely, the right to access asylum procedures and the 
right to an effective remedy, before return. In view of providing a 
substantive answer to this crucial issue, three sub-questions were 
examined in this study. They concerned: first, the content and scope 
of the right to non-refoulement, as well as the right to access asylum 
procedures and effective remedies before return; second, the 
relationship between agreements linked to the readmission of 
unauthorized migrants and the decision to return refugees to countries 
of origin or transit; third, the extent to which the text of bilateral 
agreements linked to readmission can be deemed compatible with 
core refugee protection standards, as enshrined in the main 
international refugee and human rights law treaties. 
In reconstructing the meaning of core refugee rights, Part I of this 
thesis explored, through the lens of international human rights and 
refugee law, the content and scope of the relevant protection standards 
binding EU Member States each time that they deal with refugees’ 
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admission and readmission. Occasional reference was made to EU 
law, especially the CFR, which, after the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty lies at the heart of the Union human rights paradigm. 
Because of the vastness of the issue concerning the obligations of 
States under international and European law in the frame of 
immigration controls, the emphasis of Part I drew on the right to non-
refoulement, and the right to access asylum procedures and effective 
remedies before removal. These rights are described as overarching 
terms whose full meaning can be better shaped through the use of 
different international refugee and human rights instruments, which 
require EU Member States to comply with a number of obligations 
every time they decide to return an asylum seeker apprehended either 
within the country or at the border of the host country. In addition, 
some international instruments (in primis the ECHR) more clearly 
than others recognize these obligations to apply also when migrants 
and refugees are intercepted outside the territorial jurisdiction of the 
would-be destination State.  
With regard to the relationship between agreements linked to 
readmission and the return decision, my conclusion is that none of 
these three categories of bilateral arrangements constitutes per se the 
legal basis for the return of irregular migrants and asylum seekers to 
third countries. Decisions to remove an individual, refuse asylum, or 
exclude her from protection are not taken by States by means of one 
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of the selected agreements linked to readmission. However, they all 
facilitate the enforcement of the return orders and, to a greater or 
lesser extent, influence the choice of the host, or would-be host State 
to transfer unauthorized/unwanted foreigners to the authorities of a 
third country, thus hampering, in certain circumstances, refugees’ 
access to protection, that is to say the combination of the right to non-
refoulement and the right to access asylum procedures and effective 
remedies.  
The quick answer to the question on the compatibility of the text of 
agreements linked to readmission with refugee rights is that no 
noteworthy issue of inconsistency seems to rise. Readmission 
agreements constitute purely administrative tools serving the purpose 
of smoothing the final stage of the return procedure for irregular 
migrants, rejected refugees, and asylum seekers whose claims will be 
examined elsewhere. They do not define criteria for the legality of a 
person’s presence in a EU Member State, as this assessment is made 
by national authorities in compliance with domestic administrative 
law and the procedural safeguards enshrined in international and EU 
law. Similarly, diplomatic assurances for the fair and human treatment 
of the deportee tend to be very detailed, especially when formalized 
within written standardized MoUs. Finally, ‘readmission’ of 
intercepted migrants and refugees does not readily follow from the 
text of bilateral agreements for technical and police cooperation, 
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which are aimed to combat irregular migration to Europe through a 
system of joint patrols with the country of embarkation.  
The seeming compatibility of the text of agreements linked to 
readmission with refugee rights is inherent to their personal scope of 
application. Indeed, these instruments are specifically designed to 
tackle only the return of irregular migrants. However, mixed flows 
are a fait accompli. Asylum seekers can be returned by means of a 
readmission agreement on a ‘safe third country’ ground, or can travel 
onboard the same boat along with other undocumented migrants 
intercepted at sea. In practice, the lives of these two vulnerable 
categories of foreigners are so intertwined that any analysis limited to 
assessing the compatibility of the text of agreements linked to 
readmission with refugee rights - without considering how their actual 
implementation also involves people seeking asylum - would be an 
insufficient and short-sighted one.  
Therefore, with regard to the main research question on the impact 
of agreements linked to readmission on refugee rights, three key 
points need to be highlighted here. First, the fact that readmission 
agreements do not offer the legal basis for return decisions, as argued 
by Coleman in 2009, is not, in my view, the end of the story. Indeed, 
in situations of informal border controls and emergency, the existence 
of a readmission agreement may boost the use of swift and 
accelerated identification and return procedures with the risk of 
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removing asylum seekers, as unauthorized migrants, to allegedly ‘safe 
third countries.’ Second, the actual negotiation of diplomatic 
assurances in concrete situations does not only violate the principle of 
confidentiality of asylum applications, but it can also influence return 
decisions to countries where there is a risk of torture and inhuman and 
degrading treatment. Access to protection might therefore be 
hampered, in particular if assurances are exchanged with regard to 
asylum seekers sent to ‘safe third countries’ before an examination of 
their asylum claims is completed. Third, the implementation of 
bilateral agreements for technical and police cooperation aimed to 
intercept and return migrants and refugees to ‘unsafe’ countries of 
embarkation, before they are able to enter the territorial jurisdiction of 
a EU Member State and claim asylum, de facto undermines refugees’ 
access to protection.  
From the foregoing, it emerges that the enforcement of bilateral 
agreements linked to readmission can jeopardize the right to non-
refoulement, the right to access asylum procedures, and the right to an 
effective remedy before return. This result is not, however, uniform 
but assumes various degrees of intensity according to the right under 
consideration, the agreement at hand, as well as the time and place of 
application of the agreement itself—that is to say the point in which 
the State encounters the refugee. Therefore, studying all these accords 
as part of the overarching ‘agreements linked to readmission’ concept 
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does not only give us the possibility of unveiling their similarities and 
their common purpose – that is facilitating the return and readmission 
of unauthorized/unwanted foreigners to countries of origin and transit 
- but also, the opportunity to disclose their divergences and their 
altered paths. At the same time, getting to the end of this research 
journey, I can feel to conclude that there is more communality 
between these three categories of agreements than expected, in 
particular with regard to the negative impact they might have on 
refugees’ access to protection. Having stated that, such an impact is 
mutable, and as a consequence, the follow up to the analysis varies 
from accord to accord. 
 
8.2. The way forward 
This conclusive Section will provide a general assessment of the 
three categories of agreements linked to readmission by summing up 
the main points of interest for this subject. To start with, I do not seek 
to question the States’ entitlement to both exercise their sovereignty 
and control their borders, even by means of bilateral cooperation with 
third countries. The argument is rather that EU Member States must 
always guarantee the rights of asylum seekers falling under their 
jurisdiction, whether they are found within their borders, at the border, 
or outside their borders. The crucial point is that EU Member States 
should not cooperate on migration control with entities that do not 
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abide by the law. The ECtHR emphasized this concept in Al-Saadon v 
UK by holding that ‘it is not open to a Contracting State to enter into 
an agreement with another State which conflicts with its obligations 
under the Convention.’1377 
 In relation to the way forward in the return/readmission process, 
and considering the different traits of the selected agreements, I have 
made a number of recommendations that may help States ensure a 
better protection of the rights of refugees subjected to a formal or 
informal return decision. First, diplomatic assurances – whether 
framed or not within MoUs - should not be considered reliable when 
issued by governments that practice torture in a systematic manner, 
have previously infringed similar undertakings,
1378
 or notoriously fail 
to investigate the allegations of prohibited treatment against other 
detainees.
1379
 
Second, where EU Member States engage in the negotiation of 
arrangements on extraterritorial migration control with third countries, 
they shall ensure that sufficient guarantees toward refugees are in 
place. This might imply the insertion, within the text of so-called 
agreements for technical and police cooperation, of specific clauses 
                                                 
1377
 Al-Saadoon v UK, para 138. 
1378
 In the Agiza v Sweden case, for example, the Committee against Torture held 
that Egypt could not be relied upon by Sweden because it had already breached 
other clauses in the assurances, such as fair trial. 
1379
 Toumi v Italy para 53. See also, Ryabikin v Russia App no 8320/04 (ECtHR 19 
June 2008) para 119. 
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designed both to exclude asylum seekers from the personal scope of 
application of the accords and to ensure that they can express the 
reasons of their fear to return. However, echoing Al-Saadoon, I also 
believe bilateral agreements for technical and police cooperation 
should not be negotiated with countries that produce the largest 
numbers of refugees, or with transit countries that are notoriously 
known for the poor treatment meted out to migrants and refugees on 
their territory.   
Third, as readmission agreements do not generally include separate 
provisions on refugees, I consider an added value the insertion of both 
non-affection clauses and procedural human rights clauses creating 
extra safeguards for asylum seekers running the risk to be removed as 
unauthorized migrants, to allegedly ‘safe third countries.’ To this end, 
this thesis make a number of concrete proposals of draft provisions as 
a platform for further discussion among legal scholars and policy-
makers.   
I am confident the analysis developed in this work with regard to a 
number of case studies can be extended to the same categories of 
agreements negotiated by EU Member States with other third 
countries to govern the return of unauthorized/unwanted migrants to 
States of origin or transit. Considering the role that law can play in 
promoting refugee rights, the suggestions developed throughout this 
thesis can foster continuous progress in refugee protection and 
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improve the understanding of readmission agreements, diplomatic 
assurances, and agreements for technical and police cooperation, 
which often lack of both transparency and a comprehensive account.  
In Chapter 5, I argue that the insertion of non-affection clauses and 
itemized procedural human rights clauses within the text of future 
bilateral readmission agreements should be positively considered if 
we want to see them acting as effective conditionality tools. Despite 
the costs deriving from a drafting process that gives centrality to 
human rights, I argue that the alternative of incurring in international 
responsibility for violating the non-refoulement obligation following 
the implementation of a readmission agreement would definitively be 
more troubling. Beyond enhancing legal certainty for governments 
and frontier authorities, non-affection clauses and human rights 
procedural safeguards would moreover present the advantage of 
making fundamental rights part of ordinary business and bilateral 
cooperation, rather than principles merely subject to specialized 
human rights instruments, thereby emphasizing the implicit 
acceptance by both parties, during return operations, of a ‘human 
rights acquis.’  
Chapter 6 involves diplomatic assurances within the broad 
category of agreements linked to readmission. The bombing attacks in 
September 2001 and July 2005 constituted a turning point in the 
strategic approach of the US, the UK, and their allies more generally, 
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to national security, by reinforcing cooperation with countries of 
origin of ‘dangerous radicals.’ However, I am of the view that 
balancing arguments weighing up national security and the rights of 
foreigners should not be used to excuse derogations from fundamental 
human rights, such as non-refoulement to torture and inhuman 
treatment.
1380
 Moreover, as earlier explained, I question the reliability 
of diplomatic assurances issued by governments that practice torture 
in a systematic manner, even if the deportee has been elevated to a 
case of high diplomatic significance. In a context in which the 
removal of suspected terrorists to unsafe countries has become highly 
a politicized issue, likely to be subjected to electoral interests 
myopically pandering to the xenophobic or panic-stricken reactions of 
public opinion, restating the salience of human rights as justiciable 
obligations becomes all the more urgent.  
Chapter 6 also seizes a worrisome anomaly of the deportation with 
assurances system, namely that States deem pointless requesting 
assurances against torture from countries other than those that 
notoriously practice it. In the vicious circle created by security-related 
Memoranda, torture becomes, therefore, the prerequisite for keeping 
out certain countries from the arena of cooperation on the safe 
removal of third country nationals, but at the same time, and 
paradoxically, the conditio sine qua non for this cooperation. As 
                                                 
1380
 On this point, see, Guy S Goodwin Gill, ‘Current Challenges in Refugee Law’ 
in Gauci, Giuffré and Tsourdi 2014, 19. 
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Prometheus' liver, eaten by a giant eagle all day long, became whole 
again during the night - in an endless cycle - similarly the 
combination diplomatic assurances/torture is set to ever-regenerate the 
same dilemmas and the same hurdles, as an irreconcilable oxymoron. 
Chapter 7 collects and analyses both instances of State practice and 
the agreements for technical and police cooperation between Italy and 
Libya. In my view, such a review is not only of value in itself, but 
also, the results could serve as a point of reference in similar cases for 
courts and tribunals, as well as legal practitioners and policy makers. 
Joint offshore migration patrols carried out through bilateral 
agreements between a EU Member State and a third country have 
become increasingly attractive because of the presumption that States 
can be divested of their refugee and human rights law obligations by 
moving beyond their territorial frontiers. However, in light of the 
current drive toward reinvigoration of these cooperation agreements, 
this work aims to enhance EU governments’ awareness that they 
cannot be divested of both their previously-contracted human rights 
obligations and their international responsibility (either direct or 
indirect) every time they offshore, or outsource, migration controls to 
the authorities of a third State. 
 
Continuing to dig deeper into this topic, and as a next step, I 
identify four strands of enquiry on issues that remain unresolved in 
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this thesis, or continue to be unsettled in international law. First, 
doctrine should continue exploring the concrete meaning of the 
‘effective control’ element as a facet of the concept of jurisdiction. 
Such a study would help lawyers, judges, and State authorities clearly 
establish whether, beyond any coercive conducts imposed on a person 
through the use of direct force, jurisdiction under human rights law 
can be engaged also when less intrusive measures entailing operations 
of looser-control at sea are in place.   
Second, scholarship should more thoroughly address the issue of 
the legal status of diplomatic assurances. Such a research would 
contribute to provide an answer to three interrelated questions: i) 
whether diplomatic assurances are mere political commitments to act 
toward certain agreed ends, without any legally binding effect; ii) if 
so, why States need to frame their human rights commitments within 
bilateral political agreements, which replicate standards that have 
already been enshrined within international human rights treaties; and 
iii) whether such a reliance on bilateral diplomatic assurances can 
defy the protection of fundamental rights, in primis the prohibition of 
torture, inscribed within international human rights treaties.  
A third strand of enquiry could be directed to developing the 
debate on the different kinds of responsibility arising from joint 
operations of migration control involving States as well as 
international organizations. I refer in particular to the study of joint 
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responsibility under Article 47 of ILC Articles, whereby several 
States can be held directly responsible for the commission of the same 
wrongful act. A connected question concerns how responsibility can 
be determined - from the perspective of both international and EU law 
- when the EU itself, through its organs and/or agencies, such as 
Frontex, operates in extraterritorial settings of migration control. As a 
fourth point, future research is needed to keep monitoring State 
practice of territorial and maritime borders control to ascertain 
whether diplomatic assurances and other types of formal or informal 
agreements are utilized both to prevent migrants and refugees’ 
admission in Europe and to facilitate their return to countries of origin 
and transit. 
 
To conclude, this thesis aims to develop the concept of 
readmission as a broad notion encompassing diverse cooperative 
arrangements of migration control. It reveals, additionally, the baleful 
impact readmission policies at times may have on refugees’ access to 
protection, in particular the right to non-refoulement, as well as the 
right to access asylum procedures and effective remedies before 
return. Despite the fact that asylum is an intensely political topic and 
one which States tend to adopt through draconian measures so as to 
stop irregular migration and remove unwanted foreigners, this study 
shows to what extent international human right law and refugee law 
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‘exercise control’ over State action both within or beyond borders. It 
also pulls together areas of law and policy that are generally 
considered neatly distinct, and therefore unrelated also in a temporal 
sense. Return and readmission have indeed been studied vis-à-vis 
refugees’ access to protection, in search of a link that at face value 
appears overly remote. However, a fully-fledged analysis intertwining 
legal and practical issues reveals how in certain operative scenarios, 
especially in situations of extraterritorial migration controls, 
admission and readmission tend to overlap and answers are more 
convoluted than expected. It is this complexity that invites for 
continued scholarly and legal attention. 
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